

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Volume XXX

1968



PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
TORONTO, CANADA

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED
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Subscription \$ 10.00 a Year

Mediaeval Studies does not accept books for review

Printed at
IMPRIMERIE UNIVERSA, WETTEREN BELGIUM

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Ignatius Eschmann, O.P., 1898-1968	L. K. SHOOK, C.S.B.	v
A Question by Peter Bradlay on the "Prior Analytics" . . .	EDWARD A. SYNAN	1
Immobility and Existence for Aquinas	JOSEPH OWENS, C. Ss. R.	22
The Liberal Arts in the Sermons of Garnier of Rochefort . .	NICHOLAS M. HARING, S.A.C.	47
Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes . . .	MAJID FAKHRY	78
Lupus of Ferrières: Carolingian Scribe and Text Critic . .	ROBERT J. GARIÉPY, JR.	90
Two Latin Poems against the Friars	A. G. RIGG	106
The Altercatio Phyllidis et Florae as an Ovidian Satire . . .	ROBERT S. HALLER	119
"Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesiae": A Quaestio Disputata of Francis Caraccioli	E. JAMES LONG	134
Ockham and Some Mertonians . .	JAMES A. WEISHEIPL, O.P.	163
On Rhetoric in Fourteenth Century Oxford	R. J. SCHOECK	214
Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent	ANTON C. PEGIS	226
English Prose Style from Alfred to More: A Bibliography . .	JAMES R. BENNETT	248
Pedagogus Abbatum Ordinis Cistercii	COBURN V. GRAVES	260
Current Trends in Mediaeval Bibliography: A Progress Report	DONALD FINLAY	339
Report of a Thesis Defended at The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Robert of Flam- borough, Liber Poenitentialis	J. J. FRANCIS FIRTH	342

MEDIAEVALIA

Methods in the Study of Old English in the Sixteenth and Seven- teenth Centuries . . .	MICHAEL MURPHY	345
Lanugage and Theme in the Towne- ley Magnus Herodes . . .	CHARLES ELLIOTT	351
Wolfram's Lapsit Exillis (Parzival, IX, 469) . . .	CHARLES R. DAHLBERG AND PETER SALUS	354



IGNATIUS ESCHMANN, O.P., 1898-1963

IGNATIUS ESCHMANN, O.P.

1898-1968

IGNATIUS (Karl Theodor) Eschmann, O.P., professor of philosophy in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies since 1942, died on April 11, 1968 in Wellesley Hospital, Toronto. His funeral was conducted in St. Basil's Church by Reverend Carl A. Piepenbreier, O.P., of Cincinnati, delegate of the Very Reverend Friederich Quatmann, O.P., provincial of the Cologne Dominicans; the homily was delivered by Reverend Laurence K. Shook, C.S.B., president of the Pontifical Institute. Interment was in Holy Cross Cemetery, Toronto.

Karl Theodor Eschmann was born in Dusseldorf, Germany, November 13, 1898, son of Karl Eschmann, a Railway District Supervisor (d. 1952) and Anna Buschmann (d. 1939). He had one brother, Dr. Hans Eschmann, musician, of Dusseldorf. Father Eschmann received his early education in Dusseldorf where he completed his classical training in the summer of 1916 at the Royal Prussian Hohenzollern-Gymnasium. He went directly from the gymnasium to the trenches where he served as a machine-gunner until the end of the war. He was in his own words a faithful if unenthusiastic soldier. He remembered the trenches for the rigours they imposed and for the unusual background they provided for his careful reading of the *Confessions of St. Augustine* which was done in them.¹

Following his honorable discharge from the army in November 1918, Theodor entered the Dominican novitiate. A year later, May 19, 1920 he made his first religious profession, taking the name Ignatius. Later in the same year, Frater Ignatius went to the Angelicum University in Rome for his philosophical and theological studies. He was ordained to the priesthood on July 12, 1925, at the end of second year theology. Between 1925 and 1929 he completed his theology and went on with graduate studies and research. In 1928 he was granted his lectorship and some time afterwards began to teach in the Angelicum. He continued his studies in Rome,

¹ From this distance, how ironic to observe that in the same year, 1916, Étienne Gilson, also a machine-gunner, but in the French army, was taken prisoner by the Germans and that while in prison he read intensively St. Bonaventure's *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* and wrote also an article subsequently published in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* (1917), pp. 524-546.

Vienna and Berlin, taking his doctorate in philosophy in the early thirties. He was professor of philosophy at the Angelicum and a regular reviewer of books for *Angelicum* until 1936.

By the time he left Rome in 1936, Father Eschmann had become convinced of the importance of a controlled textual knowledge of the medieval theologians but especially of St. Thomas, and he had acquired a familiarity, unsurpassed in these times, with the provenience of the real and putative works of the angelic doctor. Also characteristic of Eschmann as a theologian in the thirties was his firm position on the essential unity of theology which he found so real in the great medieval treatises and so little in evidence in the main 16th century collections with which he had by this time also become familiar. This took him at a relatively early date into an analysis of changing and developing moral doctrine. He came to distrust newer legalist and casuist approaches which he found weighted down by both the understandable desire on the part of their authors to protect the mentally and morally weak and by the less understandable desire to legislate back into existence a world that never was.

Father Eschmann returned to Germany in 1936 when the country was immersed in National Socialism. It was his assignment, after the appearance of *Mit brennender Sorge*, March 4, 1937, to read and expound the explosive encyclical from Catholic pulpits. He carried out this apostolate with such vigour and penetration that he was arrested by the civil police and incarcerated in Cologne. He passed 1937-1938 in the municipal prison subject to hardships and indignities so trying to one of his unusually sensitive temperament. Upon his release in the autumn of 1938, he passed a few weeks of recuperation in Bavaria, then, shortly before the year's end, emigrated to Canada.

Father Eschmann's first home in Canada was with the Dominicans in Ottawa where he worked with Father Regis and others on the Ottawa edition of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas. He first visited Toronto in 1939 when he and Father Regis came to the Institute Library to check references and to consult. During 1939-1940 he accepted an invitation to join the faculty of philosophy of Laval University in Quebec City. During this year his mother died in Dusseldorf. His attempts to communicate with his father and brother through an American friend (the United States was not yet at war with Germany) led to a misunderstanding with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This episode, coupled with an academic controversy with some of his Laval colleagues led to his withdrawal from Laval and his subsequent joining of the faculty of the Toronto Institute. His first full year in Toronto was 1942-1943, and Toronto remained his home for the rest of his life, broken only by occasional visits to give courses at the Institut d'Études Médiévales in Montreal and on

two or three special occasions (after becoming a Canadian citizen in December 1945) to revisit Dusseldorf and Cologne.

Father Eschmann has spent 26 years with the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. He has generously maintained a busy schedule of lectures, seminars, and thesis-directing, becoming as completely identified with the Institute as any of its founding faculty. His publication has been incisive, valuable, but not copious. His prison experience in Cologne and two somewhat acrimonious controversies, combined to make him chary about academic utterances which, given his temperament, appeared aggressive and challenging in a milieu of post-tridentine theology and school philosophy. Among his colleagues and students he will be remembered, as already indicated, for his advanced stand on the unity of theology; he will also be remembered for other positions dynamically defended: that the human act is moral in its totality, that *Formgeschichte* is a *sine qua non* in the editing and interpreting of texts, and that medieval political theories have significance for the "modern instance."

Father Eschmann's academic post at the Institute has always been in philosophy. To his colleagues, however, and to most of his students he has been a supreme theologian. His case argues that the currently-discussed problem of the proper relation between philosophy and theology will in the days ahead be more easily solved at the human than at the statutory level. An anomaly of the present situation in theology and philosophy is that men like Eschmann who have long resisted legalistic theology and long resisted classroom Thomism should themselves sometimes be eschewed along with the diseases they so properly diagnosed.

Typical of Eschmann's classroom manner is the following passage from an unpublished lecture: "Moral theologians have managed to eliminate wisdom from moral science and consequently from human life. Uneasiness about moral instruction without wisdom is growing every day. Concrete morality cannot be pre-cooked, canned, and sold ready for use at the spiritual grocer's. Handy stores for merchandising moral groceries and moral hardware have been too long among us. No one should try to spare us the trouble, or deprive us of the satisfaction, of conducting our life on our own account and our own responsibility. Practical wisdom is precisely the intellectual-moral virtue which functions for this purpose — for the purpose of forming the mature mind, the human and moral personality." Wisdom, Eschmann has always maintained, is more pertinent to the human condition even than moral instruction. A favourite text of his was the anomalous if not ambiguous Proverbs 19, 27: "Give up listening to instruction, my son, and ignoring what knowledge has to say." Unmitigated Eschmann, some will say; unmitigated Thomas, too, will say others!

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A Question by Peter Bradlay on the "Prior Analytics"

EDWARD A. SYNAN

THIS disputed question on a problem from the *Prior analytics* is one of two works that we can ascribe to a Balliol master, Peter Bradlay. His other, more extensive, work is a series of eleven disputed questions on the *Categories*, an edition of which appeared in the last volume of *Mediaeval Studies*.¹ Both works have been preserved in the same manuscript, Gonville and Caius 668 *, fols. 1^r-8^v plus a slip, and fols. 30^r-33^v respectively; the present question is the fifth component of a codex that collects 'questiones locales date a diversis magistris' (fol. 174^r) and it is one of two components that deal with problems arising from the *Prior analytics*, the other a series of twenty questions, fols. 76^v-117^r, by Richard of Campsall.² Since the same scribe has written both works by Bradlay (as well as nearly the whole codex), and a uniform editorial policy has been followed in editing them both, here it will suffice to refer the reader to the edition of the questions on the *Categories* and to note a few anomalies that might otherwise give him pause. Despite his expertise, the scribe rode with a loose rein in spelling and capitalization; his punctuation is inadequate for our purposes. It bothered him not at all to write 'inprotrahi' and 'in protrahi', 'identitas' and 'yidentitas', 'aparere' and 'apparet', 'hora' and 'ora' in a single sentence; a sport of nature is for him 'monstruum in natura'. His capital letters are rare and capriciously bestowed; 'Huic', 'Contra', and even 'Ad' vary his customary minuscules. When Bradlay worked on the *Categories* he gave more than a hint that he knew the views of Duns Scotus on univocity without sharing them;³ here he has defended, as did Scotus,⁴ an Aristotelian commonplace in formal logic, namely, that where a syllogism has been formulated correctly, a false conclusion argues a false premiss, and that by necessity. So tightly organized is the tradi-

¹ E. A. Synan, "Master Peter Bradlay on the 'Categories'," *Mediaeval Studies* 29 (1967) 273-327.

² See my edition of this text, *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, Volume I, (Toronto, 1968).

³ *Ed. cit.*, pp. 273, 274.

⁴ *Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, (Paris, 1891) II, 182: Utrum possibile sit, quod ex falsis sequatur verum.

tional syllogism that it can be tested indirectly as well as directly: from the opposite of one member, juxtaposed with another, the opposite of the remaining member can be inferred.⁵ This necessitating pattern of internal relationships makes the rule at stake a truly commonplace one, but Bradley has brought to the issue an ingenious and varied armament that reveals much more of his world than the formal logical relation he had chosen to exhibit and to defend.⁶

It was a world of professionalism in debate. A scholar faced deceptive verbalizing,⁷ formal fallacies,⁸ and opponents who were not ashamed to deny that the best known authors had made their best known statements unless you thought to bring the book along: 'non potest alio modo argui contra talem nisi portando librum'.⁹ When the book had been examined, Avicenna's *Sufficientia*, for instance, Bradley might think it right to use a vocabulary somewhat different from that of the Subtle Doctor, even where in substance they were at one: 'natura neque intendit universale seu commune, neque singulare'¹⁰ seems to confuse the universal with the common nature, still: 'unum tantum aliquid primo intenditur, et id nec est simpliciter universale, nec simpliciter singulare, sed medium'.¹¹ A sleight of hand artist might make what one knew to be a sound coin look counterfeit: 'scis esse verum denarium, faciat iugulator aparere falsum denarium per artem suam'.¹² Bradley's world was composed of contraries,¹³ of four elements and of the 'corpus quintum'.¹⁴ Material and accidental components of the cosmos are in flux, but these entail the corruptibility of individuals only; essential and formal constituents of the world endure and it is on these that the stability of species, and of the world as a whole, depends.¹⁵ The essence of Socrates is a composite of matter and form, but

⁵ See Aristotle, *Prior analytics* II, 9; 60a 35-60b 2; for a reference to this procedure by Bradley, see below, par. 2.

⁶ This armament includes 'rules': 'ad alicuius superioris (sequitur alicuius inferioris)', par. 30, 'ab inferiori ad superius (valet illatio)', par. 45, 'si conclusio sit falsa, antecedens est falsum', par. 48, the conception of syllogism as an instance of 'consequentia', par. 48, as well as the extra-logical materials suggested in what follows.

⁷ The difficult verb 'feri', pars. 14-17, 52; can a disputation survive interruption by moments of silence by one or both disputants? pars. 34-38, 63; is 'nego me esse asinum' a negative? pars. 39-40, 64; 62.

⁸ Pars. 2, 14; 50; 54; 55; 59.

⁹ Par. 19.

¹⁰ Par. 18.

¹¹ Par. 53.

¹² Par. 25.

¹³ Par. 31.

¹⁴ Par. 69.

¹⁵ Pars. 12, 69.

the essence, for all its compositeness, is susceptible of intellectual analysis;¹⁶ on the plane of natural philosophy, man is composed, of course, of flesh and bones.¹⁷

Beyond the world of nature and of her agents,¹⁸ Bradlay saw grounds for metaphysical discourse. He does not shirk discussion of 'esse completum', that is, 'tota essentia',¹⁹ and, unless the scribe has betrayed him in failing to write 'esse existencie', he puts beside essence an 'esse existere'.²⁰ Where being reigns, nothing is excluded²¹ and an illustration of what is thus excluded might be a line, at once longer and shorter, for what can be said of this except: 'est unum nichil, quoniam nec est, nec esse potest' ?²²

QUESTIO 1 DISTINCCIO 5 QUESTIO PRIMA SUPER SECUNDUM *priorum*¹

<C> circa librum *priorum* queratur unum commune, quod videtur esse regula philosophi in *prioribus*, istud videlicet: utrum, conclusione existente falsa, et premissis eiusdem sillogismi existentibus determinate qualitatis et non repugnantibus, necesse sit maiorem esse falsam vel minorem ?²

I

1 quod non ostendo sic: sequitur: hoc iudicas esse denarium falsum; et hoc est denarius verus; igitur, denarium verum iudicas esse denarium falsum. hec conclusio est falsa et maior est vera, et similiter minor, quod patet, posito isto casu: quod iudices istum denarium esse denarium falsum, demonstrato denario vero, et quod nescias utrum sit denarius verus. maior tunc est vera, certum est, demonstrando id quod iudicas, et minor est vera, quia demonstratur denarius verus, per casum.

¹⁶ Par. 65.

¹⁷ Pars. 31, 60.

¹⁸ Pars. 18, 19, 53, 69.

¹⁹ Par. 57.

²⁰ Par. 58 and note 15 on its text.

²¹ Par. 59.

²² Par. 51.

¹ Heading is written across top margin, fol. 30r; column a, lines 1-10 are the last lines of questions on Priscian, of which the *explicii* is: respondebitur ubi materia ista planius pertractabitur. *Expliciunt questiones date a magistro thoma chirmister in opus preciani*. The work of Bradlay, edited here, is a single question, despite the heading 'questio 1' that suggests more than one, and it constitutes the fifth item in the collection of logical questions extant in Gonville and Caius MS 668*.

² For the 'unum commune', a 'regula philosophi,' see *Prior analytics* II, 2; 53b 4-10, ed. Laurentius Minio-Paluello, (Bruges-Paris, 1962), p. 94, ll. 7-8: Ex veris ergo non est falsum syllogizare; for Aristotle's argument, *ibid.* 53b 12-25, *ed. cit.* p. 94, ll. 11-23 and 57a 36-37, *ed. cit.* p. 104, ll. 11-12.

2 similiter, minor est vera, si demonstratur denarius verus; volo, igitur, demonstrare denarium verum, et sic, minor vera, et maior vera, et conclusio falsa. huic dicitur quod in isto discursu est fallacia accidentis. Contra: oppositum maioris non stat cum opposito conclusionis et minore, igitur, discursus bonus. assumptum patet quia ista plane repugnancia, 'nullum denarium verum iudicas esse denarium falsum' et 'hoc est denarius verus' et, tamen, quod hoc non iudicas esse denarium falsum quia in minore demonstratur per se suppositum subiecti in maiore, quia demonstratur denarius verus, per casum.

3 similiter, si hic esset accidens,³ in optimo sillogismo expositorio esset accidens, cum hic arguatur expositorie.

4 similiter, in ista 'nullum denarium verum, et cetera', fit distributio pro eo quod demonstratur in minore primi sillogismi, quia ibi demonstratur denarius verus, per casum, et, per consequens, ex ista et minore primi discursus sequitur oppositum maioris primi discursus et ita, primus discursus bonus.

II

5 *Aliud principale*: sequitur: omnia inparia sunt plura quam duo; duo sunt inparia; igitur, duo sunt plura quam duo. minor patet (30^r a/b) quia duo sunt duo numeri ternarii, igitur sunt duo numeri impares et ita sunt duo inparia. huic negatur minor et hec similiter: duo sunt numeri impares, ita sequitur: sunt duo ternarii, igitur sunt numeri impares. Contra: sequitur: concedis istam: 'duo sunt inparia', igitur tu bene respondes ad istam, quod, tamen, non sequeretur si hec esset falsa.

6 similiter, hec est vera: aliqui duo numeri impares sunt numeri quia aliter nulli numeri impares essent, et sequitur: igitur aliqui numeri sunt duo numeri impares, igitur hec vera: sed non plura quam duo sunt duo numeri impares, quia sic, plura quam duo essent duo et, per consequens, duo essent plura quam duo, quod est propositum; igitur hec est vera: 'duo sunt duo numeri impares', igitur, sunt numeri impares, et ultra, igitur, duo sunt inparia. Ad primum: negatur prima consequentia. Contra: sequitur: concedendam hanc, igitur concedendam hanc, et hec est concedenda a te, et ultra, igitur, bene respondes ad hanc. huic: negatur prima consequentia. Contra: sequitur: concedendam hanc, propositione prima demonstrata, igitur quodlibet consequens ad hanc est concedendum a te; sed hec est consequens ad hanc, demonstrando se ipsam, igitur, si concedendam hanc, hec est concedenda a te, et si hec est concedenda a te, et hanc concedis, tu bene respondes ad hanc.

³ That is, the fallacy of accident, as urged above, par. 2.

7 similiter, si non sequatur: 'concedendam hanc, igitur hec est concedenda a te', tunc, concessa ista que prius, si proponatur tibi conversa huius, ut hec: 'inparia sunt duo' non proponitur tibi concedendam a te, nec distinguendam 'proponitur tibi', nec dubitandam, igitur, negandam a te qua ratione hec erit neganda et, per consequens, hec est neganda: 'duo sunt inparia', quia convertitur et ita, hac concessa, hec est neganda.

8 similiter, a quolibet concedente antecedens est suum consequens concedendum, et sibi est suum consequens concedendum quia, qui concedit antecedens habet concedere consequens, igitur, si aliquis concedit istam: 'duo sunt inparia', consequens huius est concedendum ab eo, scilicet, 'inparia sunt duo' et, per consequens, ab eodem istud est concedendum: 'duo sunt inparia', igitur.

9 amplius, si concedendam hanc: 'duo sunt inparia', hec est concedenda a te, ex hoc, igitur, antecedente concedis hanc. sequitur hec copulativa 'concedendam hanc, et hec est concedenda a te' quia utraque pars sequitur; de prima non est dubium, et probatum est de secunda, et ad hanc copulativam sequitur: 'tu bene respondes, igitur, et cetera'.

III

10 *Aliud principale*: sequitur: omne <quod> potest esse due res extra animam, potest esse aliud a se; sed eadem res una numero extra animam potest esse et cetera; igitur, et cetera. minor patet quia eadem quantitas numero potest esse due quantitates numero. huic negatur minor et, similiter, sua probatio. Contra: eadem linea numero potest esse due linee numero quia (30^r b/30^v a) protrahatur una linea; hec linea, que est inprotrahi, potest esse maior linea et minor linea, igitur due linee numero, quia eadem linea numero non est maior et minor. assumptum patet nam linea, que est inprotrahi in pariete, potest terminari in hac parte parietis, significando partem in medio parietis; hec etiam linea inprotrahi, eadem numero, potest terminari ad aliam partem parietis citra illam partem in medio, igitur potest esse linea maior et minor. consecuencia patet ad sensum.

11 huic dicitur quod nulla linea potest protrahi. Contra: hic conceditur unum manifeste falsum cum sensus sit ad oppositum et preter hoc in nullo vitat argumentum quia possibile est protrahere figuras; volo, igitur, esse inprotrahendo unam figuram ubi prius, ut in pariete; tunc, hec figura, que est inprotrahi, potest terminari hic, et citra, et ultra; igitur potest esse maior figura et minor figura, et ita due res extra animam. huic conceditur quod potest terminari in qualibet parte parietis, et conceditur quod potest esse figura maior et figura minor, sed non sequitur quod potest esse due res extra animam. Contra istud: hic conceditur impossibile quia, si hec figura,

que est inprotrahi, potest terminari ubicunque protrahens voluerit, igitur hec figura potest esse triangulus quia non conquestat antequam fecerit triangulum — et sic potest esse omnes species figure et ita una figura potest esse omnes figure, et sic socrates posset esse omnes homines. Contra aliud: si hec figura potest esse maior figura et minor figura, et maior figura et minor figura sunt due figure, aliter idem esset maior et minus seipso, igitur potest esse due res extra, igitur et cetera.

12 similiter, secundum istud, idem posset esse totum et pars eiusdem totius quia figura que terminatur in medio est totum respectu figure terminate citra medium, et hec que est inprotrahi potest terminari utrobique per concessum; igitur et cetera.

13 similiter, idem terminus numero posset esse infiniti termini et, per consequens, infinite res extra animam — quod est propositum principale. assumptum patet ex concessio, quia hec linea inprotrahi potest terminari in qualibet parte parietis, igitur terminus eius potest esse quelibet pars parietis, et non habet nisi unum terminum cum sit una figura, igitur idem terminus potest esse infiniti termini, quia tot termini potest esse quot sunt partes parietis, et sic eadem res numero, diverse res numero — quod est propositum principale et prius, tamen, negatum.

IV

14 aliter probatur hec conclusio adhuc: eadem res numero et cetera. esto quod socrates fiat albus, hec est vera: 'socrates fit aliquid' quia fit socrates albus; aut, igitur, (30^v a/b) fit socrates aut alia res a socrate; non socrates, quia socrates est socrates, nec alia res, quia sic erit alia res a socrate et erit socrates; certum est, igitur, erit due res extra animam. huic dicitur negando istam 'socrates fit aliquid', posito primo casu. Contra: sequitur: fit socrates, igitur fit aliquid, quia socrates albus est aliquid. Huic: negatur consequentia. Contra: hoc quod est socrates albus in predicato non confunditur per hoc verbum 'fit' quia sic hec esset impossibilis: 'socrates fit homo'; sit socrates suppositum futurum 'hominis' quia, si 'fit' confunditur, sequeretur quod socrates fit omnis homo; predicatum, igitur, in prima stat disiunctive pro suppositis; igitur, inferri potest ex quolibet, nisi ponatur fallacia accidentis hic sicut prius. conceditur totam usque ad ultimam consequentiam. Contra: sequitur: 'socrates fit socrates albus, igitur socrates fit hoc aliquid', demonstrando socratem album, 'et ultra, igitur, fit aliquid'. huic: negatur ultima consequentia, sed sequitur: 'igitur, fit aliqual'.

15 similiter, prima non valet, hec, scilicet: 'socrates fit albus, igitur fit hoc aliquid', demonstrando socratem, set sequitur: 'igitur fit hoc aliqual'. Contra: modo conceditur propositum prius negatum, quia, si

socrates fit hoc aliquale, aut igitur hoc aliquale quod est socrates, quod non est dandum quia socrates est quodlibet aliquale quod est socrates et non fit id quod est, aut hoc aliquale quod non est socrates et ita fit hec res que non est socrates, demonstrando hoc aliquale, et ita socrates erit hec res que est socrates, et hec res que non est socrates, et sic, res alia a socrate.

16 similiter, ista stant simul: 'fit hoc aliquale' et: 'tamen non fit aliquid'.

17 similiter, hec est vera: 'socrates albus fit socrates' et ex hac sequitur: 'igitur, aliquid fit socrates' aut: 'igitur, socrates aut res alia a socrate', et sic redit primum argumentum.

V

18 Preterea, aliquid primo intenditur a natura, et id erit aliqua res extra animam; igitur, erit universale vel singulare, quia quidlibet est universale vel singulare; et id idem erit alia res ab universali vel singulari; igitur, erit due res extra animam. assumptum patet, nam natura neque intendit universale seu commune, neque singulare, per avicennam in *physica* sua in principio;⁴ igitur, id quod intenditur neque erit hoc neque illud. huic diceret aliquis⁵ quod avicenna non dicit hoc.

19 Contra: quod hoc sit verum potest probari per rationem, sed quod avicenna dicit hoc non potest probari nisi per librum, quoniam ibidem probat quod non intenditur commune primo, ut patet intuenti; non enim, per ipsum ibidem, intenditur hoc commune quod est 'animal' nec⁶ quod est 'corpus', nec aliquod singulare signatum, quia sic, ipso destructo, destrueretur ordo eius. si iterum dicatur quod avicenna non dicit istud, non potest alio modo argui contra talem nisi (30^v b/31^r a) portando librum, unde, sic posset responderi negando omnia dicta aristotelis. per rationem: ostendo quod nec intenditur primo universale nec singulare ab agente naturali, ut a socrate generante; non universale quia socrates in generando non primo intendit producere speciem, quoniam sic, accio sua esset frustra, cum species precessit suam accionem et ita nichil produceret de novo; nec

⁴ *Avicennae Opera Philosophica* (Venice, 1508) *Sufficientia*, Liber primus, Capitulum I, fol. 13^r C: Non enim exigitur a natura facere animal absolute: vel corpus absolute: sed ut sint nature specialium: et cum natura specialium habuerit esse in singularibus fiet aliquod individuum. Ergo hoc intenditur: ut natura specialium faciant esse aliqua individua in sensibilibus: non autem intenditur hoc individuum expresse signatum: sed in natura particulari que propria est ipsi individuo...

⁵ See below, par. 53, for paraphrase of the text available in Avicenna against a putative opponent, 'aliquis', who might deny its existence.

⁶ Maug. nec.

singulare quia nec hoc nec illud, quia, si hoc primo intenderet, quocunque alio producto, illud esset monstrum in natura et frustra produceretur quia non fuit intentum ab agente naturali, et ita per rationem patet quod nec intenditur primo universale nec singulare.

VI

20 *Aliud principale*: omne quod est album est illud quod non est species; species est album; igitur, et cetera. conclusio est falsa et maior vera et minor vera quia, sic dicto: 'qualis est homo?' bene respondetur quoniam est albus, sed sic respondens concedit aliquid esse album; aliquid tunc conceditur esse album, aut igitur illud de quo queritur aut aliud. si aliud, tunc non responsum ad questionem quia, si queratur: 'an homo sit albus?' et respondeatur quod aliud ab homine est album,⁷ in nullo respondetur ad quesitum. si illud concedatur esse album de quo queritur, et queritur de communi, igitur conceditur commune esse album, et ita species est album. huic dicitur quod, sic dicto: 'qualis est homo?' non queritur de alico; Contra: hic aliquid queritur nam aliter non esset questio, igitur de alico queritur.

21 similiter, sic dicto: 'qualis est homo?' bene respondetur quoniam est rationalis, et in antecedente queritur de homine, igitur consimiliter in alia questione queritur de homine quia de eodem queritur hic et ibi; quod hic fit questio de homine patet nam aliter concedens hominem esse rationalem non concederet rationale inesse ei de quo querebatur.

22 similiter, id quod est demonstrabile de alico est queribile de eodem; sed rationale est demonstrabile de homine; igitur, est queribile de eodem. minor satis patet quia hec est conclusio demonstracionis — omnis homo est rationalis.

23 similiter, aliter nichil esset quesitum de subiecto demonstracionis, nec posset queri quia, si de subiecto demonstracionis posset queri sua passio sic: 'utrum homo est rationalis?' tunc queritur rationale hic de alico, et non de alico singulari 'hominis' quia nec de socrate nec de platone, et cetera, quia sic bene posset responderi ad questionem dicendo quod socrates est rationalis, sed per socratem non potest responderi quia eadem ratione per platonem, et ita esset respondendum simul per omnia singularia; queritur igitur hic rationale de specie 'hominis' et cum respondens affirmative ad istam debet concedere id de quo queritur esse rationale, et queritur de specie, igitur hec est concedenda: 'species est rationalis' nec valet dicere quod ad primam questionem, scilicet: 'qualis homo?' potest

⁷ Em. MS: albus.

responderi per aliquod singulare (31^r a/b) 'hominis' quia nec per socratem nec per platonem quia non bene respondetur sic: 'socrates est albus'.

VII

24 *Aliud principale*: omne quod scivisti esse non socratem fuit non socrates; socratem scivisti esse non socratem; igitur, et cetera. conclusio est falsa et maior vera et minor vera. probacio: quia sequitur: istum hominem scivisti esse non socratem, demonstrando eum qui est socrates, igitur socratem scivisti esse non socratem. antecedens patet nam, antequam hec vox 'socrates' inponeretur socrati scivisti istum hominem esse non socratem quia scivisti ipsum esse aliquid et non scivisti ipsum esse socratem; igitur scivisti ipsum esse non socratem.

VIII

25 *Aliud principale*: omne quod iudicatur a te esse verum creditur a te esse verum; sed aliquid, cuius oppositum scitur a te esse verum, iudicatur a te esse verum; igitur, aliquid, cuius oppositum scitur a te esse verum, creditur a te esse verum. conclusio est manifeste falsa et maior est vera, esto quod iudicas sicut potes et scis; et minor est vera quia pono talem casum, qui est satis possibilis, et videtur ad visum: possibile est quod eundem denarium iacentem in manu tua, quoniam scis esse verum denarium, faciat iugulator aparere falsum denarium per artem suam; isto facto, quantamcunque bene iudicas, iudicabis istum esse falsum denarium, quia hoc apparet visu, et certum est quod scis istum esse verum denarium; iudicas, igitur, hoc esse verum: 'iste denarius est falsus denarius' et, tamen, tu scis quod iste denarius non est falsus denarius quia scis quod est verus denarius.

IX

26 Preterea, omne quod est album est id quod non est nigrum; hoc est album, demonstrato nigro; igitur, et cetera. conclusio falsa et maior vera et minor.

27 similiter, quia accipiatu aliquam tabula alba possibile est inducere nigredinem per artem, tota albedine manente, ut patet ad sensum. hac nigredine inducta, esto quod nescies de albedine; concederes istam tabulam esse nigram, et non es⁸ obligatus, igitur hec est vera: 'hec tabula est nigra'

⁸ Em. MS: est ob(liga)tus; as emended, text seems to mean that a debater could concede the apparently true statement that the table is black; he does not know of its permanent, underlying, whiteness, nor is he 'obligated', i.e. under a conventional agreement made in this debate such

et: 'hec tabula est alba'. probacio: arguo sic, quod potest esse albam, sine quod erit albam, et non per albedinem inductam de novo, id est, albam quia talem erit albam per albedinem inductam; sed hec tabula erit alba et non per albedinem inductam; igitur, hec tabula est alba. minor patet quia, expulsa nigredine, potest tota albedo que prius manere et, illa albedine, est tabula alba, nulla alia inducta de novo sed sola nigredine expulsa.

<quod> istud est verum ad sensum non est dubium. si negetur maior, Contra: si hoc erit album, albedine que est in hoc ita quod nichil albedinis adquiratur de novo, igitur albedo in hoc ita complete et secundum quodlibet esse est nunc in hoc secundum quod postea erit in hoc; igitur, si postea denominabit subiectum, nunc denominare (31^r b/31^v a) potest hoc, quia expulsio nigredinis nichil inducit de albedine.

28 similiter, albedo est in hoc secundum suum esse completum quia tantum secundum illud esse denominari potest suum subiectum et secundum esse quod habet in hoc denominavit et denominabit hanc tabulam, et nigredo est in hoc secundum esse completum quia aliter hec non esset nigrum; sed ista, secundum sua esse completa, contrariantur; igitur, contraria in eodem subiecto.

X

29 *Aliud principale*: quodlibet totum est si quelibet eius pars est; hoc est totum, demonstrando hoc aggregatum 'homo albus'; igitur, hoc totum est si quelibet eius pars est. conclusio est falsa et premissae sunt vere. falsitas conclusionis patet, esto quod nullus homo sit albus, et quod aliud ab homine sit album, tunc homo albus non est quia res significata per istum totum non est et, tamen, utraque eius pars est quia res significata per utramque partem est, cum homo est, et album est.

XI

30 *Preterea, aliud principale*: tantum socrates, vel aliud a socrate, non est socrates; et 'a' convertitur cum isto disiuncto; igitur, 'a' non est socrates. conclusio est falsa et premissae vere; minor est vera, esto quod 'a' significat idem quod hoc disiunctum: 'socrates, vel aliud a socrate', et maior est vera quia sequitur ex hac vera: 'tantum socrates non est socrates'; dicitur

as would prevent his conceding either one of the contradictory statements, the first of which he would make in answering according to appearances, the second of which he would make if the underlying whiteness were known to him; compare this with the remarks of Richard of Campsall, in the same codex, fol. 106^v a: si utrumque istorum <tu sedes, tu non sedes> tibi ponatur, cum diversum positum faciat diversam disputationem, oportet quod unum istorum sustineatur in una disputatione, et aliud in alia... si obligatus ad ista duo posita, concedat repugnancia...

quod conclusio est vera, Contra: sequitur: 'tantum "a" non est socrates, igitur quidlibet aliud ab "a" est socrates, cum quidlibet aliud ab "a" est socrates, vel non est socrates'. consequens falsum, igitur antecedens. si concedatur consequens, Contra: ex consequente sequitur quod socrates sit aliud ab 'a' per conversionem, et ultra, igitur socrates est aliud a socrate vel non socrate quia 'a' significat et convertitur cum predicato consequentis, et ultra; igitur socrates est aliud a socrate quia ad alietatem superioris et cetera.

XII

31 *Aliud principale*: omne corruptibile corumpitur; species est corruptibilis; igitur, species corumpitur. conclusio est falsa cum species sit incorruptibilis et maior vera est et minor patet sic: species componitur ex contrariis, igitur est corruptibilis. consequentia patet quia omne compositum ex contrariis est corruptibile. antecedens patet quia hec species 'homo' sic diffinitur a naturali: homo componitur ex carnibus et ossibus, et omne tale componitur ex calido et humido et, per consequens, ex contrariis. istud confirmatur nam totum universum est corruptibile, sumpto toto categorice, igitur quolibet species est corruptibilis. antecedens patet nam hoc totum est corruptibile, demonstrando universum integratum quia iste ignis est pars huius totius, et istum ignem possibile est corumpi, quo corrupto, non manet totum prius demonstratum quia nullum compositum ex isto igne et ex alio quocunque manet, et ita hoc totum, nam non est.

XIII

32 *Aliud principale*: omne quod vixit per etatem que minus duravit est minoris etatis quam id (31^v a/b) quod vixit per etatem que per plura tempora duravit; sed, qui vixit per 10 annos est huiusmodi quoniam etas sua per pauciora tempora duravit quam etas qua qui vixit per unum annum; igitur, est minoris etatis eo qui vixit per unum annum. conclusio est falsa et premissae sunt vere quia etas 10 annorum non durat per tantum per quantum etas unius anni quia, accipiat primum instans in quo es 10 annorum — quod est possibile, sit illud hoc instans. quero tunc: aut etas tua 10 annorum fuit in alico tempore ante hoc instans, vel non? si sic, et non magis in uno quam in alio, igitur fuisti 10 annorum quando fuisti tantum unius anni. si non, et etas unius anni duravit per novem annos, igitur etas 10 annorum duravit per minus quam etas unius anni.

XIV

33 *Aliud principale*: nichil quod non significatur per vocem significatur per vocem; sed aliqua res est id quod non significatur per vocem; igitur,

aliqua res significatur per vocem. conclusio est falsa quia sic quelibet res posset significari per vocem, et sic res non significata per vocem posset significari per vocem. sed hec est falsa quia quelibet singularis eius est falsa, quia, si aliqua sit vera, hec igitur est vera: 'hec res non significata per vocem, et cetera' sit hec singularis pro quo est vera, sed si hec sit vera, quero: quid pronomen in subiecto demonstrat non rem significatam per vocem? quia sic illa esset falsa; igitur, rem non significatam et cetera. si pronomen significat quod demonstrat, igitur hec res non significata per vocem significatur per hoc pronomen 'hec' et ita significatur per vocem, et ita 'hec', vera res que non significatur per vocem, significatur per vocem.

XV

34 *Aliud principale*: sequitur: omnia⁹ disputancia locuntur arguendo; isti homines, demonstrando socratem et platonem, disputant; igitur, isti homines locuntur. conclusio est falsa, posito quod socrates disputet cum platone, et premissae sunt vere; maior est vera quia disputacio non est nisi in loquendo, ut arguendo et respondendo. falsitas consequentis patet quia ex ea sequitur hec: 'uterque istorum loquitur', consequens falsum. huic: conceditur hec: 'uterque istorum loquitur' si disputent ad invicem; Contra: si disputent, igitur vel alter responderet vel alter opponit; si alter responderet, tunc alter tacet quia, loqueretur cum eo et responderet, responderet ad argumentum antequam esset factum.

35 similiter, non esset disputacio si simul loquerentur.

36 similiter, quando alter opponit, tunc disputant, non obstante quod alter tacet; igitur, quando disputant, alter tacet et, per consequens, disputancia non loquuntur, et ita non (31^v b/32^r a) omnes disputantes locuntur.

37 similiter, possent disputare, utroque tacente, quia volo quod non respondeas ad argumentum antequam sit factum ab opponente, et quod, ipso facto, non loquaris. tunc arguo: prius est argumentum factum a te quam respondens incipit respondere, ut patet per casum, igitur in tempore medio inter responsonem et argumentacionem neuter loquitur quia unus respondet, nec alius opponit, et in illo tempore est disputacio, igitur, duo homines disputant quando uterque tacet. si dicatur quod tunc non est disputacio, tunc sequeretur quod nullus disputaret nisi quando loquitur

⁹ Although the masculine nominative plural is expected, the scribe has written the neuter unmistakably; for this usage, see below, par. 36; also the 'opponens principale' in a disputation and the 'plura movencia' of a procession in par. 63.

actu et ita, cum respondens respondet opponenti, non esset disputatio inter opponentem et respondentem.

38 similiter, sequeretur quod non esset una disputatio ab hora tertia ad oram nonam et, per consequens, si aliquis fuerat in principio disputationis in scolis, et postea exiret et iterum rediret Ad scholas, priori adhuc disputante, non potest vere dici quod iste fuit bis ad disputationem hodie, quia, si hec sit vera, ad quam, igitur, disputationem fuit bis? non ad disputationem ad quam fuit in principio, quia sic, illa duraret usque ad finem, et semper certum est quod opponens tacuit alicō tempore medio et ita opponens disputaret, ipso tacente — quod est propositum. et ita videtur esse concedendum quod, duobus tacentibus, illi disputant.

XVI

39 *Aliud principale*: omnis propositio affirmativa est id quod non est propositio negativa; sed propositio negativa est huiusmodi; igitur, et cetera. minor patet quia, esto quod responderes huic: 'tu es asinus' sic: 'nego istam', responsio tua est negativa quia negative respondes, et hec est responsio tua: 'nego me¹⁰ esse asinum', igitur hec est negativa et hec est affirmativa certum est; igitur, affirmativa est negativa et e contra. quod autem hec sit responsio tua patet, nam id est responsio ad argumentum per quod vitas argumentum; sed tu vitas istud argumentum: 'tu es asinus'; igitur, tu non profers hanc per hoc quod tu negas te esse asinum, igitur, 'nego me esse asinum' est responsio.

40 similiter, non profers nisi hoc in respondendo, si, igitur, non sit responsio, non dicis aliquam responsionem et ita, si neges te esse asinum, non bene respondes quia non respondes.

XVII

41 *Aliud principale*: si aliqua sint eadem convertibiliter, quod est pars unius est pars¹¹ alterius; sed socrates et essentia socratis sunt eadem convertibiliter; igitur, et cetera. conclusio est falsa et premissae sunt vere. si concedatur conclusio, Contra: pars socratis est pars socratis, igitur est pars essentiae socratis; consequens falsum quia sic, essentia haberet pedes et posset currere et ita, quidquid (32^r a/b) posset ire et haberet caput. si aliter dicatur, negando minorem primi discursus, Contra: essentia socratis aut nominat materiam socratis tantum, aut formam tantum, aut compositum ex utroque; non primo modo quia sic, forma socratis non esset pars

¹⁰ Em. MS: te.

¹¹ Em. MS: unius est pars has been repeated.

essencie socratis; nec secundo modo quia sic, materia socratis non esset pars essencie socratis; et ita, essencia socratis significat compositum ex materia et forma socratis, et id non est aliud quam socrates, et ita, essencia socratis non est aliud quam socrates.

XVIII

42 *Aliud principale*: sequitur: homo et asinus sunt eadem genere, igitur homo et asinus sunt eadem. consequens < falsum > et, tamen, antecedens verum.

43 similiter, sequitur: socrates et plato sunt eadem specie, igitur sunt eadem. huic negatur utraque consequentia; Contra: unitas generis sufficit ad concludendum aliqua esse eadem; cum, igitur, talis unitas et identitas sit inter hominem et asinum, sequitur hominem et asinum esse eadem.

44 similiter, si unitas generis sufficiat ad concludendum aliqua esse eadem, igitur maior identitas, per locum, a multo forciori sufficiet ad concludendum aliqua esse eadem; cum, igitur, maior sit ydentitas inter socratem et platonem quam ydentitas generis quia inter eos est ydentitas specifica, sequitur ista esse eadem. assumptum primum patet nam sequitur: hoc genus est idem huic generi, demonstrato alico genere, et non est idem huic generi nisi ydentitate generis; igitur, hoc genus est idem huic generi identitate generis et, demonstrato utrobique, idem genus, et sequitur: hoc genus est idem huic generi, igitur hoc genus est hoc genus; identitas, igitur, generis sufficit ad concludendum hoc esse hoc, et tunc arguatur ut prius: ydentitas specifica est maior ydentitas quam identitas generis, igitur illa sufficiet ad concludendum hoc esse hoc, et cum socrates et plato sint idem identitate specifica, sequitur quod socrates est plato.

XIX

45 *Aliud principale*: omnia animalia sunt aliqua animalia; animal et non animal sunt animalia; igitur, et cetera. probatur minor nam sequitur: animal et pars animalis sunt animalia, igitur animal et non animal sunt animalia, et cetera. antecedens patet quia sequitur: animal et plato sunt animalia, igitur animal et pars animalis et cetera. consequentia patet quia sequitur: animal et pars, et cetera, igitur animal et pars subiectiva animalis sunt animalia, et ultra, igitur animal et pars animalis, et cetera, ab inferiori ad superius, nam aliter nulla subiectiva esset pars.

46 similiter, demonstrando totum residuum a socrate, aliud a pede, tunc hec est vera: 'a' et socrates sunt animalia quia utrumque est animal et 'a' est pars animalis, igitur socrates et pars animalis sunt animalia quia socrates et pars integralis socratis sunt animalia, et ultra; igitur, animal et

non animal, et cetera. quod autem 'a' sit animal patet, nam quod statim sit animal, et non generabitur de novo, ut est aggregatum per accidens, ut 'socrates albus' est animal; 'a' est huiusmodi quia, abscindatur pes; adhuc quod remanet est socrates; et non remanet nisi 'a', quod potest esse socrates; igitur, 'a' est socrates, et ultra; igitur, est animal.

47 *Ad oppositum*: si non, sequeretur: starent simul quod conclusio alicuius determinati sillogismi sit falsa et, tamen, nec maior falsa nec minor eiusdem sillogismi et, tamen, premissae sunt determinate qualitatis; sed sequitur: neutra premissarum est falsa huius sillogismi; et utraque est determinate qualitatis; igitur, utraque est vera et ita premissis existentibus <veris> conclusio esset falsa.

48 *Ad problema*: dicendum quod, quocunque sillogismo demonstrato, si conclusio sit falsa in rei veritate, et maior illius non est falsa, et maior et minor non repugnant, nec sunt indeterminate qualitatis, minor erit falsa, et hoc si scitur quod conclusio sequitur ex premissis, omnibus aliis pre-suppositis, necesse est concedere minorem esse falsam, quia falsum non sequitur nisi ex falso, igitur, si conclusio sit falsa, antecedens est falsum, et antecedens est compositum ex maiore et minore que non repugnant, et maior non est falsa; relinquatur, igitur, quod minor sit falsa, nam aliter ex veris sequeretur falsum. utrum, tamen, conclusio potest esse dubia, et maior vera, et minor dubia, et tunc dubium est utrum conclusio sequitur ex premissis; sed qui scit maiorem non esse falsam, sed veram, et scit premissas esse determinate qualitatis et non repugnantes, necessario scit¹² minorem esse falsam,¹³ et istud querit problema.

Ad I

49 *Ad Primum principale*: dicendum quod hec est dubia et minor discursus; Contra: si hec sit dubia: 'verum denarium iudicas esse falsum denarium' tunc potest esse vera, quia non est impossibilis certum est; ponatur, igitur, quod hec sit vera: 'verum denarium, et cetera' tunc sequitur: 'verum denarium iudicas, et cetera; et nichil aliud quam hoc iudicas esse falsum denarium; igitur, hoc est falsus denarius'. conclusio est falsa cum 'hoc' demonstrat verum denarium per casum, et premissae sunt vere. sequitur quod maior et minor repugnant, ita quod non possunt sciri a te esse vera quia, si tu scis istam: 'verum denarium iudicas esse falsum denarium' et scis istam: 'nichil aliud quam hoc, et cetera', necessario scis istam: 'hoc est falsus denarius', unde impossibile est quod maior sciatur a te. Contra:

¹² Em. MS: sit.

¹³ Em. MS: veram.

esto quod aliquis ponat denarium verum in manu tua, ut argutum est prius, possibile est ipsum eundem denarium facere apparere falsum denarium, et tu iudicas secundum apparenciam rei iudicate, igitur, iudicas istum denarium esse falsum denarium, et tu scis denarium esse verum denarium et ita, tu scis istam: 'verum denarium esse falsum denarium'; (32^v a/b) huic dicendum est quod eundem denarium, quam scio esse verum denarium, non faceret aliquis apparere falsum denarium unde, si aliquis accipiat, ut iugulator, illum denarium a manu mea, et postea reponat ibidem aliquid quod apparet esse falsum denarium, non scio illud esse verum denarium. unde, dubito utrum illud sit denarius quem hic ponit et prius a manu accepit; ideo, ista non sunt simul vera, quod iudicem aliquid esse falsum denarium quod scio esse verum denarium. possibile est, tamen, quod ista sit in re: quod idem iudicatur a me esse verum denarium quod est falsus denarius.

Ad II

50 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum negando istam: 'duo sunt plura quam duo' et ad probacionem dico concedendo quod nulli duo numeri in pares sunt numeri. Ad aliam probacionem negatur hec consequencia: concedendam istam, igitur hec est concedenda a te, quia possum concedere aliquid quod, tamen, est negandum a quolibet, unde bene concedendum est quod, si aliqua propositio concedatur a te, et bene respondes in hoc, igitur quodlibet eius consequens est concedendum a te, et quia in concedendo minorem secundi argumenti principalis non bene respondes, sed male, ideo nec ipsa minor est concedenda a te, nec consequens ad minorem.

Ad III

51 *Ad primum argumentum contra* posicionem: negatur hec: 'eadem res numero extra animam potest esse due res extra animam' sive accipiat in sensu compositionis, sive in sensu diviso; unde, de sensu compositionis non est dubium. similiter nec de sensu divisionis, quia sua conversa est falsa: alique due res extra animam possunt esse una res extra animam, quia quolibet singularis est falsa, quibuscunque duabus existentibus rebus demonstratis, unde solum supponit in sensu diviso subiectum et etiam predicatum pro suppositis presentibus. et si accipiat ista: eandem rem extra animam contingit esse duas res extra animam, hec est vera quia predicatum huius supponit pro hiis que sunt et que est, et ita sequitur: Hec linea in protrahi potest esse terminata hic et potest terminari citra, igitur potest esse due linee que erunt, quarum una et maior alia. et accipio hic 'potest' secundum quod accipitur pro 'potest ad utrumlibet' et ita hec vera: hec linea potest esse maior et minor et ita, due res. huic dicendum

est quod hec est impossibilis: hec linea potest esse maior linea et minor linea; hec, tamen est vera: potest esse linea que potest terminari in medio, et similiter, que potest terminari citra medium; sed non sequitur: igitur potest esse linea maior et minor, quia hoc quod est linea maior et minor est unum nichil, quoniam nec est nec esse potest.

Ad IV

52 *Ad aliud* contra posicionem: dicendum est quod hec propositio: 'socrates fit albus' est vera prout 'fit' sonat 'in fieri' et, hoc supposito, quod socrates non sit albus. et concedo quod fit, hoc est, 'est in fieri aliquid', et illud non est socrates quia est in fieri socrates albus, et illud non est socrates per casum. et concedo quod socrates erit aliquid quod nunc non est socrates in sensu diviso, quia socrates erit aliquid et illud nunc non est (32^v b/33^r a) socrates, nec socrates albus; unde hec est falsa: socrates non erit nisi socrates, sumpto predicato pro eo quod est; sumpto, tamen, pro eo quod erit, est vera.

Ad V

53 *Ad aliud* sequens hoc: dicendum est quod neque universale absolutum, neque singulare absolutum intenditur primo a natura, et hoc est de intencione avicenne ubi prius, unde, dicit ibi quod nullum singulare signatum intenditur, nec ullum simpliciter universale, ut 'animal' vel 'corpus' et hoc est verum: unum tantum aliquid primo intenditur, et id nec est simpliciter universale, nec simpliciter singulare, sed medium; ita, natura in determinato supposito, et hoc non est simpliciter universale, nec simpliciter singulare,¹⁴ quia natura in hoc supposito est magis singulare.

Ad VI

54 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum est quod sit questio 'qualis est homo' queritur qualitates de homine, sumpto predicato huius simpliciter, huius, scilicet: hic queritur qualitates de homine. et respondens concedens hominem esse album, bene respondet. et concedo quod sic respondens concedet istam: aliquid est album, nec, tamen, concedet socratem esse album, nec platonem. et cum dicitur 'concedet album de alico' hoc est negandum, quia album est incomplexum et actus concedendi non est nisi circa complexum, unde nullus concedit 'hominem'. et si queratur: 'ex quo aliquid conceditur esse album?' id quod conceditur esse album aut est id de quo

¹⁴ Em. MS: universale.

queritur aut non, dicendum est negando istam: 'aliquid conceditur esse album' in sensu diviso, hec, tamen, est vera in sensu compositionis, unde hec est vera: 'hec conceditur: "aliquid est album"'.¹⁵

Ad VII

55 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum distinguendo istam: 'socratem scivisti esse non socratem'; in sensu composito est falsa quia sic dicatur quod scivisti socrates est non socrates; in sensu diviso distinguitur ultra, eo quod subiectum potest sumi simpliciter vel personaliter; primo modo falsa, secundo modo vera, et cetera, quia istum hominem scivisti esse non socratem. et concedenda quod iste homo aliquando fuit non socrates, qui nunc vocatur hoc nomine 'socrates', quia antequam hoc nomen 'socrates' sibi inponebatur, scivisti istum hominem esse aliquid et scivisti quod non fuit socrates, sic ita, igitur, scivisti quod ipse fuit non socrates.

Ad VIII

56 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum per prius dictum, negando hanc: 'aliquid iudicatur a te esse verum, cuius oppositum scitur a te esse verum'. et ad probationem, dicendum est, ut prius dictum est in reduccione primi argumenti principalis.

Ad IX

57 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum negando istam: 'nigrum esse album'. unde, hec propositio est neganda: omne quod potest esse album per albedinem non inducendam est album, quia in principio dealbedinis socratis, secundum istos et solempnes, inducitur tota essentia albedinis ad quam est motus et, tamen, socrates tunc non est albus et erit, tamen, eadem albedine, postea albus.

Ad X

58 *Ad aliud*: dicendum est quod hoc quod est homo albus significat unum totum aggregatum, unde, non est vere unum totum, nec istud totum habet esse existere¹⁵ extra animam, posito priori casu, nec eius partes quia non habet partes existentes extra animam; natura, tamen, albedinis est, et natura hominis est, (33^r a/b) sed ista non uniuntur in isto aggregato sub esse existere unde, destructa domo, hoc lignum est, vel iste lapis est et,

¹⁵ Scribe has written 'esse existere' twice in this par., perhaps for 'esse existencie', and surely with that meaning.

tamen, partes domus non sunt quia non sunt partes nisi ut unite sibi in toto.

Ad XI

59 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum est concedendo totum usque ad hanc consequentiam: 'tantum "a" non est socrates, igitur nichil aliud ab "a" et cetera' quia¹⁶ exceptiva, cuius inclusum est transcendens, si exceptiva sit negativa, debet affirmative exponi per condicionalem, et si sit affirmativa, exponetur negative per condicionalem; sic 'tantum ens est' exponitur sic: 'ens est' et: 'si aliquid non est ens, non est'. similiter hec: 'tantum ens non est' exponitur sic: 'ens non est' et: 'si aliquid est non ens, illud non est' et ideo hec: 'tantum "a" non est socrates' non exponetur sic: 'nichil aliud quam "a" non est socrates' sed sic: 'si aliquid non est socrates, illud non est socrates' quia 'a' significat hoc disiunctum: 'socrates vel aliud a socrate' per casum et hoc disiunctum est transcendens, quia convertitur cum hoc transcendente 'ens' et ideo, quando tale includitur, nichil excluditur et propter hoc habet exponi per condicionalem que nichil ponit.

Ad XII

60 *Ad aliud principale*: dicendum est negando istam: 'species est corruptibilis'; et cum dicitur 'componitur ex contrariis, igitur est corruptibilis' dicendum est quod contraria sunt duplicia: quedam que pertinent ad individua, quedam ad species. unde, compositum ex contrariis pertinentibus ad individuum est corruptibile, sed species non est huiusmodi, quia componitur ex contrariis pertinentibus ad speciem talem non oportet esse corruptibile. unde, hec non est diffinitio naturalis: 'homo componitur ex carnibus et ossibus', sumpto predicato simpliciter quia sic, eadem res componeret hominem et asinum, nec personaliter quia quelibet singularis falsa ut sic; immo, sic diffinitur a naturali, quod hec species 'homo' componitur ex carnibus et ossibus huius speciei.

Ad XIII

61 *Ad aliud*: concedendum est quod etas unius anni per plura tempora duravit quam etas 10 annorum, unde si sis 10 annorum nunc, et non undecim, tunc etas tua unius anni duravit per 9 annos, quia semper post unum annum fuisti unius anni, et non tantum duravit etas tua 10 annorum.

¹⁶ The text from 'quia exceptiva' to 'si aliquid non est ens, non est' is marked by a bracket in the right margin; this bracket has been developed into a caricatured human profile.

Ad XIV

62 *Ad aliud: dicendum* est quod pronomen non significat id quod demonstrat, quia sic, hoc pronomen 'iste' significaret quodlibet, unde significaret hominem, asinum, et significaret contradictoria ut 'homo currit' et 'nullus homo currit', et ita clauderet opposita. unde, non est dicendum quod aliquis inposuit hoc pronomen 'iste', 100 annis elapsis, rei que nunc primo est in rerum natura quam nunc demonstrat, quia nullus inponit vocem ignoto — sic enim nesciret inponens cui vocem inponeret. et si queratur: quid significat hoc pronomen 'iste' ex inposicione? dicendum quod inponebatur ad significandum unum conceptum particularem pronominis.

Ad XV

63 *Ad aliud: dicendum concedendo istam*: socrates et plato (33^r b/33^v a) disputant, altero — dummodo, tamen, alius loquitur — opponendo vel respondendo; aliter enim, quandocunque protulerit opponens maiorem, vel opponendo, cessaret disputacio, et hoc antequam posset capere minorem, quod, tamen, nullus diceret. unde, loquendo de disputacione prout communiter sumitur, secundum communem usum, bene potest concedi disputacionem esse et si nec opponens principale loquatur nec sibi respondens, cum, in eadem disputacione, secundum usum communem sumpta, possit esset plures opposcentes, non, tamen, est simpliciter una disputacio quo modo est disputacio una, que versatur inter unum opposcentem et unum respondentem. unde, videtur hic dicendum sicut dicendum est de motu processionis, qui non est simpliciter unus motus quia sunt plura movencia.

Ad XVI

64 *Ad aliud: dicendum* quod hec est affirmativa: 'nego me esse asinum'. unde, responsio uno modo est actus respondentis, et sic nec est propositio affirmativa nec negativa, vel, si concedatur quod sic respondens 'nego me esse asinum' habet istam pro responsione sua, 'nego me esse asinum' adhuc hec: 'nego me esse asinum' non est negativa, sed est affirmativa.

Ad XVII

65 *Ad aliud: dicendum* negando maiorem, quia aliquid potest esse idem et pars intellectualis unius et non alterius, ut argutum est.

Ad XVIII

66 *Ad aliud: dicendum* quod identitas generis, qua est minor identitate specifica et numerali, non arguit aliqua esse eadem; et cum dicis: 'hoc genus est huic generi idem identitate generis', verum est, sed hec est identitas numeralis cum quidlibet sit idem sibi ydentitate numerali, et sic ydentitas specifica erit minor ista ydentitate.

Ad XIX

67 *Ad ultimum: dicendum* negando istam: 'animal et pars animalis sunt animalia', loquendo de parte integrali; loquendo, tamen, de parte subiectiva, cuius est socrates, concedo eandem, et talis pars est animal.

68 et ad aliam probationem: dicendum est quod, absciso pede socratis, quod remanet est socrates, et illud prius fuit pars socratis, et ideo concedendum est quod id quod est pars socratis, non absciso pede, erit socrates, absciso pede. sed tunc, negatur hec propositio: 'omne quod erit socrates, et non generabitur, est socrates'.

Ad XII, responsio omissa

69 *Ad unum argumentum* omissum de universo, dicendum quod licet iste ignis, qui est pars universi, corumpatur, universum, tamen, manet, sicut licet pes socratis abcindatur, socrates totus manet. unde, quedam sunt partes universi materiales et accidentales, que continue fluunt et refluunt, hoc est, generantur et corumpuntur, et cum corupcione talium stat entitas universi. Alie sunt partes essenciales et formales, que requiruntur ad esse universi, ut quatuor elementa cum corpore quinto, et cum non esse alicuius earum parcium non stat esse universi et ideo, sicut totum universum est corruptibile, ita et huius partes.

*Explicit questio magistri petri de bradley circa II priorum.*¹⁷

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¹⁷ Colophon that guarantees the authenticity of this question is supported by the name 'Magister petrus de bradley' in the blank portion of fol. 33v b; both occurrences of the author's name are in a hand other than that in which the text itself is written: owing to damage to the text, it is uncertain whether the last word is '*priorum*' or '*prioribus*' — if the latter, then the symbols interpreted here as 'circa II' would require another reading.

Immobility and Existence for Aquinas

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I

WHAT has been called "the awful leap" from the finite to the infinite in proving God's existence does not seem even to be felt in the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae* (I, 2, 3c), or in the two corresponding *viae* of the *Contra Gentiles* (I, 13), or in the other versions of the argument that have been left by St Thomas Aquinas.¹ The reasoning flows smoothly from the actuality that is being attained through motion to a movent that is in no way being moved. In view of the difficulty in experiencing any sensation of shock, may not one legitimately ask if a leap has really been made?

Certainly in the reasoning there is no overt preoccupation with a passage from the finite to the infinite. In fact, the terms finite and infinite are nowhere operative in this perspective during the demonstration. The word "infinite" is used to designate a series of movents that would keep receding indefinitely — a possibility that is eliminated in the course of the argument. The word "finite" is also used (*CG*, I, 13, *Quarum prima... Si*) in reporting Aristotle's reasoning that an infinite number of bodies cannot move in a finite spread of time. But in the sense in which the two terms would imply a start from a finite object and a conclusion to an infinite object, they just do not enter into the proof.

Rather, the procedure is from something that is being moved in the observable world to something that is entirely unmoved. No attention is paid to any consideration that the one must be finite and the other infinite. The movement in the observable world is analyzed into actuality and potentiality. So analyzed, it shows that the observable thing is being moved ultimately by something that is imparting motion without thereby being moved itself. This unmoved movent is at once identified with the God of Christian belief. The procedure is entirely unruffled by any question of a passage from the finite to the infinite. The notions do not seem to affect the progress of its reasoning in any notable way.

¹ For other versions, see *In I Sent.*, d. 3, div. lae partis textus (ed. Mandonnet, I, 88-89); d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, *Contra* (I, 211); *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1-3, Angeli-Pirotta nos. 1759-1799, with *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1-23, nos. 1966-2550; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5-7, Cathala-Spiazzi nos. 2488-2535; *Comp. Theol.*, I, 3, Verardo no. 4; I, 11, no. 21.

Could it be that the Aristotelian framework of the argument is partly responsible for this failure to sense any shock at a leap from the finite objects of the observable world to the infinitely perfect God of sacred theology? In Aristotle, the starting point was undoubtedly finite. It was an object composed of matter limited by form, even though there was no need to call attention to the fact. But with Aristotle the objects reached in the conclusion of the argument were also finite. They were a limited number of separate forms, each confined to its own distinct actuality. There was accordingly no passage from the finite to the infinite. There was only a passage from finite material objects to finite immaterial forms. The procedure was from the finite to the finite, with no occasion to bring the notion of an infinite being into the reasoning. Does this condition of the Aristotelian model, then, allow St Thomas to close his eyes to a transition that has actually taken place in his own argument? Has it enabled him to speak as though he was unaware that he had made a leap from the finite to the infinite?

Prima facie, the interpretation seems very unlikely. St Thomas was keenly sensitive to the differences of his own demonstration from that of his Greek predecessor. He knew that he was arguing from different premises.² Possibly, he could have realized full well that he had made a leap from the finite to the infinite, have seen no need of adverting to it for the moment, and have left its explanation to a later stage when the question of infinity would be dealt with explicitly. But no such explanation is ever given. No such problem is even faced. There seems no way of finding his own solution when the situation is approached from this angle. Might it not be more advisable, then, to test the possibility of a different alternative? Would it not be more feasible to proceed at first on the assumption that no leap was being made at all in the argument? Could the reason lie in the fact that during the reasoning there is no passage from any finite nature to an infinite nature? Could that be why the two notions of finite and infinite are not operative in the course of the demonstration?

At least, this alternative is worth investigating. Is there any reason why a passage from the mobile to the entirely unmoved has to involve *ipso facto* a transition from the finite to the infinite? Certainly the transition did not occur in the Aristotelian background against which Aquinas is sketching the argument. For Aristotle, the argument led to a plurality of separate forms. Each form was distinct from the others. Each, consequently, was finite in itself. This was in full accord with the Parmenidean setting in which being and finitude coincided. With the Stagirite, separate being

² See *infra*, n. 35.

was actuality without potentiality. But, as required by the Parmenidean background, it was actuality that was finite in virtue of its very nature as form. Pure actuality, in this understanding of the notion, could be reached without any transition to an infinite object.

With St Thomas, however, can there be any chance of allowing the presence of finitude in the object reached by the proof's conclusion? Is not this object straightway identified with the infinite and unique God of Christian revelation? Does it not become the basis for concluding to eternity and to other considerations that involve infinity? Can it even for a moment be regarded as finite? From the viewpoint of its openness to infinity does it not stand in clearcut contraposition to the nature of the Aristotelian separate movent? Clearly, there is no possibility of interpreting the Thomistic reasoning as a transition from one type of finite object to another type of finite object. The object reached by the demonstration cannot be finite. If a transition from the finite to the infinite is to be avoided, the reason will evidently have to lie in the starting point of the argument. Insofar as it is operative for the reasoning, the starting point will clearly have to transcend the finite.

But how is this possible? At first sight, does not the starting point of the Thomistic demonstration seem definitely located in finite things? Surely the things in the observable world are all finite. The examples used in the argument are clearly finite objects. The stick that is being pushed by the hand, the wood that is being heated by the fire, are undoubtedly finite things. Likewise, the reasoning from motion requires this condition. The mobile thing, from which the argument starts, is a composite of matter and form. It is accordingly able to contain the combination of actuality and potentiality that allows the argument to set out on its way. But it is thereby shown to be a subject limited by a form.

There is not the least doubt, then, that the things from which the argument commences are finite objects. How can they furnish the basis for reasoning that eventually reaches something infinite? The reasoning leads to an unmoved movent. Unlike the unmoved movent of the Aristotelian argument, it at once breaks out into consequences that show it to be infinite. In point of fact it does this in all its locations in St Thomas. In the *Contra Gentiles*, moreover, the basis from which the further characteristics of God are to be deduced is explicitly noted. It is the thoroughgoing immobility that was reached in the conclusion of the argument from motion.³ From this immobility the characteristics that involve infinity are reasoned to. If it itself is not something infinite, will there not

³ CG, I, 14, Ad procedendum. On the way immobility is understood, see *infra*, n. 34.

have to be a "leap" in reasoning from it to the divine perfections that require infinity? Yet how can it be regarded as something infinite in itself, if it is reached by way of the argument from finite mobile things? Must one agree with Suarez⁴ that the argument from motion is incapable of reaching an uncreated movent? Or has some new ichor been injected into the argument's starting point by St Thomas, enabling it to flow out into channels that transcend the finite?

There can, of course, be no question of a buffer region between the finite and the infinite. If a thing is not infinite it has to be finite. It cannot be a *tertium quid*, a denizen of a no man's land located between the two. In nature and individuality, mobile things are undoubtedly finite. No reservation need be made in this assertion. But can the condition of finitude be extended so readily and so uncompromisingly to their existence? On the one hand, their existence is in every case the existence of a stone or a tree or a man or some such other finite object, and is limited in space to the here and in time to the now. On the other hand, it has been possible to say in a Christian context that God is the existence of all things.⁵ There seems to be a sense in which the existence of mobile things is not finite but infinite.

The relevance of this consideration should become apparent after a moment's reflection. If, as the texts of St Thomas imply cogently enough,⁶ the actuality towards which all movement tends is existence, will not existence be the supremely operative factor in the argument from motion? Will it not be the actuality that is found to be acquired through motion and that finally is the immobile nature reached in the conclusion of the demonstration? But for Aquinas existence is an actuality that of itself is not finite.⁷ Of its own nature it is unlimited. Could this condition, then, not be carried over in some way when existence is limited by a subject into which it is received? Does some aspect of infinity always remain with it? If so, is this the aspect that enables a mobile thing to function as the starting point for the Thomistic *prima via*? Does it allow the reasoning to arrive at

⁴ *Disp. Metaph.*, XXIX, 1, 7-16; ed. Vivès, 26, 23-26.

⁵ Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite and St Bernard are cited for this assertion by Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2; ed. Mandonnet, 1, 197-198. For St Thomas' own explanation, see also *CG*, I, 26. A discussion of it may be found in the paper of the late Msgr. G. B. Phelan, "The Being of Creatures," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 31 (1957), 118-125; reprinted in *G. B. Phelan: Selected Papers*, (Toronto, 1967), 83-94.

⁶ A study of the texts may be found in my article, "Actuality in the *Prima Via* of St Thomas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 29 (1967), 26-46.

⁷ E.g.: "Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est." *CG*, I, 43, *Amplius ipsum*.

an infinite being without involving any leap from the finite? Does it in this way provide an opening or a "clearing" into an order beyond that of finite beings?

At least, these considerations suggest a close, hard look at the starting point of the *prima via*. From their angle does the starting point in fact transcend the condition of finitude, and does it thereby open the way to a nature of infinite perfection, without any need or possibility of a leap from the finite? If existence is what characterizes the starting point in this manner, further problems will arise and will have to be met. Existence, for instance, is not ordinarily a specifying principle. Yet in this case it would have to enter into the specification of the argument from motion. Then, too, if any aspect of infinity is carried over into the existence of mobile things, the problem of keeping their existence really distinct from subsistent existence would seem to become more acute. Finally, after these preliminary difficulties have been considered, the procedure of St Thomas himself in reasoning from thoroughgoing immobility to aspects that involve infinity call for examination in detail.

II

The first interest, then, requires a good look at the starting point of the *prima via* from the angle of finitude or transcendence of finitude. The starting point is explicitly found in observable things, things "in this world" that are in motion. As composites of matter and form, these things themselves are finite. As in motion, they are in process towards new actuality. The motion ceases when the new actuality has been brought into existence. The actuality towards which motion ultimately strives is accordingly existence.⁸ Insofar as it enters into the starting point of the *prima via*, actuality cannot help but involve existence. As the actuality that is ultimately being acquired through motion, the aspect of existence will necessarily condition the starting point.

As being acquired through motion, is the new existence to be considered finite or infinite? The question may seem foolish. But perhaps that is just the trouble. Early in the present century, G. E. Moore noted that many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy arose from the faulty way in which the questions were framed.⁹ May this be the case here? To ask whether the fleeting existence of a rainbow or a rose petal is infinite, may at first hearing seem to overstep the limits of propriety

⁸ E.g., *Comp. Theol.*, I, 11, no. 21. See *supra*, n. 6.

⁹ See *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, 1903), pp. vii-viii.

in posing philosophical questions. Placed that way, the question shuns an affirmative answer. It calls quite obviously for a negative reply. Just as the rose petal has a limited size, a definite shade of color, a particular time and place, so may it be said to have, correspondingly, a finite existence.

Precisely here, however, should suspicions begin to arise. The debates of the last few decades have shown the difficulty in assessing existence as a predicate in a sense that corresponds to predicates like size and color and time and place. In the text of St Thomas the difficulty is accentuated by the different way in which existence is originally grasped. While the predicates that belong in the categories are first attained through conceptualization, existence on the contrary is not originally known through a concept. Existence is apprehended through judgment, the second operation of the intellect.¹⁰ Only subsequently is existence conceptualized. Even then it is represented under other notions, such as actuality or perfection or "something." The result is that one never acquires an authentic concept of existence, a concept with content characteristic of existence and nothing else. The concept may be elaborated in a way that will pinpoint its bearing and make it focus exclusively upon existence, as in the description "the actuality of all acts, and... the perfection of all perfections."¹¹ But in itself it does not carry the genuine message of existence, namely the assertion that something does exist. This can be known only through judgment.

Here the difficulties become crucial. Existence as attained through judgment is expressed in speech by the copula "is" or the simple verb "exists."¹² If you try to take what is meant by the "is" and ask whether it is finite or infinite, do you not at once become aware that there is something incongruous about the question? It does not seem to bear properly upon its subject. You are taking a notion that is predicative and making it into the subject of an assertion. Elsewhere the process may be perfectly legitimate. You make take the predicate "white" and turn it quite smoothly into a subject, saying for instance that whiteness is a color or a quality. In this perspective it makes perfect sense to say that whiteness is something finite, a finite quality. But if you apply exactly the same treatment to the notion of existence, you find you are left with an empty concept. You have no content about which you could ask whether it is finite or infinite. True, you can retain content for it by keeping it focused on what was apprehended

¹⁰ The texts may be found assembled and discussed in my article "Diversity and Community of Being in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 284-295.

¹¹ *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m. Cf. *ST*, I, 3, 4c (Secundo); *In I Periherm.*, lect. 5, Leonine no. 22.

¹² See *In I Periherm.*, lect. 3, nos. 9-13; lect. 5, nos. 8-22.

through judgment, just as in the *prima via* the concept of movement is given existential content by spotlighting movement that is taking place here and now in the observable world. But in regard to the present problem, the focusing on what is attained through judgment merely brings the question back where it started. Is the fact that a golf ball is white something finite or something infinite? The query just does not seem to apply to the content of the "is," to the object distinctively grasped by the judgment. Can the reason be that what the "is" represents is not a "something," and therefore cannot immediately appear as either something finite or something infinite?

These reflections suggest an investigation of the way in which existence comes to be represented as something and known as something. Is the injection of the notion "something" the factor that allows the predicates of finite and infinite to characterize existence? If so, existence will be subject to these predicates in exactly the manner in which it is something. How, then, is existence something? There is no particularly acute problem in the primitive predication of "something" in its regard. Existence is an object of cognition, attained through the cognitive activity of judgment. The object of conceptualization, the other activity of human intellection, is in its most general aspect regarded as a thing, as something. When existence is conceptualized for purposes of study or communication, it accordingly has to be regarded as something, as something that is known and that can be discussed. What could be more natural or normal in view of the workings and exigencies of the human cognitive powers? Through the concept, moreover, attention may be brought to bear on the fact that a thing is existing here and now in the sensible world. The concept, though just in itself it is entirely without existential content, in this way focuses upon and spotlights what is attained through judgment. It brings that distinctive content directly before the fixed gaze of the inquiring intellect. It allows the intellect to possess in a way manageable for reasoning and discussion the content of the judgment that a thing is existing or that movement is taking place here and now in the observable universe. If the concept ceases to focus upon the fact already known through judgment, it is no longer the means of exhibiting existential content, just as the spotlight no longer makes visible the features of the actress when it is turned away from their actual presence on the stage. But when kept under the focus of the concept, the existence known through judgment leads the mind to knowledge of existence as a nature in God.¹³

¹³ The proof may be found developed in terms of existence (*esse*) in *De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 34.7-35.19. The overall point at issue in the passage to show that the angelic forms (*intelligencie*) are not entirely incomposite. Yet in the course of the reasoning it

In this conclusion of the demonstration of God's existence you finally have existence as a thing.¹⁴ The question may now be legitimately posed. Is existence finite or infinite? The answer, in the context of St Thomas, is unhesitating. Existence, where it subsists, is infinite.¹⁵ The nature of existence is something that embraces in itself every perfection in unlimited degree.¹⁶ When the question is asked without qualification, the answer is simple and straightforward. Existence is something infinite. An argument that starts with existence and ends with existence should accordingly be moving on a plane that transcends the finite.

However, once existence is participated in other things, does it not thereby become finitized?¹⁷ As found in things in the observable world, is it not a finite actuality, limited by the essence in which it inheres? There is no doubt about the affirmative answer invited by both these questions. Yet the problem does not seem to be met. When existence is established as a real nature, it has the status of something infinite and unique. It cannot be repeated. To be found in other instances, it has to pay the penalty of losing its status as a nature. In all things other than God existence does not enter into the nature it actuates.¹⁸ It always remains other than finite nature. The *only* nature that it discloses is the infinite nature of

proves "quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus ex eo quod ipsa est esse tantum" (*ibid.*, p. 35. 13-14). The demonstration occurs frequently in the commentary of St Thomas on the first book of the *Sentences*, e.g., *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, Contra, Praeterea ejus (ed. Mandonnet, I, 60); d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, Solut. (I, 222). That creatures have their existence from another is the common reason given for all three ways mentioned by Dionysius for reaching God: "Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero." *Ibid.*, d. 3, div. lae partis textus (I, 88).

¹⁴ St Thomas has no hesitation in referring to God as a *res*. See text quoted from *De Ente*, supra n. 13. Cf.: "... res illa quae Deus est, est quoddam esse subsistens," *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 67.

¹⁵ "Sed esse non receptum in aliquo, non est finitum,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, Contra; I, 226. "... illud quod non habet esse receptum in aliquo, sed subsistens, non habet esse limitatum, sed infinitum, sicut Deus." *In III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, Solut. 2; ed. Moos, III, 402 (no. 46). "... habet esse non limitatum." *Ibid.*, d. 14, a. 4, ad 3m; III, 465 (no. 180). "... cuius esse est infinitum." *CG*, II, 21, Amplius cum. See also supra, n. 7, Cf. *Comp. Theol.*, I, 18, no. 35.

¹⁶ *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 62-63. *De Ente et Essentia*, c. V; pp. 38.12-39.3. *CG*, I, 28. *ST*, I, 4, 2. *Comp. Theol.*, I, 21, nos. 42-43. Cf. *In De Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 1, Pera nos. 629-631; lect 2, nos. 661-662.

¹⁷ See *De Ente et Essentia*, c. V; p. 39.6-24.

¹⁸ "Vnde oportet quod in qualibet alia re preter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quidditas uel natura seu forma sua." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 34.30-32. A discussion of the texts on this topic may be found in my article "Quiddity and Real Distinction in St Thomas Aquinas," *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965), 14-19.

God.¹⁹ The existence found in observable objects never acquires the status of a finite thing or a finite nature.

When for the purposes of reasoning and discussion, therefore, the existence of finite things is itself represented as something finite, does not the original problem recur? Because it has to be represented in human concepts as something finite, does existence thereby have to function in an argument as something finite? Certainly it cannot function as a finite nature or thing. Outside God existence can never function as a nature or thing. While finitized through reception in a limited nature, existence manifests a character of its own that is not an aspect of any finite nature. That character is what enables it to play its distinctive role in the starting point of the demonstration that leads to subsistent being. As operative in the starting point of the argument, then, existence is not appearing in the guise of something limited. It is appearing only as existence, as something whose nature is eventually shown to be infinite. That it is in fact a finitized actuality can be shown only after existence has been established as a real nature that cannot be shared in things as a nature but can be participated through limitation in them by an essence other than itself. Not this limitation, however, but only the character of existence, becomes operative in the argument. The fact that things possess existence, or are being brought through movement into existential actuality, is what counts in the starting point of the demonstration. What *kind* of a thing the actuality is, whether it is finite or infinite, is a question that can be asked only later. It can be asked only after existence has been shown to be a real nature, a nature that can actualize other things through efficient and not through formal causality. But this information comes only after the conclusion of the argument. In the starting point, the existence is not operative as finite or as infinite, but only as existence. It is operative only as a characteristic that opens out into an infinite nature, in line of efficient causality. Its status as a finitized actuality in observable things is reached only after the "clearing" into subsistent existence has been penetrated. To regard it in the starting point of the argument as something finite would be to make it originally an object of conceptualization, and immediately to short circuit the whole procedure.

¹⁹ "Sane esse omnium dixerim Deum, ... sed causale, non materiale." St Bernard, *In Cant.*, IV; PL, 183, 798B. Similarly "Deus est esse omnium non essentiale, sed causale." St Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 198. Cf. supra, n. 5. On the Platonic background, see: "...eo modo loquendi utitur quo Platonici utebantur qui esse separatim dicebant esse existentium, inquantum compositiva per participationem abstractorum participantur. Et quod causaliter sit intelligendum, apparet per hoc quod subdit quod *non solum existentia* sunt ex Deo, *sed etiam ipsum esse existentium est ex Deo...*" *In De Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 1, no. 630.

There is no question, then, of a leap from something finite to something infinite in the argument. The procedure, rather, is from existence to existence. As originally grasped through judgment, the existence is not given as something finite. It is given merely as existence, an actuality that through reasoning discloses its nature as infinite. Only afterwards is it shown to be a really distinct actuality in the observable thing, and finitized by the thing's essence. But in the starting point of the argument it is operative only as existence grasped through judgment, and not as specified in one way or the other in conceptualization.

Lacking any authentic concept of existence, the human intellect is of course unable to reason in this situation from within. It cannot explain the consequences in the way it can account for the properties of a triangle by the essence of the three-sided figure. From what it grasps of the existence of observable things, it can conclude that existence subsists. It knows thereby that existence is a real nature, infinite in every perfection. But *what* existence is, and *what* the perfections are when identified with it, it does not know at all in any characteristic way.²⁰ Correspondingly, it cannot understand from within how existence is participated. It can know only *that* when existence is participated, existence is no longer a nature or part of a nature, but an actuality other than the nature and finitized by the nature. The questions that the intellect asks about the finitude or infinity of existence have to be posed accordingly in this framework.

Posed in this way, however, the infinity of the divine existence does not appear as something that excludes other existents.²¹ The infinite nature of subsistent existence is known only through the existence of observable things. A conclusion that eliminated their existence would be sawing off the branch on which it was posed. As far as Thomistic metaphysics is concerned, the existence of observable things is the only existence that is immediately given. Upon their existence alone rests metaphysical knowledge of subsistent being. From the viewpoint of the metaphysician, then,

²⁰ On this topic see A. C. Pegis, "Penitus Manet Ignotum," *Mediaeval Studies*, 27 (1965), 212-226.

²¹ Outside the Thomistic framework, however, the difficulty can become insuperable. Cf.: "The hard question for the Thomist is then whether or not I, with my peculiar fragment of existence, do not in fact stand over against God with his Existence. The Thomists sometimes speak as though they meant to hold that all Existence is God, in him or from him. But it is not clear then how I can exist." Paul Weiss, *Modes of Being* (Carbondale, Illinois, 1958), 191 (no. 3.08). "The classical doctrine, of course, regarded deity as exclusively actual (*actus purus*). ...All that God has power to be, that, it was held, He is. ...God, on the contrary, is supposed to know and will what He elicits in the world, and indeed to love His creatures. That so many could think they believed this, and at the same time could hold that, no matter what world there is, God remains in exactly the same state, is to my mind one of the great oddities in humen development." Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (Lasalle, Ill., 1962), 35-36.

the starting point cannot be eliminated by the conclusion. Rather, it stands on its own evidence, and is the support upon which the conclusion is maintained.

Nevertheless the temptation is strong to view the problem outside its genuinely Thomistic framework and face it as though the existence of finite things were itself a thing or a nature. From that viewpoint an infinite being would exclude all other beings and accordingly would be an absurd conclusion to reach. Just as whiteness when shared by more golf balls or sugar cubes means more whiteness, so existence when participated by more existents should mean more existence. But is this not regarding existence as a nature that is participated by way of a nature? Can that be done in the Thomistic framework? Is not existence participated purely by means of efficient causality, and in no way through intrinsic formal causality?²² In bestowing existence the efficient cause makes a thing exist, but without adding anything to the thing in the line of nature. No new nature or additional aspect of a nature is conferred upon the thing through its existential status. Merely a nature other than existence is brought into being. There is no multiplication of a nature, as there is when generic or specific traits are exemplified in new individuals. While more births mean more humanity, how can more effects of an efficient cause really mean more existence? The nature of existence, rather, is entirely concentrated in its primary instance. It cannot be found anywhere else as a nature. How, then, can it be looked upon as increased when other things begin to exist? Is that not regarding it as being shared in the manner of a nature, as for instance whiteness and humanity are shared?

Existence, consequently, is participated by a type of causality, namely efficient causality, that prevents it from being assimilated with the model of perfections that are shared through formal causality. While the process of participation cannot here be understood from within, on account of the lack of any authentic concept of existence, it does make the conclusion sufficiently clear from without that it cannot multiply instances of a nature. More existents do not mean more existence.

²² "... non sic est in rebus quasi aliquid rei, sed sicut rei causa quae nullo modo suo effectui deest." *CG*, I, 26, Quatum. Cf. texts supra, n. 19. The latter texts seem to stress efficient causality in this regard. Nevertheless the commentary on the *Sentences* means to include also exemplar causality, that is, extrinsic formal causality: "et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum effective et exemplariter manat." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 198. Exemplar causality is the type mentioned expressly in the *Contra Gentiles* article: "Ex hoc vero quod dixit quod divinitas est *esse omnium*, ostendit quod a Deo in omnibus quaedam divini esse similitudo reperitur." *CG*, I, 26, Huic. Cf.: "Unde ipse est exemplaris forma rerum." *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, Solut.; I, 63.

But does not the participation of existence mean more things? Undoubtedly it does. If there are more existents, there are necessarily more things in the universe. Yet if the primary existent is all-embracing, if it contains within its own infinity all perfection, how can it leave room for any other things?

The question seems to presume that finite things have some perfection just of themselves. It would be this perfection that might be set off in contrast to the infinite perfection of their primary cause. In the Thomistic framework, however, finite essences have no actuality of their own. Of themselves, their status is that of nothing. They receive all their perfection from an efficient cause. To exercise their own type of causality they do not need actuality, for they specify their existence not as actualities but as potentialities.²³ From the viewpoint of perfection, consequently, the problem is thrown back to the framework of existence, the actuality through which they have their perfections. For the same reason that more existents do not mean more existence, so more things do not mean more perfection added to the already infinite perfection found in their primary cause. They may mean a greater number of perfect things in the universe, but they do not thereby mean that there is more perfection.

The problem, accordingly, is forced back on the character of existence and the way it is known originally through judgment. As things, existents are known through conceptualization. The being that is infinite in every perfection is reached by the metaphysician first as existence, and only later as a thing. The existence is established first, and then is shown to be subsistent and accordingly to be a thing. From a metaphysical viewpoint, therefore, the aspect of thing is secondary in infinite being.²⁴ The problems of its relation to other things have to be broached on the level of existence. If in the perspective of existence the presence of a unique infinite existence is shown to be compatible with a plurality of finite existents, the question

²³ "Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam." *De Pot.*, VII, 2, ad 9m.

²⁴ In the context of St Thomas, accordingly, it can hardly be correct to prefer "the reality of God" to "the existence of God," at least if the etymology of "reality" as coming from *res* 'thing' is respected. Peirce, on account of his own understanding of existence, advocated that preference: "I will also take the liberty of substituting 'reality' for 'existence.' This is perhaps overscrupulosity; but I myself always use *exist* in its strict philosophical sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment.' Of course, in that sense, it would be fetishism to say that God 'exists.'" Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass., 1935), VI, 340 (6.495). Cf. *ibid.*, 311-341 (nos. 452-496). The influence of this diction continues, e.g.: "The question is whether the existence of God — or better, the reality of God — is..." E. Fontinell, "Postscript," in *Speaking of God*, ed. Denis Dirscherl (Milwaukee, 1967), 158. On the etymology of *res* for Aquinas, see *In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; I, 611-612.

has been answered. They all may then be considered as a totality of things, without any further query arising how a thing of infinite perfection can allow room for things of finite perfection.²⁵ Used as a starting point and model, the notion of thing will inevitably involve finitude. It is a notion that generalized the limited natures found in the categories. Only through starting with existence and showing that subsistent existence is itself a thing, is the notion of an infinitely perfect thing established.

The problem of the alleged leap from the finite to the infinite becomes accordingly quite intelligible. To serve as a subject for consideration and discussion, the existence of finite objects had to be represented as itself a finite thing. The illusion is thereby given that the demonstration of God's existence is starting off from something finite. While the thing that is being moved in the observable world is unquestionably a finite object, the existential actuality that is being acquired by the motion is not grasped as a finite thing or nature, but as an actuality that discloses only an infinite nature. As subsistent, existence is finally established as a thing and a nature. It shows itself to be something infinite by its very nature. It can never appear as something finite. When actualizing a finite thing, it ceases to be something. Yet it has to be represented as something if it is to be placed in the starting point of the demonstration. Hence arises the temptation to project the argument as a passage from a finite thing to another thing that would be infinite. This, of course, is impossible. Rather, the operative feature throughout has to be located in existence, an actuality that in its nature is infinite only.

III

But if a demonstration of God's existence has to find its operative characteristic in existential actuality, in order to avoid a leap from the finite

²⁵ In this perspective one may concede that "God and creatures have nothing in common as regards their essence" — J. Bobik, "Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," *The New Scholasticism*, 37 (1963), 418. Although St Thomas himself regards existence as essence in God, he does not consider the tradition predicating essence of God to be basically different from the Avicennian assertion that God has no essence: "Hae autem opiniones, quamvis in superficie diversae videantur, tamen non sunt contrariae, si quis dictorum rationes ex causis assumit dicendi. Quia primi consideraverunt ipsas res creatas, ... et ideo dixerunt, quod Deus est esse sine essentia, ..." *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, Solut.; I, 69. Cf. *De Ente*, c. V; p. 37.14-16. Having nothing in common from the viewpoint of essence, God and creatures are not comparable strictly as things. They are comparable from the standpoint of existence — God is the primary instance, creatures are secondary instances. Creatures, because of their essences, diversify the existence they receive. To try to find a ground for diversification directly in subsistent existence, which is infinite in its inclusiveness, seems to render insoluble the problem how any room is left for other existents. The diversification has to be explained entirely from the side of finite essences.

to the infinite, will not every cogent proof have to be in some way specified by existence? Will not the proof from motion have to be regarded as existential in character and bearing? Yet how can existence specify any intellectual activity or process?

This throws the question into the larger context of the specification of metaphysics as a science. In the Aristotelian tradition, metaphysics is the science of beings as beings. It finds its specifying principle in the characteristic of being. In St Thomas, being is existence. Metaphysics, accordingly, will have a subject that is characterized by existence. Existence will be its specifying principle. But how is this possible?

Explicitly for St Thomas, all things come under metaphysics insofar as they coincide in the aspect of being (*ratio entis*).²⁶ Common being is accordingly the subject of the science.²⁷ But how is this "aspect of being" or the notion of "common being" attained by the human intellect? Certainly it cannot be regarded as merely "given" in conceptualization, in the way that aspects such as humanity or quantity or motion are immediately given. Would not a concept so attained be lacking in all content when it attempted to represent being? Would it not extend the notion of "common being" in a way that would bring under it all beings, including God? But for St Thomas the aspect of being has important content, and God does not come under common being. In the case of being must not the common aspect, then, be attained in a way quite different from the manner in which the specifying principles of other sciences are grasped?

How is the aspect of being, in its basic notion, constituted for Aquinas? It is clearly derived from the actuality of being.²⁸ This actuality is the being that is originally grasped through judgment,²⁹ and that has regularly been called existence in the course of the present article. What is apprehended through judgment gives the notion its characteristic content. It gives it content that is able to constitute a subject for a distinctive science, metaphysics. To that extent does existence determine the character and procedure of this discipline. To that extent, accordingly, may it be regarded as specifying the science of metaphysics. True, the notion of specification thereby becomes analogous. As certain essential traits determine the objects of other sciences, so does existence characterize the subject of

²⁶ See *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 2; I, 9-10.

²⁷ *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4, Resp.; ed. B. Decker, 194-195. *In Metaph.*, Proem.

²⁸ E.g.: "...esse est actus existentis, inquantum ens est." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, Solut.; I, 470. Cf. "Sed nomen entis sumitur ab esse rei." *In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, Solut.; I, 612.

²⁹ Cf.: "...secunda respicit esse ipsius." *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7m; I, 489. "Alia autem comprehendit esse rei,..." *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, Solut.; I, 903. "Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei,..." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 3, Resp.; ed. Decker, 182.9-10.

metaphysics. In this analogous fashion the notion of specification is extended to the existential order. But need there be anything surprising about the introduction of analogy into the constitution of the subject of metaphysics? Rather, is not analogy the condition under which anything enters into the metaphysical realm in the context of Thomistic reasoning?

A genuinely metaphysical aspect, then, is not something that is immediately given in conceptualization. It is not something that can be indicated or pointed to with the finger, as plants for botany or stars for astronomy. If you try to isolate being in this manner as an object for a science, do you not get something entirely empty of objective content?³⁰ To reveal characteristic content, the concept of being has to be kept focused on what is known through judgment, that is, on the fact that something exists. It is in this way that the subject of metaphysics is established. Not immediately given in any one activity of the human intellect, it has to be constituted by combining the objects of the intellect's two basic and irreducible operations. Is is something that exists. In the complex notion the "something" is the general object of conceptualization, and is focused upon what the judgment grasps in the knowledge that something exists. May not this situation be correctly designated by saying that the subject of metaphysics has to be established, since it is not immediately given in conceptualization?

This peculiar condition of the subject of metaphysics has two important consequences in regard to the primary instance of being. It means that God does not come under the subject of metaphysics. The subject of metaphysics has to be a combination of two factors. The general object of conceptualization enables it to be common and to provide accordingly the universal character necessary for any scientific subject. The highly particularized existence, as attained through judgment, gives it distinctive content. Both are necessary for the subject of metaphysics. In consequence the primary instance of being, which in itself does not contain the combination of these two factors, does not come under the subject of metaphysics. Rather, it is the principle of the subject of this science. Accordingly common being comes under it, and not vice versa.³¹

The other notable consequence in regard to the primary instance of being is that the demonstration of God's existence is based upon the judg-

³⁰ E.g.: "The reason that Existence must be empty, diaphanous, blank, and in sum, *nil*, resides in its definitory contrast with Essence. ...There is no *nature* left for Existence,..." Donald C. Williams, "Dispensing with Existence," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 59 (1962), 753.

³¹ "... omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute,..." *In De Div. Nom.*, c. V, lect. 2, no. 660.

ment that something exists here and now in the observable world. Not on anything originally known through conceptualization can a metaphysical reasoning to God be grounded. Existence as grasped through judgment has to be the operative factor. An ontological argument is accordingly impossible. What characterizes a demonstration as metaphysical in the context of St Thomas, therefore, is its specification by existence grasped through judgment.

What bearing do these general considerations have upon the particular case of the *prima via*? If movement is a process towards existential actuality,³² it will possess quite obviously the factor that allows it to ground a metaphysical demonstration. That factor, however, will have to be known through judgment. It will have to be the fact that something is here and now being moved in the observable world. Nothing in the essence or nature of movement is able to lead the intellect to an infinite movent. Only the existential feature in the actuality that is being acquired through motion is able to provide the operative characteristic for a demonstration that has to proceed on a level higher than that of finite natures.

If this is the case, may not the existential factor be correctly said to specify the demonstration contained in the *prima via*? Will not the *via* be an argument from existential actuality that is being acquired through movement, to existential actuality that subsists? Will it not thereby allow ample room for other *viae*? Existence can be acquired or shared in different ways. It is bestowed through motion, through creation, through conservation, through concurrence. These, in themselves and in their numerous complications, allow wide scope for distinct ways of proceeding from participated existence to subsistent existence. While the operative force of the demonstration is always in the existential order, the different ways in which existence is bestowed invite different ways of developing the one proof.

Need this assessment of the *prima via*, then, be regarded as an effort to have things both ways at the same time, to keep one's cake and eat it? Does not the subject of metaphysics itself require both the universalizing concept and the existential actuality? In this context is the specification of the *prima via* by both motion and existence anything more than a claim that the argument is metaphysical in character?

IV

How do these considerations apply in the way St Thomas himself proceeds from the conclusion of an unmoved movent to problems involving

²³ See *supra*, n. 6.

its infinity and its existence? The *Contra Gentiles*, in which the argument from motion is developed at its greatest length and in explicit attention to detail, should provide a good means for investigating the sequence of his thought.

In it the arguments are presented as "rationes quibus tam philosophi quam doctores Catholici Deum esse probaverunt."³³ They are offered as ways already established in philosophical and Christian tradition. No original way is promised. In point of fact, they are all regarded here as arising in one way or another from Aristotle, with the exception of the last *via*. For it John Damascene and Averroes are cited (*CG*, I, 13, Ad hoc). What has been reached by these arguments is a primary being, and its conditions remain to be investigated: "Ostenso igitur quod est aliquod primum ens,... oportet eius conditiones investigare" (*CG*, I, 14, init.).

The examination of the conditions of the primary being is to be made chiefly by way of the negative theology. The reason is that the divine substance exceeds any form the human intellect can grasp:

Nam divina substantia omnem formam quam intellectus noster attingit, sua immensitate excedit: et sic ipsam apprehendere non possumus cognoscendo quid est. Sed aliqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est (*CG*, I, 14, Est autem).

From the start, accordingly, the object reached by the arguments for God's existence is being regarded as something endowed with *immensitas*. It is something that is beyond measure. The way in which it is beyond measure is specified. It supresses any form that the intellect can attain, so that there is no possibility of apprehending *what* it is. This means, clearly enough, that one has no conceptual knowledge of the divine substance. Conceptual knowledge is knowledge of things from the viewpoint of their forms. But because it is immeasurable, the divine substance exceeds all such forms.

From the start, therefore, the object reached by the demonstration is considered to be without measure. Not for a moment is the possibility allowed that it might be a finite form, as in the case of the Aristotelian separate substance. The term "infinite" is not used. Nevertheless the notion expressed by *immensitas* can hardly differ from what is ordinarily meant by infinity. At least it excludes any bounds or limits, in its notion of beyond all measure. The treatment takes place as though one has but to

³³ *CG*, I, 13, Ostenso. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 3, div. lae partis textus (I, 88-89), where the three ways are presented as those of Dionysius. Theological method, proceeding on the strength of God's revelation, presupposes his existence. Its interest, from St Thomas' viewpoint, is to examine the proofs, just as it examines any other materials offered it.

look at the object reached by the demonstration to see that it is beyond measure, just as one has but to look at it to see that it is what all recognize as God.

Negative theology, or procedure by way of removal, must however presuppose something positive to work on. It is true that knowledge of the divine substance is reached more and more as one characteristic after another is removed by the process of human thought: "Tantoque eius notitiae magis approinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo poterimus remove" (*ibid.*). But to offer more knowledge, the process has to consist in removal of limitations that restrict the object's perfection. The human intellect must have attained a positive object that appears under limitations, and that becomes better known as the limitations are gradually removed.

What is that positive underlying and immeasurable object? The article of the *Contra Gentiles* immediately identifies it under the characteristic of immobility, as reached by the *viae* from motion: "Ad procedendum igitur circa Dei cognitionem per viam remotionis, accipiamus principium id quod ex superioribus iam manifestum est, scilicet quod Deus sit omnino immobilis" (*ibid.*, fin.). The thoroughgoing immobility reached by the argument from motion is to be the starting point from which limiting traits are to be removed one by one. It itself is placed beyond all limiting measures. It is designated by a word that is negative in form. But what the word signifies in the backward reference to the conclusion of the demonstration from motion is positive enough. It is the "primum motorem separatim omnino immobilem" (*CG*, I, 13, Sed quia). According to the force of the reasoning it is actuality that is not being brought into actuality by anything. Is not this a decidedly positive notion? From its unmeasured and immeasurable richness, consequently, all limiting features are to be gradually removed. The removal of the limiting traits enables the human intellect to understand it in increasing depth.

With immobility as the basis for the reasoning, the first aspect demonstrated of the primary being is its eternity:

Nam omne quod incipit esse vel desinit, per motum vel mutationem hoc patitur. Ostensum autem est Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Est igitur aeternus, carens principio et fine (*CG*, I, 15, init.).

From the immobility reached by the argument from motion, the conclusion is drawn that God has no beginning of existence or end of existence. His existence cannot undergo change either by beginning or by ending. To carry this reasoning, the notion of movement has been extended to that of any kind of change (*mutatio*) whatsoever. In the Thomistic argument, accordingly, movement has not been understood as restricted to the process

by which matter acquires form. In that Aristotelian perspective the matter was always previously existent, and was being brought to a new form. The extension of the notion to *mutatio* shows clearly enough the location of the reasoning in the traditional Augustinian setting, in which mutability was the characteristic of creatures in contradistinction to God. Against this background, mutability covered change from non-existence to existence, even though there was no subjective potency presupposed.³⁴ Does not this indicate quite sharply that in the conclusion of the Thomistic argument the notion of the entirely immobile is being understood on a level above that of form? Is it not taken in a sense in which the actuality reached by the proof is existence? Though the phrasing is Aristotelian, does not the meaning range beyond the Aristotelian notion of change as the acquisition of form to a setting in which change can denote the attaining of new existence?

St Thomas is well aware of the basis on which the cogency of the Aristotelian reasoning is laid. The cogency rests on the eternity of time and of cosmic notion. It is from the eternity of cosmic movement that the Aristotelian argument concludes to the eternity of the movent substance. Nevertheless the rejection of the Aristotelian premise does not undermine the conclusion:

Ostendit etiam Aristoteles ex sempiternitate temporis sempiternitatem motus. Ex quo iterum ostendit sempiternitatem substantiae moventis. ...Negata autem sempiternitate temporis et motus, adhuc manet ratio ad sempiternitatem substantiae. Nam, si motus incoepit, oportet quod ab aliquo movente incoeperit. Qui si incoepit, aliquo agente incoepit.³⁵

Even after the denial of the Aristotelian premises regarding the eternity of time and cosmic movement, the argument from motion still holds for St Thomas. If movement begins, it has to have its beginning through a movent, and ultimately through an agent that had no beginning. An

³⁴ See the standard texts of St Augustine assembled in Lombard's *Sentences*, Dist. VIII, cap. 1-7, in *Libri IV Sententiarum* (Quaracchi, 1916), I, 57-64. Cf.: "Si creata, utique et mutabilia sunt." John Damascene, *De Fide Orth.*, I, 3, 126; PG, 94, 795. Nevertheless the Aristotelian conception of motion may be seen influencing the traditional Christian demonstration of God's existence before the thirteenth century. In a text pointed out by Beryl Smalley from Herbert of Boseham, *Liber Melorum*, III, 8 (PL, 190, 1357), the coupling of actuality with movement seems to me to indicate Aristotelian conditioning, even though the notion of mobility is meant to be in accord with *Wisdom*, VII, 24. The text is: "Quare et juxta philosophorum demonstrationem certissimam, necesse est ut ab aliquo immobili omnis hic sensibilis mundi procedat motus. ...prima et summa causa est sicut omnis actus et omnis motus, juxta quod scriptum alibi quod manens immobilis dat cuncta moveri."

³⁵ *CG*, I, 15, Ostendit. Cf. I, 13, Praedictos. See also In *XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 2499; lect. 8, no. 2536.

eternal agent, and accordingly an eternal substance, is thereby demonstrated. This conclusion may not seem to rise above the Aristotelian framework, in which a finite form could be an eternal substance. Yet unlike the Aristotelian separate form, the eternal substance reached by the Thomistic reasoning here is an agent, an efficient cause. Not feeling himself bound by the premises in the Aristotelian framework, St Thomas is quite free to substitute other premises and arrive at a different kind of eternal substance. The full force of the difference is not exploited here, as it is elsewhere,³⁶ but enough appears to show that, just as in the other places, eternity is being conceived in terms of existence: "Est igitur carens principio et fine, totum esse suum simul habens. In quo ratio aeternitatis consistit" (CG, I, 15, Item).

The next stage in the development of conclusions from the immobility of the primary movent is to show that there is no passive potency in God (CG, I, 16). Through demonstration couched in terms of actuality and potentiality, the arguments from motion had reached explicitly an entirely immobile movent. But the conclusion that in the immobile movent there is no potency at all, was not drawn. In the Aristotelian *Physics* a conclusion of this kind had not been reached. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle did arrive at separate movents about which he was able to draw this conclusion. The eternity of cosmic motion required them to be entirely without potency, even though they did not function as efficient causes. Against his own Christian background, St Thomas is now drawing explicitly the conclusion that the primary movent has no passive potentiality whatsoever.

The case is introduced in terms of the eternal existence already established in the preceding article. To the extent a substance has admixture of potentiality, it is capable of non-existence. But God, because of his eternity, is not capable of non-existence. Accordingly there is no admixture of potentiality in his substance. Secondly, as primary being and primary cause, God cannot presuppose any actuality prior to himself. But a thing that is in any way potential presupposes some prior actuality. Thirdly, because God is of himself necessary being, he is not subject to any cause and consequently cannot have any aspect of potentiality in his substance. As the primary agent, fourthly, he cannot act in virtue of participating anything else. He has to be active through his own essence. This means that he is active in virtue of his entire self. He has accordingly no admixture of potency, but is pure actuality (CG, I, 16, Item unumquodque).

³⁶ In *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1-2; I, 201-206. *Ibid.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 1-2; I, 465-472. In *II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; II, 61-65. In *De Div. Nom.*, c. X, lect. 3, nos. 860-875. In *Lib. de Causis*, Prop. 2 (ed. Saffrey, 1954, 11-16). *ST*, I, 10, 1-3.

These arguments, starting with the one from the eternity of God, all understand potentiality in relation to existence and activity. Potentiality, even though introduced in the Aristotelian setting of cosmic movement, is being viewed in the wider setting of potentiality to existence. No difficulty seems felt in this extension of the notion, and no need of calling attention to it seems to be experienced. In a fifth argument, the notion of potentiality is thrown back on the Aristotelian definition of movement, and the same conclusion is immediately drawn from the immutability that had already been established for God as a result of the arguments from motion:

Unumquodque, sicut natum est agere in quantum est actu, ita natum est pati in quantum est in potentia: nam motus est actus potentia existentis. Sed Deus est omnino impassibilis ac immutabilis, ut patet ex dictis. Nihil ergo habet de potentia, scilicet passiva (CG, I, 16, *Adhuc unumquodque*).

In this argument the thoroughgoing immobility of God, as reached in the demonstration from motion and viewed in the wider terms of impassivity and immutability, is regarded as leading to the impossibility of any passively potential aspect in God. The conclusion is meant in the broad sense in which potentiality has been understood throughout the present article. It is regarded as potentiality not only to form but also to existence.

The sixth and final argument also follows closely the steps of the demonstration from motion. But the aspect of existence makes itself felt in the reasoning. What is only in potency does not yet exist, and therefore cannot perform any activity. Accordingly it requires that something prior to itself exist, to bring it from potentiality to actuality:

...quia quod est potentia, nondum est; unde nec agere potest. Ergo oportet esse aliquid aliud prius, quo educatur de potentia in actum. ...Ergo oportet devenire ad aliquod quod est tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia (CG, I, 16, *Item videmus*).

The least that can be said in respect of the potentiality envisaged in all this reasoning is that it ranges considerably beyond the Aristotelian notion. It is spread out in a Christian context in which mutability is the characteristic of creatures, in the sense that they are made from nothing and not from a pre-existing potentiality. In this setting potentiality is related to existence and to efficient cause, rather than to form. What is in potency does not exist and cannot act, as is stated in the final argument just quoted. The explicit conclusion that the primary agent is pure actuality is drawn from the consideration that it has to act in virtue of its whole essence. It is shown to be pure actuality because it is in this way an efficient cause. Could the difference from the Aristotelian separate forms be any more striking?

The theme of immobility is then used to show that in God there is no

matter, since matter is something potential: "Si igitur Deus est immobilis, ut probatum est, nullo modo potest esse rerum causa per modum materiae" (CG, I, 17, Item materia non fit causa). Likewise, complete lack of potentiality makes any composition impossible, since composition requires at least the potentiality of the parts to form a whole (CG, I, 18). Also, the thoroughgoing immobility of God is used to show that there can be nothing strained or unnatural in him: "Omne in quo est aliquid violentum vel innaturale, natum est ab alio moveri: ...Deus autem est omnino immobilis, ut ostensum est" (CG, I, 19, Item). Further, the impossibility of composition and the complete lack of potentiality in God require that he be his own essence, since individual is related to essence under the aspect of potentiality as to actuality (CG, I, 21).

Then follows the proof that in God essence or quiddity is not other than his existence. The first arguments are from the necessary and independent character of the divine existence, from its simplicity or lack of composition, and from its primacy. But eventually one is brought forward from the aspect of pure actuality in God. Pure actuality, however, is understood in a context in which everything other than existence is regarded as a potentiality for existence. The result is that nothing besides existence could be understood as pure actuality. The restriction of the notion to the existential order appears clearly in the argument:

Esse actum quendam nominat: non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc quod est in potentia, sed ex eo quod est in actu. Omne autem cui convenit actus aliquis diversum ab eo existens, se habet ad ipsum ut potentia ad actum:... Ostensum est autem in Deo nihil esse de potentia, sed ipsum esse purum actum (CG, I, 22, Amplius *esse*).

Can there be any question here of deriving the notion of subsistent existence from any non-existential actuality? Can the reasoning be construed as though the argument from motion had reached a conclusion common to both the Aristotelian and Thomistic conceptions of an entirely immobile movent, and that only later the additional conclusion is drawn that the primary movent has to be subsistent existence? Is it not clear from the above text that the immobile movent reached by the Thomistic reasoning was understood from the start as purely existential actuality, since all other actuality is still a potency to its own existence? In the course of the subsequent reasoning no query was framed in terms of proving that the entirely immobile movent was subsistent existence. Rather, the query was framed in terms of lack of any difference between essence or quiddity and existence in God. The conclusion as first expressed is that God has no essence that is not his existence: "Deus igitur non habet essentiam quae non sit suum esse" (CG, I, 22, Ostensum). Does not this read as though the divine existence is taken as established, here by the argument

from the possible and the necessary, and the query is whether any essence is there in addition to the existence? When the argument from pure actuality as demonstrated through motion is reached, the framework of the reasoning can hardly be regarded as changed. The conclusion accordingly is worded: "Non igitur Dei essentia est aliud quam suum esse" (CG, I, 22, *Amplius esse*). The conclusion here takes for granted that the existence has been established, and is showing that in this case the essence cannot be other than it. All continues to proceed as though the argument from motion had arrived at existential actuality, and now this actuality is shown to have no essence other than itself. There is no trace of an attempt to prove that the actuality itself is existential. That is clearly taken for granted.

In the concluding passages of the article the statement of *Exodus*, III, 14, is brought forward. Since the name signifies the nature or essence of a thing, it follows that the divine existence itself is its own essence or nature: "Hanc autem sublimem veritatem Moyses a Domino est edoctus:... *Ego sum qui sum*. ...Quodlibet autem nomen est institutum ad significandum naturam seu essentiam alicuius rei. Unde relinquitur quod ipsum divinum esse est sua natura vel essentia."³⁷ The existence is regarded as established. The conclusion drawn is that it is its own essence. If this use of the Scriptural passage is compared with its occurrence in the article in which the *prima via* of the *Summa Theologiae* is located, does not the whole picture make excellent sense? In the *Sed contra* of that article (*ST*, I, 2, 3), God is presented under the designation found in *Exodus*. Accordingly, from St Thomas' earlier understanding of the Scriptural text in the *Contra Gentiles*, God is presented as existence that is its own essence. In that setting, when the immobile movent reached by the *prima via* is at once identified with God, need it be at all surprising that the movent should be regarded as existential actuality? As existential actuality and nothing else,³⁸ does it not appear without more ado as the *I am who am* of the *Sed contra* in the article, especially when one considers the understanding that had been given the Scriptural statement in the *Contra Gentiles*?

Finally, in proving that all perfection is found in God, St Thomas draws the conclusion equally from God's existence and from his pure actuality. The conclusion follows from his existence: "Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem

³⁷ CG I, 22, Hanc autem. Cf. *ST*, I, 2, 3, *Sed contra*.

³⁸ Cf.: "... a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hec est causa prima que Deus est." *De Ente*, c. IV; p. 35.17-19. "...quod Deus est esse tantum." *Ibid.*, c. V, p. 37.21-22.

ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate³⁹ quae alicui rei conveniat" (CG, I, 28, Omnis). It follows just as readily from pure actuality: "Id igitur quod nullo modo est in potentia sed est actus purus, oportet perfectissimum esse" (*Ibid.*, Amplius unumquodque). In the premises, then, pure actuality, just as does subsistent existence, involves all perfections. It is being understood as existential actuality, not formal actuality. This totality of perfection means that God is infinite: "... eius perfectio omnium generum perfectiones continet, ut supra ostensum est. Est igitur infinitus" (CG, I, 43, Omne). The infinity is shown equally from pure actuality (*ibid.*, Item tanto) and from existential actuality (Amplius ipsum). The two seem regarded as coinciding in the fullness of actuality.

The procedure in the *Contra Gentiles*, then, shows clearly enough that what is reached in the conclusion of the arguments from motion is an actuality unlimited by any essence or nature. This, in the framework of St Thomas' metaphysical reasoning, can be only existential actuality. On the strength of the actuality so reached, the immobile movent is readily shown to be eternal, lacking all passive potentiality, containing the perfections of all things, and accordingly to be infinite.

V

Nowhere in the procedure of St Thomas in proving God's existence and perfections is there any leap from the finite to the infinite. The operative feature in the starting point is the existential actuality found in sensible things. Of its nature this actuality is infinite. Where it is present in a status other than that of a nature, it is indeed limited by something else, but not at all in virtue of the characteristic it itself discloses. It is on the strength of that characteristic that the demonstration is developed.

In particular, in the reasoning from motion the actuality that is being attained through movement is ultimately existential. Accordingly the actuality that is finally reached in the argument, actuality that is not being actualized by anything, can be only existential actuality. It is existence and nothing else. No authentic concept of it can be formed. It has to be expressed in terms of notions taken from finite natures, such as something, or actuality, or perfection. Here the notion used is that of an entirely un-

³⁹ In this sense "nobilitas" seems meant to reflect the aristocratic Greek notion of *arête* and corresponding adjective (see Aristotle, *Cat.*, 8, 10b5-9) *spoudaios*, as may be seen in St Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d.2, q.1, a.2, Praeterea (I, 62), where the concept of the perfect is based on the teaching of *Metaph.*, A 16, 1021b21-24, with the comments of Averroes, *ad loc.*, comm. 21 (Venice, 1574), fol. 130v1-131r1.

moved movent, a notion taken from Aristotle's separate finite forms. In itself it does not express existence. But, just as the concepts of something and of actuality and of perfection, it can be kept focused on existential actuality and serve as an apt means of spotlighting the character that enables the object reached by the *prima via* to be identified at once as the *I am who am* of *Exodus*. No more than any other concept can that of a completely immobile movent have genuine existential content. But like a number of other concepts, it can focus attention on what is concluded from the actuality apprehended through judgment. Just as what is known through the judgment "This table exists" can be taken up again conceptually as "the existence of this table," so the entirely unmoved actuality that ultimately is imparting observed motion can, though existential in character, be indicated by the concept of a completely immobile movent. To be so known, however, it has to be seen as cogently required, in the conclusion of a reasoning process, by the movement here and now occurring in the observable world. It may not even for an instant be cut off from the existential starting point, if it is to be validly reached. Pascal⁴⁰ noted trenchantly that a metaphysical proof for the existence of God would have force only at the moment the demonstration is being seen. Does not this reflection have striking application in the case of the Thomistic *prima via*? A reservation, of course, is that memory keeps fresh the assent given to conclusions already proved.

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⁴⁰ "The metaphysical proofs of God are so remote from the reasoning of men, and so involved, that they have but little force; and if this should be helpful to some persons, it would be so only during the moment they are seeing the demonstration." *Pensées*, 543 (ed. Chevalier).

The Liberal Arts in the Sermons of Garnier of Rochefort

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I. GARNIER'S LIFE AND WORKS

GARNIER of Rochefort was a monk at the abbey of Longuay (Longué) in the diocese of Langres¹ before he was elected abbot of Auberive² in 1180. Some seven years later he became the ninth abbot of Clairvaux. As such he is praised in the *Exordium magnum cisterciense*³ for his religious zeal. It is generally assumed that he preached the Third Crusade. This assumption is based on a letter of 1 October 1191 addressed to him by Richard I.⁴ About 1193 Garnier succeeded Manasses (1179-93) in the episcopacy of Langres.⁵

The promotion proved to be a mixed blessing. A letter addressed to him on 16 March 1198 by Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) reveals that he was bitterly opposed by his dean, Hilduin, and the cathedral chapter. They accused him of incompetence and of squandering church property.⁶ Innocent ordered Garnier to present himself in Rome on 29 September 1198 to justify his actions unless peace was restored before that date. All those critics whose names were mentioned in a letter of Garnier to the pope⁷ were given the same orders. The canons obeyed, but the pope waited in vain for the bishop's arrival. At last two messengers appeared with a letter which was read at a consistory. Since the messengers had

¹ *Gall. chr.* 4 (Paris, 1876) 837-839.

² According to the *Gall. chr.* 4,834C he was a prior at Clairvaux before his transfer to Auberive.

³ *S. Bernardi vita prima* VII, 29, 65; PL 185, 451 BC.

⁴ *Hist. litt.* 16 (Paris, 1892) 425. The letter has been edited by J. C. Didier, in: *Coll. Ord. Cist. ref.* 18 (1956) 195-197. In mid-November 1191 Garnier sent a copy of the letter to William of Champagne, archb. of Rheims (1176-1202).

⁵ *Gall. chr.* 4,591-594. PL 205,555C. The exact date of succession is not known. See also J. C. Didier, "Garnerius of Rochefort," in: *New Cath. Encycl.* 6 (New York, 1967) 291. Idem, "Garnier de Rochefort: sa vie et son œuvre," in: *Coll. Ord. Cist. ref.* 17 (1955) 145-158, M. D. Chenu, "Erigène à Cîteaux," in: *La phil. et ses problèmes* (Paris, 1960) 99-107.

⁶ Innocent III, *Ep.* 182; PL 214, 163C. A. Potthast, *Reg. Pont. Rom.* 1 (Berlin, 1874) 19, No. 192.

⁷ Both Garnier and the chapter appealed to Rome when the archb. of Lyons, Rainald Forez (1193-1226), failed to reach a settlement.

received no authority to act in the bishop's name, the pope detained the canons until Christmas, hoping that Garnier would obey his orders. Finally, on 31 December 1198 Innocent suspended the bishop until he had satisfied the dean and the chapter concerning his handling of church property.⁸

At the same time, Eudes of Sully, bishop of Paris (1196-1208), was instructed by Rome to bring about a settlement and to appoint an "able procurator" who was to safeguard the interests of the cathedral. On 26 February 1199 Innocent authorized Master Peter of Corbeil, then still a canon at the cathedral of Paris, later (1199) bishop of Cambrai and archbishop of Sens (1200-1222), to assist his bishop in settling the dispute. In the following year Garnier resigned at the pope's request and retired to an abbey, probably Clairvaux.⁹ He was succeeded by his dean, Hilduin of Vandœuvre (1201-1203). The last known charter¹⁰ signed by Garnier bears the date: January 1225. His epitaph¹¹ shows that he died at Clairvaux.

It is thought that during his retirement Garnier compiled the Scriptural nomenclator known as *Angelus*.¹² Cl. Baeumker,¹³ however, holds that it was written as early as 1186. About 1208-1212 he wrote the tract *Contra Amaurianos*,¹⁴ found in a Troyes manuscript containing forty-two of his sermons.¹⁵ Garnier is also the author of a work called *Ysagoge theophaniarum symbolice*¹⁶ and of a smaller tract entitled *De contrarietatibus in sacra scrip-*

⁸ *Ep.* 504; PL 214,464C-466B. Potthast, *Reg.* 1,49, No. 513.

⁹ Innocent III, *Ep.* 553; PL 214,505C-506D. Potthast, *Reg.* 1,57, No. 596. *Hist. litt.* 16,427. Garnier retained the authority to ordain and to consecrate churches, as is reported by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, *Chron.* an ann... 1200; MGH SS 23, 878: Garnerius episcopatum Lingonensem dimisit ita quod auctoritatem ordinandi et ecclesias consecrandi retinuit a Summo Pontifice — qui aliquos novos libros compilavit et novos tractatus et sermones subtiles satis ipse composuit. Cf. Potthast, *Reg.* 1,93, No. 987.

¹⁰ J. C. Didier, "Garnier de Rochefort", 153.

¹¹ *Gall. christ.* 4,593D: PL 205,560A. Cf. PL 185,1555B.

¹² See A. Wilmart, "L'ancienne bibl. de Clairvaux," in: *Coll. Ord. Cist. ref.* 11 (1949) 313. Idem, "Les Allégories sur l'écriture attribuées à Raban Maur," in: *Rev. Bén.* 32 (1920) 48-50. The *Angelus* is published as a work of Rabanus Maurus in PL 112, 849-1088.

¹³ Ed. "Contra Amaurianos," in: *Beiträge* 24 (1926), p. xxxvii. Cf. Fr. Stegmüller, *Rep. bibl. mediæ ævi* 2 (Madrid, 1950) 325.

¹⁴ Edited by Baeumker in *Beiträge* 24 (1926) 1-49 from MS Troyes, Bibl. munic. 1301, f. 141-154 (s. xiii) described in *Cat. gén.* 4^o, 2 (Paris, 1855) 536.

¹⁵ Forty of Garnier's forty-six known sermons have been edited by B. Tissier, *Bibl. Patr. Cist.* 3 (Bonofonte, 1660) 75-192 = PL 205, 555-828, from MS Troyes, Bibl. munic. 970 (s. xiii) described in *Cat. gén.* 4^o, 2 (Paris, 1855) 401.

¹⁶ MS Troyes, Bibl. munic. 455, f. 1-146 (s. xiii). The prologue has been edited by Baeumker (pp. xli-xliii).

tura.¹⁷ Many texts in the *Ysagoge* are copied from Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and John Beleth.¹⁸ The commentary on the penitential Psalms mentioned by Garnier in one of his sermons¹⁹ has not yet been identified. The sermons, forty of which have been published, are probably the earliest evidence of Garnier's literary activity as they reflect a man still in a position high enough to address the General Chapter on several occasions.²⁰

II. GARNIER'S USE OF THE LIBERAL ARTS

According to the *Histoire littéraire*²¹ Garnier's sermons did not deserve to be published. There is no denying that they would not appeal to a modern audience. His great love for allegories, his consuming interest in the etymology of biblical words and their secret meanings create an atmosphere of mystery which he endeavours to enlighten with the help of the liberal arts. In Garnier's world everything is orientated towards God. All learning must help man to discover the manifold manifestations of God on earth. Thus all knowledge and acquisition of learning is subordinate and subservient to theology. For that reason, theology, as understood by Garnier, is a wide concept. It is not treated as a systematized science but as the sum-total of knowledge concerning God, a sum-total which grows potentially with every increase of knowledge.

Garnier finds an outline of the general orientation of all things toward God in the first chapters of the Bible. Although at the beginning of his narrative Moses deals with God's works of creation, his principal intention, Garnier tells us, was to inform fallen mankind of God's work of restoration. Moses could not fittingly show how man was restored unless he showed first how he had fallen. Moses could not properly describe man's fall unless he explained first how he was created. To give a description of man's condition he had to reveal the condition of the entire world. The spirit, we learn from Garnier, has been made for God, the flesh for the

¹⁷ MS Troyes, Bibl. munic. 455, f. 146v-173. Its prologue has been published by Baeumker (pp. xxxviii-xxxix). P. Anciaux, *La théol. du sacrement de pénitence au xii^e siècle* (Louvain, 1949) 106, ascribes to Peter Cantor a work *De contrarietatibus*. But his reference to A. Landgraf does not confirm this claim.

¹⁸ See Baeumker, pp. xliii-liv.

¹⁹ Sermo 3; PL 205,586B. Henceforth Garnier's sermons will be quoted by the letter S followed by the number of the sermon and the column of PL 205 placed within brackets.

²⁰ S 33-35 (779D-798C).

²¹ *Hist. litt.* 16 (Paris, 1892) 429. The chronicler Alberic of Trois-Fontaines describes them as *sermones subtiles satis*. MGH SS 23,878.

spirit, the world for the human body.²² The liberal arts, as we shall see, were invented for theology and thus are equally orientated towards God.

Of the seven liberal arts, Garnier once told a General Chapter of the Cistercians, some "edify us" with words (*voces*), others with things (*res*). Of those that deal with words, grammar teaches their pronunciation, dialectic studies their signification, rhetoric instructs in both. Among those arts whose objects are things, physics examines nature while others study the form. Geometry deals with measures, arithmetic with numbers, music with proportions, astrology (= astronomy) with movements.²³ In other words, the trivium (grammar, logic, rhetoric) instructs us in the use of words while the quadrivium (geometry, arithmetic, music, astronomy) examines the forms of things. Physics studies their nature. Garnier keeps returning to this basic outline of the liberal arts and never grows tired of drawing attention to their role in theology.

For Garnier the liberal arts were foreshadowed in the Old Testament. He points out that God is the final end or motive of all human actions.²⁴ He asks his audience: which theology or "liberal discipline" of the New and the Old Testaments or even of the philosophers themselves does not proclaim that a good motive is the beginning of all things?²⁵ Some philosophers, however, have erred. Yet we read that Moses who was in all branches of learning the wisest of all Egyptians watered the sheep of the seven daughters of the priest of Madian.²⁶ Moses did this to make us realize that he who was the foremost preacher of theology filled the lovers of the seven arts with the profound mysteries of Sacred Scriptures.²⁷ The "foremost preacher of theology" of whom Garnier speaks is presumably not Moses but Christ.

²² S 34 (790AB).

²³ S 34 (789D): Nam cum illarum septem liberalium artium aliae de vocibus, aliae de rebus nos aedificent, quae autem de vocibus alia de pronuntiatione instruit ut grammatica, alia de significatione ut dialectica, alia de utraque ut rhetorica; quae vero de rebus alia circa naturam ut physica, alia circa formam; et quae circa formam alia circa mensuram ut geometria, alia circa numerum ut arithmetica, alia circa pondus (*read* proportiones) ut musica, alia versatur circa motus ut astrologia. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* V,14; ed. Ch. H. Buttimer (Washington, 1939) 131.

²⁴ S 34 (789 C).

²⁵ S 34 (789B): Nam quae theologia vel liberalis disciplina Novi et Veteris Testamenti immo et philosophorum hoc non resonat ut finem bonum rerum initia sortiantur?

²⁶ *Ex.* 2: 16-17.

²⁷ S 34 (789CD): Hinc est quod Moyses qui omni sapientia Egyptiorum sapientissimus perhibetur greges septem filiarum sacerdotis Madian ad puteum legitur adaquasse ut per hoc daretur intelligi quod iste qui praecipuus theologiae fuit praedicator profundis sanctorum scripturarum mysteriis septem liberalium artium amatores imbueret.

Our Cistercian expounds his view on the foreshadowing of the seven arts in the Old Testament more extensively in a sermon on St. John the Baptist. Again he returns to the same scene. Considering and knowing that he who walks in darkness does not see where he is going and therefore will fall into a pit, Moses fled from Egypt into the desert and on raising his eyes saw the well and the seven daughters of Raguel, the priest of Madian, preparing to water their sheep. When the shepherds denied them the water, Moses drove them away, watered the sheep, and later married Sephora, one of the priest's daughters. Garnier holds that for this reason we read in *Acts* (7: 22): "Moses was instructed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians." Then Garnier muses: "The seven daughters, I think, are the seven liberal arts by which the learning of the Egyptians is signified." Those sheep are the philosophers. The shepherds are the *physici et doctores*. The priest of Madian — a gentile and as such a son of iniquity, for Madian means iniquity — was the inventor of the arts.²⁸ When the shepherds hindered the sheep just as the teachers of philosophy hinder their disciples by not leading them to perfection, Moses first made the seven maidens drink, then watered the sheep. All this he did as soon as he detected the mysteries of theology (*divinitas*) in the arts. Thus he showed even the Egyptians an example of true learning, for "the liberal arts have been invented to serve theology."²⁹

It is obvious that the liberal arts rank higher in Garnier's estimation than philosophy. He holds, in fact, that we should regard the "doctrine of philosophy" as a prostitute, a strange woman, a concubine, and ought to love theology as the one spouse, the woman of the house, the queen.³⁰ Theology is really the *ars artium et regimen animarum*.³¹ In philosophy the senses reign, in theology sensuality is banished.³² The words of philosophers are bombastic (*ampullosa*). They talk a great deal about most insignificant matters. Garnier even speaks of the philosophers' *ineptas verborum phaleras*.³³

²⁸ S 23 (723AB).

²⁹ S 23 (723B): Ad hoc enim liberales artes inventae sunt ut theologiae deserviant.

³⁰ S 23 (726A): Illam quippe philosophiae doctrinam quasi meretricem quasi peregrinam quasi concubinam cognoscere, theologiam vero quasi unicam, quasi domesticam, quasi reginam diligere.

³¹ S 23 (726C): Tanto tamen excellentius et evidentius quanto ceteras artes ars artium et regimen animarum theologia praecellit. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* II, 1; ed. Buttmer 23: Philosophia est ars artium et disciplina disciplinarum. Cf. Concilium Lateranense IV (1215), Constit. 27; ed. J. Alberigo, in: *Conc. œcum. decreta* (Basel, 1962) 224; Cum sit ars artium regimen animarum...

³² S 23 (726C-727C).

³³ S 22 (710C).

It is, unfortunately, not easy to define what Garnier means by philosophy. In his vocabulary astronomers are philosophers.³⁴ In one sentence he goes so far as to admit that in matters concerning morals and faith we are instructed "by the writings of the philosophers."³⁵ In this context Garnier seems to refer to non-Christian authors writing on religious or moral subjects. He may have had in mind such writers as Seneca.

It is hardly easier to define Garnier's concept of theology. He insists that theology surpasses the liberal arts because they are subservient to theology and assist in the understanding of the various senses of Scriptures. Of special importance in this regard is the knowledge of history, allegory, and tropology. For history is contained in the signification of words in relation to their reality (*res*). History, Garnier goes on to explain, is served by grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. Allegory is hidden behind the relationship of things to "mystical deeds." The tropological sense appears in the relationship between the signification of things and mystical actions to be performed.³⁶ Both allegory and tropology are assisted or served by arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, and physics. But whatever we are taught through history, allegory, or tropology we are taught in view of our restoration.³⁷ In another sermon Garnier speaks of four different Scriptural senses: historical, moral, allegorical, and anagogical.³⁸ It is thus the primary task of theology to read and interpret the sacred writings.

We have seen that in the trivium words signify without things while in the quadrivium things signify without words. In theology both things and words have a signification. Hence theology, as Garnier reasons, needs

³⁴ S 24 (734A): *Nam philosophi circulum illum therinos (illos) tropicos appellant quo sol ab inferiori signo, videlicet capricorno, magis ac magis fervet et ascendit.*

³⁵ S 23 (725D): *Quamvis ergo vel circa ea, quae mores aedificant vel fidei testimonia habent, nos scripturae philosophorum crudiunt.*

³⁶ S 34 (789D): *Theologia in hoc omnes praecellit quod in his omnibus ei omnes famulantur. Nam sub eo sensu qui est in significatione vocum ad res historia continetur cui tres scientiae famulantur: grammatica, dialectica, rhetorica. Sub eo vero sensu qui est rerum ad facta mystica continetur allegoria. Et sub eo sensu qui est in rerum significatione ad facienda mystica continetur tropologia. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* V, 2 and VI, 3-5; ed. Buttner 95 and 113-123.*

³⁷ S 34 (790A): *Et his duobus deservunt arithmetica, geometria, musica, astronomia et physica. Quidquid vero vel sub historia vel allegoria sive sub tropologia docetur, causa huius pacti i.e. nostrae restorationis edocetur.*

³⁸ S 11 (639 D): *Et quoniam verbum dei in historico morali allegorico et anagogico sensu solet dividi... S 37 (808A): Dicitur enim quandoque emphatice, quandoque antonomastice, quandoque specificce, quandoque anagogice, quandoque tropologice. S 21 (706B): Sunt enim aliqui qui solo textu historiae sunt contenti; alii in fide per allegoriam imbuendi; alii vero moribus per tropologiam aedificandi. In S 18 (686A) he distinguishes between Pascha historicum, allegoricum, tropologicum, and anagogicum.*

the assistance of both trivium and quadrivium. With ringing oratory Garnier proclaims: Where do we stand in greater need of words if not when we speak of the Word? Where do we need the embellishment of the human word more than when we speak of the divine Word? Where do we need logical words more than when we speak of Wisdom? Consequently, acting as maid-servants, grammar must be of service by providing the word, rhetoric the embellishment of style, logic its reasoning.³⁹

In a sermon on the Trinity, Garnier emphasizes even more strongly that to be a "perfect theologian" one must know the signification of both things and words.⁴⁰ Theology surpasses the trivium and quadrivium precisely because in theology both words and things signify something.⁴¹ The proper nature of a word, as Garnier sees it, consists in its utterance (*prolatio*) and its meaning. Its utterance belongs to grammar, its meaning to dialectic, both to rhetoric. In a similar manner the signification of things consists in their external form and in the internal quality of their nature.⁴² Form, as used by Garnier, is never a metaphysical term related to the composition of matter and form. According to our Cistercian, form is perceived in number (arithmetics), measure (geometry), proportion (music), and movement (astronomy). We learn from Garnier that nature is the object of physics.⁴³ He did not tell his audience the precise meaning of the word "nature."

The distinction between nature and form is also discussed in a sermon on John the Baptist. Garnier tells us that the signification of things is based either on their forms or on their nature. For example, because of its rapacious nature a wolf symbolizes the devil; because of its simplicity the lamb is a symbol of Christ. In this regard, we are told once more, physics serves theology like a maid-servant.⁴⁴

Since, as Garnier understands it, form consists in number, measure,

³⁹ S 23 (723C): Ubi enim magis indigemus verbo quam cum loquimur de Verbo? Ubi magis indigemus ornatu verbi quam cum de Verbo loquimur specioso forma prae filiis hominum... Ubi magis indigemus rationali verbo quam cum loquimur sapientiam? Ergo tamquam pedissequa grammatica deserviat verbo, ornatui verborum rhetorica, logica rationi.

⁴⁰ S 22 (712C): Scire debemus quia sine rerum et vocum significatione nemo perfecte theologus esse potest.

⁴¹ S 22 (712D).

⁴² S 22 (712D): Proprietas autem vocum in duobus consistit: in prolatione et significatione. Prolatio ad grammaticam, significatio ad dialecticam, utraque vero spectat ad rhetoricam. Similiter et rerum significatio in duobus consistit, in forma scilicet et natura: forma quantum in exteriori dispositione; natura quantum in interiori qualitate.

⁴³ S 22 (712D).

⁴⁴ S 23 (723CD): Rerum autem significatio vel circa formam vel circa naturam consistit. Nam pro sui rapacitate quam habet a natura lupus diabolum, pro sui simplicitate agnus Christum insinuat. Et in hoc quasi pedissequa dominae physica deservit theologiae.

proportion, and movement, arithmetic aids theology in the meaning of numbers, geometry in the significance of measure, music in the understanding of proportions, and astronomy in the interpretation of movement.⁴⁵ For the function of astronomy Garnier offers the example of the Magi: by observing the rising and the movements of a new star the Magi perceived the rising of a new King.⁴⁶ Garnier must have had the quadrivium in mind when he declared: *Secundum formam etiam quatuor modis manifestatur deus. Forma enim constat numero pondere mensura et motu. Per numerum deus significatur sicut per unitatem.*⁴⁷ He does not enlarge on the statement that God is signified by number. Perhaps he thought of the Trinity. Many instances in Garnier's sermons confirm the fact that he paid special attention to numbers whenever they occurred in a Scriptural text under consideration.⁴⁸

In proposing the distinction between word and thing our Cistercian is inclined to emphasize the latter. In Scriptural narratives, he points out, we must advert to things by whose contemplation we are lifted up "on the wings of reason." Scripture says: "And Moses took to wife Sephora, the daughter of the priest of Madian" (*Ex.* 2:21). Here Garnier tells us again that Madian means iniquity and that accordingly the priest of Madian is a teacher of iniquity. More surprising is Garnier's concession that despite the evil significance of his name the priest's doctrine must not be rejected if what it contains is morally good.⁴⁹ Garnier goes on to say that the name of the priest's daughter, Sephora, means bird and signifies the doctrine that uplifts the mind by contemplation. Sephora's name then reminds our preacher of another Sephora, one of the two midwives who were given instructions to kill Moses (*Ex.* 1:15). Her companion was Phua which means a shy woman who blushes easily. As such she signifies the doctrine which teaches moral living in active life.⁵⁰ In this fashion Garnier reaches and justifies the distinction between active and contemplative life, a

⁴⁵ S 23 (723D): *Forma vero consistit in numero, in mensura, et proportionem et motu. Igitur in numero deservit theologiae arithmetica, in mensuris geometria, in proportionem musica, in motu vero astronomia. Cf. S 35 (794D).*

⁴⁶ S 23 (723D): *Nam ex ortu et motu novae stellae novi Regis ortum magi cognoverunt.*

⁴⁷ S 35 (794D).

⁴⁸ See, for instance, S 3 (587C); S 11 (644B); S 35 (794D).

⁴⁹ S 23 (724A): *Nam quamvis magister iniquitatis sit ille, eius doctrina, si mores informat, respuenda non est.*

⁵⁰ S 23 (724AB): *Phua quippe quae rubens vel verecunda dicitur illam, quae mores corporum per activam vitam informat, doctrinam insinuat. Sephora vero quae, ut dictum est, avis interpretatur illam quae, mentem per contemplationem elevat, doctrinam demonstrat. (725A): ...per Sephoram figuratur illa videlicet doctrina quae rationis alis per contemplationem nos erigit.*

distinction to which corresponds a twofold doctrine concerning morals and faith.⁵¹

Summing up, Garnier tells his audience that every doctrine of which he has spoken is comprised in logic, ethics, physics, and theology. Logic, he explains, is a rational, ethics a moral, physics a natural, and theology a spiritual science. Of philosophy as a science Garnier has nothing to say. As far as it can be gathered from his sermons Garnier distinguished four sciences:

<i>scientia</i>	
<i>rationalis</i>	: <i>logica</i>
<i>moralis</i>	: <i>ethica</i>
<i>naturalis</i>	: <i>physica</i>
<i>spiritualis</i>	: <i>theologia</i> ⁵²

But this division must not be interpreted in the sense that the four sciences are autonomous. In Garnier's view theology teaches whatever pertains to physics, logic, and ethics: *Quidquid enim naturae, quidquid rationis, quidquid morum est, docet sapientia spiritualis.*⁵³ Needless to say, such a statement turns every science into theology. This is not as absurd as it may sound in a different context, for by theology Garnier means every kind and piece of knowledge that helps in the understanding of the Scriptures and thus leads man closer to God.

Within the sciences the intellectual approach to the object varies. Proceeding "mathematically" the mind studies the visible forms of visible things; proceeding "physically" it examines the invisible causes of visible things; proceeding "by symbols" (*symbolice*) it gathers and adjusts visible forms for a demonstration of things invisible; proceeding "theologically" it contemplates invisible substances and the invisible nature of invisible substances. According to Garnier these four ways of approaching the object are successive steps of contemplation leading the human mind to the highest degree of knowledge.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Cf. S 23 (725A): *Ergo per Achimaan illa quae mores informat activa vita figuratur.* (726B): *In his duobus (Isaac et Rebecca) duplex illa doctrina designatur quarum una mores, altera fidem aedificat.*

⁵² S 23 (727D): *Omnis enim de qua supra dictum est doctrina sub quadruplici doctrina logica ethica physica theologia concluditur. Logica rationalis scientia est, ethica moralis, physica naturalis, theologia spiritualis.*

⁵³ S 23 (728B).

⁵⁴ S 23 (730A): *Nam vel mathematice (mens) speculatur visibiles rerum visibilium formas vel physice invisibiles rerum visibilium causas vel symbolice colligit et coaptat formas visibiles ad invisibilium demonstrationem vel theologicè contemplatur invisibiles substantias et invisibilium substantiarum invisibiles naturas.* Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* VI,14; ed. Ch. H. Buttimer (Washington, D.C., 1939) 131. *Speculum ecclesiae* 8; PL 177,376A.

In this adaptation of a Boethian division of sciences the last two steps coincide with Garnier's distinction in theology of two different types of contemplation or vision: theophany and *anagoge*. The theories expounded by Garnier in connection with this distinction are, as we shall see, based partly on Hugh of Saint-Victor, partly on a strange piece of angelology which seems to have originated in the school of Gilbert of Poitiers. Largely attributed to Scotus Erigena the doctrine is transferred by Garnier from angelic to human knowledge.

He tells us that in theophany or divine apparition the truth remains hidden and covered through figures, forms, and likenesses. In the *anagoge* the mind strives to contemplate the apex of the divine hierarchy openly, clearly, and without any covering (*integumentum*).⁵⁵ The *anagoge* is an experience in which man remains almost completely passive, for in it the human mind, surrounded by the darkness of its ignorance, shivers and trembles so much that it cannot go forth into that bright light of truth unless it is guided. Being blind, as it were, and being led by the hand, it walks without seeing and begins to melt at the sight and the visit of the Loved One.⁵⁶

In a sermon on the Feast of the Purification Garnier told his audience that the power of the light illuminating the mind performs various functions. This light is a *vis*

1 *ascensiva* disposing man to proceed from servile to filial fear and higher love and to contemplate the superheavenly and superessential theophany or manifestation of God *aenigmatice vel anagogice*.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ S 23 (730B): Et sic ex duobus generibus visionum ad omnem perfectionem ascendit... unum quo formis et figuris et similitudinibus rerum occultarum veritas obumbratur — quod genus visionis et Graece theophasias i.e. divinas apparitiones appellant — alterum quo ascensu mentis et excessu nude et pure et absque integumento sicut est illum caelestem sacratissimum principatum nititur contemplari. Quod anagogicum nuncupatur. In S 31 (766C) Garnier derives the word from *ana* quod est sursum et *agoge* quod est ductio.

⁵⁶ S 23 (730B): Sed in hoc ultimo genere visionis ita tremit et palpitat mens humana ut tenebris ignorantiae suae obvoluta ad illam claritatem et veritatis lumen nisi dirigatur exire non potest sed quasi caeca et manu ductione utens quo non videt incedit et incipit liquefieri per visionem et visitationem dilecti. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Exp. in Hier. cael.* II; PL 175, 948B.

⁵⁷ S 9 (629D): Ex vi igitur ascensiva disponit ascensiones homo in corde suo incipiens a timore servili... sic ut, mente purgata et defaecata, cogitatione et aviditate contempletur aenigmatice vel anagogice supercaelestem et superessentialem theophasiam i.e. dei manifestationem. In S 35 (794B) Garnier enumerates five ways of divine manifestation: voce, re, imaginatione, ratione, anagogica contemplatione. The third way is described as follows: (795A): Fit autem dei manifestatio secundum imaginationem tribus modis videlicet per similem similitudinem, per dissimilem similitudinem, per similem dissimilitudinem. The distinction shows the influence of Alan of Lille. See, for instance, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* I, 1, 11; I, 1, 34; I, 1, 36; I, 1, 83; ed. P. Glorieux, in: *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge* 20 (1953) 58; 172; 175; 229.

- 2 *discretiva* which leads reason to "epiphany." Garnier tells us that *epi* means above (*supra*) and *phanes* means manifestation. Epiphany shows reason how to distinguish virtue from vice.⁵⁸
- 3 *restrictiva* leading the mind to "hyperphany." The word is composed of *hyper*, which according to Garnier means medium, and *phanes*. By teaching obedience it restrains the mind and strengthens it against adversity.⁵⁹
- 4 *consolidativa* which elevates the mind to "hypophany." *Hypo*, as Garnier explains, means underneath (*infra*). It consolidates and confirms the soul with its strength and the secret meanings of its words.⁶⁰
- 5 *attractiva* which makes us proceed to "bethphany." We learn that the word is derived from *beth*, which means house, and *phanes*. With the bonds of love it draws those who are far away from us.⁶¹
- 6 *accensiva* conducting the mind to "phagiphany." Garnier discloses to his audience that the word comes from *phagin*, which means to eat, and from *phanes*. It moved five thousand men to pity and compassion (*Luke* 9: 12-17) after consuming dishes of "xerophagy" and "sariphagy," that is, after eating dry food and fish. According to Garnier's interpretation *xero* means dry, *sario* fish, and *phagein* to eat.⁶²

⁵⁸ S 9 (630A): Vis vero discretiva rationem promovet ad epiphaniam. Et dicitur epiphania ab *epi*, quod est supra, et *phanes* quod est manifestatio. Ardentem siquidem affectat ratio vi lucis discretiva diligenter intueri et discernere iudicii libra non solum vitiorum contrariorum cautelam... sed caute discernere vitia a virtutibus praeferebat speciem virtutum... Cf. Alan of Lille, *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. M. T. d'Alverny, *Alain de Lille*, in: *Études de phil. médiévale* 52 (Paris, 1965) 229: Epiphania... ab *epi* quod est supra et *phanes* quod est visio. See also Alan of Lille, *Expositio prosae de angelis*; ed. d'Alverny 207. Simon of Tournai, *Sentences* (partial edition by d'Alverny 309): Epiphania dicta est ab *epi* quod est supra et *phanes* quod est manifestatio.

⁵⁹ S 9 (630B): Vis autem restrictiva mentem promovet ad hyperphaniam. Et dicitur hyperphania ab *hyper*, quod est medium, et *phanes*. Restrigit enim animum religionis et obediendae vinculis... Cf. Alan of Lille; *Expositio prosae de angelis*; ed. d'Alverny 209: Yperphania... ab *yp* quod interpretatur inter et *phanes* quod est visio. Media est enim inter superiorem et inferiorem. Idem, *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. d'Alverny 232: Yperphania dicitur ab *yper* quod est post et *phanes* quod est apparitio. See also Simon of Tournai, *Sentences*; ed. d'Alverny 310.

⁶⁰ S 9 (630B): Vis etiam consolidativa mentem provehit ad hypophaniam. Et dicitur hypophania ab *hypo*, quod est infra, et *phanes*. Consolidat enim... Alan of Lille, *Expositio prosae de angelis*; ed. d'Alverny 210: Ypophania... ab *ypo* quod est sub et *phanes* quod est visio.

⁶¹ S 9 (630B): Vis autem attractiva nos provehit ad bethphaniam. Et dicitur bethphania a *beth*, quod est domus, et *phanes*. Ipsa enim est quae longe positos trahit funiculis charitatis.

⁶² S 9 (630C): Vis vero accensiva promovet animum ad phagiphaniam. Et dicitur phagiphania a *phagin*, quod est comedere, et *phanes*. Accendit enim ex xerophagiae et sariphagiae ferculis quinque milia... Dicitur autem xerophagia a *xero* quod est siccum et *phagein* quod est comedere. Sariphagia vero a *sario* quod est piscis. Xerophagy is the eating of dry food especially as a form of fasting in the early Church. Tertullian, who considered the word a neologism, uses it repeatedly

7 *illuminativa* illuminating the mind to "sepherphany." *Sepher*, to Garnier's mind, means letter. Sepherphany is the lock and key to the depository of physics, logic, ethics, and *theorica*,⁶³ for through the written letter the mind is illumined, God is revealed. Hence it is the key that opens the door to all other manifestations and enlightens man in things physical, logical, ethical, and theological.⁶⁴

In his sermon on the Trinity Garnier claims that through the liberal arts man can discover the existence of God and clear vestiges of the Trinity. God, who deigned to reveal himself to the world, laid in the arts the foundation which enabled those to discover him through reason who did not merit to find him through revelation.⁶⁵ The philosophers discovered God by studying their own nature and the things outside their own selves. Garnier derives this view from *Rom.* 1:20. He holds that the philosophers obtained their knowledge by "plausible and irrefutable arguments."⁶⁶ This knowledge includes the Trinity, for one such argument is taken from the geometrical construction of an equilateral triangle.⁶⁷ After a lengthy analysis of a triangle with three equal sides Garnier concludes that such a triangle is a true vestige and symbol of the Trinity: *Sicut in triangulo pluralitatem in lineis, singularitatem in figura, sic in summa Trinitate et unitatem in substantia et Trinitatem in personis confitemur.*⁶⁸

Garnier then gives a long explanation of the *tetragrammaton* as a symbol of the Trinity⁶⁹ and turns to the vestige of the Trinity in the human soul with

in *De ieiunio* (1,4; 2,4; 5,4; 9,6; 12,1; 17,7; CCL 2,1257ff.). The word *sario* is derived from *ὁ ψάριον*, used in *John* 6:9 in the sense of fish. The question whether Garnier himself coined the word, apparently not known elsewhere, is difficult to answer.

⁶³ S 9 (630C): *Vis quoque illuminativa illuminat mentes ad sepherphaniam. Et dicitur sepherphania a sepher, quod est littera, et phanes. Haec est physicae logicae ethicae theoricarum clavis et pessusum apothecae. The Hebrew word sepher means book.*

⁶⁴ S 9 (630D): *Per scripturas enim illuminatur animus, manifestatur deus, et clavis est omnium aliarum phanaum. Reserat enim omnes manifestationes et ad naturalem rationalem moralem divinam illuminat rationem nostram... Omnium manifestationum clavigera sepherphania. Another discussion of the various manifestations of God is found in S 35 (794B).*

⁶⁵ S 22 (712D): *Cum igitur deus, quod esset et quid esset vel non esset, mundo palam facere dignaretur, in artibus suae cognitionis primordia praelibavit ut in ipsis cognoscerent eum per rationem qui nondum meruerant per inspirationem.*

⁶⁶ S 22 (713B): *In iis itaque quae erant extra se cognoverunt deum quibusdam probabilibus et necessariis argumentis in quibus summae Trinitatis apparet vestigium non probabiliter tantum sed necessario probatum sicut in illa geometrica propositione demonstratur aperte. Cf. Cicero, *De inv.*, I, 28,24: *Omnis autem argumentatio... aut probabilis aut necessario debet esse.**

⁶⁷ S 22 (713C-714C).

⁶⁸ S 22 (714C).

⁶⁹ S (715C-717C). Cf. Garnier, "*Contra Amaurianos*"; ed. Cl. Baumer 34-38.

its threefold power: reason, wisdom, and love.⁷⁰ From this threefold power he proceeds to the ternary: *potentia, sapientia, benignitas*.⁷¹ At the same time he tells his audience that the triangle symbolizes the mystery of the Trinity more convincingly than the ternary: power, wisdom, and goodness.⁷² The fact that two circles are required to construct an equilateral triangle is interpreted by Garnier in the sense that both the Old and the New Testaments contain the revelation of the Trinity.⁷³ Thus geometry assists theology in its penetration into the mystery of the Trinity. In another sermon we read that power is attributed to the Father and wisdom to the Son *nomine et non re*.⁷⁴ a distinction which had been adopted in the school of Gilbert of Poitiers to designate the so-called trinitarian appropriations.⁷⁵

To see how Garnier makes use of grammar to expound his theology we may study his Christmas sermon on the text: "And the Word was made flesh" (*John* 1:13). He told his listeners that we distinguish between *verbum substantivum* and *adiectivum*, *activum* and *passivum*, *deponens* and *neutrum*.⁷⁶ As applied by Garnier to the divine Word, the *Verbum substantivum* is God in the Father, the *Verbum adiectivum* is God in the flesh. The Word is *activum* in creation, *passivum* in his Passion, *deponens* in his death.⁷⁷ Garnier also describes the Word as *Verbum indeclinabile, figurae simplicis, praesentis temporis, numeri singularis, infiniti modi*.⁷⁸ He wants to assure us that he did

⁷⁰ S 22 (718A): *Triplitem in anima considerans virtutem et eas non a se ipso sed a deo se recepisse non ambigens: rationem scilicet et sapientiam et amorem.*

⁷¹ S 22 (718B): *Sed aperte cognitio in deo potentiam et sapientiam et benignitatem declarat.* Cf. S 12 (647B): *in immensitate potentia vel in pulchritudine sapientia in utilitate benignitas dei commendatur.* A similar derivation is found in Gundissalinus, *De process. mundi*; ed. G. Bülow, in: *Beiträge* 24 (1925) 1: *Cum enim magnitudo pulchritudo et utilitas tantum miranda proponitur, profecto potentia creatoris sapientia et bonitas... revelatur.* See also the text quoted by B. Hauréau, *Les œuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris, 1886) 88: *Immensitas ad potentiam, pulchritudo ad sapientiam, utilitas ad benignitatem pertinet.*

⁷² S 22 (718D): *Unde patet quod in trianguli ratione familiaris Trinitatis invenies sacramentum.*

⁷³ S 22 (715AC).

⁷⁴ S 2 (575D).

⁷⁵ Concerning this distinction see Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* I, 22; ed. Moore-Dulong (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1943) 183 or PL 211,875C. Simon of Tournai, *Sentences*; ed. M. Schmaus, in: *Rech. théol. anc. et méd.* 4 (1932) 63. Alan of Lille, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* I, 4, 80; ed. P. Glorieux 226. Idem, *Theol. reg.* 52; PL 210,645D.

⁷⁶ S 5 (605D).

⁷⁷ S 5 (605D): *Nam Verbum substantivum est deus in Patre, Verbum adiectivum deus in carne, Verbum activum in rerum creatione, Verbum passivum in passione, Verbum deponens in depositione animae.*

⁷⁸ S 5 (599D).

not find this explanation in the rules of Priscian.⁷⁹ He suspects that his audience may cling to the human meaning of those words. As for himself, he wishes to expose their spiritual significance.⁸⁰

As *Verbum activum* the Word conceived the world before creating it just as an architect designs a building before erecting it.⁸¹ Garnier distinguishes three steps in the execution of this design: the *opus in praescientia, in materia, in essentia*.⁸² A further analysis of these three steps is but another way leading Garnier to the ternary mentioned above: power, wisdom, and goodness.⁸³ By calling the Word *Verbum indeclinabile* Garnier intends to convey the idea that there is no change in God: *Non enim declinatur de loco ad locum*.⁸⁴ To confirm this doctrine he quotes a familiar text from Boethius twice in the same sermon: *Stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri*.⁸⁵

The grammatical tenses (present, preterite, present perfect, past perfect, future, infinitive) and their application to theology are not forgotten in Garnier's sermons.⁸⁶ To make the comparison complete, he applies the various grammatical moods (indicative, imperative, optative, conjunctive, infinitive), the impersonal verb, the gerund, and the supine to the works of the Word on earth.⁸⁷ And just as we are taught to distinguish between the first, second, and third person in a single verb we confess three persons in one God.⁸⁸ Our Cistercian also speaks of a *verbum intrinsecum* and interprets it as the Word of the Father.⁸⁹ In another sermon he mentions a *verbum extrinsecum* which seems to signify the word as spoken.⁹⁰ The terminology has a curious affinity to the Logos-speculations of the early Church.

⁷⁹ S 5 (600A): *Ex regulis Prisciani ita edocti non sumus.*

⁸⁰ S 5 (600A): *sensum tamen humanum ex verbis humanis colligitis, ego vero spiritualement.*

⁸¹ S 5 (600D).

⁸² S 5 (601A).

⁸³ S 5 (601B). This ternary was introduced by Peter Abelard (*Theologia 'Scholarium'* I, 8-9; PL 178, 989CD) and severely attacked by Gilbert of Poitiers, *De Trin.* I, 2, 16 prol. and II, 1, 30; ed. N. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, in: *Studies and Texts* 13 (Toronto, 1966) 61 and 169.

⁸⁴ S 5 (602A).

⁸⁵ S 5 (602A and 606A).

⁸⁶ S 5 (606AC).

⁸⁷ S 5 (606C-607A).

⁸⁸ S 5 (607A): *sicut in doctrina philosophialis verbi tres esse personas docemur et unum verbum ita in doctrina fidei.* This reasoning was introduced by Peter Abelard, *Theologia 'Scholarium'* II, 12; PL 178, 1067B. Cf. Alan of Lille, *Distinctiones*; PL 210, 899B.

⁸⁹ S 5 (605A). Cf. S 8 (623D): *Ideo ergo, ut ita dicam, verbo intrinseco Magos erudiebat quia Verbum intrinsecum et in carne latens indicabat.*

⁹⁰ S 12 (651D): *Sed aliud est verbum in ore carnis, aliud in ore cordis. Illic verbum intrinsecum et absconditum, ibi verbum extrinsecum et manifestum.*

In the Christmas sermon we have already examined there is also clear evidence of Garnier's study of rhetoric. An example is the statement: Ut igitur auditores suos dociles et benevolos redderet et attentos, Verbum abbreviatum fecit dominus super terram.⁹¹ Garnier had obviously read in Cicero's *De inventione* that an introduction is intended to make the audience or reader well-disposed, receptive, and attentive.⁹² He was convinced that the Jews were neither well-disposed nor receptive nor attentive when Christ was among them.⁹³ To Garnier's tripartite division of *utile*, *honestum*, *necessarium* corresponds the Ciceronian distinction between *utilitas*, *honestas*, and *necessitudo*.⁹⁴

Garnier's second Christmas sermon opens with the words: Liber generationis Jesu Christi...⁹⁵ The text affords Garnier an opportunity to develop a profuse *accessus ad auctorem*. In accordance with the prevailing custom he proposes to investigate six points: the subject matter of the book, the writer's intention, the reason for writing it, its usefulness, method, and title.⁹⁶

Concerning the subject matter Garnier has this to say: Materia (libri) est materia materians omnia vel materia materiata vel illa quae una est ex materiata et materiante materia.⁹⁷ The description defies translation, but its meaning becomes a little more lucid through the explanation which follows. The *materia materiata*, we are told, is Christ's flesh taken from the Virgin; the *materia materians* is the divinity assuming the flesh; the *materia ex materiata et materiante* is the one person consisting of flesh and God.⁹⁸ Garnier's terminology is uncommon, to put it mildly.

We learn that the sacred writer's intention is to enrich the poor, bring home the exiled, make free the slaves, lead sinners to penance and the condemned to eternal glory.⁹⁹ The reason or cause for this intention was

⁹¹ S 5 (605C).

⁹² *De inv.* I,15,20: Principium est oratio perspicue et protinus perficiens auditorem benivolum aut docilem aut attentum. In his introduction to the *De contrarietatibus in sacra scriptura* Garnier writes: Sicut ergo ictor auditores suos in primis reddit benivolos dociles et attentos ita... Cl. Baeumker, *Contra Amaurianos*, p. xxxviii.

⁹³ S 5 (605C): Propter hoc ad verbum iubentis nec benivoli nec dociles nec attenti fuerunt.

⁹⁴ S 6 (609C): Cicero, *De inv.* II,52,158. Compare the text from Garnier, *De contrarietatibus* transcribed by Cl. Baeumker, p. xxxviii.

⁹⁵ S 6 (608C).

⁹⁶ S 6 (611A): in primis considerantes quae sit huius libri materia, quae intentio, quae causa intentionis, quae utilitas, quis agendi modus et quis titulus.

⁹⁷ S 6 (611A).

⁹⁸ S 6 (611AB): Materia materiata est caro de Virgine assumpta; materia materians divinitas assumens; materia ex materiata et materiante una ex carne et deo persona.

⁹⁹ S 6 (611B).

man's fall and misery.¹ The book's "wondrous and admirable usefulness" is seen by Garnier in its effect, for it offers us eternal joy and a joyful eternity, happiness without sadness; it promises rest from labour, freedom from fear, from taxation, from rancorous envy in time of peace.² Garnier then illustrates the writer's method³ and draws ascetical conclusions from his *accessus*.⁴ He envisages his audience as being in "the Saviour's school" studying "the book God wrote for us."⁵ The largest book, he holds, is the Incarnate Son himself. His flesh is the book's parchment, the Word of the Father its letters. Just as through the written letters the word is united to the parchment so the Word of the Father is united to the flesh by the assumption of man.⁶

We have seen that as *Verbum activum* the Word conceived and created the world. To describe creation Garnier turns to his knowledge of cosmology. He told his audience that first of all God made the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire.⁷ The rest of the sermon deals mainly with Biblical texts in which Garnier detects references to the four elements. We read more about them in a sermon on the Feast of the Purification.⁸ Speaking of the Incarnation, Garnier expresses the view that God and man are so widely apart from, and opposed to, each other that the union took place by the mediation of Christ's flesh and soul.⁹ To illustrate this point Garnier offers the example of the four elements.¹⁰ Among them, earth and fire are two extremes very much opposed to each other, for fire is subtle, penetrating, and mobile while earth is touchable, impenetrable and immovable. They are joined together by air and water, for air, being subtle and

¹ S 6 (611D).

² S 6 (612B): *Mira et admirabilis utilitas per quam nobis aeterna reddetur iucunditas et iucunda aeternitas, ubi gaudium sine moerore, quies sine labore, ubi nullus timor in minore, nulla exactio in maiore, nullus invidiae rancor in pace.*

³ S 6 (612D-613D).

⁴ S 6 (613D-614C).

⁵ S 6 (614C): *Ecce, fratres, doctrina caelestis, ecce schola Salvatoris, studium filiorum dei.*

⁶ S 6 (609D). Virgin birth constitutes no problem for Garnier who cites similar phenomena from nature: *Vultur sine coitu concipit et parit.* S 8 (620B). Cf. S 12 (651B).

⁷ S 6 (610C): *Liber maximus est Filius incarnatus quia sicut per scripturam verbum unitur pelli ita per assumptionem hominis Verbum Patris unitum est carni.*

⁸ S 1 (563B).

⁹ S 12 (655A): *Humanitatem dico corpus et animam assumptam a Verbo. Duo ergo sunt extrema et contradictorie opposita: deus et homo... Ut igitur haec duo extrema sibi valde et omnino contraria unirentur, interposita sunt duo media: caro Christi et anima.*

¹⁰ A mediaeval drawing illustrating this concept found in MS Paris, B. nat. lat. 6734 is reproduced in *Arch. d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 20 (1953) 47. Cf. Isidore, *De natura rerum* 11; PL 83,979D.

mobile but not penetrating, is akin to fire; and being impenetrable, it is akin to earth. Water, on the other hand, is akin to air because it is mobile, and akin to earth because it is impenetrable and touchable.¹¹

Quoting a verse from the *De consolatione*¹² of Boethius, Garnier claims that the elements are held together by numbers and that the union of God and man by the mediation of flesh and soul is symbolized by the very same elements, upheld by the same numbers.¹³ Fire symbolizes God; earth, man. Air is a symbol of the soul, for the philosophers employed the word "air" to designate the "soul of the world."¹⁴ Water symbolizes Christ's flesh. In summing up his doctrine Garnier declares that the soul mediates between God and the flesh while the flesh mediates between the soul and man.¹⁵ Hence the sequence, as conceived by Garnier, is: God, soul, flesh, man. The division suggests man as a third reality distinct from body and soul.

In this context we learn also that a distinction exists between *caelum aereum*, *aethereum*, *chrysellinum*, and *uranicum* or *empyreum*.¹⁶ According to Garnier the word *caelum* comes from the expression *casa elios* which means house of the sun.¹⁷ The aerial heaven is also called *caelum condensatis* because of the density of the air which is increased by rain.¹⁸ The ethereal

¹¹ S 12 (655B): Sicut in quatuor elementis duo extrema, terra et ignis quae sibi valde sunt opposita — quia cum ignis sit subtilis acutus mobilis, terra palpabilis obtusa et immobilis — mediantibus aliis duobus elementis scilicet aere quod multam habet cum igne convenientiam quia est subtilis mobilis sed non acutus, multam etiam cum terra quia obtusa, et aqua cum aere convenit quia mobilis et cum terra quia obtusa et palpabilis. Quae cum quibusdam ligantur numeris ut scriptum est: "Qui numeris elementa ligat" — sic et illa duo extrema: deus et homo. The description of the elements is based on Calcidius, *In Tim. Platonis* 21; ed. J. H. Waszink, in: *Plato lat.* 4 (London, 1962) 72.

¹² *De cons. phil.* III,9,10: Tu numeris elementa ligas.

¹³ S 12 (655C): Sic et illa duo extrema, deus et homo, duobus mediis sunt unita et eisdem numeris ligata et in eisdem elementis figurata. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didasc.* II,5; ed. Ch. Buttimer 29: De quaternario corporis. Cf. St. Bernard, *De consid.* V, 7, 15; PL 182, 797A; Quaternitas orbem determinat.

¹⁴ S 12 (655C): Quid enim obest si per ignem deum figuramus?... Per terram vero de terra factum hominem, per aërem vero animam quia mundi animam aërem philosophi vocaverunt. Per aquam vero caro Christi non immerito figuratur.

¹⁵ S 12 (655CD). The idea that the union took place *mediante anima* was spread by Peter Lombard (*Sent.* III,2,2; p. 555), who derived it from John Damascene. Alan of Lille, *Theol. reg.* 102; PL 210, 676C writes: Anima vero unita est Verbo sine medio, spiritus vero mediante anima, corpus vero mediante spiritu. According to Alan, *Contra Haereticos* I, 28; PL 210,329CD, a *spiritus physicus* is required to join body and soul. Garnier does not mention such a link. Cf. R. Heinzmann, *Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes*, in: *Beiträge* 40,4 (1965) 41-42.

¹⁶ S 12 (656C-657B).

¹⁷ S 12 (656C).

¹⁸ S 12 (656D).

heaven is also called heaven of serenity. The crystalline heaven or firmament is solid and divides the waters from the waters. The empyreal heaven is sometimes called *caelum uranicum*.¹⁹ Above it there is the heaven of the three hierarchies.²⁰

More copious use of astronomy is found in Garnier's sermon on John the Baptist. As the sun moves through the zodiac and around the firmament it illumines the sphere of the megacosmos. Similarly in the microcosmos of man the "Sun of Justice" rises to the mind, warms the heart to the firm hight (*firmamentum*) of virtue, and enlightens the sphere of thoughts.²¹ While rising the sun passes through twelve zones of the sphere. It first enters Capricorn, then Aquarius, the Fishes, Aries, Taurus, the Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo, Libra, Scorpion, and Sagittarius.²² For Garnier all these steps have a spiritual meaning. And it may be worth noting that he considers Capricorn the first belt (December 22), the month of Christ's birth, while as a rule Aries (March 21) was considered the first of the sun's twelve paths.²³

We learn from Garnier that the Greek names for the four *climata* of the macrocosmos (East, West, North, South) are *anatole*, *dysis* or *delta*, *arctos*, and *mesimbrion*.²⁴ In the same context we are told that Christ was nine months and six days in his mother's womb.²⁵ In the larger sphere of the earth there are five zones of which three are inhabitable because two are too frigid and one torrid.²⁶ Just as the world turns around in seven days its history is divided into seven periods (*aetates*).²⁷ The seventh of them began with the coming of Christ.²⁸ Even the comparative "velocity of the moon" and the "laziness of Saturn" serve a spiritual purpose.²⁹

We can also learn some details about Garnier's psychology. The soul is "formed" and joined to the body forty-six days after conception.³⁰ Garnier

¹⁹ S 12 (657A). Angels come from the "empyrean heaven". S 2 (580C). See also S 21 (797C): Unde et aethereo caelo in quo sunt luminaria ratio comparatur.

²⁰ S 12 (657B).

²¹ S 24 (731D).

²² S 24 (734D-736C). Later the galaxy and the gnomon are interpreted spiritually.

²³ Cf. S 24 (734A): Nam *chimerinos* (= *therinos*) *tropicos* ille circulus appellatur quo sol ab eminentiore signo, scilicet cancro, per zonam hiemalem reflectitur ad capricornum.

²⁴ S 24 (732A).

²⁵ S 24 (732C).

²⁶ S 24 (733BC).

²⁷ S 19 (695D): Sicut mundus septem diebus volvitur ita septem aetatibus distinguitur. In S 8 (626CD) Garnier explains the origin of the names of the seven days of the week.

²⁸ S 19 (695 D).

²⁹ S 6 (612 D).

³⁰ S 12 (648C): Formatis siquidem membrorum lineamentis, post quadraginta et sex dierum

thinks we should know that when the soul is changed through various acts it transforms itself into different shapes.³¹ The operation of the senses is closely linked to the four elements in the human body. Man's liver is the seat of fire. In fire we must distinguish between its brightness and its heat. When fire ascends to the brain, the veins diminish the heat whereas the brightness approaches the eyes and is joined to them. The remaining heat stays in the brain. But it is the same fire that affects the brain and the eyes.³² This explanation is, of course, not given to teach us the process of sense perception but to show that the Son who is one with the Father assumed flesh without the Father.

A more detailed description of the origin of sight is found in Garnier's comment on the text: *Vidi, et ecce vir vestitus lineis* (*Dan.* 10: 5). Beginning with the verb *Vidi* Garnier tells us that according to the Scriptures there are three kinds of sight: corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual.³³ He holds that St. Paul calls corporeal sight the "first heaven" because, seated in the liver, fire shines up into the high regions of the brain as if it were the heaven of the body. From the centre of the brain very thin tubes branch out not only to the eyes but also to the other senses — for instance, to the ears, the nose, and the palate. Even the sense of touch, which is spread over the entire body, is directed by the same brain through the marrow of the neck and of the spinal bones. From there some very delicate little rivulets that produce the perception of touch run through all parts of the body.³⁴ Thus, after the heat has been removed, the brightness of light first goes forth alone from the brain to make us see visible things in the path of the rays emanating from the eyes. It also proceeds to the ears but in a certain mixture with pure air. Moving a moist exhalation it proceeds

spatium infundendo formatur et formata statim infunditur anima. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De sacr.* 1,15; PL 176,12C.

³¹ S 12 (656B): *Unde sciendum quod cum anima per diversos affectus variatur, diversas in se figuras immo in diversas se figuras transformat.*

³² S 7 (620B): *Cum ignis sit calor et splendor, splendor in rubo fuit sed non calor et cum ignis sedes sit in icore ascendit ad cerebrum et per venas, represso calore, accedit splendor ad oculos et unitur illi carnali membro cui tamen non adhaeret calor cum calor ignis sit in cerebro et unus tamen ignis qui afficit cerebrum et oculum: sed calidus in cerebro, splendidus in oculo.*

³³ S 3 (583C). The same division is found in the preface to the gloss on the Apocalypse attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers in the *Glossa ordinaria* of Nicolaus Lyranus; ed. Vol. 6, (Paris, 1590) 1447. Alan of Lille, *Summa* II, 1, 140; ed. Glorieux 267, distinguishes between *corporalis*, *imaginaria* or *spiritualis*, and *mentalis*.

³⁴ S 3 (584C): *Est igitur visio corporalis qua pertinent corporis sensus ad visa corporalia. Et hanc vocat Apostolus primum caelum quoniam in excelsum cerebri locum tamquam in caelum corporis a sede icoris ignis emicat. De cuius cerebri medio velut centro non solum ad oculos sed etiam ad sensus ceteros tenues fistulae ducuntur.*

to the nose in a mixture with dark air. Moreover, it advances with a heavier moisture as far as the sense of taste. Finally, it comes down to the density of earth to produce the sense of touch, for we know that corporeal sight pertains not only to the eyes but also to all the other senses of the body. It is called corporeal precisely because bodily objects are perceived, not because it proceeds from the body.³⁵

Spiritual sight enables us to see not the bodily objects themselves but their likenesses whether these objects be present or not or whether the thing perceived really exists or not as it exists in the mind. Various shapes of corporeal images are formed in the mind when we plan or do or say something. Sometimes, for instance in dreams or when the body is tired from a journey or weakened by illness, real and unreal images are so mixed in the mind that we can hardly distinguish them. St. Paul, as Garnier affirms, calls this kind of vision the second heaven.³⁶

Intellectual sight far surpasses spiritual vision, for it enables the mind to see and hear things in heaven, see God's substance and God the Word through whom all things are made.³⁷

While discussing these varieties Garnier enumerates the different meanings of *spiritus* and *mens* found in Scriptures. *Spiritus* may designate the soul of man, even the soul of an animal.³⁸ It may also mean the rational mind (*mens rationalis*) which is, as it were, the eye of the soul.³⁹ According to Garnier St. Paul makes a distinction between mind and spirit.⁴⁰ It would seem that such a distinction is made by Garnier himself in his analysis of prophecy where he states: *Signa quae per aliquas rerum similitudines demonstrantur in spiritu, nisi accedat mentis officium quo visa intelligantur, non est prophetia.*⁴¹ The statement implies that *mens* is the higher faculty.

Spiritual sight may be erroneous, but not intellectual vision: in intellectual visione mens non fallitur.⁴² *Mens* is the seat of *intellectus* as is in-

³⁵ S 3 (584CD): Ita ut represso calore lux ignis sola primum splendeat a cerebro in radiis oculorum ad visibilia contuenda, deinde ad aures tanquam post oculos cerebro viciniores descendit mistura quadam primo cum aere puro, secundo ad nares cum aere caliginoso movens humidas exhalationes, tertio cum corpulentiore humore usque ad gustum. Ultimo ad terrenam crassitudinem descendit ut faciat tangendi sensum...

³⁶ S 3 (584D-585B).

³⁷ S 3 (585BC).

³⁸ S 3 (583D).

³⁹ S 3 (584A).

⁴⁰ S 3 (584A): 1 Cor. 14:15.

⁴¹ S³ (585C).

⁴² S 3 (586A).

dedicated in the sentence: quo cum intellectus accesserit, qui mentis est, fit revelatio vel agnitio vel prophetia vel doctrina.⁴³

Garnier speaks of "spiritual vision" as being *in animo* and in the next sentence as being *in mente*.⁴⁴ *Animus* is the wider concept and as such the more remote faculty of intellectual sight. In addition to *mens* and *spiritus* Garnier uses the term *ratio* whose meaning is so difficult to define. He mentions *rationis motus qui homini iure attribuitur quia soli homini ratio solet competere*.⁴⁵ In the same context he speaks of *motus animi*.⁴⁶ He enumerates reason and intellect as distinct faculties of the soul in the statement: *Naturalia sunt memoria, voluntas, ratio, intellectus*.⁴⁷ A frequent phrase in Garnier's sermons is "the mind's eye" (*oculus mentis*). But he also knows the "spiritual eyes of the heart."⁴⁸ The latter may be deceived through images that do not agree with reality. A prophet, however, sees visions through an "intellectual eye" which, as we have seen, cannot err.⁴⁹ Such a vision may be *aenigmatica* or *anagogica*.⁵⁰

Garnier applies the same two adjectives to his description of *speculatio*. He claims that the word is derived either from *speculum* (mirror) or *specula* (look-out or watchtower). It is *aenigmatica* whenever God is seen through likenesses and images of things as if in a mirror.⁵¹ As derived from *specula* it is *anagogica* in which the mind is carried aloft to see God without the mediation of images.⁵² The distinction coincides with Garnier's division between theophany and *anagogicum*.

Studying the subjects of the trivium Garnier learned the proper gram-

⁴³ S 3 (584B). S 33 (780B): intellectu mentis. Cf. S 3 (585C): in signum ante mentem adducat rei similitudine.

⁴⁴ S 3 (585A).

⁴⁵ S 4 (593B).

⁴⁶ S 4 (593B). Cf. S 20 (703B): Vix enim animus ad contemplationem ascendit sine mundi imaginationibus... Imaginarium est quidquid de deo animus comprehendit.

⁴⁷ S 12 (654D). Cf. S 26 (744C) and S 35 (791C). The fact that *mens* is not enumerated among the *naturalia* does not seem to be an oversight. Alan of Lille never mentions *mens* in similar enumerations. Cf. *Summa* I, 1, 53; I, 3, 63; I, 2, 160; II, 3, 163; II, 4, 177; ed. P. Glorieux 192, 212, 300, 302, 319. See also Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* II, 20; PL 211, 1025A or ed. Moore-Dulong (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1950) 159.

⁴⁸ S 7 (617B): spirituales cordis oculos.

⁴⁹ S 7 (617C).

⁵⁰ S 7 (617C). Cf. S 23 (730BC).

⁵¹ S 31 (765D).

⁵² S 31 (766B): A specula vero speculatio dicitur quando mens ita sursum ducitur ut nullis signis praecedentibus, nullis causis subsistentibus, mens ab omni imagine defaecata ad superessentialem et infinitam originem simpliciter et reciproce refertur... quae quidem admodum paucorum est. Although the text is corrupt, it appears that the relative clause dates back to Plato's *Timaeus* 51E (Calc. interpr.); ed. Waszink 50.

matical, logical, and philosophical use of words. To express the abstract form of a concrete noun he coins such new words as *feneitas* from *fenum*, *vitreitas* from *vitrum*, *panitas* from *panis*, and *carnositas* from *caro*.⁵³ Worth noting is the terminology *mutabilitas cohaerentiae*, *discohaerentiae*, *adhaerentiae*, and *inhaerentiae*.⁵⁴ It seems to reflect the influence of Alan of Lille.⁵⁵ Garnier's explanation shows that the last two terms do not have the philosophical connotations found in the verbs *adhaerere* and *inhaerere* as adopted by Gilbert of Poitiers.⁵⁶ Garnier also gives a detailed etymology of the seven days of the week and interprets their ascetical significance.⁵⁷ He is very fond of using Greek words. On one occasion he told his audience not to be disturbed by the fact that the word "spirit" is masculine in Latin, feminine in Hebrew, neuter in Greek.⁵⁸ Garnier maintains that the first of all virtues is *Gnothi seauton* i.e. *Nosce te ipsum*.⁵⁹ His fondness for Greek words appears in the distinction between *megacosmus*, *microcosmus*, and *macrocosmus*.⁶⁰ He contrasts *calodaemones* and *cacodaemones*.⁶¹

In his studies Garnier acquired a certain knowledge of law. Speaking of St. Paul he told a General Chapter: (Paulus) naturali vero et civili utitur ratione: naturali quidem quia, sicut lex ait, nihil convenientius quam pactum servare. Clamat enim ius naturale: Quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris vel Quod tibi vis fieri hoc fac alteri.⁶² He reminded his audience

⁵³ S 12 (653B). The neologisms *feneitas*, *vitreitas*, *panitas* occur also in Garnier's tract *De contrarietatibus*. Cf. Cl. Baumeister (ed.), "*Contra Amaurianos*," p. xxxix. The context shows that the formation of those terms is based on Priscian, *Instit.* II, 4, 18; ed. Keil (Leipzig, 1855) 55: *Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem significare*.

⁵⁴ S 12 (652C).

⁵⁵ The nouns *inhaerentia* and *adhaerentia* occur rather frequently in the works of Alan of Lille. See his *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* I, 1, 30; 2, 63; II, 1, 139; ed. P. Glorieux 167; 213; 276. *Distinctiones*; PL 210,816D.

⁵⁶ See the index (s.v. *adesse*, *inesse*) in N. Häring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers*, in: *Studies and Texts* 13 (Toronto, 1966) 314 and 324.

⁵⁷ S 8 (626BC).

⁵⁸ S 10 (635A). Garnier even compares the sound of the three languages in S 19 (697A): *Graeca vero lingua sonat in labiis, Hebraea in gutture, Latina in medio, scilicet in palato*.

⁵⁹ S 7 (622B). S 24 (734D). The Mediaeval spelling was probably something like *notys elitots* or *nothis elitots*. Cf. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* III, 3, 2; ed. C. C. I. Webb I (Oxford, 1909) 175. Alan of Lille, *Sermo de Trinitate* and *Memorare*; ed. d'Alverny 259 and 267. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* I, 1; ed. Buttner 4 (*tnoti celicon*).

⁶⁰ S 24 (731D-732A).

⁶¹ S 4 (598D). Alan of Lille, *Distinctiones*; PL 210,759B. Worth noting is also his enumeration of various chairs or seats in S 7 (618B): *Est enim alia sedes quae dicitur thronus, alia ferculum, alia cathedra, alia synhedra, alia tribunal, alia exhedra. Thronus regum est, ferculum seu sella pauperum, cathedra doctorum, synhedra auditorum, tribunal iudicum, exhedra iudicis assessorum*.

⁶² S 34 (786CD). S 35 (798A). Cf. Alan, *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* II, 3, 170; ed. P. Glorieux 312.

of the rule: *Privilegium meretur amittere qui concessa sibi abutitur potestate*. For the law of prescription he cites Petrus Ravennas, better known as Petrus Chrysologus.⁶³ He refers to the *ius occupantis* and to the praetor's order: *Pactum servato*.⁶⁴ In the same sermon Garnier explains the distinction between *restitutio iuris* and *restitutio iuris et facti*.⁶⁵ After quoting the law: *actor debet sequi forum rei*, he describes the difference between *lex fori* and *lex poli*.⁶⁶ Garnier holds that although monastic customs vary among Cistercians, Premonstratensians, and Cluniacs they are all, as it were, the "civil law of the City of God,"⁶⁷ St. Benedict is "our legislator," as Garnier puts it.⁶⁸

III. NOTES ON GARNIER'S SOURCES

There is no doubt that Garnier had received a broad education enabling him to draw on a great variety of sources. To begin with the classics, he quotes Horace,⁶⁹ Virgil,⁷⁰ Ovid,⁷¹ Seneca,⁷² Persius,⁷³ Juvenal,⁷⁴ and refers to Priscian.⁷⁵ He presents a lengthy text in which Josephus Flavius speaks of Christ. The Jewish historian is described by Garnier as *illius temporis fidelis historiographus*.⁷⁶ Porphyry, on the other hand, is characterized as

⁶³ S 34 (787C): *Consummatur etiam praescriptione quia dicit Petrus Ravennas — sicut scriptum est in Decretis — Triginta annis humanae legis omnes sopiunt quaestiones*. The text dates back to Petrus Chrysologus, *Sermo* 145; PL 52,591B. Garnier seems to have derived it from a canonical collection.

⁶⁴ S 34 (788B and 786D).

⁶⁵ S 34 (792A).

⁶⁶ S 34 (793B).

⁶⁷ S 39 (815B). Cf. S 11 (637C).

⁶⁸ S 29 (758B). Other examples of legal terminology are found in S 39 (820D; 821CD; 822B) and S 40 (822B-828B).

⁶⁹ S 2 (576A): Horace, *Ep.* I, 18,84: *Nam tua res agitur paries cum proximus ardet*. S 5 (599B): *De arte poetica* 25-26: *Dum brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio*. S 18 (693D): *De arte poet.* 161-163. S 20 (702D) and S 23 (725C): *Ep.* I, 2, 62-63. S 28 (751A): *Ep.* I, 2, 57.

⁷⁰ S 23 (725C): *Ecl.* 4,7.

⁷¹ S 37 (811A): *De rem. amoris* I, 91.

⁷² S 32 (779A). S 34 (791B). Concerning the influence of Seneca in the twelfth century see K. D. Nothdurft, *Studien zum Einfluss Senecas auf die Philosophie und Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts*, in: *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgesch. des Mittelalt.* 8 (Leiden, 1963).

⁷³ S 32 (774B): *Sat.* I, 58.

⁷⁴ S 12 (645D), S 19 (695A), S 20 (703C): *Sat.* 14,138: *Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit*.

⁷⁵ S 5 (600A). In S 24 (735C) Garnier quotes a verse not yet identified: *Curva retro cedens cum fert vestigia Cancer*.

⁷⁶ S 7 (616A): *Antiquitates* XVIII, 63-64; ed. L. H. Feldmann (London, 1965) 49-51. Garnier's immediate source may have been Jerome, *De vir. ill.* 13; PL 23, 663A.

christianae religionis saevissimus impugnator.⁷⁷ When Garnier wrote of the knowledge quae quidem admodum paucorum est, he remembered Plato's *Timaeus*.⁷⁸ When he declared: Cum enim argumentum rei dubiae faciat fidem, he thought of Cicero's *Topics*.⁷⁹ The sentence: A prima substantia nulla est praedicatio points to Aristotle's *Categories*.⁸⁰

Of early Christian authors Garnier cites Origen,⁸¹ Hilary,⁸² Ambrose,⁸³ Augustine,⁸⁴ Jerome,⁸⁵ Hesychius,⁸⁶ John Chrysostom,⁸⁷ Petrus Chrysologus,⁸⁸ Boethius,⁸⁹ Pope Gregory I,⁹⁰ and Bede.⁹¹ It is of interest to note that St. Hilary is cited twice, Bede thrice, Boethius five, Augustine six, and Pope Gregory eight times. The other authors are quoted but once. We would expect to find the names of Basil⁹² and Benedict.⁹³ Garnier's immediate source was not always the original work. A text from Pope Callistus quoted by him dates back to a canonical collection⁹⁴ while a short sentence attributed to Pope Sergius⁹⁵ is most probably derived from Peter Lombard

⁷⁷ S 8 (620D).

⁷⁸ S 31 (766B): *Timaeus* 51E (Calc. interpr.); ed. J. H. Waszink, in: *Plato lat.* 4 (London, 1962)
50. Alan of Lille, *Distinctiones*; PL 210,751D.

⁷⁹ S 9 (631D): *Topica* I; PL 64,1048A: Argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem.

⁸⁰ S 31 (774B).

⁸¹ S 23 (728B).

⁸² S 2 (579D), S 16 (675A). The sentence in S 10 (634A): intelligentiam dictorum ex causis assumamus dicendi is based on Hilary, *De Trin.* IV,18; PL 10, 111B. It is discussed by Alan of Lille, *Theol. reg.* 116-125; PL 210,681D-684C. See also his *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* I,2,53; ed. Glorieux 192. Garnier used Hilary, *De Trin.* IV,12; PL 10,104B-106A when he prepared S 2 (576C-577D).

⁸³ S 1 (568D).

⁸⁴ S 1 (563C), S 8 (620D), S 14 (661A), S 19 (692A = Ambrose, *De off.* I,30,147; PL 16,71B), S 22 (712A), S 40 (825B).

⁸⁵ S 8 (624C).

⁸⁶ S 18 (688D).

⁸⁷ S 5 (607C): in reality John Damascene.

⁸⁸ S 34 (787D). The quotation is taken from *Sermo* 145; PL 52,591B.

⁸⁹ S 5 (602A and 606A), S 7 (617C), S 18 (689C), S 40 (689C).

⁹⁰ S 1 (565A), S 4 (597B), S 13 (566C), S 14 (664B and 667B), S 15 (670C), S 22 (721B), S 26 (741C), S 33 (779D).

⁹¹ S 1 (657C), S 9 (631A and 632A).

⁹² S 39 (821CD). Garnier also quotes liturgical texts on several occasions: S 11 (642B), S 16 (679A), S 31 (763A), S 32 (772B and 776C).

⁹³ S 39 (821AC and 822B) St. Bernard is mentioned once in a sermon on the feast of St. Bernard: S 29 (759C): Fractum est enim alabastrum unguenti boni nardi vel per syncopam Bernardi cuius verba et martyribus rosam et castis lilium redolebant.

⁹⁴ S 13 (661A): Ivo, *Decr.* IV,26; PL 161,269BC. Cf. *Pan.* II,175; PL 161,1123A. Gratian, *Decr.* D. 76, c. 1.

⁹⁵ S 26 (746B): Ivo, *Pan.* I, 140; PL 161,1076D: Triforme est corpus domini. Gratian, *Decr.* D. 2, c. 22 de cons. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De sacr.* 6, 9; PL 176,145B.

with whose reading it agrees: *Triforme est corpus Christi*.⁹⁶ The fact that Garnier knew Lombard's *Sentences* is quite obvious if we compare the excerpts in his fifth sermon.⁹⁷ He copied them without acknowledgment.

Preaching on the Nativity of the Virgin Mary, Garnier presents a group of writers who foretold the coming of Christ. He quotes the Sybil,⁹⁸ the two "philosophers of the Persian King," Hermes⁹⁹ and Asterius,¹ and the poet Albumazar.² In a different context the Sybil, Hermes Mercurius, and "Abulmasar" are also cited in a *Summa* written by Alan of Lille³ who is known to have entered the Cistercian Order about 1194.

⁹⁶ *Sent.* IV,12,4; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 811. Garnier's information on Pope Boniface IV (608-615) and Phocas in S 36 (798C) is based on the *Liber Pontificalis* 69; ed. L. Duchesne I (Paris, 1886) 317.

⁹⁷ S 5 (607D): *Sent.* III, 6,3-6; ed. Quaracchi (1916) 578-580. In S 2 (576A) Garnier used *Sent.* III,7,2; III,11,3; III,6,2; pp. 588; 597; 578.

⁹⁸ S 32 (775B): De caelo rex adveniet per saecula futurus.

⁹⁹ S 32 (775C): Hermes vero paucis verbis mutatis de eadem virgine sic locutus est: Nascetur sub virgine puella quaedam quae vocatur *Corciscastalis* sedens super stratam publicam, gemina manu gerens aristas dans filio suo ius ad pascendum in terra hebreā. Nomen autem filii vocabunt Iesum.

¹ S 32 (775C): Dicit enim Asterius: Orietur sub decano virginis puella quaedam quae lingua persica dicitur *Sedeozordama*, arabice vero *Adrevedefa*, sedens super solium auleatum binas manu tenens spinas et pascens filium suum iure in loco ubi dicitur: Ave. Et nomen pueri vocabunt Iesum.

² S 32 (775D): Quibus consentit tertius poeta cuius nomen est Albumazar ita dicens: Orietur sub decano virginis mater virgo lactatque patrem et eidem solio assidet, vir eam non attingens. In his *De essentiis* Hermann of Corinthis (ed. M. Alonso 29) mentions that in his *Introductorium in astronomiam*, translated by Hermann in 1140; Albumazar inserted some passages *ex Hermete et Astalio persarum astrologis*. The report in Hermann's *De essentiis* (p. 29) reads: Oritur, inquit, in primo virginis decano in lingua eorum *sethos sarzama* quod prout arabes interpretantur *adre nedesa* apud nos significat virgo munda, supra solium auleatum manu geminas aristas tenens, puerum nutriens et iure pascens in regione cui nomen hebreā, puerum autem nominatum Iesum... Oritur cum ea virgine ut eidem solio insidens nec attingens pariter... The alleged prophecy is still found in the *Speculum astronomicum* (c. 12) published among the works of St. Albert, *Opera omnia*; ed. A. Borgnet 10 (Paris, 1891) 644. The question whether Garnier used Albumazar's *Introductorium* or Hermann's *De essentiis* or an intermediary source is difficult to determine. It is less difficult to admit that his three "prophecies" are in reality but one.

³ *Summa 'Quoniam homines'* I, 1, 4; ed. P. Glorieux 124. Concerning this treatise see J. M. Parent, "Un nouveau témoin de la théol. dionysienne au xii^e siècle," in: *Beiträge*, Suppl. 3, 1 (1935) 289-309, and P. Glorieux, "L'auteur de la Somme *Quoniam homines*," in: *Rech. théol. anc. et méd.* 17 (1950) 29-50. Concerning the published text of this *Summa* it should be noted that in numerous cases the published text reads *ullus* (etc.) where the meaning is *nullus*. Accordingly corrections should be made in such cases as *ulla forma* (p. 123), *ulli ergo* (p. 124), *ullam causam*

The writings of Alan of Lille hold a key position in Garnier's doctrine on theophanies, for it is most likely that he borrowed from Alan what he attributes to John Scotus Erigena. Garnier claims that "John, called the Scot, describes four manifestations: theophany, epiphany, hyperphany, and hypophany... by which God manifests himself to the angels."⁴ Apart from theophany,⁵ these terms do not date back to John the Scot. Earlier traces of such terminology are found in the *Summa de ecclesiasticis officiis* by the Porretan John Beleth, a work with which Garnier was quite familiar.⁶ John Beleth distinguishes between epiphany, theophany, bethphany, and phagiphany as manifestations of Christ through the Star, the Father's voice at Christ's Baptism, the miracle of Cana, and the multiplication of bread.⁷

Beleth affirms that his teaching on the fourth manifestation was found in Bede's commentary on St. Luke.⁸ The very same fourfold division is actually offered by Garnier⁹ who likewise credits Bede with the alleged doctrine on phagiphany¹⁰. These are strong indications that the terminology and the

(p. 126), ullum principium (p. 129), quia ulla (p. 131), ullus numerus (p. 134), ulla diversitas (p. 134), ulli talium (p. 137), ullum enim (p. 139), ullus sermo (p. 139), ulla indagine (p. 143), ulli tamen (p. 144), ullum nomen (p. 144), ullum nomen (p. 145), ulla res (p. 146), quod ulla (p. 146), personarum ulla (p. 147), ulla res (p. 147), ulla res (p. 148), hoc ulla (p. 149), ullum nomen (p. 149), ulla mutabilitas (p. 161), ullus motus (p. 161), ulla quantitas (p. 161), ullum tempus (p. 163), actionis ullam (p. 166), in ullo (p. 169), quarum ulla (p. 173), ullo est (p. 191), ullo istorum (p. 192), qui ullam (p. 193) in ullo (p. 193), hec ulla (p. 196), ulla persona (p. 200), quarum ulla (p. 212), ullus numerus (p. 212), ulla dictio (p. 221), ulla proprietas (p. 224), ullam vim (p. 225), in ullo (p. 228), ut ulla (p. 228), ulle cause (p. 228), ullum vocabulum (p. 232), ulla permittit (p. 238), ullus numerus (p. 249), ulla pluralitas (p. 249), quoniam ulla (p. 257), ulla locali (p. 261), de ullo (p. 262), ulli superiori (p. 281), ordinans ulli (p. 281), sequitur ulli (p. 281), ullo modo (p. 303), ulla ergo (p. 311), negationum ulle (p. 336). In all these cases ullus (etc.) should be changed to nullus (etc.).

⁴ S 9 (631A): Nam sicut in caelis describit Iohannes cognomento Scotus quatuor manifestationes i.e. theophaniam, epiphaniam, hyperphaniam, hypophaniam de quibus alibi diseruisse me memini quibus se angelis manifestat. The work referred to is probably the *Ysagoge theophaniarum symbolice* still extant in MS Troyes 455, f. 1-146v. The four manifestations are discussed on f. 21v-22. Cf. Cl. Baumer (ed.), "Contra Amaurianos," p. x.

⁵ *De div. naturae* I,7-9; III,4; V,26; PL 122,446CD; 448BC; 449AC; 681AB; 919C.

⁶ Baumer, pp. i-liv.

⁷ *Summa de eccl. officiis* 73; PL 202,79B-80C. The first three are mentioned by Alan of Lille, *Sermo in die epiphaniae*; ed. d'Alverny 244-245.

⁸ The term *bethphagia* was not likely coined by Bede, However, he offers the explanation: Bethpage autem domus buccae. In *Luc.* V,19; PL 92,67A. Cf. St. Bernard, *De laude novae militiae* 12; PL 182,938A.

⁹ S 9 (630D): Hae autem sunt manifestationes dei quarum quatuor specialiter hodie cum honore memoriae commendamus i.e. epiphaniam, theophaniam, bethphaniam, phagiphaniam... Prima facta est per stellam...

¹⁰ A threefold division is attributed to Bishop "Maxentius sive Maximus" in a gloss on Matthew

significance attached to it originated in the school of Gilbert of Poitiers. The definitions circulated in the school confirm this assumption. According to Garnier, John the Scot is the author of the following definition: *Theophania est subsequentibus signis non substantificis geniis, mentibus ab imaginibus defaecatis, superessentialis et diffinitivae originis simpla et reciproca manifestatio*.¹¹ An identical definition is given at least three times by Alan of Lille¹² who interprets the word theophany as follows: *Theophania enim dicitur divina manifestatio a theos quod interpretatur deus et phanes quod interpretatur apparitio*.¹³ The description accounts for Garnier's statement: *Unde et theophania dei manifestatio interpretatur a theos quod est deus et phanes quod est manifestatio*.¹⁴ Both Alan and Garnier speak in this context of God as *causa causalissima*.¹⁵ It is the sort of terminology that suited Alan's preference for the uncommon as did the definition of theophany.

Garnier claims that John the Scot distinguishes three *characteres* of theophany; he calls them epiphany, hyperphany, and hypophany.¹⁶ We find a similar claim in the *Summa* of Alan of Lille: *Theophania autem angelica in tres dividitur species: in epiphaniam, iperphaniam et ypophaniam*.¹⁷ In his *Distinctiones* he ascribes this division to John the Scot¹⁸ and offers the following definition of epiphany: *Est autem epiphania incalescentis affectionis altiorisque intellectus iudiciiue libera resultatio distributa*. A slightly longer text occurs in his *Summa*: *Epiphania est incalescentis affectionis incendio altiorisque intellectus fastigio iudiciiue libera resultatio distributa*.¹⁹ Garnier's reading of this definition is: *Epiphania est*

quoted by A. Landgraf, *Dogmengesch. der Frühschol.* II,1 (Regensburg, 1953) 44. See also Du Cange, *Glossarium* 1 (Paris, 1937) 646.

¹¹ S 35 (794B).

¹² In the *Summa* '*Quoniam homines*' II,1,141 (ed. Glorieux 282) and in the *Hierarchia Alani* (ed. d'Alverny 228) the definition reads: *Est autem theophania ex consequentibus signis non ex...* Cf. Alan of Lille, *Expositio prosae de angelis*; ed. d'Alverny 205: *Theophania est ex signis consequentibus...*

¹³ *Summa* '*Quoniam homines*' II, 1, 144; ed. Glorieux 282. The definition is attributed to John Chrysostom in the *Sentences* of Simon of Tournai as preserved in MS London, Br. Mus., Royal 9.E.XII, f. 20v.

¹⁴ S 35 (794B).

¹⁵ S 35 (795C): *Summa* '*Quoniam homines*' II,1,144; ed. Glorieux 282. Cf. *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. d'Alverny 228: *quia causae causalissimae nulla est causa*. See also S 29(757D). *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. d'Alverny 229. *Expositio prosae*; ed. d'Alverny 207.

¹⁶ S 35 (796B). S 37 (808B). The division was later rejected as *ficta et contra sententiam Dionysii* by St. Albert, *In Sent.* II, d. 9 a. 2. ed. A. Borgnet 27 (Paris, 1894) 192.

¹⁷ *Summa* '*Quoniam homines*' II,1,145; ed. Glorieux 283.

¹⁸ *Distinctiones*; PL 210,780A.

¹⁹ *Summa* '*Quoniam homines*' II,1,145; p. 283. The definition is attributed to John Chrysostom

ministeriis incalescentis affectionis altioris intuitus iudiciiue libra resultat distributa.²⁰ This definition agrees verbatim with the reading found in Alan's *Expositio prosae de angelis*.²¹ In other words, Garnier did not make up his own definition. If we substitute *intellectus* for *intuitus* the reading agrees with the definition given by Alan in the *Hierarchia Alani*.²²

Alan's definition of hyperphany reads: Iperphania est divina illuminatio sui participem scalari reverentia insigniens usum edocens arcensque contrarium.²³ In Garnier's definition, as published, the word *illuminatio* is missing: Hyperphania est sui participem insigniens scalari reverentia usumque eius edocens arcensque contrarium.²⁴ Despite slight variants the two definitions are clearly identical.

Garnier ascribes to John the Scot the definition: Hypophania est naturae legibus occurrens et arcana reserans pro sui capacitate.²⁵ Compared to Alan's definition Garnier's text, as published, seems to be faulty again. Alan gives this definition: Ypophania est divinum participium naturae legibus occurrens arcana revelans pro discreta capacitate.²⁶ Here, too, the substantial identity of the two definitions is unquestionable.

Although the problem of how Garnier came to the distinction of xerophagy, sariphagy, and sepherphany²⁷ still remains to be solved, we may dispense with John the Scot as a direct source used by Garnier.²⁸ But

in the *Sentences* of Simon of Tournai as preserved in MS London, Br. Mus., Royal 9.E.XII, f. 20v. Praepositinus, *Summa* 'Qui producit ventos' in MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 14526, f. 18 reads: Superior hierarchia celestis est incalescentis affectionis incendio altioris intellectus fastigio iudicumque libra resultat distributa. The *Summa* is dated 1190-1194. See also William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, 3; (Paris, 1500) 42.

²⁰ S 35 (796C). H. F. Dondaine, "Cinq citations de Jean Scot chez Simon de Tournai," in: *Rech. théol. anc. et méd.* 17 (1950) 303, describes the three definitions as "trois définitions bizarres."

²¹ *Expositio prosae*; ed. d'Alverny 207.

²² The same reading is found in Simon of Tournai. See the partial edition of his *Sentences* in M. T. d'Alverny, *Alain de Lille* (Paris, 1965) 309.

²³ *Summa* II, 1, 145; ed. Glorieux 284 = *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. d'Alverny 232. The *Expositio prosae* (ed. d'Alverny 208) reads: Extat (= Est autem) Yperphania divina contemplatio sui participem insigniens scalari reverentia usumque eius edocens arcens contrarium. See also Simon of Tournai, *Sentences*; ed. d'Alverny 310.

²⁴ S 35 (796D). Praepositinus, *Summa*; MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 14526, f. 18v states: Media ierarchia est divina illuminatio sui participem scalari reverentia insigniens usum dominandi edocens arcensque contrarium. Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* II, 3; (Paris, 1500) 42.

²⁵ S 35 (797A).

²⁶ *Summa* II, 1, 145; ed. Glorieux 285. *Hierarchia Alani*; ed. d'Alverny 234: Ypophania est divinum participium naturae legibus occurrens archana caelestia pro discreta capacitate revelans. Garnier's reading *reserans* instead of *revelans* is found in Alan of Lille, *Expositio prosae* (ed. d'Alverny 209) and Simon of Tournai, *Sentences* (ed. d'Alverny 311).

²⁷ S 9 (630CD).

²⁸ Garnier mentions Alanus as the author of the *Maximae theologiae* in his *Contra Amaurianos*; ed. Baeumker 37.

the question may be raised whether Garnier used the *Sentences* of Simon of Tournai in which the same definitions occur.²⁹ In his exposition of the definition of theophany Garnier declares: *diffinitivam vero, non peremptoriam sed constitutivam... originem*.³⁰ Simon makes a similar statement: *diffinitivam quia est causa constructiva rerum, non earum peremptoria*.³¹ Alan of Lille does not propose this explanation. Explaining the definition of epiphany Garnier remarks: *Distributa i.e. distincta*.³² Simon's comment reads: *Distributa est i.e. distincta*.³³ This clarification is not provided by Alan.³⁴ The view that Garnier relied directly or exclusively on Alan of Lille is therefore not firmly established. With our present knowledge, however, preference must be given to Alan of Lille and not to Simon of Tournai.³⁵

The fact that the Porretan Raoul Ardent³⁶ discusses the same divisions at length in his *Speculum universale* (iv, 16-21) shows the widespread interest in a topic whose origin, as noted before, must be sought in the school of Gilbert of Poitiers.³⁷ Since Simon of Tournai was not the author of these divisions,³⁸ the view that Simon had ever read the works of John the Scot may also be safely discarded. We have seen that the fourfold division is already listed by John Belet who studied under Gilbert.³⁹ At least among these authors, including the Cistercian Garnier, John the Scot did not yet enjoy the "mauvaise réputation"⁴⁰ which became attached to his name in the early thirteenth century.

To the sources not acknowledged by Garnier we must also add Hugh of Saint-Victor. In his explanation of the *anagogicum* Garnier writes: *Sed in*

²⁹ See the text transcribed by d'Alverny, *Alain de Lille* 307-312.

³⁰ S 35 (796A).

³¹ *Sentences*; ed. d'Alverny 309.

³² S 35 (796C).

³³ *Sentences*; ed. d'Alverny 309.

³⁴ Cf. *Summa* II,1,145; ed. Glorieux 283.

³⁵ Points of contact between Garnier and Alan of Lille are much more numerous than with Simon of Tournai. Garnier, who never refers to Simon, mentions Alan explicitly.

³⁶ See H. F. Dondaine, "Cinq citations" 308. Cf. Praepositinus, *Summa*, MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 14526, f. 18-18v.

³⁷ Dondaine (p. 309) holds that Simon of Tournai is Garnier's immediate source "en termes visiblement empruntés à Simon de Tournai."

³⁸ Simon of Tournai is almost notorious as a plagiarist. See D. van den Eynde, "Deux sources de la Somme théol. de Simon de Tournai," in: *Antonianum* 24 (1949) 19-42. O. Lottin, "Alain de Lille, une des sources des *Disputationes* de Simon de Tournai," in: *Rech. théol. anc. et méd.* 17 (1950) 175-186. N. M. Haring, "Simon of Tournai and Gilbert of Poitiers," in: *MedSt* 27 (1965) 325-330.

³⁹ In 1164 Master John Belet signed a charter at Frontenay. P. de Monsabert, "Chartes de l'abbaye de Nouaillé," in: *Arch. hist. du Poitou* 49 (1936) 339. No other date seems to be known.

⁴⁰ E. Gilson, "Maxime, Erigène, S. Bernard," in: *Beiräge*, Suppl. III, 1 (1935) 191.

hoc ultimo genere visionis ita tremit et palpitat mens humana ut tenebris ignorantiae sua obvoluta ad illam claritatem et veritatis lumen nisi dirigatur exire non potest sed quasi caeca et manu ductione utens quo non videt incedit.⁴¹ Hugh of Saint-Victor writes in his commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*: Mens etenim hominis tenebris ignorantiae suae obvoluta ad lumen veritatis exire non potest nisi dirigatur sed quasi caecus manu ductione utens quo non videt incedat.⁴² Garnier did very little to disguise his borrowing. Another such example is Garnier's description: Mens enim tenebris suis assueta quando internam divinitatis claritatem contemplari nititur quasi trementibus et palpantibus luminibus vim insoliti fulgoris non sustinens ipsis primi aspectus radiis reverberatur.⁴³ The text is copied verbatim from Hugh of Saint-Victor's commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*.⁴⁴

The same work accounts for Garnier's view on the object of the sciences pertaining to *theoria*. Garnier writes: Nam vel mathematicae (mens) speculatur visibiles rerum visibilium formas.⁴⁵ Of mathematics Hugh declares: speculatur visibiles rerum visibilium formas.⁴⁶ Garnier continues: vel physice invisibiles rerum visibilium causas.⁴⁷ Hugh says of physics: scrutatur invisibiles rerum visibilium causas.⁴⁸ Of theology Garnier writes: vel theologice contemplatur invisibiles substantias et invisibilium substantiarum invisibiles naturas.⁴⁹ Hugh states the object of theology in the very same terms: contemplatur invisibiles substantias et invisibilium substantiarum invisibiles naturas.⁵⁰ In view of these findings it is not presumptuous to suspect that Garnier copied from other authors whose identity is still unknown.

⁴¹ S 23 (730C).

⁴² *Exp. in Hier. caelestem* II; PL 175, 948B.

⁴³ S 23 (729C): *Exp. in Hier. cael.* II; PL 175, 938C. Compare also S 23 (730B): Unum (genus) quo formis et figuris et similitudinibus rerum occultarum veritas obumbratur... alterum quo... nude et pure et absque integumento... copied from *Exp. in Hier. cael.* II; PL 175, 941C.

⁴⁴ *Exp. in Hier. cael.* II; PL 175, 938C. Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *Didascalicon* IV, 14; ed. Buttimer 52.

⁴⁵ S 23 (730A). Cf. M. D. Chenu, *La théologie au douzième siècle*, in: *Études de phil. médiévale* 45 (Paris, 1957) 169.

⁴⁶ *Exp. in Hier. cael.* II; PL 175, 927C.

⁴⁷ S 23 (730A).

⁴⁸ PL 175, 928A.

⁴⁹ S 23 (730A).

⁵⁰ PL 175, 928A. Hugh's teaching is also found in *Speculum ecclesiae* 8; PL 177, 376A.

IV. CONCLUSION

By returning to the works of Hugh of Saint-Victor Garnier continued a tradition which had received a strong impetus from Hugh's insistence on the importance of the liberal arts for theology.⁵¹ It is well known that especially in monastic circles the use of the seven arts in theology was favoured against the inroads of speculative debates and questions inaugurated by Abelard.⁵² As understood by Garnier, theology consists essentially in reading and interpreting the Sacred Scriptures with the help of the liberal arts. It is not so much a systematized speculative science as a living faith to which visible things and historical events are allegories of invisible realities. The liberal arts, we have seen, were invented to help theology in its incessant effort to find God behind the *integumentum*, the covering, of creation until it reaches its highest stage, the unveiled manifestation of God in the *anagoge*. Garnier knew contemporary theology as embodied in the works of Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Alan of Lille. Yet theirs was not the theology he chose to offer his brethren whom he addressed "almost every day."⁵³ For that reason, no doubt, he does not indulge in controversies concerning the Trinity, the Incarnation, or the sacraments. In fact, sacramentology plays a very subordinate role in Garnier's sermons.⁵⁴ Only the Eucharist is discussed at some length.⁵⁵ His digression on Sacred Orders is vague.⁵⁶ Only on rare occasions does he allow philosophical terminology to dominate as is the case in his remarks on the Eucharist.⁵⁷ If on the strength of such rare digressions we try to determine Garnier's school affiliation, we must consider him a scholar who mainly through the influence of Alan of Lille owes much to Gilbert of Poitiers. He had probably studied in Paris before he decided to become a Cistercian.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

⁵¹ *Didascalicon* II,1; ed. Buttner 23.

⁵² A. Lang, *Die theol. Prinzipienlehre der mittelalt. Scholastik* (Freiburg i.B., 1964) 28.

⁵³ S 11 (639B): *Quotidie fere vobis loquimur...*

⁵⁴ In S 18 (687B) he defines sacrament as *sacramentum quippe est visibilis forma panis et vini*.

⁵⁵ S 18 (687A).

⁵⁶ S 21 (797D).

⁵⁷ S 12 (652C).

Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes*

MAJID FAKHRY

THE standing of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) in the history of medieval philosophy is an eminent, though highly complex one. The translation of his commentaries on Aristotle into Latin between 1217 and 1256 established his reputation in Scholastic circles as *the Commentator* of Aristotle and his commentaries became standard sources for the study of Aristotelianism well into the 16th century. A direct consequence of the translation of these commentaries, however, was that thereafter Averroes's literary output became part of the Aristotelian heritage of Western Europe.

This 'internationalization' of the greatest Peripatetic in the history of Islam had its drawbacks. It tended to highlight his contribution to the exegesis of Aristotle and to ignore or underrate his original contribution to the perennial problem of the relationship between philosophy and scripture, in which his own deepest convictions appear to have been involved.

Averroes' independent theological thought is contained in *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (*Incoherence of the Incoherence*) written probably in 1180, *al-Fasl* (*Agreement of Philosophy and Religion*), and *al-Kashf* (*Exposition of the Methods of Proofs Concerning the Beliefs of the Community*), written shortly before. These three works form a trilogy which is of far-reaching significance for the understanding of Averroes's own thought, as indeed of the whole development of Muslim philosophical thought.

One of the principal philosophers to address himself to the systematic task of bringing philosophy into harmony with revelation, Averroes was by no means the only one. Al-Kindī (d. c. 866), a great patron and admirer of Greek philosophy and science, during the formative years of Muslim philosophy, strove valiantly to promote and defend the study of Greek philosophy against the more conservative and anti-rationalist theologians who proscribed its study as heresy. For this scholar, who stands at the

* This paper was originally presented at the University of Toronto on November 22, 1966. The writer wishes to thank the Department of Islamic Studies at the University of Toronto for making this presentation possible.

frontier of philosophy and theology, the unity of religion and philosophical truth is an undoubted postulate. Like the later Neo-Platonists of Islam such as al-Farābī (d. 950) and Avicenna (d. 1037), al-Kindī is fully committed to the view that philosophy and religion, reason and revelation, partake of a unity of purpose or objective which the philosopher should never disavow. Unlike both these Neo-Platonists, who set up philosophy as the ultimate court of appeal in any conflict between philosophy and Scripture, al-Kindī, however, asserted the superiority of revelation in unequivocal terms. This superiority, he argues, is an instance of the superiority of divine over human wisdom and of the privileged status of the prophets, who are God's spokesmen and the bearers of a 'divine science' which transcends human capability.¹ These two wisdoms, however, are in complete agreement. In the event of their apparent conflict, the duty of the philosopher is to resort to allegorical interpretation (*ta'wīl*).

Al-Kindī not only recommended but also practiced the method of *ta'wīl*,² which the conservative theologians, as a rule, tended to disallow. In fact, the denial of the validity of *ta'wīl* is, according to him, an obvious sign of feeble-mindedness.³ None of al-Kindī's philosophical successors were, fortunately, so feeble-minded. The real problem which the method of *ta'wīl* raised in a philosophical context was that of the possible limit or limits its application involved. Al-Farābī and Avicenna do not seem to have recognized or, at any rate, defined any such limits, and this was the measure of their belief in the juridical superiority of philosophy over scripture, in matters involving theological conflict.

The main purpose of this paper is to show that, despite his affiliation to the philosophical tradition associated with al-Farābī and Avicenna, on the specific question of the relationship of philosophy and scripture, Averroes did develop a theological method of far greater stringency than either of these two predecessors. This method resembles in many respects that of al-Kindī, but surpasses it in the measure of its pre-occupation with distinguishing clearly the sphere of philosophy and revelation and defining the exact scope of each.

The starting-point of this method is the classic, late Neo-Platonic theme of the unity of truth in its many manifestations. The Brethren of Purity were perhaps the first to popularize this theme in the 10th century, but it is clearly pre-supposed by al-Kindī, al-Farābī, Avicenna, the whole Illuminationist or *Ishrāqī* tradition, though certainly not by such *libre-*

¹ See *Rasā'il al-Kindī al-Falsafiyah* (Cairo, 1950), i, 372 f.

² See, for instance, *R. fi'l-Ibānah 'an Sujūd al-Jīm al-Aqsa*, in *Ibid.*, 244-261.

³ *Ibid.*, 245.

penseurs as Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. c. 910) or al-Rāzī (d. c. 923). Obviously inherited from the Hellenistic Neo-Platonic tradition, as illustrated in the eclecticism of Jamblichus (d. c. 330) Damascius (d. 553), Syrianus (fl. c. 430) and Simplicius (d. 533),⁴ the concept of the unity of all truth was the only logical way in which the philosophers of Islam could justify their philosophical pursuits, appease the theologians and satisfy the natural urge of the mind for internal coherence.

The anthropomorphisms in which the Koran abounds had raised from the start the crucial question of this unity. Both the Koranic references to God's 'sitting upon the throne' (Koran 7, 54; 20, 5) and the possibility of perceiving Him on the Last Day (Koran 75, 22), (to mention only the two most glaring instances) compelled the more rationally-minded theologians, from the time of Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā (d. 748) down, to fall back upon the only logical device possible, namely, the interpretation of those anthropomorphisms in a way which would safeguard God's immateriality, without sacrificing their intellectual content. Thus the 'sitting upon the throne' was interpreted by the Mu'tazilite and post-Mu'tazilite theologians as an allegory for majesty or sovereignty the 'contemplation' of God's countenance as an allegory for the beatific vision and so on.

The more literal jurists and exegetes like Mālik b. Anas (d. 795) and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 855) were not particularly disturbed by such anthropomorphisms. In their unconditional belief in the infallibility and sanctity of the Koranic text, they were simply content to accept its truth without much ado. But this attitude, which they and other literalists and semi-literalists in the centuries to come were to assume, did not satisfy the nagging intellectual curiosity of the rationalist theologians or the philosophers. Averroes, as we hope to show, is fully committed to the infallibility of the Koran also, but he is equally committed to the postulate of the unity of truth.⁵

This postulate did not involve for him the methodological necessity of recourse to interpretation (*ta'wīl*) only; it involved in addition the tacit recognition of the *parity* of philosophy and scripture, of reason and revelation, as the two primary and infallible sources of truth. If some philosophers, such as Avicenna, had tended, in their incontinent zeal for philosophy, to sacrifice this parity, some like al-Kindī never doubted it. Better than any other Muslim philosopher, Averroes has given clear expression to this concept of parity and drawn all the logical corollaries implicit in it.

⁴ See, E. Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, English translation (New York, 1931), 306 ff.

⁵ See, for instance, *Faṣl al-Maqāl in Falsafat Ibn Rushd* (Cairo, n.d.), 26. Cf. G. Hourani's *Averroes on Harmony of Religion and Philosophy* (London, 1961), 70.

On Averroes's unbounded zeal for philosophy and his veneration for Aristotle in 'whom the truth was consummated', I need hardly dwell here. If St. Thomas Aquinas, whose regard for Aristotle was second only to his regard for the Bible, took the liberty to depart from him on a series of cardinal issues, Averroes never explicitly dissociated himself from what appeared to him to be the genuine intent of Aristotle. How could he, in the circumstances, continue to acquiesce in the authority of the Koran as the revealed word of God? Or to state this question in its simplest form: How could Averroes as a good philosopher remain a good Muslim? Or even more generally: Is it possible for one to be both a philosopher and a Muslim at the same time?

That Averroes was and continued to be, to the very end, both a good philosopher and a good Muslim, I for my part can find no reason to doubt. Whether, as was for a long time alleged, he was able to do so by virtue of a certain disaffection or duplicity, euphemistically referred to as the double-truth, I cannot, for my part, believe. Étienne Gilson has discussed all the difficulties, historical and logical, which the whole thesis of double-truth raises in his admirable little book, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*.⁶ The student of medieval philosophy in general and of Averroes in particular can only express surprise at the dogmatism with which this thesis is still defended by some scholars.⁷ Whether Averroes's personal, religious beliefs were not a mask for his irreligion, as some have also argued, no one could put the answer more felicitously than Gilson has put it. After observing that: "il paraît certain qu'Averroes n'a rien dit de tel (sc. what is true in philosophy may not be true in theology)," he goes on to ask: "Que pense-t-il réellement?" and then goes on to reply: "La réponse est cachée dans le secret de la conscience" adding in the sequel: "le secret des consciences individuelles est une des limites de l'histoire."⁸

The general question: Whether it is possible for a philosopher to be also a Muslim is a question which cannot be fully explored in a brief paper. This question admits naturally of two answers: a historical and a theoretical one. The fact that historically most philosophers in Islam tended to be Muslims of a dubious type, while Muslims (especially the theologians) tended to have little sympathy for philosophy, does not necessarily entail as a corollary that a philosopher could not logically be a Muslim or that

⁶ New York, 1938, 58 ff. See also his *Philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1947), 360, and "Boèce de Dacie et la double vérité," in *AHDLMA* (1955), 81-99.

⁷ See, for instance, Phil. Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism and Metaconsciousness* (The Hague), 1963, 106 f., where the double-truth is explained in terms of linguistic usage or 'mode of discourse'.

⁸ *Philosophie au moyen âge*, 360.

Islamic philosophy is not possible *in principle*. If we exclude the Illuminationist tradition (*al-Ishrāq*), and particularly its greatest *Shi'ite* representative in modern times, Mulla Sadra (*al-Shīrāzī*) (d. 1640), al-Kindī and Averroes are perhaps the two philosophers who best illustrate the possibility of the 'marriage' of philosophy and dogma in Islam, so to speak. And it is not without significance that these two philosophers span the three centuries of creative philosophical thought in Islam, al-Kindī in the 9th century and Averroes in the 12th century.

Two circumstances in particular enabled Averroes to maintain the difficult position which we have labelled the parity of philosophy and scripture, of reason and revelation: first, the distinction, which the Koran itself (Koran, 3, 5) makes and which the commentators from al-Tabarī (d. 923) down had recognized between ambiguous (*mutashābih*) and unambiguous (*muḥkam*) scriptural passages; and second, the absence of a teaching authority in (Sunnite) Islam upon which devolved the right to define doctrine. What the first circumstance entailed was the recognition that some scriptural passages cannot be taken at their face value. What the second circumstance entailed was the need for some authority in whom the right to arbitrate doctrinal conflicts was vested. In *Shi'ite* Islam this right was vested in the Imām, who was the spiritual and temporal head of the community, as well as its infallible teacher (*mu'allim: magister*). This explains how in *Shi'ite* circles from the time of the Brethren of Purity in the tenth century down to that of Nasir-e Khusraw in the 11th and al-Shīrāzī in the 17th, the conflict between philosophy and scripture was never a serious issue.

In trying to determine the body in which this doctrinal authority should be vested, Ibn Rushd exhibits his greatest subtlety. The Koran again provides him with a clue to this determination. Having stated that "it is He who has revealed the Book to you (i.e. Muḥammad)," it goes on to state (at least according to a perfectly sound and respectable reading): "some of its verses are unambiguous (*muḥkamāt*)... and the others are ambiguous (*mutashābihāt*)... and that "only God and those confirmed in knowledge know its interpretation (*ta'wīl*)" (Koran 3, 5).

It will be noted at once that the whole issue hinges on the interpretation of the phrase "those confirmed in knowledge." For Averroes, however, the phrase admits of one and only one interpretation: namely, the philosophers. His reasons are sometimes historically-founded, sometimes purely *a priori*. Both on the basis of Aristotelian logical theory and that of his own estimate of the validity of scholastic theological methods, he arrives at this result, which for him is indubitable. Aristotle, as is well known, distinguishes in *Analytica Posteriora* (I, 71b) and *Topica* (I, 100a-b) between scientific and sophistical arguments and lists in *Sophistica* (165b)

four types of sophistical arguments: didactic, examination, dialectical and contentious (*διδασκαλικοί, κειραστικοὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐριστικοί*). In *Rhetorica* I (1354a), he explains the nature of rhetorical or persuasive reasoning. Averroes reduces the list to the three principal types of argument: the demonstrative, the dialectical and the rhetorical and proceeds to identify the demonstrative method with that of the philosophers, the dialectical with that of the theologians and the rhetorical with that of the masses at large.⁹

What further disqualifies the theologians (*al-mutakallimūn*), according to him, is the fact that they have unlawfully divulged the secrets of interpretation, which should be reserved for those only who are fit to comprehend them and have thereby sowed the seeds of heresy and discord in Islam.¹⁰

To make good his case against the theologians and particularly the Ash'arites, Averroes wrote his *Exposition of the Methods of Proofs Concerning the Beliefs of the Community* (*al-Kashf*),¹¹ intended to serve as a sequel to his *Agreement of Philosophy and Religion*. His aim in this treatise is stated to be "the examination of the external aspects (*al-Zāhir*) of the beliefs which the lawgiver (i.e. Muḥammad) intended the public to adhere to," as distinct from those (false) beliefs which the unwarranted interpretations of the theologians have induced them into.¹² By those 'external beliefs' he means those articles of faith which are indispensable for salvation, or as the text puts it: "those without which the faith (of the believer) is not complete." The determination of those articles provides him with the occasion of drawing up a credal statement of orthodoxy, as he understood it, as well as laying down the conditions and the limits of the method of interpretation.

(1) The first condition is that, as already hinted, neither the theologians (whether Mu'tazilite or Ash'arite), nor the literalists (*hashwiyah*) nor the advocates of the esoteric method (i.e. the Ismā'ilis or Bāṭinīs) are competent to formulate the "sound interpretations" which genuine faith requires. Only the philosophers are. The examination of his specific strictures against each of these groups lies outside the scope of the present paper, but it is noteworthy that the general charge levelled at them is that most of their arguments or interpretations are 'innovations' which have no basis in tradition.¹³

⁹ See *al-Faṣl in Falsafat Ibn Rushd*, 19 f. and G. Hourani, *op. cit.*, 64.

¹⁰ *Al-Faṣl*, 22f. et passim, see G. Hourani, *op. cit.*, 65 f.

¹¹ In *Falsafat Ibn Rushd*, 30 ff. Spanish translation in M. Alonso, *Teología de Averroes* (Madrid-Granada, 1947), 203 ff.

¹² *Al-Kashf*, 30 f.

¹³ *Al-Kashf*, 31.

(2) The second condition is that scripture, which is addressed to all classes of men, and not to the philosophers only, uses the three types of proof already mentioned.¹⁴ Each class, however, attains the degree of assent (*al-taṣḍīq*) appropriate to it and which its salvation requires. And this, argues Averroes, is the token of God's wisdom: that He has addressed each class, in the Koran, according to the degree of their understanding.¹⁵

(3) The third condition is that interpretation should be properly understood and applied. By interpretation or *ta'wīl* is to be understood: "the act of extending the connotation of the term from the real to the figurative meaning, without violating the linguistic usage of the Arabs, which allows for giving a thing the name proper to its equal, its cause, its accident or its concomitant."¹⁶ Averroes asserts repeatedly that the masses should take the pronouncements of scripture at their face value and that the divulging of the 'secrets of interpretation' is a very grave sin, of which al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) is particularly guilty. The obvious implication of this thesis is that there is an impious inquisitiveness which can only conduce to damnation and from which the masses, who are not equipped to probe the hidden truths of revelation, should be guarded at any cost.

Where the line of demarcation between what ought and what ought not to be interpreted lies is not clearly spelt out by Averroes. It is a fair inference from his statements, however, that there are three cases in which interpretation is called for:

- (a) Where no consensus (*ijmā'*) is possible on the legal or doctrinal significance of certain scriptural passages.¹⁷
- (b) Where the pronouncements of scripture appear to conflict with each other.
- (c) Where those pronouncements appear to conflict with the principles of philosophy or natural reason.

The first of these cases is doubtless the most fertile area of possible interpretation. *Ijmā'* itself is ill-defined and in the absence of a teaching religious authority inconclusive. It is possible theoretically, of course, that consensus on all juridical and doctrinal matters could have been achieved during the life of Muhammad and thereby the area of interpretation drastically restricted from the start. But the fact of theological discord in early Muslim history shows beyond question how idle is this supposition.

¹⁴ See *al-Faṣl*, 7, 19.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9; *al-Kashf*, 79.

¹⁶ *Al-Faṣl*, 8.

¹⁷ On the general question of *Ijmā'* see L. Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd* (Averroes) (Paris, 1948), 32 f. and G. Hourani, *op. cit.*, 28 f.

The second of these cases was the one with which the commentators of the Koran and the theologians (particularly the Mu'tazilah) were primarily concerned. Averroes himself is naturally concerned with the third case, especially since the intermittent dialectical warfare between the theologians and the philosophers had seriously compromised philosophy in Muslim lands and brought it to the verge of bankruptcy, following al-Ghazālī's classic onslaught. The rehabilitation of philosophy, he felt, could be achieved only if it can be demonstrated that no genuine conflict between philosophy and religion could arise, and that scripture properly interpreted is in complete harmony with philosophy properly understood.

It should be noted that nowhere does Averroes suggest that in carrying out the task of harmonization, by recourse to the method of *ta'wīl*, the philosopher is authorized to introduce any new doctrines, or, conversely, to eliminate any positively given ones. From this it follows that, like the commentator of the texts of scripture, he is fully dependent on these texts. This is the first and perhaps the most important limit of the philosophical method of *ta'wīl*. But there are other and equally significant limits. Like the most humble member of the religious community, the philosopher has a personal stake in salvation, or, what is normally designated in the Islamic sources, happiness or felicity in this world and the world-to-come. To safeguard his salvation, the philosopher must subscribe to that system of beliefs which is indispensable for salvation.

The determination of the irreducible core of such beliefs thus becomes for the philosopher a decisive issue. As outlined in *al-Kashf* this irreducible core consists of the following articles or precepts which the philosopher, the theologian and the ordinary man must all subscribe to.

1. The existence of God as Creator and providential ruler of the world. The most convincing arguments for this existence are not the cosmological or aitiological arguments developed by Aristotle, nor the argument from contingency, advanced by Avicenna and the Ash'arite theologians, but rather the argument from invention (or creation) and the argument from providence or design (*dalīl al-'Inayah*).¹⁸ The Koran itself has drawn attention to these two arguments which are the most suited to the capabilities of all classes of men.
2. God's unity defined in three Koranic verses (21, 22; 23, 93; 17, 44), which are at the basis of all the philosophical arguments for this unity.
3. The 'attributes of perfection' which the Koran predicates of God. These are knowledge, life, power, will, hearing, seeing and speech. Although the first three do not raise many serious difficulties from a philosophical point of view, the last four have given rise to endless controversy. To vindicate these attributes, Averroes proceeds by way of inference. Thus will, like power, is for him

¹⁸ *Al-Kashf*, 45 f. Cf. M. Fakhry, "Classical Islamic Arguments for Existence of God," in *Muslim World* (April, 1957), 133 f.

a logical inference from the production of the world by a knowing agent. The exact determination of the *mode* of God's willing is not possible either for the theologians or the philosophers. The thesis advanced by the theologians, particularly al-Ghazali, for instance, that God willed eternally that the world should come into being at a particular time is a heresy or innovation (*bid'ah*),¹⁹ and is at any rate logically self-contradictory. For the act of willing signifies the indifferent capacity to perform an act or its opposite. To conceive of a will determining the occurrence of one alternative rather than the other since all time is to nullify the concept of will altogether.²⁰ Speech is predicated of God as an inference from knowledge and power. For speech is nothing but the act of exhibiting, verbally or otherwise, the knowledge which the agent has within him.²¹ Finally, hearing and seeing are to be predicated of God by virtue of the fact that they bear on certain aspects of the object which cannot be rationally known. God as the Maker of the world must be cognizant of all aspects of the world made and consequently must know "the objects of sight and the objects of hearing," which are part of His creation.²²

Averroes does not clearly explain how God can have knowledge of such *sensibilia* without prejudice to His immutable and incorporeal nature. It is noteworthy, however, that in this and similar cases, the ultimate evidence advanced by him is scriptural. The measure of his dependence on scripture is such that in the matter of rationalizing the attributes, he even outstrips his most inveterate foes, the Ash'arites, and takes a distinctly agnostic stand fully consistent with his juridical Malikite position. Thus for this Malikite *Qādi*,²³ the question raised by the Mu'tazilah and their successors from the 9th century on, *namely*; whether the divine attributes are identical with the essence of God or distinct from it, is one of the heresies or innovations which the theologians have introduced. Neither the Ash'arite thesis that the attributes are distinct from the essence of God, nor the Mu'tazilite thesis that they are identical with it is logically tenable. For the first view implies that God is made up of essence and attribute or subject and predicate and consequently composite, whereas the second view presupposes that the identity of essence and attribute in God is a self-evident proposition, which is quite unwarranted.²⁴ The position of the philosophers on this question is that God must possess the seven attributes of perfection, but the mode of this possession, being transcendent, is incomprehensible. In fact, it belongs to God alone to comprehend this mode.²⁵

¹⁹ *Al-Kashf*, 55.

²⁰ *Tahāfūt*, 9 f.

²¹ *Al-Kashf*, 55.

²² *Ibid.*, 57. Cf. *Tahāfūt*, 454.

²³ Averroes served as *qādi* or religious judge of Seville from 1169 till 1171 and subsequently as chief judge of Cordova. See Gauthier, *op. cit.*, 4.

²⁴ *Al-Kashf*, 58; *Tahāfūt*, 301 f.

²⁵ *Tahāfūt*, 446, 354, 149. Cf. *Al-Fasl*, 29.

The remaining articles which must be believed by all classes of men and which consequently cannot be interpreted or questioned include: (d) God's freedom from any imperfection (*tanzih*), clearly asserted in the Koran especially in the classic verse (42, 9), "there is nothing like unto Him" and upon which the *via remotionis*, a favourite method of the Mu'tazilah and the Neo-Platonists, ultimately rests. Apart from the Koran, this concept is rooted in human nature. For man recognizes instinctively that the Creator must be unlike the creature and that any attributes common to both must belong to God in a pre-eminent way, or as the Scholastics were to put it, *eminenter*.²⁶

The other articles are (e) the creation of the world, (f) the validity of prophecy, (g) the justice of God and finally (h) resurrection or survival after death (*al-ma'ād*). Upon all those matters, the Koran has legislated unambiguously and consequently has left the philosophers, the theologians and the masses no choice but to acquiesce in them without question. Here interpretation or controversy is entirely precluded. It is clear, however, that the *manner* in which these articles are to be understood is not unambiguously defined in the Koran. Let us take as an example: the problem of creation. That the world is created by God is absolutely certain. However, whether the world was created *ex nihilo* and in time, as the theologians maintain, is far from being clear. For, there is not a single proposition in the Koran which states explicitly that "God existed together with not-being" and subsequently the world came into being after it was not. The import of a series of Koranic passages appears, on the contrary, to suggest that the 'form' of the world is created in time, whereas both its duration and matter are uncreated. Thus the verse (Koran II, 6): "He who created the heavens and the earth in six days, while His throne rested on water" implies the eternity of water, the throne and the time which measures their duration. Similarly the verse (Koran, 41, 10): "Then He arose towards heaven, which consisted of smoke" implies that the heaven was created out of a pre-existing matter, *i.e.* smoke.²⁷

Or let us take the equally knotty question of resurrection. This is a question "regarding the validity of which," writes Averroes, "the various religions are in agreement and the demonstrations of the learned have established its truth... through necessary proofs."²⁸ The only difference between the philosopher and the theologian in this regard is that the character (*ṣifāt*) of this resurrection is differently understood. The Koran,

²⁶ *Al-Kashf*, 60 f.; *Tahafut*, 463 et *passim*.

²⁷ *Al-Faṣl*, 13.

²⁸ *Al-Kashf*, 118.

in its concern for the welfare of the masses, has spoken of the pleasures and tribulations of the world-to-come in gross sensuous or corporeal terms, so as to compel their assent. In so far as they serve a positive moral or spiritual purpose by inciting to a life of virtue, such 'sensuous representations' can only be welcomed by the philosophers, who must piously defer to the authority of the prophets as the lawgivers of the community in these matters.²⁹

Some scriptures (i.e. the Christian), it is true, have dispensed with 'sensuous representations.' The Koran, however, has this advantage over them: that it has coupled the sensuous or pictorial to the spiritual or non-sensuous method and has thereby safeguarded the felicity of the three classes.³⁰

An obvious implication of this view is that the masses at large, as distinct from the philosophers and theologians, can only understand the pictorial language of 'sensuous representations'. The theologians, misconceiving the nature or purpose of this language, have extended to it the process of interpretation and thereby confused the masses and repudiated the divine wisdom underlying its use. However, since the 'sensuous representations' with which the Koran abounds do not belong to the class of ambiguous statements, the duty of the masses is to accept them at their face value and any attempt to elicit their hidden meaning for them, through interpretation, should be condemned.³¹

Another implication is that, despite the harmony of philosophy and scripture where the fundamentals of belief are concerned, religion has a wider scope than philosophy. For whereas philosophy is concerned with "the intellectual felicity of a small group of men" (i.e. the philosophers), religion is concerned with the felicity of all and consequently has used the three types of argument: the rhetorical, the dialectical and the demonstrative.³² Although different, these three types are not incompatible. The results arrived at through demonstration are not different in *substance* from the results arrived at through dialectical or rhetorical methods. Only the *form* in which they are expressed is different.

Moreover, there is a certain region lying outside the scope of reason, into which philosophy cannot venture. Al-Ghazālī was therefore right to argue that "with respect to whatever lies outside the scope of human cognitions, it is necessary to resort to scripture (*al-Shar'*)."³³ In some cases,

²⁹ *Tahāfut*, 584.

³⁰ *Al-Kashf*, 102 f.; *Tahāfut*, 585.

³¹ *Al-Kashf*, 64.

³² *Tahāfut*, 582.

³³ *Ibid.*

human reason is essentially incapable of attaining a species of knowledge indispensable for man's felicity. In other cases, it is incapable owing to some accidental impediment, or simply to the difficulties inherent in the subject-matter itself. In all such cases, revelation necessarily supplements rational knowledge.³⁴

What, in the light of this analysis, one should make out of the legend of the ungodly or disaffected Averroes, I leave to the reader to judge. The insight, sanity and subtlety which Averroes brought to bear upon some of the knottiest problems of theology can only command our admiration today. The analogies of his solution of the problem of reason and revelation to that of St. Thomas Aquinas have been underlined by some scholars,³⁵ but have been questioned by others.³⁶ On the general recognition of two distinct and complementary spheres, that of reason and that of revelation, their agreement appears to us to be almost complete.

Be this as it may, neither in Islam, nor in the West did Averroes enjoy the regard that was due to him as a systematic theologian; in the latter case, because his theological writings remained virtually unknown until the 14th century during which the *Tahāfut* was translated into Latin; in the former, because the recrudescence of Hanbalism and the general cultural decadence of Islam made it difficult to sustain the intellectual effort Averroes's subtle theological disquisitions required. From the 12th century on, theologians became engrossed, chiefly under the influence of Avicenna, in arid discussions of the abstract questions of being, essence and accident, or writing super-commentaries on the works of the masters or on manuals of logic. The only exceptions were almost all Shi'ite. *Ishrāqī* philosophers from the time of al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191) down, continued the speculative work of their predecessors. And even when their eclecticism was greater than that of their predecessors, they were still fully conscious of the duty of the philosopher to bring the light of discursive thought to bear on the data of revelation. The only surprising circumstance, however, is that Averroes should not have enjoyed a greater vogue than he actually did in these circles, which continued to flourish well into modern times.

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³⁴ *Tahāfut*, 255 f.

³⁵ See M. Asín Palacios, "El Averroísmo teológico de Santo Tomás de Aquino," in *Homenaje a don Francisco Codera* (Saragossa, 1904), 271-331.

³⁶ See P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1908).

Lupus of Ferrières: Carolingian Scribe and Text Critic

ROBERT J. GARIÉPY, JR.

LUPUS Servatus, Abbot of Ferrières, has long been celebrated as occupying a prominent place in medieval intellectual history, and he is usually considered one of the most cultured men of the ninth century. He has been called the first humanist — a man who, when compared with other men of the Carolingian Age, attained a solitary pre-eminence in the field of humanistic studies. Since he professed to have a wide range of literary interests, he has been considered a precursor of the humanists of the later Renaissance. Moreover, it has been said that he displays a wide knowledge of Latin literature by his frequent references to Latin authors.¹ There is another aspect of his scholarly pursuits, however, which stamps him as the pre-eminent humanist of the Carolingian Age — his accomplishments as a scribe and text critic. It will be the purpose of this study to consider this side of Lupus' literary attainments.

Believing as he did in seeking knowledge for its own sake, Lupus made it one of his greatest aims in life not only to acquire manuscripts, but also to correct and copy them. This presented something of a problem because at that time it was often difficult to locate books, and, when this was accomplished, the loan of the precious and costly manuscripts had to be arranged. Copies of them must then be made and the original sent back to the owner. However, Lupus was indefatigable in increasing his library's resources. Anyone who had a book which was not in the Ferrières library was subject to petition. Thus, he borrowed from the monasteries of Tours, Fulda, and Prüm among others, and from his friends Einhard, Wenilo, Reginbert, and Marcward, and even went so far as to ask Altsig of York and Pope Benedict III for manuscripts.

Although Lupus was eager to borrow books, he was very reluctant to lend them. Time and again he pleaded that the troubled times prevented safe transportation of his precious books. To Reginbert he wrote, "in

¹ For the most recent publication on this aspect of Lupus' scholarship, see Wolfgang Edelstein, *Eruditio und Sapientia: Weltbild und Erziehung in der Karolingerzeit. Untersuchungen zu Alcuins Briefen*. (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1965), 169-219.

regno Karolo... impune latrocinia committuntur et nihil securius atque constantius quam rapinarum violentia frequentatur." (*Epist.*, 101).² It is interesting to add that Lupus, in the final paragraph of the same letter, and in spite of the dangers just enumerated, still requested his friend to send *him* some books. In another letter to Altwin of Sens he said that, since he feared to lend a manuscript which was in constant demand, he had almost resolved to send it to some place of security for fear of losing it himself. In addition to this, Lupus added, even though the distance from Ferrières to Sens was short, yet the messenger would be traveling on foot and thus more subject to peril:

Librum quem petisti multi quibus non erat commodandus meum post reditum flagitarunt. Quare ablegandum illum aliquo, ne perire contingeret, pene statui. Hunc a me, cum veneris, forsitan impetrabis. Nam huic clerico etsi, quia tibi fidus est, hunc committi posse videbam, tamen non satis tuto, quod pedes erat, te non advertisse miratus sum. (*Epist.* 8).

In still another letter Lupus tells Reginbert that he would have sent the book which Reginbert had requested if he had had a suitable courier to take it to him: "Librum quem flagitasti misissem, nisi lator defuisset idoneus." (*Epist.*, 11).

The rich bindings of some books of those days rendered them especially tempting prizes to the highwayman. Thus, in a letter to Hincmar of Rheims Lupus said that he was afraid to send the *Collectaneum* of Bede because, since it was too large to fit conveniently into a wallet, it was liable to be stolen. But Lupus himself would bring it to Hincmar at some later date:

Collectaneum Bedae in apostolum ex operibus Augustini veritus sum dirigere, propterea quod tantus est liber, ut nec sinu celari nec pera possit satis commode contineri. Quanquam, si alterutrum fieret, formidanda esset obvia improborum rapacitas, quam profecto pulchritudo ipsius codicis accendisset, et ita forsitan et mihi et vobis perisset. Proinde tuto vobis memoratum volumen ipse commo-daturus sum, cum primo, si Deus vult, aliquo nos contigerit sospites convenire. (*Epist.* 108).

Lupus has sent ten pine cones, however, since these could be easily carried !

It was in the copying of manuscripts that Lupus was outstanding. His thirst for knowledge, however, was not quenched with the possession of a manuscript, especially if it were incomplete. This is evident from a letter to Pope Benedict III where Lupus says: "Petimus etiam Tullium *De oratore*

² The best edition of Lupus' letters is that of L. Levillain, *Loup de Ferrières, Correspondance (Les Classiques de l'Histoire de France, 10 and 16, 1927-35)*, which was reprinted in 1964 by l'Association Guillaume Budé "Les Belles Lettres." All references are to this edition.

et duodecim libros *Institutionum oratoriarum* Quintiliani, qui uno nec ingenti volumine continentur; quorum utriusque auctorum partes habemus, verum plenitudinem per vos desideramus obtinere." (*Epist.*, 100). When he tried to get a copy made at Ferrières of some book that his library lacked he was doing nothing different from what other scholarly abbots and librarians of his time were doing. But what makes Lupus unique is that he was never satisfied with the copy of a work he had, but was always eager to get another copy so that he could collate the two and arrive at a better text. This idea is brought out in a letter to Ansbaldu: "Tullianas epistolas, quas misisti, cum nostris conferri faciam, ut ex utrisque, si possit fieri, veritas exculpatur." (*Epist.* 69). It was this trait of Lupus that caused C. H. Beeson to remark: "The urge for a second copy from which to correct the first is almost as strong in Lupus as the desire for a new text. It is this characteristic that distinguishes him from all the other scholars of the Middle Ages."³ Similarly, E. Norden considered this trait as making Lupus a humanist: "Wer fühlt sich bei dem allen nicht erinnert an die Briefe der Humanisten mit ihrem sechsüchtigen Verlangen nach neuen und vollständigen Autoren? Ja, in einem Punkte ist er sogar den meisten Humanisten voraus: er will nicht bloss Texte, sondern gute Texte."⁴

Most modern scholarship has treated Lupus from the standpoint of his textual work. Such eminent palaeographers as E. A. Lowe, C. H. Beeson, E. K. Rand, L. Traube, P. Lehmann, and W. M. Lindsay have studied the manuscripts which were known to Lupus and corrected by him. A 1936 dissertation, *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières* by Sister L. Meagher, dealt exclusively with his manuscript of Aulus Gellius, and Beeson's work on Lupus' autograph copy of Cicero's *De oratore* is a masterpiece of scholarship.

Before we discuss some of the modern work that has been done on certain manuscripts that Lupus is known to have criticized, it seems advisable to list the manuscripts that have been attributed to him, whether correctly or incorrectly.

GENUINE LUPUS MANUSCRIPTS

There has been some dispute about the true identity of the corrector of a few of the manuscripts attributed to Lupus. It is generally agreed,

³ *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic: A Study of His Autograph Copy of Cicero's De Oratore* (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), 4.

⁴ *Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert vor Christus bis in die Zeit der Renaissance*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1909), 2, 701.

however, that Lupus is the scribe or corrector of the following manuscripts:⁵

- Berne 366
- Valerius Maximus, *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*
- London, Brit. Mus. Harleianus 2736
- Cicero, *De oratore*
- Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 5726
- Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, Books VI-X
- Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 6370
- Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* and beginning of the *Saturnalia*, Book I
- Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7774 A
- Cicero, *Orationes in Verrem* (Act. II, or. IV-V) *De inventione*
- Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 8623
- Symmachus, *Epistolae*, Books I-VIII
- Vatican, Reg. lat. 597
- Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, Books IX-XX
- Vatican, Reg. lat. 1484
- Tiberius Claudius Donatus, *Interpretationes Vergilianae Aeneidos*, Books I-VI
- Vatican, Cod. lat. 474
- Augustine, *Sermones*
- Vienna, Bibl. Nat. Cod. 189
- Cicero, philosophical corpus, i.e. *De natura deorum*, *De divinatione*, *De fato*, *Timaeus*, *Topica*, *Paradoxa*, *Lucullus* (*Academica Priora*), *De legibus*
- Berlin, Bibl. Nat. lat. 126 (Phillips 1872)
- Jerome, *Chronica Eusebii*

POSSIBLE LUPUS MANUSCRIPTS

The following manuscripts were included in the list of Lowe and some of them have been commented on by Traube. There is not universal agreement, however, that all of them were actually worked on by Lupus. Some of them are judged to be "en rapport" with Lupus' critical method but may have in fact been corrected by one of Lupus' students, such as Heiric of Auxerre.⁶

⁵ See especially C. H. Beeson, *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*; E. A. Lowe, "Nugae Palaeographicae," *Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor of George Lincoln Burr* (New York, 1931), 62-64; E. Pellegrin, "Les Manuscrits de Loup de Ferrières," *BECh*, 115 (1957), 5-31; E. K. Rand, *A Survey of the Manuscripts of Tours* (*Studies in the Script of Tours*, 1, Cambridge, Mass., 1929); E. K. Rand and L. W. Jones, *The Earliest Book of Tours with Supplementary Descriptions of Other Manuscripts of Tours* (*Studies in the Script of Tours*, 2, Cambridge, Mass., 1934); and L. Traube, *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, 3, ed. S. Brandt (Munich, 1920).

⁶ The Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7496, for example, which contains some various works of Priscian and which is considered a Lupus MS by Lowe is instead attributed to Heiric by M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* (Munich, 1911-13), 1, 489.

- Leyden, Voss. lat. f. 12b
 Cicero, *De senectute*
 Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*
 Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 5763⁷
 Caesar, *De bello gallico*
 Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 6332
 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes*
De senectute
 Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7496
 Priscian, various works
 Paris, Bibl. Nat. N.A. 1626
 Lucan, *De bello civile*

There are three other manuscripts which F. Carey considers to have been annotated by Lupus.⁸

- Berne 391
 Cicero, *De officiis*
 Berne 451
 Quintus Curtius, *Historia Alexandri Magni*
 Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 1913 A
 Augustine, *Confessiones*

Finally, there is a manuscript which the latest commentator on Lupus' manuscripts, E. Pellegrin, claims to have been "corrigé de sa main."⁹ This is the Orléans 162 (139) which contains three works of Augustine: *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *Epistula CCVII ad Claudium*, and *Contra Iulianum*.

The total, then, of manuscripts which have been attributed with more or less certainty to Lupus is twenty. Of this number it seems safe to conclude that at least those contained on our first list were actually written or corrected by him. Beeson, the greatest specialist in Lupus' textual work, certified only six of the total, but he died before the work of Carey and Pellegrin appeared. Other experts on Lupus' style and method of textual criticism are also deceased, so there remains no one of their caliber to pass judgment on the validity of Carey's or Pellegrin's claims. But there are enough manuscripts available that can be certainly attributed to Lupus to be able to ascertain his style and method of textual correction.

⁷ Lowe lists this MS as "doubtful"; Pellegrin, p. 15, says, "Les notes marginales, d'une écriture anguleuse, ne sont pas de la main de Loup."

⁸ "MSS from the Scriptorium of Saint-Germain d'Auxerre" (1956), 2-3. These MSS are listed by Pellegrin, 17-18; of the MSS listed by Carey, she agrees only with the possible attribution to Lupus of Berne 391.

⁹ "Les Manuscrits de Loup de Ferrières," 5.

LUPUS AND VALERIUS MAXIMUS

The year 1891 marks the beginning of modern scholarship concerning Lupus' textual work. It was in this year that L. Traube determined that the revision of the Berne 366, which contains the *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus, was by the hand of Lupus.¹⁰ Traube supposed that Lupus had used this manuscript when, for instruction in Roman history, he dictated to his students extracts he had himself culled from Valerius Maximus. Furthermore, Traube felt that the corrections in the text and in the margin of this manuscript were made by Lupus' own hand. This suggestion was later confirmed by the studies of Traube's pupil J. Schnetz, who showed that in addition to many interlinear and marginal corrections, one whole column of the Berne 366 was copied by Lupus.¹¹

The study of the Valerius Maximus manuscript was continued by W. M. Lindsay, who published an important article on it in 1909.¹² He briefly reviewed the work of Traube and Schnetz which showed, as we have just seen, that Lupus used extracts of Valerius Maximus from the Berne 366 in dictating to his students: these extracts were later published by his student Heiric of Auxerre. This is as far as Traube goes, but Lindsay adds other important facts. According to the editor of the Teubner edition of Valerius Maximus consulted by Lindsay, C. Kempf, the "codex optimus" is the Berne 366 which Kempf claimed was emended by some corrector in the ninth century with the help of a manuscript of Julius Paris' *Epitome* of Valerius: sometimes the readings from the *Epitome* are placed in the margin of the Berne 366, sometimes "engrafted" in the text itself. It seems, according to Lindsay, that the corrections made by Lupus belong to two periods, for the readings from the *Epitome* manuscript are later than the others and are not found in Heiric's edition. Thus, they must have been entered by Lupus later than the time of his dictation. And the fact that it is only the older series of corrections which were prior to the lectures heard by Heiric in 860 (Traube's date), leads Lindsay to suppose that before taking the Berne 366 to the lecture room so that he could dictate passages from it, Lupus must have carefully emended the text. To do this he must have used both his own conjectures and a second manuscript of Valerius Maximus. It is the main purpose of Lindsay's article to ascertain what this manuscript was.

¹⁰ "Untersuchungen zur Ueberlieferungsgeschichte römischer Schriftsteller. I. Zu Valerius Maximus, etc.," *Sitzungsberichte der Akad. zu München, Phil.-Hist. Klasse* (1891), 387-391 (= Traube, *Vorlesungen und Abhandlungen*, 3, 3-6, 11).

¹¹ *Ein Kritiker des Valerius Maximus im 9. Jahrhundert* (Neuberg a. Donau, 1901).

¹² "The Archetype Codex of Valerius Maximus," *CPh*, 4 (1909), 113-117.

He assumes that the later series of corrections were made by Lupus when he obtained an ancient manuscript of Julius Paris' *Epitome* from the nearby library of Fleury. This manuscript is called by Lupus "vetustus codex," whereas the second is called "novus" by him. Lupus evidently had this borrowed manuscript copied by some of his monks and then, with his own hand, corrected the transcription by using the original whenever he detected some difficulty. Lindsay concludes, then, that Lupus must have used the archetype codex of Valerius Maximus, a fifth century manuscript of Julius Paris' *Epitome*, from which the Berne 366 was copied.

Lindsay included a phototype of the Berne 366 with his article with the hope that the specimen of Lupus' handwriting contained therein would be conducive to the discovery of other manuscripts which Lupus had copied or corrected. This is in fact what happened, as we will discuss below, but first it seems advisable to note briefly Lupus' style and method of copying and correcting¹³ so that we can gain a clearer insight into what the later palaeographers were looking for in their search for other Lupus manuscripts.

LUPUS' CRITICAL TECHNIQUE

Lupus' script is a clear specimen of Carolingian minuscule: it is a compact and uniform script which reveals a skillful and experienced hand. This is hardly surprising, for even while Lupus was a student at Fulda "he was busy in that copying which was to give him and his monastery so many books by Christian, pagan, or barbarian writers."¹⁴ It was at Fulda that Lupus and another student, Gerolf, had corrected a manuscript of Rabanus Maurus' *Commentary on the Book of Numbers*¹⁵ and Lupus alone copied for Count Eberhard of Friuli a large manuscript of the *Leges Francorum et Ripuariorum et Langobardorum et Alamanorum et Bavariorum*,¹⁶ a work which contained the national laws of these German tribes; he also adorned this manuscript with a verse of dedication containing his name and that of Eberhard, and with his own drawings to illustrate the text.

Lupus' handwriting shows clear influence of the script of Tours: he has mastered the Tours open 'g'; he avoids the ligature for 'st', except when he is pressed for space; the ligature NT is regularly used at the end of a word; he regularly uses the K form of H; rustic capitals are used in his *Incipits* and *Explicits*.

¹³ The fullest description of Lupus' critical technique is found in C. H. Beeson, *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, 9-49. Much of the following section is based on this work.

¹⁴ E. S. Duckett, *Carolingian Portraits* (Ann Arbor, 1962), 163.

¹⁵ *MGH, Epistolae, Karolini Aevi*, 3, 397.

¹⁶ *MGH, Leges, folio*, ed. Part 3, 3, 3-4.

The most characteristic scribal habit of Lupus, however, is found in his method of word division. Most scribes divided Latin words naturally as they were pronounced, but Lupus rigidly adhered to the artificial syllabification taught by Roman grammarians whereby a syllable should begin with as many consonants as are capable of being pronounced. Thus, words like *scrip-si* and *dig-nus*, normally divided by scribes as here noted, would be corrected by Lupus to *scri-psi* and *di-gnus*. This results in a letter ending a line, such as 'p' or 'g', being struck out or expunged and the next line beginning with an inserted 'p' or 'g'. These added letters, by jutting outside the regular alignment, easily call attention to the correction. Lupus not only followed this rule in his own scribal practice, but also made the texts which he corrected conform to it.

A couple of other aspects of Lupus' technique as a text critic are noteworthy. Probably the most significant aspect of his work of revision is the variants which he puts in the margins. The variants are prefixed by the capital 'A' (standing for *alter*, *aliter*, *alibi*, *alias*, *alius*) with dots on either side; the reference is clarified by the use of two or three dots over the marginal variant and the word found in the text. Another characteristic feature is his custom of erasing parts of lines or even whole lines and re-writing them. He does this so skillfully that often the erasure goes undetected or, if it is noticeable, it is impossible to determine what was erased.¹⁷

Lupus showed great respect for textual tradition. If he had two manuscripts of the same author, he would generally preserve the discrepant readings or old readings, resorting only occasionally to emendation. Moreover, he would faithfully follow the archetype, preserving spaces left vacant in the archetype or leaving spaces where the archetype actually was corrupt or appeared to Lupus to be corrupt. In addition to leaving vacant spaces where he thought the passage corrupt, he also marked the passage with the cryphia which often was copied directly from the archetype, but in some places was probably inserted by Lupus himself.

There are other scribal and correctional habits which Lupus shows, but the above are the most peculiar to him and provided the clue for further investigation of other ninth century manuscripts with the hope that still further evidence of Lupus' editorial activities could be found.

¹⁷ For a brief discussion of modern techniques used in attempting to restore erasures in a manuscript, see A. Freeman, "Theodulf of Orléans and the *Libri Carolini*," *Speculum*, 32 (1957), 703-705.

BEESON AND LUPUS

This clue was most successfully followed by C. H. Beeson. Taking advantage of the various hints that had appeared, in 1910 he undertook an investigation to search for manuscripts which once had belonged to Lupus, and to make a study of them. During that year he began his investigation by visiting the libraries of Leyden, Paris, Orleans, and Berne. The search proved fruitful, for he soon was able to point to a number of manuscripts, found by himself and other palaeographers, which contained the corrections or collations of Lupus and one that was written entirely by Lupus. At Paris Beeson found two manuscripts: one, the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7774 A contains our best witness for the text of the *De inventione* of Cicero;¹⁸ the other, the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 5726,¹⁹ which contains Livy's *Ab urbe condita*, Books VI-X, known to editors of that historian as the "Codex Thuaneus," was later (1929) identified by E. K. Rand.²⁰ The Harleianus 2736, containing Cicero's *De oratore*, was identified by Beeson in the summer of 1910 and in the following winter the Vat. Reg. lat. 597, containing the *Noctes Atticae*, Books I-VIII of Aulus Gellius, was identified by E. A. Lowe while he was examining some Vatican manuscripts for Beeson.²¹ In 1915 W. A. Lindsay discovered that the Vat. Reg. lat. 1484, which contains the *Interpretationes Vergilianae Aeneidos* of Tiberius Claudius Donatus, was corrected by Lupus.²² In 1922 Beeson identified the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 8623, which contains the *Epistolae*, Books I-VIII of Symmachus; and in 1931 he first noted the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 6370, which includes Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* and the beginning of his *Saturnalia*, Book I.²³ The last Lupus manuscript that Beeson mentions, in 1945, is the Vienna, Bibl. Nat. Cod. 189, which contains the philosophical corpus of Cicero.²⁴ From the above discussion, therefore, we must agree that Beeson's investigation was very successful, for of the eleven

¹⁸ E. K. Rand and L. W. Jones, *The Earliest Book of Tours*, 103, judge that Lupus took this MS with him to Fulda about 828 "to collate with a copy there that he found even more defective." They would date this MS as having been written between 820-825.

¹⁹ Beeson, *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, p. vii, erroneously numbers this MS 7526.

²⁰ *A Survey of the Manuscripts of Tours*, p. 95.

²¹ *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, p. viii.

²² *Notae Latinae* (Cambridge, 1915), 482. Lindsay says that this MS was "written by Tours scribes and corrected by Lupus of Ferrières." For a description of this MS, see Rand, *A Survey of the Manuscripts of Tours*, 143.

²³ For a description of this MS, see Rand and Jones, *The Earliest Book of Tours*, 100-101.

²⁴ See Beeson, "The Collectaneum of Hadoard," *CPh*, 40 (1945), 219 and "Lupus of Ferrières and Hadoard," *CPh*, 43 (1948), 191.

manuscripts which we have placed above in our first list of manuscripts identified as having passed through the hands of Lupus, he was responsible for the identification of six.

It was Beeson's goal to publish all of the above-mentioned manuscripts, but he died with this still unaccomplished. One of his students, however, published an account of the Aulus Gellius manuscript which we shall discuss below and Beeson himself brought out the edition of the Harleianus 2736, containing Cicero's *De oratore*, which we have already often referred to. He tells us in the preface of this work that the reason for this codex being published first was that it is the only manuscript which is an autograph copy.²⁵ This manuscript was studied and transcribed by Beeson in 1923 but it was not until 1930 that the entire work was published.

As one might expect from such a scholar as Beeson, his description of the Harley Codex, which is the best of the oldest group of the *mutuli* of the *De oratore*, is clear and complete. The volume consists of two parts. Part one contains the Preface, Table of Contents, and the Introduction, which treats of "Lupus as Scribe and Text Critic"; in this part Beeson gives a detailed history of the manuscript, a lengthy analysis of the work and methods of Lupus under different headings, such as Orthography, Division of Syllables, Punctuation, Abbreviations, Technical Signs, Marginal Corrections, Interlinear Corrections, etc.; there is also a Concordance Table at the end of this section. Part two consists of an excellent reproduction of the Harleianus 2736; this manuscript is a square quarto-codex containing 109 folios which were "ruled with a dry point for two columns with double vertical lines for the text margin; there are twenty-four lines to a column,"²⁶ except for one column which contains twenty-five lines. The text of the *De oratore* stands on Folio 1 Recto to 106 Verso, first column; Folios 106 Verso, second column to 109 Verso contain some Latin poems which have no connection with Cicero.

Beeson maintains that Lupus is the first writer of the Middle Ages to mention Cicero's *De oratore*.²⁷ This occurs in the very first letter of Lupus' correspondence, written about 829-830²⁸ to Einhard. After some introductory remarks in which he declares his devotion to classical learning, Lupus asks Einhard for the loan of several manuscripts: "Sunt autem hi: Tullii *de rhetorica liber...* item eiusdem auctoris *de rhetorica tres libri in disputatione ac dialogo de oratore...*" Beeson assumed that Einhard sent the copy of the

²⁵ *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, p. viii.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁷ This statement is corroborated by M. Manitius, *Handschriften antiker Autoren in mittelalterlichen Bibliothekskatalogen*. (*Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, Beiheft 67, Leipzig, 1935), p. 26.

²⁸ According to Levillain, *Loup de Ferrières, Correspondance*, 1, 2.

De oratore requested by Lupus, for the second mention of this treatise, contained in a letter (*Epist.*, 100) to Pope Benedict III written about 855-858,²⁹ shows that Lupus owned a copy of the *De oratore* at that time: "Petimus etiam Tullium *De oratore* et duodecim libros *Institutionum oratoriarum* Quintiliani, qui uno nec ingenti volumine continentur, quorum utriusque auctorum partes habemus, verum plenitudinem per vos desideramus obtinere." Furthermore, as we have already seen, three of the texts requested by Lupus in this letter to Einhard have come down to us and have been identified as having been criticized by Lupus: the Harleianus 2736, the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 7774 A, and the Vat. Reg. lat. 597. Beeson also assumed that Lupus must have promptly returned the *De oratore* manuscript to Einhard since this was the first such request of the youthful monk from "the distinguished churchman and author."³⁰ This assumption is strengthened by the fact that every page of Lupus' copy shows evidence of the haste in which it was written.

LUPUS AND AULUS GELLIUS

There is another detailed work, complete with facsimile, concerning a manuscript which Lupus is known to have corrected. This is the 1936 dissertation written by Sister L. Meagher, under Beeson's guidance, on the Vat. Reg. Lat. 597, which contains Books IX-XX of Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae*.³¹ She points out that the first mention of this work in the Middle Ages,³² as was the case with Cicero's *De oratore*, is found in the first letter of Lupus' correspondence. Here, as we have recently seen, Lupus asks Einhard to send him some manuscripts. After mentioning several other works, Lupus concludes: "praeterea, A. Gellii *noctium Atticarum*." Assurance that this request was granted is found in another letter to Einhard (*Epist.*, 5) written about six years later (836) in which Lupus explains why he has not returned the manuscript: Rabanus Maurus was having a copy of it made for his own use. But Lupus promised that he would return it himself: "A. Gellium misissem nisi rursus illum abbas retinisset, questus necdum sibi cum esse descriptum. Scripturum se vobis dixit quod praefatum librum vi mihi extorserit. Verum et illum et omnes caeteros, quibus vestra liberalitate fruor, per me, si Deus vult, vobis ipse restituum."

Sr. Meagher compared the Gellius manuscript with other Lupus ma-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, 120.

³⁰ *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, 5.

³¹ *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières*, University of Chicago Dissertation, 1936.

³² This is affirmed by Manitius, *Handschriften antiker Autoren*, p. 147.

manuscripts and found that "the corrections and the marginalia in it exhibit all the earmarks of Lupus' script."³³ It seems that Lupus' technique is about the same throughout all his work. Many of the individual characteristics of this technique can be paralleled in the work of other scribes, but the chance of finding them all together in another scribe is very slight. It is this evidence which definitely established Lupus as the corrector of the Gellius manuscript. By comparing this manuscript with others of Lupus, Sr. Meagher also found that Lupus had revised it more thoroughly than any of the others.³⁴ In fact, the Gellius manuscript, which is written in 121 folios, contains 810 words, even with the omission of proper names, in the marginal index, whereas the *De oratore*, which is written in 106 folios, contains in its marginal index only 111 words.³⁵

A recent article, written by G. I. Liefstinck and concerning a manuscript of Aulus Gellius, makes use of the work of Beeson and Sr. Meagher. In 1953, while visiting different libraries in the Netherlands to make an inventory of manuscripts, Liefstinck came across a manuscript in the library of Leeuwarden which was "un chef d'œuvre de collaboration de scribes insulaires et continentaux de la première moitié du ix^e siècle, de la grande époque carolingienne."³⁶ In his attempt to determine the source of this manuscript Liefstinck refers to the two letters of Lupus which we have just quoted in our discussion of Sr. Meagher's work. Lupus' second letter, written in 836 while he was still a student at Fulda, is especially interesting to Liefstinck. We will recall that in this letter Lupus said that he would have returned a manuscript containing Aulus Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* to Einhard except that Rabanus Maurus was having a copy of it made for his own use. Liefstinck is certain that the manuscript which he discovered at Leeuwarden, the Bibl. Prov. de Frise, MS B.A. Fr. 55, is identical with the manuscript which was being prepared.³⁷ To test the validity of this conclusion, he follows the ideas of Sr. Meagher as pointed out in her Chapter IV, which treats the sources of correction of Lupus as found in the second part of the *Noctes Atticae*. Liefstinck compiles several tables to prove that the Reginensis 597 which contains Einhard's original of this work is the basis

³³ *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières*, 17.

³⁴ Cf. Beeson, "The Authorship of 'Quid Sit Ceroma,'" *Classical and Mediaeval Studies in Honor of E. K. Rand* (New York, 1938), 6: "Lupus was quite familiar with the text of Gellius; he revised it more thoroughly than any other of his MSS — he used pen or knife some two thousand times in making changes — and his Gellius marginal index is much the longest."

³⁵ *The Gellius Manuscript of Lupus of Ferrières*, 21.

³⁶ "Le MS. d'Aulu-Gelle à Leeuwarden exécuté à Fulda en 836," *Bullettino dell' "Archivio Paleografico Italiano,"* n.s. I (1955), 12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

for the corrections of Lupus and those found in the manuscript of Leeuwarden. One of the more conclusive charts, in which he compares only two pages of the Reginensis as reproduced by Sr. Meagher with Lupus' corrections and the manuscript of Leeuwarden, is as follows (here abridged):³⁸

	Regin. 597	Corr. Loup	Leeuw.
X,27,3	existimarent	existumarent	existumarent
XI, 2,5	crassator	grassator	grassator
XI,13,2	collocata	colocata	colocata
XI,18,17	obrepetendi	obrependi	obrependi
XII, 5,7	fundatast	fundamentum	fundamentum
		ratast	ratast
XIII,23,19	privativa	privativast	privativast
XIV, 1,23	casus est	casus et	casus et

LUPUS AND SUETONIUS

There has been some question about the history of the introduction of Suetonius' *De Vita Caesarum* into France. According to one view, stated first by L. Traube,³⁹ Lupus secured from the monastery at Fulda either the manuscript of Suetonius that it had or a copy; from this manuscript Lupus dictated certain extracts to his students which were subsequently edited by Heiric of Auxerre, one of Lupus' pupils.⁴⁰ The evidence for this view is a letter (*Epist.*, 35) written by Lupus in 844 to Marcward, abbot of Prüm. After making other requests, Lupus adds:

Quaeso praeterea ut ad sanctum Bonifatium sollertem aliquem monachum dirigatis, qui ex vestra parte Hattonem abbatem⁴¹ deposcat ut vobis Suetonium Tranquillum *de Vita Caesarum*, qui apud eos in duos nec magnos codices divisus est, ad exscribendum dirigat; mihique eum aut ipsi, quod nimium opto, afferatis aut, si haec felicitas nostris differetur peccatis, per certissimum nuntium mittendum curetis. Namque in hac regione nusquam invenitur et credimus hoc quoque nos beneficium vestra liberalitate consecuturos.

Commenting on this statement, Ihm says, "Nun wissen wir, dass Lupus sich einen Sueton aus Fulda kommen liess, weil er in Frankreich keinen fand."⁴² According to E. K. Rand, however, Ihm's view is faulty in two

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

³⁹ *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, XXVII (1901), 266 f.

⁴⁰ M. Ihm, "Beiträge zur Textgeschichte des Sueton," *Hermes*, 36 (1901), 343-363, published a copy of these extracts. We have already seen above this argument of Traube applied to Lupus' work on Valerius Maximus.

⁴¹ He was abbot of Fulda at this time.

⁴² "Beiträge zur Textgeschichte des Sueton," 344; this view is echoed by J. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship* (Cambridge, 1920), I, 661, who says, "Servatus Lupus, who could find no MS of Suetonius in France, borrowed the Fulda MS."

respects: first, Lupus' request does not prove that he did not know of any other manuscripts of this work in France; "in hac regione" is not perforce synonymous with all of France — he could have simply meant the diocese of Sens, since Ferrières was in this diocese, to distinguish it not only from Germany, but perhaps from the neighboring diocese of Tours as well; second, there is no surety that Lupus' request for the manuscript was granted.⁴³

Rand continues in this very detailed article — in fact it is so detailed that a brief summary of it is impossible — to disprove the theory generally accepted before his writing (1926) that the text of the *De vita Caesarum* was introduced into France through Lupus, who was successful in his appeal to Fulda. This argument is strengthened by Rand's careful examination of the manuscripts of Suetonius, which show no traces of the script of Fulda. There is a manuscript of Suetonius, however, the Memmianus, which Rand believes was written at Tours some two decades or more before Lupus' appeal to Marcward.⁴⁴ Rand conjectures that Lupus knew of this manuscript, "but remembering also the sumptuous edition in two volumes at Fulda, Lupus tried for the best... Failing to secure a copy of the Fulda manuscript, he succeeded at Tours. Either the codex was transcribed for him there, or it was loaned to him at Ferrières for that purpose... No direct descendants of Lupus's copy, save through the *Excerpts*, have been detected."⁴⁵ Finally, using evidence gathered by textual criticism, palaeography, and history, Rand concludes that the *De vita Caesarum* was not introduced into France by Lupus somewhat later than 844, but actually some thirty years or more before that time — probably by Einhard or some other person of Charlemagne's circle.⁴⁶

LUPUS AND MACROBIUS

We pointed out above that in 1931 Beeson identified the Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 6370, which contains Macrobius' *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* and the beginning of his *Saturnalia*, Book I, as being thoroughly revised by Lupus.⁴⁷ According to Beeson,⁴⁸ this may have been the manuscript re-

⁴³ "On the History of the *De Vita Caesarum* of Suetonius in the Early Middle Ages," *HSCPh*, 37 (1926), 20.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

⁴⁷ Cf. Rand and Jones, *The Earliest Book of Tours*, 100-101; the following description of this MS is taken from them.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 101.

ferred to by Lupus in a letter to Adalgaudus.⁴⁹ There are four main hands identifiable of which Lupus is identified as Hand C. His revisions are for the most part written in erasure, except for two folios which have been inserted by him.⁵⁰ On one page the original scribe wrote to the bottom of the page and thus left no room for a diagram but Lupus erased most of the page, rewrote the section with corrections, and compressed it by using many abbreviations; thus, he was able to provide space for the diagram which was subsequently supplied. This leaf is especially characteristic of Lupus' scribal technique.⁵¹

LUPUS AND QUINTILIAN

Our final discussion will be concerned about Lupus' relationship with Quintilian. Until the ninth century Quintilian was intermittently studied, but P. Lehmann has recently shown that this century marked a revival in the study of Quintilian; this is seen from the many important manuscripts of this author which can be dated as of the ninth century.⁵² Lehmann points out that by this time the manuscript tradition had broken down into two classes: the complete tradition existed in Germany, but in France manuscripts circulated which lacked various books; these manuscripts are designated *mutili*.⁵³ It seems that Lupus had such a *mutilus* which he tried to expand by getting a complete text.

Lupus' first attempt to get another copy of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* was in 852 when he sent a letter to Altsigis of York. After asking him to send several manuscripts containing works of Jerome and Bede, Lupus concluded: "praeterea Quintiliani *Institutionum oratoriarum* libros XII per certissimos nuntios mihi ad cellam sancti Judoci... dirigatis..." (*Epist.*, 87). It appears that this request was not granted,⁵⁴ for several years later we

⁴⁹ "Habeo vero tibi plurimas gratias, quod in Macrobio corrigendo fraternum adhibuisti laborem, quamquam librum, cujus mihi ex eodem folium direxisti, praecoptarem videre. Est enim revera venerabilis et exactissimae diligentiae." *Epist.*, 21.

⁵⁰ A. La Penna, "Le Parisinus Latinus 6370 et le Texte des *Commentarii* de Macrobe," *Revue de Philologie*, 24 (1950), 180, n. 1, conjectures that this is the *folium* which Lupus received from Adalgaudus; Lupus then, seeing that this leaf was more correct than that of his own MS, "l'a recopié et a inséré cette copie à la place des feuillets correspondants dans son propre manuscrit."

⁵¹ For a representation of this leaf, see Rand and Jones, *The Earliest Book of Tours*, Plate 46.

⁵² "Die *Institutio oratoria* des Quintilianus im Mittelalter," *Philologus*, 89 (1934), 349-383.

⁵³ See P. S. Boskoff, "Quintilian in the Late Middle Ages," *Speculum*, 27 (1952), 76, n. 5, for a list of the lacunae in the *mutilus* tradition.

⁵⁴ Cf. Beeson, *Lupus of Ferrières as Scribe and Text Critic*, 4, who says: "He had attempted to secure copies of the Jerome Commentary and of Quintilian from Altsigis of York (849) but evidently without success." Levillain, *Loup de Ferrières, Correspondance*, 2, 78, dates this letter as of 852, not 849, which is Beeson's date.

find him again requesting a complete text, this time from Pope Benedict III: "Petimus etiam Tullium *De oratore* et duodecim libros *Institutionum oratoriarum* Quintiliani, quo uno nec ingenti volumine continentur; quorum utriusque auctorum partes habemus, verum plenitudinem per vos desideramus obtinere." (*Epist.*, 100). The knowledgeable way in which Lupus describes the Quintilian manuscript indicates that he knew the Pope had such a manuscript; perhaps Lupus had seen it in 849 when, at the behest of Charles the Bald, he had gone to Rome on a mission to Benedict's predecessor, Leo IV. Boskoff supposes that again Lupus' request was not answered because "the mutilated version remained in circulation from approximately this time until the discovery of a complete text by the humanists in the fifteenth century."⁵⁵ Lehmann traces the proliferation of *mutili* to Fleury, under the initiative of Lupus from nearby Ferrières.⁵⁶

There is just such a manuscript, the Berne 351, which seems to have its origin at Fleury. It has usually been considered a tenth century manuscript, but Lehmann thought that he detected certain characteristics of Lupus' method in it. Therefore, he asked Beeson for his opinion and received the following reply in a letter dated July 9, 1932: "The Bernensis in format and script is very like some of the mss. of Lupus. It has the cryphia and \bar{q} (= quaere) and N^T in the margin; even the curious reference-marks are the same as those sometimes employed by Lupus, but the script of the corrector is not that of Lupus."⁵⁷ Lehmann accepted Beeson's opinion; he did show, however, that this manuscript dates from the ninth century and not from the tenth. Giuseppe Billanovich, the latest scholar to discuss the Berne 351, says that it is "vicino a Lupo."⁵⁸

Gonzaga University, Spokane, Wash.

⁵⁵ "Quintilian in the Late Middle Ages," 71.

⁵⁶ "Die Institutio oratoria des Quintilianus im Mittelalter," 357.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁵⁸ "Dall' antica Ravenna alle Biblioteche Umanistiche," *Aevum*, 30 (1956), 329.

Two Latin Poems against the Friars

A. G. RIGG

THE two poems printed here are found only in the fifteenth-century Glastonbury commonplace-book, Trinity College, Cambridge, MS 0.9.38.¹ In the middle of the book, ff. 49^b-58^b, is a group of four poems concerned with the friars: they were evidently intended by the scribe to be taken together. The first two are in defense of the friars, and are already known: they are the "De Laude Universitatis Oxonie"² by Richard Tryvytlam (or Trevithelan), a minorite, and the anonymous "Quis dabit meo capiti".³ Tryvytlam⁴ writes at great length (496 lines) at first in praise of the University, but then in sad reflection on her recent "dotage": she has allowed the oppressors of the friars to thrive. He denounces in general monks who leave their cloisters (specifically singling out Glastonbury) in order to live immoral lives and to afflict the friars; finally he denounces "three beasts", John Sene, monk of Glastonbury, Richard, Abbot of Louth Park, and Uhtred of Boldon.⁵ The "De Laude" may be dated fairly accurately: Richard de Lincoln did not become Abbot of Louth Park until 1349, but a reasonable amount of time must be assumed to have elapsed before the three monks became distinguished enough to merit

¹ I have recently edited the contents of this MS as a thesis for the degree of D. Phil. (Oxford); copies of the thesis are deposited in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and Trinity College, Cambridge. References to the thesis are made in this article: Vol. 1 "Introduction, Text", vol. 2 "Notes, Appendix, Glossary." The poems are printed by kind permission of the Masters and Fellows of Trinity College.

² H. Walther, *Initia carminum ac versuum aevi posterioris latinorum* (Göttingen, 1959), No. 462. Ed. (i) T. Hearne, *Historia... Ricardi II* (Oxford, 1729), Appendix, pp. 344-58; (ii) H. Furneaux, *Collectanea III* (Oxford Historical Society 32, 1896), 188-209; (iii) thesis, I, 115-31, II, 333-41. A transcript was made in the seventeenth century (after 1634) by the Oxford Keeper of Archives, Brian Twyne, Bodley MS Twyne XXIV pp. 299-307. None of these editions is recorded by Walther.

³ Walther No. 16052. Ed. W. Heuser, "With an O and an I," *Anglia* 27 (1904), 283-319; thesis, I, 132-8, 2, 341-6. Heuser's punctuation of the poem is often misleading. In the first line *meo* has been omitted by the scribe.

⁴ For biographies of Tryvytlam and the persons mentioned in the poem, see A. B. Emden, *Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-9).

⁵ See i.a. M. E. Marcett, *Uhtred de Boldon, Friar William Jordan and Piers Plowman* (New York, 1938); D. Knowles, "The censured opinions of Uhtred of Boldon," *Proc. Brit. Acad.* 37 (1952), 305-42.

Tryvytlam's wrath: Uhtred did not become a doctor until 1357, Sene until 1360; both men would have been very active in Oxford affairs in the years 1357-60 (Uhtred was Prior of Durham College). In 1368 the Chancellor of the University was ordered by Simon Langham to silence the disputants (Uhtred and the friars led by the Dominican, William Jordan), and Tryvytlam would almost certainly have mentioned this notable intervention. The poem is in four-line stanzas of rhythmical asclepiads.

The "Quis dabit meo capiti" is not concerned with Oxford; it denounces the activities of two leading anti-mendicants, Richard Fitzralph, Archbishop of Armagh, and (probably) Richard Kilwyngton, Dean of St. Paul's. The poem laments the plight of the friars: the two Richards are trying to turn London against them by their sermons at St. Paul's Cross. It deals at length with the attacks made on the doctrine of evangelical poverty. The anonymous author claims not to be a friar, and states that he intends to become one out of sympathy with their aims: this is probably a fiction intended to establish his objectivity.⁶ The poem consists of 180 lines; each stanza has four lines in Goliardic metre (7 pp + 6 p) rhyming at the caesura and finally, and a couplet, the first line of which begins "Wyt an O and an I." This stanza is the same as that of a poem on the Council of London of 1382,⁷ except that the latter lacks the internal rhyme.

The two poems which follow are both anti-mendicant; neither has been printed before or received notice in modern times. The first⁸ is a short story (17 hexameters, with several variations from classical quantities) telling how a man was puzzled at the two figures beside the Crucifix in a friars' chapel; on being told that they were a Dominican and a Franciscan he exclaimed, "Now I understand — for I have often heard that two thieves were crucified with Christ, but before I did not know their names!" This story (it is not possible to assign a date to it) is only a prelude to the next, a much more serious attack entitled "De Supersticione Phariseorum".⁹ This is a bitter denunciation of the friars for their arrogance and hypocrisy. The author begins by saying that he is a monk and a supporter of the secular clergy, but will not reveal his name (from 9 it is clear that he is resident in Oxford); the occasion of the poem is the "song of the angry friars"; 9-52 the University is compared to the sun, in a very complex

⁶ See my article "William Dunbar: the 'Fenyeit Freir'", *R.E.S.* n.s. 14 (1963), 269-73.

⁷ Ed. T. Wright, *Political Poems and Songs*, Rolls Ser. 14 (1859), i, 253-63. On the "O-and-I" refrain, see Heuser, *op. cit.*, R. L. Greene in *MAe* 30 (1961), 170-5, and R. H. Robbins, *Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries* (New York, 1959), 336-7.

⁸ Walther No. 5592. Transcribed in full in the seventeenth century (after 1628), by Cotton's librarian, Richard James, Bodley MS James 7, pp. 84-88.

⁹ Walther No. 122. Extracts from it were made by both James and Twyne.

simile; 53-90 the friars ungratefully attack the secular clergy and the University; 91-134 they also attack the monks, but have at last been defeated; their ingratitude is stressed; 135-98 their arrogance, hypocrisy and likely nemesis; 199-220 a warning to their leader, a plea for humility, and a final condemnation.

It was assumed by Richard James that this poem was written "tempore Edw. 2" because of the reference in 192-3

Petrus nuper capite plexus est sub telo;
Ordo Templi periit.

However, it seems more likely to me that it is a reply to Tryvytlam's "De Laude": 1-8 clearly imply a *carmen* composed by the friars — the subject of the poem "arises from the University" and is directed against the friars because of the *occasio* which they themselves have fabricated. The author immediately moves on to a comparison of the University with the sun, a simile taken directly from Tryvytlam and now used against the friars. If this supposition is correct, the charges that the friars are trying to "enslave" the University and are making secret attempts to influence the Pope (71-74, 94) probably refer to the delegation to Avignon led by the Minorite Roger Conway, who was trying to secure the condemnation of Fitzralph's doctrine of dominion; perhaps because of Fitzralph's arrival at the Curia in 1357, the mission failed — this may also help to explain the triumphant tone of 96-98. The poem is written in Goliardic metre (7 pp + 6 p) in couplets.

It may be useful to outline briefly the history of the disputes between the friars and the secular clergy.¹⁰ While the European Church as a whole was concerned with larger issues, the dispute in Oxford had mainly been over a University Statute of 1251/2 which prevented anyone from proceeding to a degree in theology without first taking the arts degree of B.A. or M.A. Moreover, Oxford reversed the normal procedure (i.e. of Paris) in which study of the Bible preceded study of Lombard's *Sentences*. This innovation was opposed by the friars. After an exceedingly bitter period of strife the friars submitted to the authority of the University in 1320 (this event could be used to argue for an earlier date for the "De Supersticione"). In 1349 the quarrel came to a head again: Boniface VIII's compromise bull *Super cathedram* (1300) was attacked both by the friars, who appealed to Clement VI for clarification and mitigation of the bull,

¹⁰ See i.a. D. Knowles, *Religious Orders in England*, 3 vols. (London, 1948-59), 1, 182-93, 2, 61-73, 90-114; H. Rashdall, "The Friars Preacher v. the University" in *Collectanea II* (Oxford Historical Soc. 16, 1890), 193-273; H. Rashdall, *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, new ed. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden. 3 vols. (Oxford, 1936), 3, 67-76.

and by Fitzralph (who became Archbishop of Armagh in that year) with a tract known as *Unusquisque*, in which he asked for the repeal of the bull and the restoration of all rights concerning the cure of souls to the secular clergy. Between this time and 1356 Fitzralph wrote the *De Pauperie Salvatoris*,¹¹ which was partly designed to show that the mendicancy of the friars had no scriptural basis. A reply to this was written by the Austin friar Geoffrey Hardeby. Fitzralph began to deliver, by invitation, a series of bitter anti-mendicant sermons, mainly at St. Paul's Cross; his *Defensorium Curatorum* (1357) was also popular throughout Europe. The delegation to Avignon has been mentioned above. In 1358 in Oxford a Statute was passed forbidding the admission to mendicant orders of boys under 18 (the friars' principal source for recruitment), but was repealed in 1366. In 1360 Fitzralph died.

MS spellings have been retained, but the punctuation and capitalization are editorial. MS abbreviations are expanded. Emendations are in angled brackets.

f. 56^a

DE ASTANTIBUS CRUCIFIXO

- Est apud ecclesias autenticus hic modus et mos:
 In medio crux stat, hinc inde Maria, Johannes,
 Sed fratres alias posuerunt cum cruce formas,
 Sicut in ecclesiis plerisque videtur eorum:
 5 Dominicus cum Francisco socii crucis astant.
 Amborum formam lustrans oculis homo quidam,
 Cum miraretur super hiis hinc inde figuris,
 Frater adest querens, "Quid respicis? vnde stupescis?"
 "Hos," ait, "aspicio: rogo qui sunt, quare vel hii sunt?"
 10 Frater ad hec, "Fili, si nescis, magnus hic est vir,
 Nomine Dominicus hinc stans, Franciscus et illinc."
 "Aha!" dixit ei, "nunc misterium scio verbi;
 Nunc quod nesciui me plenius edocuisti.
 Nam satis audiui quod cum Domino crucifixo
 15 Famosi fuerant duo latrones crucifixi,
 Sed nunquam sciui latronum nomina certa.
 Nunc scio, nunc claret via cognitionis aperta!"
 et hic finis

f. 56^b

DE SUPERSTICIONE PHARISEORUM

Ab vno de monachis amatore cleri
 Cuius nomen nesciat exprimi vel queri,
 Prodeunt sequencia verba veritatis
 De tenore carminis fratribus iratis.

¹¹ Ed. R. L. Poole, *Johannis Wycliffe De Dominio Divino.... (and) the first four books of the De Pauperie Salvatoris*, Wyclif Soc. 17 (1890). Poole gives summaries of the remaining books.

- 5 Causa vel materia forme dilatate
 Ab insigni nascitur vniuersitate,
 In fratres se dirigens ex occasione
 Quam sibi confinxerant ex elacione.
 Est hec vniuersitas comparata soli,
- 10 Summo Deo, qui sol est luminosi poli.
 Hec item corporeo soli comparatur
 Causa solis duplicis; duplex assignatur
 Nam plena sciencia: mysticus hic Phebus
 Et diuinis emicat et mundanis rebus.
- 15 Ista volo proseguī cuncta seriatim,
 In forma que sequitur applicanda statim.
- Talis vniuersitas est Oxoniensis,
 Qualis sol fulgoribus radians immensis:
 Ille mundi splendor est, illa lux Anglorum,
- 20 Super bonos malosque lucet lux amborum.
 Sed est huius solis sol clarior in polis,
 Quia sol iusticie sol est huius solis.
 Illi sol inferior cedit et obedit;
 Numquam suis legibus se rebellem dedit,
- 25 Nec excessit circulum mete sibi date;
 Ideo perpetua fulget claritate.
 Sic qui Deo seruiunt in humilitate,
 Hii fulgebunt sicut sol in eternitate;
 Qui vero rebelles sunt et elate mentis,
- 30 Erunt cum diabolo semper in tormentis.
 Vt solis empirei causa terminetur,
 Sic piis, sic impiis suis concludetur.
 Sed materialis sol, agens quod est sui,
 Quid partitur gracie, quid offense cui.
- 35 Sol percurrens spacium tante vastitatis
 Mundum replet radiis sue claritatis;
 Cui simplex oculus dum sol inardescit,
 Visus viget corporis et cor hilarescit.
 Auide prospiciens in solis acumen
- 40 Eius repercutitur oculorum lumen.
 Solis hec visibilis causa sic concludit:
 Qui perurget stimulum, sibimet illudit.
- Hic et ille, sol et sol, vnde prompsi satis,
 Sacre signat regimen vniuersitatis:
- 45 Hec vt sol illuminat omnes fines terre;
 Norunt lucis filii lumen eius ferre.
- f. 57a] Cuius nati grati sunt, amant eam gratis,
 Et sue custodiunt iura libertatis;
 Gaudia qui concipit eius ex honore,
- 50 Alitur, non vritur, eius a calore.
 Eius priuilegia cuncti qui tuentur,
 Splendidis honoribus priuilegientur.

- Sed non omnes capiunt hoc suaue verbum,
 Nam sunt qui non sapiunt nisi cor superbum,
 55 Jacobiti scilicet, per hanc eruditi,
 Lacte matris optime pessimi nutriti.
 Quare dico pessimi? quia sunt ingrati;
 Stat in summo culmine genus hoc peccati.
 Quam nimis ingrati sint, sua facta docent,
 60 Que suis beneficis et amicis nocent.
 Num sui benefici recte reputantur,
 Quorum bonis miseri large sustentantur?
 Boni bini generis male malos alunt,
 Dum pro bonis reddere mala mali malunt.
 65 Bonos bini generis scire cupientes
 Binas prosequimini lineas sequentes:
 Qui floret Oxonie clerus vniuersus,
 Monachorum cuneus vndique dispersus.
 Horum bona comedunt miseri mendici,
 70 Et hiis nichilominus fiunt inimici.
- Doli struunt machinas vniuersitati,
 Ancillare dominam temere conati;
 Res ridenda seculis, pauperes astuti
 Liberam subicere temptant seruituti.
 75 Instant curiosius, prouocant, appellant,
 Et matri degeneres filii rebellant;
 Optant pseudo-clerici cleri ius conuelli,
 Digni certe fustibus a clero repelli.
 Rem preclari nominis captant emulari,
 80 Quia sunt Dominici vellent dominari.
 Cornua testudinum sepe sunt repressa:
 Sic sit arrogancia talium depressa!
- Obseruate, clerici, quam gratis personis
 Sepius dederitis de vestris annonis;
 85 Que nunc vobis gratie propter data vestra,
 Deus scit qui prospicit a celi fenestra.
 Nunc vos monet ratio, monet causa litis,
 Graciam subtrahere vestram Jacobitis;
 Hiis exhibuistis vos pietate patres;
 90 Nunc potestis dicere 'Nolumus vos fratres.'
- Isti non tantummodo vobis sunt molesti;
 Ymmo nobis monachis semper sunt infesti;
 Quicquid possunt contra nos, machinantur mali,
 Et instillant subdole curie papali.
 f. 57^b] 95 Sed nichil prospiciunt, nam qui nescit sciat,
 Nil sic clam de nobis fit, quin in palam fiat;
 Rem sperabant assequi; spes eorum fumus:
 Laqueus contritus est — liberati sumus!
 Hec si sic voluerint, sibi scribi poscant,
 100 Vt ingratitudinem propriam cognoscant.

- Canes imitantur hii sed in malo sensu,
 Qui dum cibis vescimur assunt cum consensu,
 Sed in fine prandii, mappa iam remota,
 Perit amicitia preostensa tota.
- 105 Ita si quo veniunt fratres manducare,
 Verba comant consona faciei clare;
 Nos in mensa diligunt, sed quando recedunt,
 Nostras inhumaniter viuas carnes edunt;
 Post vt ante lacerant morsu non immiti,
- 110 Prisci beneficii penitus obliti.
 Vtinam postponerent hunc caninum morem,
 Et canum preponerent morem meliorem:
 Nam sunt canes alii, grandes et pusilli,
 Canes sunt gratissimi canes omnes illi,
- 115 Qui suos beneficos bene semper amant
 Nec contra domesticos per latratum clamant.
 Studeant moraliter tales esse canes
 Omni gratitudine pleni, non inanes;
 Studeant alioquin obstinati fore,
- 120 Vt error nouissimus peior sit priore.
 Vnum quid prefatus sum duo designare,
 Quod vt magis clareat volo declarare:
 Nominandam cencies vniuersitatem
 Solem dixi matremque per diuersitatem,
- 125 Solem pro sciencia, matrem pro doctrina;
 Radiat et parturit, patet causa bina.
 Contra solem veniunt ce<c>¹² Jacobite
 (Sub eclipsi maneant in <hac>¹³ densa lite !)
 Et materne nequiter inhiant ruine,
- 130 Quos vt natos aluit vbere doctrine.
 Tali laude prosequor gratis hos ingratos,
 Vt ruboris gracia sese reddant gratos;
 Ex ingratitudinis sue racione
 Digni sunt huiusmodi commendacione.
- 135 Piam mentem predicant hii predicatores,
 Sed superbis omnibus sunt superbiores.
 In sacris codicibus non docetur ita,
 Vt qui sancta predicant reprobi sint vita;
 Restat, cuius reproba vita indicatur,
- 140 Vt et predicacio sua contempnatur.
 Parit sermo talium vix vtilitatem,
 Ex hoc enim glorie querunt vanitatem.
 Recti corde reccius verbum sonant isti;
 Non querunt que sua sunt sed que Jesu Cristi;
- f. 58^a] 145 Isti complent opere quod affirmant ore, —

¹² *ceci*: MS *celi* (see Note)

¹³ *hac*: no gap in MS.

- Non sic, impii, non sic, sed peruerso more:
 Mores enim mali sunt, licet sermo sanus —
 Vox quidem, vox Jacob est, Esau sunt manus !
 Predicant et instruunt, quasi sunt prophete,
 150 Set ea que faciunt opera cauete:
 Si verba Dominica mente retinetis,
 Attendetis caucius a falsis prophetis:
 Oues qui se faciunt, hos, Criste, non taces,
 Dicens quod intrinsecus sunt lupi rapaces.
 155 Proinde diuisi sunt nunc a clero Dei;
 Hec interpretacio vera Pharisei
 Indicat et iudicat eos Phariseos:
 'Ex eorum fructibus cognoscetis eos';
 Cum sint fructus opera, perpendatis ea-
 160 Ipsa de se perhibent quod sunt Pharisea.
 O vox obstinacie, vox et clamor ingens !
 O tuba superbie sidera contingens !
 Clamant quod scolastica vita clericorum
 Pocius deficiet quam status eorum.
 165 Habent pro constancia pectus induratum
 Et pro sapiencia cor infatuatum;
 Pharaonis dominus eos indurauit,
 Salomone doctior hos infatuauit.
 Vult videri stulta gens sapiens et constans,
 170 Que cum stare creditur apparebit non stans.
 'Noli', dicit sapiens, 'esse iustus multum':
 Multum iustus apud se se probabit stultum,
 Et qui vult plus sapere quam sit oportunum,
 Ex insipientibus se pretendit vnum.
 175 Proprie prudencie nullus invitatur,
 Quin docta sobrietas comes habeatur;
 Si fratres appeterent talem leccionem,
 Tantam non inciderent in presumpcionem.
 Verum causa remanet in eis affectus,
 180 Vnde cetus ordinis totus est infectus;
 Sed effectus aliquis non euacuatur,
 Nisi causa primitus rei destruatur.
 Misera superbia causat omne malum;
 Nobilis humilitas residet ad talum.
 185 Donec tumor animi plene digeratur,
 Nec ni pace pergitur, nec cum Deo statur.
 Insuper et homines vbicumque vadant,
 Exorabunt iugiter vt superbi cadant:
 Male cadet quisquis vult male se preponi,
 190 Tantum casus accidit preposicioni.
 Ille quondam Lucifer cecidit e celo;
 Petrus nuper capite plexus est sub telo;
 Ordo Templi periit; si non superbissent,
 In honore celebri singuli stetissent.

- 195 Forsan zona torrida sic cinget et stringet,
 Quod predicatoribus simile continget,
 Et si casu subito simile quid gerunt,
 Mundus dicet merito, quia fremuerunt.
- Felix gaudet animus liberis habenis,
 200 Si sit ex periculis cautus alienis.
 Qui prepolles ceteris, pone tibi modum,
 Ne si modum preteris, incidas in nodum.
 Disciplinam tuimet honor non retardet,
 Nam tua res agitur cum vicinus ardet.
- 205 Mundo florens careas et pompis et mimis,
 Et cor altum caueas et memento finis;
 Cordis aures audiant hunc verborum sonum:
 Cuius finis bonus est, ipsum totum bonum.
 Quid valet pompositas tanta superbiorum,
- 210 Quando mors et mala sors finis est illorum?
- A Cristo discipulis Cristi dictum lego:
 'Si uos estis humiles, si mites vt ego
 Qui sum Deus, conditor hominis terrestris,
 Dulcis erit requies animabus vestris;
- 215 Mansueti siquidem possidebunt terram,
 Mites et pacifici non timebunt guerram.'
 Humiles deliciis celi perfruentur,
 Cum superbi pauperes Sathane tradentur.
 Cui, sicut digni sunt, eos commendamus,
- 220 Et pro digno carmine te Deum laudamus.
 Explicit etc.

NOTES TO THE "DE SUPERSTICIONE"

- Title This is explained by 155 ff. (see below on 152-8, 156-7).
- 2 The suppression of the author's name may here be for practical reasons, but cp. E. R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, transl. by W. R. Trask, Bollingen Ser. 36 (New York, 1953), 515-8.
- 3-4 "...the words of truth concerning the meaning of a poem (which was produced) by the angry friars."
- 9-52 The image of the University as the sun is used again in 124-8. It was employed extensively by Tryvvtlam: "radius" 3, "ad instar... solaris radii" 64,

De te prophetice puto predictur
 Cum vates mystice futura loquitur,
 Dicens in vrbibus quibus lex dabitur
 Quod solis civitas vna vocabitur.

Sicut sol aeris depellit tenebras,
 Sic ignorancie noctem illuminas;
 Sol quidem corpora, tu mentes illuminas,
 Ergo verissime tu solis civitas.

Sicut sol influit terre seminibus
 Vt fructum proferant humanis vsibus,
 Sic toti seculo virtutem influis
 Qua verum videat subductis deviis. (81-92)

Heu dum sic desipis nec prolem corripis,
 Veri fons aruit, sol fit eclipticus;
 Vix villa remanet spes veri luminis,
 Cum tu sciencie sol sic pallueris. (109-12)

N<un>c errans senio sol non efficeris (117).

In Tryvytlam's poem, however, the image is relatively simple: Oxford is the "civitas solis" of *Isa.* xix, 18 (cp. *Jos.* xix, 41), its rays dispel the darkness of ignorance, it warms the fruitful seeds of knowledge, and it may be eclipsed. In the "De Supersticione" the image is much more complex; the following points of comparison are made:

i) Oxford resembles the sun as a symbol of God (9-10, 21-28); round the sun is a satellite which represents Christ (23-26: see below); similarly the University has pupils as its satellites. The lesson of this image is the necessity for obedience and humility.

ii) the "double sun" is a symbol of Oxford for another reason: Oxford radiates two sorts of wisdom, divine and secular (11-14).

iii) Oxford is to England, as the sun is to the world (17-19, 35-36).

iv) Oxford and the sun shine on good and evil alike.

v) Whoever looks at the sun with a "simplex oculus" will benefit; those who gaze at it continually will suffer.

9-10 The "sun = God or Christ" equation is common in patristic writings: e.g. Ambrose's Sixth sermon "De natali Domini" (PL 17, 614), St. Gregory on *Job* xli, 21 "sub ipso erunt radii solis" (PL 76, 730-2), and St. Maximus of Turin, who says (Homily XLV) "solem hic iustitiae arbitror designari: hoc est Christum Dominum"; Christ sent the apostles, the rays, "ut perfecti facilius possimus tolerare solis ardorem" (PL 57, 329). Cp. also Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae* V, m. 2. See further PL Indices "De nominibus Christi."

11 ff. The punctuation of these lines is very uncertain.

12 *causa solis duplicis* "because of (the phenomenon of) the double sun." The nature of this "double sun", which plays such an important part in the whole of the comparison, is extremely obscure. Du Cange *sol* 2 gives the following references:

i) Matthew Paris (for 1236) "et videbatur iuxta solem quidam sol nothus collateralis";

ii) Ammianus, Book XX:

"sol autem geminus ita videri existimatur, si erecta celsius solito nubes, aethereorumque ignium propinquitate collucens, orbis alterius claritudinem tanquam e speculo puriore formauerit."

The other references are irrelevant in this context.
assignatur, i.e. *designatur*, an unusual sense.

- 20 Cp. *Matt.* v, 45 "solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos."
- 21-26 My interpretation of these lines is based partly on the tenses of 23-25: "But there is a satellite sun belonging to the latter sun (i.e. Christ in relation to God), which shines brighter in the heavens, because the parent sun of this sun is the Sun of Justice (i.e. God); to this the inferior sun (Christ) yielded and obeyed; it never became rebellious against its laws, nor exceeded the circuit of the track assigned to it. For this reason it shines with an eternal brightness." The whole passage could as easily be referred to the historians' account of an actual double sun (see on 12), were it not for *sol iusticiae* which must surely refer to God. St. Maximus (see on 12 above) calls Christ the "sol iustitiae": the origin of the phrase is *Malach.* iv, 2.
- 31-32 "To conclude the case of the fiery sun (God) — such will be the ending for pious and impious."
- 33-34 *materialis sol*: this is contrasted with *solis empirei* (31). The analogy between Oxford and God has broken down: the poet reverts to the physical sun. "But the material sun, performing its natural function, shares out something of favour and something of disfavour to everyone."
- 37-42 The contrast between the two ways of looking at the sun seems to be expressed by opposing the *simplex oculus* and the eye which looks *auide*. In order to provide an antecedent for *eius* (40) it is necessary to punctuate in such a way that *prospiciens* (39) is a "nominativus pendens." Translate: "He who has a humble, straightforward look at the sun when it is shining, his eyesight thrives and his heart rejoices; he who looks greedily into the glare of the sun, his look is dazzled and turned aside. The argument of the visible sun ends thus: he who presses the spur too hard deceives himself."
- 43 *Hic et ille*: the two kinds of sun discussed in 9-32 and 33-42.
- 46 *lucis filii*: *Joann.* xii, 36, etc. For the idea, compare the quotation from St. Maximus (9-10 above), and the Bestiary story of the eagle and its young.
- 55 *Jacobiti*: a play is intended on the two meanings of the word, both illustrated by Du Cange: 1 "Jacobini, in Aegypto et in terra sancta dicuntur Christiani quidam certis haeresibus ac pravis opinionibus infecti"; 2 "dicti Dominicani seu religiosi ordinis S. Dominici, quod eis Hospitale Peregrinorum S. Jacobi Parisiis ad mansionem assignatam primitus fuerit."
- 57 *quia sunt ingrati*: also used in "Quis dabit" 59.
- 63 *bini generis*: i.e. the secular clergy and the monks, as follows.
- 65-66 "if you desire to know the 'good men of both kinds', read the next two lines."
- 72 This presumably refers to the attempts by the friars to persuade the Pope to repeal the anti-mendicant Statutes: cp. 94.
- 75 *appellant* "appeal", a legal technical term in both classical and medieval Latin.
- 99-100 Perhaps: "if they wanted these things (to limit the University's powers), let them ask for it to be written down, so that they may recognize their own ingratitude." i.e. let their demands be written down, rather than delivered orally.
- 101 ff. For the image of the ungrateful dog, compare also the charge against flatterers in Walter of Wimborne's "De Palpone et Assentatore", ed. T. Wright, *Latin poems commonly attributed to Walter Mapes*, Camden Soc. 17 (1841), 243-6:

Inpransus balatro tua praeconia
 Canit, et alios omnes infamia
 Aspergit aliqua, te post convivia,
 Cum verax aperit liber praeconcordia.

- 119-20 If *studeant* is jussive, as in 117, the lines seem to say exactly the opposite of what they mean, and must be taken ironically. It should perhaps be emended to *studeunt*, indicative (cp. *deleunt* for *delent* in Tryvytlam's "De Laude" 228); "however, in fact they give their attention to being sure that their most recent turpitude is worse than their last."
- 121 This may refer back to *duplex assignatur* (12).
- 127 The emendation *ceci* "blinded by the sun" (cp. 37-42 Note) makes better sense than MS *ceti* "companies", although this spelling for *coitus* is found elsewhere in the MS, and a change of declension would be quite likely.
- 143-5 These lines, of course, are ironical.
- 146 *Ps.* i, 4.
- 148 *Gen.* xxvii, 22. *Esau* is also trisyllabic in the "De Laude" 204, where both Hearne and Furneaux have misread the MS: the text should read
 Volunt cum Esau de cibo regio (*Gen.* xxv, 27 "vir gnarus venandi")
- 149-60 For a discussion of the ideas behind these lines, see my article referred to above, in note 6.
- 152-8 *Matt.* vii, 15-16.
- 156-7 The friars are described as Pharisees partly because of their alleged intolerance, arrogance and hypocrisy, but also because of the Medieval Latin adj. *phariseus* "divided (from)", as they are separated from God's clergy (155).
- 165-7 *pectus induratum... Pharaonis: Exod.* vii, 13, etc.
- 171-4 *Eccles.* vii, 17, *Rom.* xii, 3, 16 (cp. *Rom.* xi, 20).
- 175-6 "No one is invited to the house of Prudence, unless he has learned Moderation as a companion"; cp. *Sap.* viii, 7 "sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet (sapientia)", which is close enough to have supplied the idea.
- 179-80 "But the root cause of their attitude remains within them, and from it the whole order is infected."
- 189-90 For grammatical punning of this sort, see Curtius *op. cit.* pp. 414-6, and P. Lehmann, *Die Parodie im Mittelalter*, 2nd rev. ed. (Stuttgart, 1963), 49 ff., 108 ff., 190 ff.
- 192 *Petrus*: Piers Gaveston, executed 1312. This MS also contains two poems celebrating his death; they are parodies of two hymns by Venantius Fortunatus, the "Pange lingua gloriosi" and the "Vexilla regis prodeunt," ed. thesis, i, 160-2, ii, 378-82, and by T. Wright, *Political Songs of England*, Camden Soc. 6 (1839), 258-61.
- 193 *Ordo Templi*: this refers to the suppression of the Templars by Clement V in 1312. A full account of their crimes, as listed by their English opponents, is found in the *Annales Londonienses* in *Chronicles of the reigns of Edward II and III*, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols., Rolls Ser. 76 (1882-3), 1, 179-98.
- 195 *zona torrida*: cp. *Ps.* cviii, 19.
- 198 *fremuerunt*: cp. *Ps.* ii, 1.
- 201 ff. This warning may be addressed directly to Tryvytlam, as a man of sufficient authority to feel reasonably well protected (203).

- 204 Horace, *Epistles* I, xviii, 84. The reference may be to the Statute made by the University in 1358, forbidding the friars to recruit boys under 18: see A. G. Little, *Grey Friars in Oxford* (Oxford Historical Society 20, 1891), p. 80.
- 205 *mimis*: this may refer to the part played by the friars in the production of Miracle Plays. Cp. i.a., R. H. Robbins, *Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries* (New York, 1959), No. 66, despite Robbins's own hesitation in admitting that the poem refers to play-acting.
- 212 ff. *Matt.* v, 4 (*Ps.* xxxvi, 11).
- 216 It is not entirely clear where Christ's words are intended to end, but he can hardly be supposed to say 218.

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The Altercatio Phyllidis et Florae as an Ovidian Satire

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AT no time was Ovid more closely studied, and more widely imitated, than during the twelfth century.¹ It would be reasonable to assume, therefore, that no other age understood him better or found him more in accord with its own values. But modern attempts to account for his great popularity and pervading influence during this century have commonly assumed either that he was misunderstood, or that he was popular as an escape from the prevailing orthodoxy. "Ovid misunderstood" has been held responsible for the so-called system of courtly love, a system which is assumed to have arisen among courtiers and court poets who acted out the precepts of the art of love without recognizing that it was a joke, on Ovid's part, to pretend that a passion could be considered as an art. The moralizations of Ovid have been treated as hypocritical excuses for reading dirty poetry, and a whole class of impudent schoolboy rebels has been posited, young clerks who are said to have found in Ovid the justification for the sexual way to freedom from a Puritanical church. But a historical theory which turns the people of the past into either knaves or fools is necessarily suspect, especially a theory which assumes so easily that our own age, when Ovid can hardly be said to be widely read and imitated, understands him better than twelfth-century clerks. Indeed, it would be more likely that the twelfth-century uses of Ovid could tell our own age what Ovid can mean to sympathetic and understanding readers who found his themes and techniques relevant to their own aims.²

For these reasons, the usual interpretation of the *Altercatio Phyllidis et*

¹ The attitude paraphrased in this paragraph is widespread, but I have had in mind specifically the discussions of the nature of Ovid's influence in L. P. Wilkinson, *Ovid Surveyed* (Cambridge, 1962), ch. 11; C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (New York, 1957), 107-109; and C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (New York, 1958), 6-7, 43.

² Peter Dronke notes, in *Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European Love Lyric* (Oxford, 1966), 229-230, that modern studies have not given a satisfactory account of the Ovidian influence on twelfth-century poetry, a fact which might be explained by the absence of any satisfying study of Ovid's amatory poetry itself, comparable to Brooks Otis' study of the *Metamorphoses* (see n. 16 below).

Florae is particularly difficult to accept. This poem, and the other poetical debates on the question of the relative suitability of knights and clerks as lovers of which it is the most famous and probably the best example,³ have been seen as reflections of a genuine historical rivalry at French courts. None of these debates was written after the early thirteenth century, so it has been assumed that the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which forbade marriage to clerks of the lower orders, put a stop to the social situation with which the poems deal. Other works of the period mention certain dissolute "curial clerks," members of the lower orders, who worked for secular nobles and lived in their courts, and it has been assumed that these clerks are the ones whose merits as lovers are being debated. And the fact that, more often than not, the poems decide that clerks are the superior lovers has been taken as a sign of their remarkable success in a pursuit which had been the exclusive province of knights.⁴ But this interpretation of the poems is unsatisfying for two reasons. The first is that this hypothetical social setting is not very evident in the poems themselves, which almost never mention marriage, which do not limit their assertions about clerks to those of the lower orders, and which in one case, the *Council of Remiremont*, present nuns, not court ladies, as the objects of knightly and clerkly affections. The second is that it does not account for the literary format and literary devices of the poems, which it must necessarily assume to be merely arbitrary ornamentation of historical fact. The clearly Ovidian qualities of these poems are, in this view, quite accidental: it happened that certain phrases and commonplaces from Ovid's amatory poetry fitted the social phenomenon which these poets wished to describe.

Conscious of the inadequacy of this purely representational view of these debates, W. H. T. Jackson has suggested that to describe a knight or clerk as "apt for love" is to say in these poems, that he is elegant and cultured. Therefore, Jackson concludes that these poems reflect not a rivalry in love, but a rivalry in manners, between the two principal classes of twelfth-century court society.⁵ Since Ovid had, in his *Ars Amatoria* (III, 121-128),

³ Texts are collected in Charles Oulmont, *Les débats entre clercs et chevaliers* (Paris, 1911).

⁴ Oulmont, *Les débats*, and Edmund Faral, "Les débats du clerc et du chevalier dans la littérature française des XII^e et XIII^e siècles," *Romania*, 41 (1912), 473-517 (reprinted in *Recherches sur les sources latines des contes et romans courtois du moyen âge*, Paris, 1913) disagree in some details, but both assume that the poems have a basis in social fact. They are followed in this interpretation by Maurice Delboulle in the introduction to his edition of *Le jugement d'amour ou Florence et Blancheflor* (Paris, n.d.), and by F. J. Raby, *The History of Secular Latin Poetry in the Middle Ages*, 2nd Edn. (Oxford, 1957), vol. 2, 291-296.

⁵ "Der Streit zwischen 'miles' und 'clericus'," *Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum*, 75 (1954-55), 293-303.

implied that the following of his precepts was one element of the attainment of *cultus*, this reading credits the twelfth-century poets who imitated Ovid in writing these debates with a rather sophisticated understanding of Ovidian wit and Ovidian social attitudes. But a close examination of the *Altercatio Phyllidis et Florae* shows that even this more plausible interpretation does not fit the facts of the poem, and that, further, the twelfth-century Ovidian who wrote it had devised a kind of "Ovidian satire," simple in its principles of invention, but subtle in its implications.

In the debate itself, for instance, it is easy to see that elegance and culture do not make a knight or a clerk apt for love, and that love is in itself not a very elegant pursuit. When Phyllis says, in defense of her lover and of all other knights, that

"Solis necessariis miles est contentus,
somno, cibo, potui non vivit intentus;
amor illi prohibet, ne sit somnolentus,
cibus, potus militis amor et iuventus"⁶—

and when Flora responds, defending her lover and all clerks, that

"In tam dulci copia vite clericalis,
quod non potest aliqua pingi voce talis,
volat et duplicibus Amor plaudit alis,
Amor indeficiens, Amor immortalis" —

they are not talking, in any way, about manners. They are in disagreement as to whether knightly austerity or clerical abundance best encourages love. They argue, specifically, whether it is better for the lover to eat, drink and sleep, or to abstain from these activities, and they therefore are in perfect agreement that love is a physical activity for which one can train as one trains for a sporting event. They agree, as well, that love is an appetite like the appetite for food and sleep, and disagree only on the question of whether it flourishes as an obsession, excluding all other appetites, or as the crown and accompaniment of general self-indulgence.

To praise a state in life for making a man apt for love is, in other words, to say that this state puts him in condition for the exercise of an appetite. It need hardly be added that, although the phrasing of the argument is very witty and elegant, the subject of the argument is by no means connected with these qualities. The terms in which the knightly and clerical life are praised are hardly flattering to the holders of these offices, or to the offices themselves. Though it is surely reasonable that clerks have enough

⁶ *Altercatio*, stanza 18. The text of the *Altercatio* is quoted from *Carmina Burana*, ed. A. Hilka and O. Schumann, (Heidelberg, 1941), where the poem is to be found in Bd. 1:2, pp. 94-103 (# 92).

to eat and drink and enough in the way of possessions to leave them free for their duties, and that knights be able to live and fight even under conditions of deprivation, no one, except a satirist, would ever say that clerks should live in sweet abundance in order to sharpen their appetites, or that the object of knightly self-discipline is to encourage an obsession. Indeed, were one to consider the ends for which these two classes are usually said to exist, one would think that the two girls have reversed the characteristics of their lovers' professions. A knight must have sufficient wealth to keep his health and to equip himself for battle. A clerk, on the other hand, needs only a few possessions to engage in his study and teaching. But since this poem assumes that any state in life exists to encourage love, it reverses the characteristics of knights and clerks. Where love is the end of human life, the values and qualities associated with social classes are turned up-side-down.

Neither girl denies the worldliness of the clerk or the poverty of the knight, though one would think, were the poems reproducing social fact, that something would be said of this paradoxical reversal of values. But instead each girl tries to use these facts to her own advantage. Phyllis describes the brutish *otium* of the clerical life, and expresses her contempt for it:

"A castris Cupidinis cor habet remotum,
qui somnum desiderat et cibum et potum.
o puella nobilis, omnibus est notum,
quod est longe militis ab hoc voto votum."

(stanza 17)

It is commonplace to contrast the effeminate laziness of the life of a non-soldier to the masculine hardness of the soldier's life, and Phyllis here seems to be making this contrast. But usually, under these circumstances, the non-soldier is to be found in Cupid's camp, the soldier in Mars'. In this poem, however, since love is the ultimate value, the terms of the contrast are correspondingly reversed. The knight's ability to suffer deprivations enables him to love, not necessarily to fight, with more vigour than the idle and gluttonous clerk. The wit of this expression of contempt derives from one's recognizing the usual terms of the contrast, and consequently seeing the incongruity of introducing the form of the contrast into a world where love is the only value.

Flora, on the other hand, is as contemptuous of the knight's self-deprivations as Phyllis is of the clerk's self-indulgence:

"Macer est et pallidus tuus preelectus,
pauper et vix pallio sine pelle tectus,
non sunt artus validi nec robustum pectus;
nam cum causa deficit, deest et effectus."

(stanza 26)

A weak and ragged soldier is usually contemptible only because he is sure to be ineffectual on the battlefield. But Flora's contempt is based upon his consequent ineffectuality in bed. It is ironic that a defender of the clerical life would express contempt for asceticism and poverty, for these are usually considered the virtues of the clergy. It is further ironic that she would condemn these virtues precisely because they kill sexual appetite, or at least sexual prowess, for it is on the grounds that asceticism releases a man from the bondage of appetite and frees him for study and contemplation that poverty and self-discipline had been recommended to clerks. The wit of Flora's contrast here, just as in the case of Phyllis' contrast, arises from the fact that the reader knows the more conventional characterizations of the two offices.

But the poem's wit sometimes arises, as well, from the misdirected praise, rather than condemnation, of the more conventional characteristics of the offices. In these cases, study and contemplation, or fighting, are considered mere adjuncts to the pursuit of love. It will be noted, for instance, that Flora's speeches are filled with the language of philosophy. She has apparently adopted the vocabulary of her lover, and speaks of causes and effects, of indeficiency and immortality. To use this vocabulary as she does, to derive, for instance, the immortality and indeficiency of love from the abundance of food and drink, is, of course, to make a travesty of philosophic logic. Furthermore, she justifies her lover's *otium*, so strongly condemned by Phyllis, on the grounds that it allows him to pursue philosophic studies:

"Otiosum clericum semper esse iuras:
viles spernit operas, fateor, et duras;
sed cum eius animus evolat ad curas,
celi vias dividit et rerum naturas."

(stanza 39)

Twelfth-century monks and scholars often talked of the *otium* necessary to the contemplative life, that freedom from cares which allowed them to attend to their studies.⁷ But this sort of scholarly *otium* was not accompanied by the aristocratic contempt for work itself which this passage manifests. Nor would the writing and thinking of these scholars be, as Flora goes on to say (stanza 40), "*totum de amica*." Indeed, the wit of her assertion is based on the presumed incompatibility of speculative studies and love: it is difficult to see how dividing the ways of heaven and the nature of things makes the clerk a better lover.

But this difficulty is as nothing compared to the difficulty of seeing how

⁷ See the discussion of contemplative *otium* in Jean Leclerc, *L'Amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1963), 67-68.

mortal battles and love are related to each other. Nevertheless, Phyllis asserts that even during combat her lover thinks of her:

"Meus armis dissipat inimicas sedes,
et si forte prelium solus init pedes,
dum tenet Bucephalam suus Ganymedes,
ille me commemorat inter ipsas cedes."

(stanza 31)

It is fortunate that the poet of the *Altercatio* could not have read Freud, for the wit of his conception would have been spoiled by any hint of a death wish implicit in sexuality. While coming close to saying that a corpse will remind a lover of his love, what the passage really does is to reduce to absurdity that commonplace of heroic poetry since Homer which makes fighting the means of earning, winning or defending one's mistress. This knight, whose name (stanza 12) is Paris, whose squire is Ganymede, and his horse Bucephalas, is precisely such a hero. But the language of this passage, by carrying to the limit the notion that war may be closely connected with love, turns this hero into either the most elegant of fighters or the most brutal of lovers, or both.

Passages like these, where the conventional attributes of the two offices are either, paradoxically, subjected to contempt in the very process of praising the holder of that office, or, equally paradoxically, assumed to have the function of enabling the holder of the office to be a lover, make up the greater part of the debate between the two girls. Each office lends itself equally well to such paradoxes, so on the basis of these passages Love's judges could not, as they do, decide the dispute in favor of the clerk. The grounds for their decision, therefore, must appear in certain other passages where the two offices are not contrasted, but related. Flora has the last word in the argument, and her concluding speech asserts the superiority of clerks to knights, not only in love, but in social and intellectual position. Since Phyllis cannot, or does not answer this assertion, it must have tipped the scales for Love's judges who, being custom (*Usus*) and nature (*Natura*), are sure to be influenced by such considerations of relative status.

This concluding speech is an answer to Phyllis' charge that the clerk's demeanor on holy days, when he appears in black clothes and a tonsure, manifests a surly disposition and ill will that disqualify him from love. Flora replies that her adversary has misconstrued the significance of the clerical tonsure:

"Universa clerico constat esse prona,
et signum imperii portat in corona.
imperat militibus et largitur dona:
famulante maior est imperans persona."

(stanza 38)

The first two lines of this stanza appeal to the distinction between spiritual and temporal nobility. No one in the twelfth century doubted that the clergy were of the highest class, on the analogy of the general superiority of the spiritual world to the temporal.⁸ But in this poem, where the distinction between spiritual and temporal does not exist, it is not surprising to find that the clerk exercises his *imperium* in the manner of a secular lord, commanding knights and giving generously of gifts. The tonsure, an appropriately ascetic emblem of spiritual *imperium*, becomes, for Flora, the justification of a clerk's assertion of temporal power. It is a not unjustified inference that, in the world of this poem, the usurpation by the clergy of the functions of a nobility accounts for the poverty and self-deprivation of knights.

And, apparently, this temporal power is reinforced by the teachings of clerks, who retain this traditional function even while acting like members of the nobility, for Flora's concluding remarks allude to the clerk's position as the repository and promulgator of knowledge:

"Quid Dione valeat et amoris deus,
primus novit clericus et instruxit meus;
factus est per clericum miles Cythereus.
His est et huiusmodi tuus sermo reus."

(stanza 41)

Clerks and knights may be equally skillful lovers. But clerks, because their office is to give instruction, can make others into lovers as well. Their superiority to the secular nobility, in a world where love is the ultimate value, is manifest: a secular noble can make a knight, but only a clerk can make a knight of Venus. It is not surprising, therefore, that Love's judges decide in favor of clerks, for clerks are Love's greatest allies. A knight may be quite apt for love, but he cannot, as a clerk can, lead others to love as well.

These reasons are not explicitly mentioned in the handing down of the decision with which the poem concludes, for the journey to Love's court which follows the presentation of the arguments has another function than to clear up the questions raised by the debate. Its function is to make explicit the assumptions about the nature of man and standards of value which the arguments themselves tacitly accept. Love holds court in an inverted paradise⁹ because, to lovers, the fulfillment of love is the cause

⁸ The discussion of the social class of clerks in the section entitled "de amore clericorum" of the *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus, translated J. J. Parry, (New York, 1941), presents the standard doctrine of the day.

⁹ The nature of this inverted paradise is, in part, indicated by Flora's contempt for Phyllis' attempt to prove that a poor man can be a lover, an attempt which she compares to trying to

and end of human life. There is a court in this paradise because love is the standard by which human actions and attributes, including those which define the various classes of a society, are judged good or bad. Custom and nature, Love's judges, not only look out for the interests of love itself, but also evaluate the extent to which an office will encourage self-indulgence and pleasure in those who hold the office. The machinery of the poem's concluding section is the metaphysical projection of the customary and natural human tendency to see life in purely physical and temporal terms, and Love's presence in the poem as the deity to whom the girls appeal is the decorous conclusion to the presentation of arguments in which love has been the standard of judgment.

The supremacy of Love is, in other words, the inventional premise which explains the curious assumptions about the way in which knights and clerks live which underlie the arguments and the curious logic whereby they procede. In a world where love is supreme, clerks will usurp some of the functions of knights, justifying their temporal power with appeals to the superiority of the spiritual over the temporal. Their usurpation will reduce knights to poverty, but knights, having been taught by the clergy that love is the end of life, do not notice their deprivation. Their forced asceticism still looks like the traditional rough soldier's life (just as the clerk's study and teaching still look like the traditional contemplative life), and it, furthermore, allows them to make love an obsession, to be pursued without the distractions of less important appetites. These are the facts of the poem. The logic of the arguments is equally appropriate to such a world. Being apt for love will be the primal virtue of such a world, and the characteristics of a way of life will therefore be shown as encouraging love. Because, in any other world, study and fighting, the pursuits of clerks and knights, are absolutely incompatible with love, some of the arguments will necessarily express contempt for the values usually associated with these pursuits. But, at the same time, love itself will be described in such superlative terms that the reversal and reduction of these usual values will not call attention to itself.

Having these characteristics, the poem is thus an ironic and satiric version of the more serious twelfth-century arguments about the relationship of *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, of the temporal and spiritual arms of so-

thread a camel through the eye of a needle (stanzas 33-34). The poet could not have been unaware that this figure was applied by Christ to the difficulties of a rich man obtaining the kingdom of heaven. The qualifications for love, in other words, are precisely the opposite of the qualifications for the kingdom of heaven. The resemblances of Love's paradise to the kingdom of heaven — its eternal spring, its harmony — serve to emphasize its differences from the real paradise where, for instance, the drunken Silenus would not be found.

ciety.¹⁰ It is ironic in the simplest Isidorian sense of the term: it seems to praise that which it means to condemn.¹¹ To praise a knight or clerk as "apt for love" is to say that he has either usurped functions which do not belong to his office or made the exercise of his office serve ends extrinsic to it. It is satiric in a double sense. It first satirizes the ingenuity of its serious equivalents by demonstrating the casuistry whereby theoretical arguments about the relationship between *regnum* and *sacerdotium* can be made to serve the ends of appetite and power. But besides this, it satirizes the clergy for tending to become a class of worldly and powerful rulers, living for power and pleasure, and teaching others to do the same. The actual existence of "curial clerks" would give a certain piquancy to the satire; but the qualities of a clerk assumed in this poem are a function of its inventional premises, and would not have had to be present in any specific clerks. The poet who wrote it, doubtless himself a clerk, must have had a great respect for the ideal of a learned and ascetic clergy, for his satire would lack point did he not believe in the great potential for good or evil implicit in the exercise of the clerkly activities, study and teaching.

The mechanics of this satire are easy to describe in traditional rhetorical terms. The debate form is an adaption to poetry of forensic rhetoric,¹² and the *Altercatio Phyllidis et Florae* does not hide its connections with the

¹⁰ For this dispute, see G. Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society* (Oxford, 1959) and John B. Morrall, *Political Thought in Medieval Times* (New York, 1959), ch. 4. Most of the arguments stemmed from the Investiture Controversy, but the general ideas of two complementary and separate orders, one spiritual and the other temporal, is of long standing in Christian thought. None of the twelfth-century arguments were presented as debates between a knight and a clerk, or about the relative merits of each; but by the fourteenth century (and perhaps because of the poetical debates we have been considering here) there were several political tracts in the form of dialogues between a *miles* and a *clericus*. See, for example, William of Ockham's *Disputatio super potestate Praelatis Ecclesiae* and Phillipe de Mezières' *Somnium Veridarii*, both printed in M. Goldast's *Monarchia S. Romani Imperii* (Graz, 1960), reprinted from the 1611 Hanover edition.

¹¹ See Isidore's *Etymologiarum Libri IV*, s.v. 'ironia': "Ironia est, cum per simulationem diversum, quod dicit, intelligi cupit. Fit autem aut cum laudamus eum, quem vituperare volumus, aut vituperamus, quem laudare volumus."

¹² The importance of legal rhetoric to the development of medieval "altercations" is argued in H. Hässler, "The Owl and the Nightingale" und die literarischen Bestrebungen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts (1942 ?) who makes this specific expansion of the general observations of H. Walther, *Das Streitgedicht in der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* (*Quellen und Untersuchungen zur lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters*, Bd. 5, Heft 2) [Munich, 1920], on the influence of rhetorical forms on poetical debates. The debate in the *Altercatio* also stems from the pastoral convention of the poetical debate (see E. Faye Wilson, "Pastoral and Epithalamium in Medieval Poetry," *Speculum*, 23 (1948), 35-57), but in the pastoral the debate is judged according to the merits of the poetry, not the cogency of the arguments. The poet of the *Altercatio* has, in other words, made the pastoral convention into an occasion for a more forensic debate.

techniques of the law courts. The speeches of the girls are like the pleadings of lawyers, and Love's court hands down a judicial decision, based on these pleas, which makes implicit claims of wide application. The subject which the girls debate is not specifically legal, but it is a medieval adaption of one of the rhetorical theses which Quintilian recommends as excellent training for the orator. Quintilian sets the subjects of the debate as "iuris periti an militaris viri laus maior,"¹³ but in the middle ages, clerks replaced lawyers as the class of men most important to the civic life. The girls' arguments are demonstrative, involving the praise or condemnation of certain persons,¹⁴ and the descriptions of these persons are formal *notationes* which define a person *ab officio*.¹⁵ In the rhetorical schools, lawyers (or clerks) and knights would doubtless have been given praise to the extent that they contributed to the common good, or to the extent that their offices represent the highest expression of human nature. In this poem, they are praised to the extent that they get status and power for themselves, and to the extent that their offices represent the greatest encouragement to human appetites. The simplicity of its irony is dependent upon the poet's having available a conception of love as the center of a world of values directly contrary to the official standards of the twelfth century (or, indeed, of any other century). Because Ovid supplied this conception, the poem deserves to be called an "Ovidian satire."

Ovid himself, of course, is never satiric in the same sense that this poet is satiric. His amatory poetry impudently reduces all the values and institutions of Augustan Rome to elements in the art of love, but the point of this reduction is certainly not to expose tendencies toward self-indulgence and private status-seeking among those who ostensibly upheld those values and supported those institutions. The effect of his impudence, if it is politically motivated at all, is to show a society which played the game of being dignified while really, and even desirably, engaged in the more

¹³ *Institutionis Oratoriae*, II, 4, 24: "Thesis autem, quae sumuntur ex rerum comparatione, ut 'rusticane vita an urbana potior?' 'iuris periti an militaris viri laus maior?' mire sunt ad exercitationes dicendi speciosae atque uberes, quae vel ad suadendi officium vel etiam ad iudicium disputationemque iuvant plurimum."

¹⁴ Demonstrative arguments are defined by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as those "quod tribuitur in alicuius certae personae laudem aut vituperationem" (III, vi, 10 ff.; cf. Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* III, vii, 1-25). This is one of the standard kinds of forensic arguments.

¹⁵ The art of the *notatio*, including the manner of defining a person *ab officio*, is explained in all of the medieval treatises on poetry. See Matthew of Vendôme, *Ars Versificatoria*, I, 38 ff., or Geoffrey of Vinsauf, *Poetria Nova*, 1.1 1366 ff. (ed. Faral, *Les Arts poétiques du XII^e et du XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924) and later edns., pp. 118 ff., 239 ff.). Matthew gives examples of how such descriptions should procede (e.g., the description of a Pope, *Ars*, I, 50; Faral, *Les Arts* p. 121), and it is to the elements of such a description that I refer when speaking of the "conventional characteristics" of an office.

interesting game of love.¹⁶ Whatever the reason, his amatory poetry has as its inventive premise that love is the ultimate value, and that Augustan institutions and ideals exist for no other reason than to encourage, or to cure, love. The temples and games which Augustus supported for the enhancement of piety and patriotism are, to Ovid, merely convenient places to find and seduce women (*A.A.*, I, 73 ff.). Triumphal processions, even those of the first citizen's adopted son, so far from inspiring awe at the extent of Rome's power, serve the Ovidian lover as the occasion for showing off to young women his spurious knowledge of the significance of a contrived spectacle (*A.A.*, I, 217 ff.). The high ideal of self-knowledge becomes, for the lover, a principle for the development of the techniques of seduction best suited to his own gifts. (*Ars Amatoria*, II, 497 ff.). Fighting imperial battles or showing one's skill in the forum are convenient, not patriotic or public spirited, pursuits: one may defeat the Parthians and Love at the same time (*R.A.* 151 ff.). The *Ars Amatoria* and the *Remedia Amoris*, in other words, are filled with examples of the witty casuistry whereby all of a society's institutions and values can be shown to encourage or to cure love, and the poet of the *Altercatio* learned his casuistry from these works.

He could learn, too, how the characteristics of dignified offices could be reduced to elements of the art of love. Ovid refuses to accept the commonplace of his elegiac predecessors which contrasts the heroic pursuit of war with the otiose pursuit of love. He insists, to the contrary, that the soldier and the lover must have the same qualities and characteristics, and that love is itself a kind of war.¹⁷ The poet of the *Altercatio* merely carries this conceit one step further, asserting, as we have seen, that the pursuit of war is one element of the pursuit of love, that a soldier will recall his love even in the midst of his corpses. There were, of course, no clerks in Ovid's time, but the corresponding offices, those of the lawyer and the poet, are dealt with in the *Ars Amatoria*, and the twelfth-century poet made up his clerk out of elements of each of the earlier portraits. In Ovid, the lawyer is often made captive by love while in the very process of arguing a case, with the result that he who was defending others becomes a client. Forensic oratory, the great Roman art of peace, can, like the soldier's art, be adapted to

¹⁶ Brooks Otis' characterization of Ovid (*Ovid as an Epic Poet* [Cambridge, 1966] 127) that he "more or less cynically accepted the incompatibility of *maiestas* and *amor*. After all, official pretence has always concealed a very human reality," seems to me to describe the Ovid of the *Ars Amatoria* as well.

¹⁷ *Ars Amatoria*, II, 233 ff. The *locus classicus* of the conceit is, of course, *Amores*, I, ix; but it pervades all of Ovid's poetry.

love.¹⁸ For Ovid, the same rhetorical principles which determine the nature of pleas at law equally determine the nature of amatory *suasoriae*, as the *Amores* and *Heroides*, as well as the *Ars Amatoria* and *Remedia Amoris*, give abundant evidence. Phyllis and Flora, those eloquent attorneys, and Flora's clerk, whose teachings make others knights of Venus, are merely later examples of the same Ovidian phenomenon.

But the clerk of the *Altercatio* resembles even more closely the poet whom Ovid describes while persuading women that poets make excellent lovers. This poet is said to lack the guile and avarice of those who frequent the forum; he seeks the couch and the shade, and fits his behavior to his art. (*Ars Amatoria*, III, 539 ff.). The poet of the *Altercatio* was obviously struck both by the special pleading of this assertion — Ovid is a poet himself, but hardly guileless — and by the device of praising poets by contrasting poetry with other professions. And he was even more impressed by the reasons which Ovid gives for being particularly kind to poets:

Vatibus Aoniis, faciles estote, puellae:
 Numen inest illis, Pieridesque favent.
 Est deus in nobis, et sunt commercia caeli:
 Sedibus aetheriis spiritus ille venit.
 (*Ars Amatoria*, III, 547-550)

Ovid claims that having commerce with heaven is a qualification for love, as if spirits from aetherial seats were particularly given to carnality, and as if a girl should seek, in a lover, the god who is in him. The wit of this passage, as of the comparable passage in the *Altercatio*, is dependent upon the incompatibility of divinity with the quite earthly pursuit of love. Even the poet of the *Metamorphoses* was aware that god-like majesty and love do not dwell together.

The poet of the *Altercatio* could have noted, as well, that this poet-lover, in his *otium*, is considerably different from the soldier-like lover which Ovid elsewhere describes. It might be possible to explain these inconsistencies as part of a larger consistency, but such an explanation would miss the point. There is no set idea of the lover in the *Ars Amatoria* or the *Remedia Amoris*, and the poet of the *Altercatio* could therefore give his knight and his clerk radically different characteristics, all of which had been, somewhere in Ovid, asserted as the characteristics of lovers. Not only in his explanation of the virtue of poets as lovers, but also at the beginning of the *Remedia Amoris* (line 139) he makes *otium* the essential precondition of love; and he is noted for having asserted that without food and drink, love grows cold. On the other hand, his comparison of a lover to a soldier, his assertions of

¹⁸ *Ars Amatoria*, I, 79 ff.; I, 459 ff.

the necessity for vigorous actions by lovers, and his advice to lovers that they look pale and sleepless because love deprives one of other appetites (*Ars Amatoria*, I, 723 ff.) all assume a quite different picture of the lover in action. Thus Ovidian inconsistency is essential to the poet's purpose in the *Altercatio*. He needed a precedent for every characteristic of both the knight and the clerk, and he found one.

But equally important to his purpose is Ovid's technique of indirection. When Ovid tells of the lawyer who, while arguing a case, suddenly finds himself eager to be a client, he is ostensibly listing all the places where love may be found, for the benefit of his neophyte lover who may not know how good a place the forum is. What he actually does, of course, is to present a comic scene of punctured dignity. His pleas to young women to be kind to poets comes in the midst of his explanation, admittedly audacious, of how a woman should consider herself a *dux*, and treat her lovers as contributors, each according to his particular skill, to the small commonwealth thus created.¹⁹ What he actually does is to show all ranks in society reduced to the status of menials to a woman whose love is shared by many men. The twelfth-century interpretations of the *Ars Amatoria* as a poem meant to "stigmatize the corruption of dissolute women"²⁰ must arise out of such an understanding of Ovid's techniques of indirection. It is clear, at least, that the *Altercatio*, which seems to be a debate of the merit of knights and clerks as lovers but is actually a satirical description of the consequences of certain misconstructions of the meaning of clergy and chivalry, makes use of a very similar technique.

It follows from this analysis of the *Altercatio* that the nature of the Ovidian influence on medieval poetry is more complex than most modern commentators have made it out to be. Indeed, any twelfth-century poet who wrote an Ovidian poem meant to be taken seriously (there is no evidence that any did) would probably have been considered rather dull. To have thought that one could judge the relative dignity of knights and clerks on the basis of their suitability for love would have been the equivalent of writing, in the present day, a serious treatise on whether a congressman or a general was the better lover, or perhaps more to the point, whether a British cabinet minister was a more suitable lover than an employee of the United States Senate. The assumption that medieval poets misunderstood

¹⁹ *Ars Amatoria*, III, 525-526: "Quis vetat a magnis ad res exempla minoris/Sumere, nec nomen pertinuisse ducis?" The phrasing of this passage indicates that Ovid was aware both of the audacity of the comparison, and of the reduction of the importance of the various offices he discusses when they are made parts of a girl's social economy.

²⁰ Fausto Ghisalberti, "Medieval Biographies of Ovid," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 9 (1946), 13, quoting from a Paris MS of the twelfth century.

Ovid, and that they devised a system of "courtly love," leads to a rather gross misreading of medieval works. Drouarte la Vache, for instance, thought the *De Amore* of Andreas Capellanus the funniest book he had ever read;²¹ but modern commentators have treated it as if it were, in some way, serious. The modern attempts to systematize the elements of an ironic structure of values have distorted many works besides the *Altercatio* and the other similar debates, and have underrated the wit of medieval Ovidian poets.

Such misreadings arise from the failure to take seriously the rhetorical basis of medieval poetry. It has long been noted that medieval treatises on poetry are primarily rhetorical, but the dullness of these mechanical treatises has led most modern commentators to assume that the meaning of medieval poems lies elsewhere than in their rhetorical inventions. The cleverness of the poet of the *Altercatio*, however, shows how fruitful rhetoric can be in the hands of someone who is both a careful reader of the poetic tradition upon which the rhetorics are based and a clever user of the devices the tradition supplies. The fact that the schoolbooks emphasize the basis of rhetoric in legal pleading could become the occasion for making a poem on the legal format, with the wit arising from the essential triviality of the subject so treated. The epideictic nature of the rhetorical *notatio* works perfectly in a poem which assumes an ironic structure of values, for it allows a poet to praise a man for just those characteristics which, according to the real values assumed by the conventions of description, are least praiseworthy. Ovid himself had been a student in the rhetorical schools, and his modern detractors have found him wanting because of his allegedly excessive rhetoricism. But for medieval poets his cleverness as a rhetorician made him the best of poetic models.

Rhetorical conventions themselves exist only in a world in which there are certain set notions of poetic rightness, those notions which are included in the idea of decorum. One cannot, therefore, expect to find in descriptions of clerks and knights direct reflection of social fact; rather one finds characteristics and qualities which are to be seen in relation to the decorum of that office. If these qualities are not decorous, or if they are perverted from their normal ends, then one is fairly safe in assuming that the descriptions are ironic; but it does not follow that the descriptions apply literally to any clerks and knights of the twelfth century. Rather the *Altercatio*

²¹ See the story of Drouarte la Vache in the introduction to J. J. Parry's translation of Andreas Capellanus' *Art of Courtly Love* (New York, 1941), p. xx. A convincing ironic reading of the *De Amore* is offered by D. W. Robertson, Jr., *A Preface to Chaucer* (Princeton, 1962), 393-448: an attempt to account for Drouarte la Vache's laughter.

Phyllidis et Florae is an Ovidian satire: a poem which ridicules certain mistaken notions of the meaning of the office of clerk by putting them in a context in which they become justifications for love. Such satire is possible in any age which, like Augustan Rome or twelfth-century France, defines a person according to his office and thereby can see the absurdity of making these definitions into reasons for praising a person's aptness for love. If Ovid is the inventor of this form of satire, he was followed, as we can see from the *Altercatio*, by poets who were capable of building on his invention satires as witty as those of their master.

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"Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie"

A Quaestio Disputata of Francis Caraccioli

Edition and Study

R. JAMES LONG

I. THE AUTHOR

FRANCIS Caraccioli, or Francis of Naples as he is sometimes called, is one of those obscure figures — with whom the Middle Ages is peopled — who only half emerges from the mist of time. Of his life we have a few dates, a few facts, a few entries in various necrologies. Of his writings we have two *quaestiones*, two letters, several excerpts, and a *Summa poenitentiae* whose attribution is very doubtful. Of the man himself, his personality, dreams, ambitions, failures we have only conjecture, only fragile hints gathered from his rather impersonal writings.

On his date of birth and earliest education we have no information. Hemeraeus conjectures that he belonged to the noble family of the Caraccioli, one of the most illustrious families of Naples;¹ Du Boulay accepts this as a fact beyond doubt.² The Caraccioli originated in Greece and immigrated to Naples in the tenth century. A "Franciscus" is, in fact, found in the geneological account of this house, belonging to the second branch, that of the counts of Pisciotta. Imhof gives as his father the Count Ligorio and as brothers the Counts Gautier and Bérard.³ Perhaps it was (as so

¹ "... forte is qui Carasoli appellatus est," (italics mine), Claudius Hemeraeus, *De Academia Parisiensi, qualis primo fuit in insula et episcoporum scholis, liber* (Paris, 1637), 130. The name is variously spelled in the manuscripts: e.g. (de) carociis, (de) caraciis, (de) caracciis, carasolus, carazolus, caratius, caraculus, etc.

The reader's attention is called to the excellent article by P. Glorieux, "François Caracciolo chancelier de l'Université de Paris," *RTAM* 33 (1966) 115-36. Unfortunately the present piece was already in press when the latter article appeared. Father Glorieux contributes much interesting data — especially on the Chancellor's works — although the *quaestio* edited here is mentioned only in passing (p. 127). Glorieux also includes an edition of Caraccioli's *quaestio* "Utrum Beata Virgo contraxerit peccatum originale" from *Vat. lat.* 932, fols. 251b-252c (pp. 129-36).

² César Égasse Du Boulay, *Historia Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris, 1668), 4, 174, 955.

³ J. W. Imhof, *Historia Italiae et Hispaniae genealogica* (Nürnberg, 1701), 261 & 291; quoted in Barthelemy Hauréau, "Francis Caraccioli, Chancelier de l'Église de Paris," *Histoire Littéraire de la France* (Paris, 1885), 30, 410.

often the case) that Francis, as a younger brother without title, was thus destined for ecclesiastical service.

In any event, Pietri, the historian of the Caraccioli, informs us that Francis was counselor to the king of Naples and also special ambassador of the queen to the court of Rome. To repay his services, moreover, the king promised him a rich abbey of which Cardinal Landolfo Brancaccio, deacon of S. Angelo in Pescharia, was at the time in possession.⁴ Since the latter died in October, 1312 (according to his epitaph), we must conclude that Francis was not actually invested with the benefice until after he had become chancellor of Paris.⁵

We next hear of Francis in Paris where in 1308 he is listed as *magister* in theology, having received his earlier education from a certain Peter of Narnia, Hermit of St. Augustine.⁶ In a letter to Robert, king of Sicily, dated 1309-1310, Francis pleads for the return to Paris of the above-mentioned Peter, who was then serving as the king's chaplain, and refers to him as "my spiritual teacher and father in Christ."⁷ The *Chartularium* of the University of Paris records Peter of Narnia as among those who "read" the *Sentences* in 1300;⁸ whether it was before or after this date that Francis came under his tutelage, we cannot be certain.⁹

Francis also held a canonicate at Rouen and is, in fact, twice mentioned in the necrology of this Church: on March 8, along with the other canons: and again on June 9, this time with the particular designation, "*vir magnae scientiae Franciscus Carazoli, doctor in theologia.*"¹⁰ It is probable, as Hauréau points out, that he did not exercise this function but contented himself with collecting its fruits.¹¹

⁴ Francesco de Pietri, *Cronologia della famiglia Caracciolo* (Naples, 1605), 18; quoted in Hauréau, 411.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Pierre Glorieux, *Répertoire des Maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1933), 458. For corrections to Glorieux's work, see Amédée Tectaert, "Le Répertoire des Maîtres en théologie de Paris: Quelques Remarques et Corrections," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 11 (1934) 17-24.

⁷ "Mei spiritualis in Christo educatoris et patris," *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle (Paris, 1889-97), 2, 146, #686 (this work will henceforth be referred to simply as *Chartularium*). On April 30, 1321, the same Peter was appointed archbishop of Reggio in Calabria. He died before October, 1328. See Glorieux, *Répertoire*, 331.

⁸ *Chartularium*, 2, 85, #613.

⁹ It is probable that Francis first came under the influence of Peter of Narnia at the court of Naples, before the latter's sojourn at Paris; unfortunately, we possess none of Peter's writings, so that any doctrinal influence he may have had on his devoted protégé is impossible to trace.

¹⁰ *Recueil des Historiens de la France* (Paris, 1899), 360, 363; quoted in Hauréau, 410-11.

¹¹ Hauréau, 410. In fact, a rather large number of Italian clerics at this period had obtained such benefices in France from the Holy See; they were usually quite lucrative and seldom imposed any obligation. Cf. *ibid.*

In August, 1308, Pope Clement V conferred on Francis, "qui in facultate theologica laudabiliter profecisse," a new canonry and prebend at Paris, the pastoral obligations of which were waived lest they impede the further pursuit of his studies; the beneficiary, moreover, was bound neither to take Holy Orders nor to reside in his church. At the same time, the Pope allowed Francis to retain his other two benefices.¹² In the following year (after April 11 it seems) he succeeded Simon de Guiberville as chancellor of the Church of Paris, the office which was to give him his place on the stage of history.¹³

The office of "Cancellarius Parisiensis"¹⁴ by the fourteenth century had ceased to possess the rather imposing prerogatives that it had enjoyed a century earlier. The thirteenth century was, in fact, marked by a series of power struggles between the chancellor and the university, with the latter — owing mainly to papal intervention — gradually emerging the victor.¹⁵ From a position roughly analogous to that of the royal chancellor, the chancellor of the Church of Paris soon became — as the university evolved from the cathedral school — a sort of ecclesiastical superintendent of education. His was the power to grant (usually for a price) the *licentia docendi* to prospective masters, to deprive scholars of their status, and to pass judgment upon (and even excommunicate) any member of the academic community. Already in 1179, however, we find the Third Lateran Council not only forbidding the chancellor to accept a fee for the *licentia*, but also requiring him to grant such a licence to every properly qualified applicant.¹⁶ Gregory IX's Bull, *Parens Scientiarum* (1229), which Denifle calls

¹² "Obtentu Roberti, ducis Calabriae, contulit Francisco canonicatum ecclesiae Parisiensis et praebendam ibi vacantem vel vacaturam.... Obtentu vero Petri episcopi Penestrin. illi confert praebendam integram non sacerdotalem ibi vacantem vel vacaturam, non obstante quod in Rothomagen. et Belacen. [possibly Bellicen; Balley, France] ecclesiis canonicatus et praebendas obtineat, indulgetque, ut insistendo studio theologiae facultatis dimidiam praebendam valeat retinere, donec illam integram fuerit assecutus nec interim teneatur se ad sacerdotium facere promoveri neque ad residendum personaliter in eadem," *Regestum Clementis P. V.*, cap. 582; ed. O.S.B. (Rome, 1887), Annus II-III, 138-39, #2939 (Aug. 18, 1308); cf. *Chartularium*, 2, 147, #686, n. 1.

¹³ Glorieux, *Répertoire*, 458. Simon de Guiberville, it seems, petitioned the bishop of Paris for permission to resign the chancellorship. Cf. *Chartularium*, 2, 136-37, #673 (Dec. 10, 1308). Denifle adds: "Quo tempore officio cancellariae renuntiaverit, non omnino compertum habemus. Verisimiliter an. 1309. Successorem habuit Franciscum Caraccioli de Neapoli.... Simon obiit an. 1320, Jul. 15," *ibid.*, 137, n. 1.

¹⁴ Concerning the title itself, Rashdall claims that English writers, "in defiance of medieval usage," persist in speaking of the "Chancellor of the University." "In the Middle Ages he is always 'Cancellarius ecclesiae Parisiensis,'" Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke & A. B. Emden (Oxford, 1936), 1, 341, n. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 306-07. Cf. David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (Toronto, 1962), 165.

¹⁶ Rashdall, 1, 280-82.

the Magna Charta of the University, forged still more shackles for the chancellor, effectively destroying his criminal jurisdiction.¹⁷ The year 1290 witnessed the last important skirmish between the chancellor, in the person of Bertrand of St. Denis, and the university faculty; this time the outcome was quite decisive. As Rashdall comments:

From this time... the strictly juridical authority of the chancellor fell into desuetude: he ceased to be, if he had ever been, the *iudex ordinarius* of scholars. He even ceased to have any real control over the grant or refusal of licences, except in so far as he retained the nomination of the examiners in arts. His position remained one of great dignity, though more and more overshadowed by the growing pretensions of the rector; but its substantial power was gone. Only his mysterious prerogative of conferring the licence was left him, and that remained henceforth almost as sacred and incommunicable as the bishop's power of conferring orders....¹⁸

The office that Francis assumed, therefore, was a rather hollow one, and his regime relatively uneventful.¹⁹ The *Chartularium* of the University records only the abovementioned letter to Robert of Anjou, king of Sicily, and an approbation of the works of Raymon Lull, the charismatic and apostolic *Doctor Illuminatus*.²⁰ This latter piece was issued apparently towards the end of Lull's last sojourn in Paris (1309-1311), where he had been allowed to teach his doctrine, even though he had never obtained a degree in theology.²¹ Alphonse, king of Aragon, later authorized the reading of the same works, vindicated (he said) by the approbation of the chancellor of Paris.²²

According to Du Boulay, Francis conferred the *licentia* on a certain

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 338.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 400-01.

¹⁹ "The chancellorship of Paris," says Rashdall, "was in the gift of the bishop but was often 'reserved,'" *ibid.*, 401, n. 1. In fact, Boniface VIII reserved the office in 1295 (*Chartularium*, 2, 66, #592) and in June, 1296, installed his own candidate, Peter of Audomaro, as chancellor (*ibid.*, 69, #595). However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may be safe in assuming that Francis was appointed to his post by the bishop of Paris, who at that time was William of Aurillac (Jan. 17, 1305 - Dec. 30, 1319).

²⁰ "...testamur, nihil nos invenisse in illis, quod bonis moribus obviet, et sacre doctrine theologicæ sit adversum. Quin potius in dictorum serie et tenore pro humani fragilitate iudicii scribentis zelum fervidum et intentionis rectitudinem pro fidei christianæ promotione notantes,..." *Chartularium*, 2, 148-49, #691. On Lull, see Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1954), 350-53.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 700, n. 57. As Denifle asks, however, why was such an approbation issued at this time, when (to the best of our knowledge) no one had called Lull's orthodoxy into doubt? *Chartularium*, 2, 149, note.

²² Hauréau, 409.

Landolf Caraccioli, Franciscan, under the pontificate of John XXII,²³ and later on John of Naples, a Dominican.²⁴ Du Boulay, however, is either mistaken in his chronology, or the licences were granted by Thomas of Bailli, the successor of Francis, since the latter is reported to have died on May 31, 1316 (that is, before the accession of Pope John). This date is confirmed by a nomenclature of the dignitaries of the Church of Paris, which is preserved in the National Archives.²⁵ In addition, an obituary of the Church of Paris, found in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 15439, contains the following entry under the date of May 31:

Item obiit Franciscus Carasolus [*sic*], Neapolitanus, cancellarius et concanicus noster, qui, anno 1316, legavit nobis ad opus anniversarii 90 libras Parisienses.²⁶

Apparently, then, Francis died in office without having seen his homeland again.

Besides the letters, Glorieux mentions certain *Quaestiones in aula*, which occupy eight folios in the only extant manuscript,²⁷ and the *Quaestio disputata* which is edited below (VI). There is, further, a *Summa poenitentiae*, which in one manuscript — Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 3568 — is entitled as follows:

Incipit Summa poenitentiae, edita a magistro Francisco, quondam cancellario Parisiensi.²⁸

Since there is only one Francis who was chancellor of Paris, the reference is obviously to Caraccioli.

However, the same treatise (which begins "Quoniam circa confessio-nem") — or approximations of it — exists in at least 50 other manuscripts,²⁹ and has been attributed variously to Raymond of Pennafort,

²³ John XXII was elected on August 7, 1316 and was consecrated on September 5 of the same year. On Landolf, see *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York, 1967), 3, 96-97.

²⁴ Du Boulay, 4, 955. The dating of John of Naples' licence is given by two different manuscripts of Bernard Gui, both indicating the month of November, 1316; Hauréau wants to read "1315" for 1316; *op. cit.*, 410. Cf. *ibid.*, 177.

²⁵ LL 189, fol. 24v; quoted in Hauréau, 411.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Vat. lat. 1086, fols. 154-55v ("Utrum ad beatitudinem supernaturalem necessario requiritur habitus"); fols. 159-64 ("Utrum finis hominis supernaturalis sit[bis] equalis perfectionis in se"); in A. Pelzer, "Prosper de Reggio Emilia, Des Ermites de Saint-Augustin, et la manuscrit latin 1086 de la bibliothèque vaticane," *Revue Néo-Scholastique* (1928) 338. Cf. P. Glorieux, "A propos de 'Vat. lat. 1086'; Le personnel enseignant de Paris vers 1311-14," *Recherches de théol. anc. et méd.*, 5 (1933) 23-39.

²⁸ Hauréau, 411; cf. Heinrich Weisweiler, "Handschriftliches zur Summa de penitentia des Magister Paulus von Sankt Nikolaus," *Scholastik*, 5 (1930) 248-60. Weisweiler incorrectly gives Caraccioli's date of death as 1326.

²⁹ Glorieux, *Répertoire*, 458-59. Weisweiler adds a large number of manuscripts that had been overlooked by the latter; 249-51. Cf. Pierre Mandonnet, "La 'Summa de Poenitentia Magistri

Cardinal Bérengar of Frédo († 1323), and a certain Paulus Sancti Nicolai, sometimes called *magister*, sometimes *praedicator*.³⁰ Since, in fact, we are already acquainted with *Summae* written by Raymond and Bérengar,³¹ their authorship of the above-mentioned work has been rejected by Hauréau. The latter does suggest, on the other hand, that the treatise may have been written by the aforesaid Paul and later abridged by Francis — or better yet, that the chancellor had first drafted a summary manual which Paul later amplified.³² The first conjecture is quite plausible; the second, on the other hand, is impossible simply in terms of chronology. Magister Paulus or Paulus Sancti Nicolai has been identified by Mandonnet as Paul of Hungary, Dominican, who completed his *Summa* in 1221.³³ The final resolution of the authorship problem, however, will have to await further study or the discovery of new manuscripts.

II. OCCASION OF THE QUESTION

The full import of the question whether the Church would be better ruled by a "jurist"¹ or a theologian cannot be understood except in the context out of which it arose. Indeed, the very fact that the question was posed reflects in no small way the growing rift between the sciences of theology and canon law in the thirteenth century. The reasons for the uncordial, at times acerbic, relations between practitioners of the two disciplines are several and complex — too complex for even a summary

Pauli presbyteri S. Nicolai," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Phil. & Theo. des M.A.*, Suppl. 3, 1, 525-44, esp. 527.

³⁰ Weisweiler, 248-50.

³¹ Cf. A. Teetaert, "La 'Summa de Poenitentia de S. Raymond de Peñafort,'" *Ephemerides* 5 (1928) 49-72, and *La confession aux laïques dans l'Église latine* (Paris, 1926), 351 ff.; also by the same author, "La 'Summa de poenitentia: Quoniam circa confessiones' du cardinal Bérengar Frédo," *Miscellanea A. Janssen* (Louvain, 1948), 567-600.

³² Hauréau, 413-15.

³³ Mandonnet, 525 ff. This *Summa* was first printed in the *Bibliotheca Casinensis*, 4 (Monte Casino, 1880), 191-215. Cf. A. Teetaert, "Le Répertoire des Maîtres," 624.

¹ "Jurist" (*iurista*) is a generic term denoting one versed in either canon or civil law. Cf. Du Cange: "Jurista — Qui Juri Civili vel Canonico dat operam, Jurisconsultus,..." in *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis*, ed. Favre (Paris, 1938), 4, 467. Indeed, the Middle Ages did not draw the sharp distinction between the two professions that we are wont to do today; the two laws constituted one faculty in the university, and from the middle of the thirteenth century, the *professores utriusque iuris* grew in number and prominence. On the canon law as an outgrowth of the civil, see Rashdall, I, 132-34. The term "civilista" to distinguish the civil lawyer from the canonist is a rather late coinage (i.e. fifteenth century). In the present context, however, we are safe in assuming that *iurista* refers *primarily* to the canon lawyer; hence, to avoid ambiguity, it will generally be translated as "canonist" or "canon lawyer."

treatment here.² For our present purposes, it is sufficient merely that the phenomenon be noted.

As far as we know, Godfrey of Fontaines († 1306) was the first theologian to treat the question explicitly;³ this treatment took the form of a *disputatio quodlibetalis* debated and "determined" at the University of Paris in 1293.⁴ The occasion of the question (a *quodlibet* very often bore reference to some contemporary event)⁵ seems to have been the synod held at Paris three years earlier (Nov. 11, 1290), at which Cardinal Benedict Caetani, the future Pope Boniface VIII, harshly rebuked the theologians of the University for interfering in the Mendicant controversy.⁶ The governing of the Church and the care of souls, the cardinal said in effect, were not the concern of the theologians — in spite of pretensions to the contrary: "Sedetis in cathedris et putatis, quod vestris rationibus regatur Christus.... Non sic, fratres mei, non sic!"⁷

² This topic will provide the subject of a future article. The reader in the meantime is referred to the following works: Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Papalism, the Political Theories of the Medieval Canonists* (London, 1949), *passim*; Stephan Kuttner, *Harmony from Dissonance* (Latrobe, Pa., 1960), *passim*; Friedrich Oediger, *Über die Bildung der Geistlichen im Späten Mittelalter* (Leiden, 1953), *passim*; Michele Maccarrone, "Teologia e diritto canonico nella Monarchia III, 3," *Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia* 5 (1951) 7-42; and Martin Grabmann, "Die Erörterung der Frage ob die Kirche besser durch einen guten Juristen oder durch einen Theologen regiert werde, bei Gottfried von Fontaines und Augustinus Triumphus von Ancona," in *Festschrift Eduard Eichmann z. 70. Geburtstag* (Paderborn, 1940), *passim*.

³ Cf. Glorieux, *Répertoire*, #198, for biography and bibliography. John Peckham posed the question (c. 1269): "Utrum theologia sit prae ceteris scientiis necessaria praelatis ecclesiae," ed. Leclercq, in "Le Magistère du Prédicateur au XIII^e siècle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire*, 15 (1946) 139-41. The question, says Leclercq, did not refer specifically to law. Nevertheless, "dans sa réponse, il passe sous silence la philosophie et les arts libéraux pour s'attaquer exclusivement au droit," *ibid.*, 139. Earlier still (c. 1240), Humbert de Romanis, Master-General of the Dominicans, was writing: "Alii sunt, qui tantum extollunt scientiam [eorum], quod venerunt ad hanc stultitiam, ut dicerent, quod melius regitur Ecclesia Dei per ista iura quam per theologiam," *De eruditione praedicatorum*, cap. ad studentes in iure canonico; in *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum* (Lyons, 1677), 25, 490b.

⁴ *Quodlibet* X, 18, in *Quodlibet VIII-X* (text inédit), ed. J. Hoffmans, *Les Philosophes belges* (Louvain, 1924), 4, 395-98; dating in P. Glorieux, *La Littérature Quodlibétique, 1260 à 1320* (Kain, 1925), 1, 150. *Quodlibets* were generally held twice a year — in the second week of Advent and fourth or fifth week of Lent; cf. *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁶ Fortunately, we have a vivid account of the proceedings by a Dominican historian, Jacobus of Soest. This unique transcript has been preserved in Codex 28 of the National Archives of Soest and printed by H. Finke in *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII* (Münster-i-W., 1902), iii-vii.

⁷ "Vos, magistri Parysienses, stultam fecistis et facitis doctrinam scientie vestre, turbantes orbem terrarum, quod nullo modo faceretis, si sciretis statum universalis ecclesie. Sedetis in cathedris et putatis, quod vestris rationibus regatur Christus. Nam consciencia plurimorum vestris frivolis rationibus sauciat. Non sic, fratres mei, non sic! Set quia nobis commissus est mundus,

The University was irrevocably alienated by the incident; the masters were to be constant in their support of the French crown against the Caetani pope, and certain of them were even to question the legitimacy of Boniface's election.⁸ Nor was it lost sight of that Boniface was above all a lawyer — indeed, the “*iurista permaximus*.”⁹ Godfrey at least seems not to have forgotten it: three years after the humiliating episode at the synod of Ste. Geneviève, *sede vacante*,¹⁰ he posed his question of whether the Church would be better ruled by a theologian or a jurist and decided in favor of the former. Since Benedict Caetani, the lawyer, was one of the more obvious *papabile*, it is not too fanciful to suppose that it was he whom Godfrey had primarily in mind. And the sting of 1290 can without too much difficulty be read into his concluding remark: “*Quae autem et quanta bona eveniant in Ecclesia cum a iuristis reguntur satis patet*.”¹¹

The next recorded discussion of the question was conducted by Francis Caraccioli approximately twenty years later under the title, “*Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie*.” Its appearance in the form of a *quaestio disputata* means that it was presented in the arena of public debate.¹² As a master of theology himself and also as chancellor of Paris, the seat par excellence of theology, it is not surprising to discover Francis opting in favor of the theologian.

For reasons politic, the question may tentatively be dated after the death of Clement V (on May 20, 1314), a canonist of no small repute. In addition, there would have been a spontaneous interest in such matters during a

cogitare debemus, non quid expediat vobis clericis pro vestro libito, set quid expediat orbi universo. Et sic in vobis impletur, quod dicitur: ‘Dicentes se esse sapientes stulti facti sunt’ *Romans* 1: 22,” *ibid.*, vi.

⁸ “*Quidam magistri in theologica facultate Parisiensi determinant Bonifacium VIII illegitime ad papatum ingressum esse*,” (1297, ante Jun. 15), *Chartularium*, 2, 77, #604. Who these masters were, we do not know, since the text is not extant.

⁹ *Chron. S. Bertin.*, in MGH, *Scriptores*, 25, 866.

¹⁰ The Chair of Peter was vacant from April 4, 1292, until July 5, 1294, when St. Celestine V was elected.

¹¹ Godfrey of Fontaines, ed. Hoffmans, 4, 397. There is another curious *quodlibet* which appears under Godfrey's name two years later (1295) — i.e. after Boniface VIII was elected pope: “*Utrum liceat doctori, praecipue theologico, recusare quaestionem sibi propositam cuius veritas manifesta per determinationem doctoris offenderet aliquos divites et potentes*,” *Quodl.* XII, 6; in Glorieux, *Lit. Quodl.*, 1, 164. Would it be altogether unreasonable to see in this question a reference to *Quodl.* X, 18, which might well have offended the rich and powerful Caetani?

¹² Glorieux calls it such; *Répertoire*, 458. Cf. also *Codices Burghesiani Bibliothecae Vaticanae*, recensuit Anneliese Maier (Vatican City, 1952), 220. A good sketch of the physiognomy of a medieval *disputatio* is given by Mandonnet, “*Chronologie des Questions disputées*,” *Revue Thomiste*, 23 (1918), 267-69.

papal conclave, especially one of considerable duration.¹³ Nor was the chancellor's interest in the episcopate purely academic. The Register of Clement V records him petitioning (unsuccessfully) for the archbishopric of Salerno in 1310; he is also mentioned as a nominee for the see of Capua.¹⁴

Francis, moreover, brought an added perspective to his treatment of the question: he had witnessed — more as a participant than a spectator — the reign of four popes since 1293, two of whom were eminent canonists.¹⁵ A third, however, was the ascetic and eccentric Peter del Murone,¹⁶ the very anti-type of the worldly, efficient lawyer. The hermit-pope had recently been canonized (May 5, 1313), partly as a slight to the memory of the late Pope Boniface, feelings against whom were still running high in France. What precisely it was, however, that prompted the chancellor to raise the question is unknown. Moreover, to impute motives — especially when so many historical facts are lost to us — is in the end a very tenuous business.

III. CARACCIOLI'S TREATMENT OF THE QUESTION

Francis formulates his question in terms of whether the jurist or the theologian would more *effectively* govern the Church: "Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie."¹ He opens his treatise by attempting to remove any equivocation concerning the word *ecclesia*. By *ecclesia* the author does not intend the material building, that is, "a house made by hand or a temple constructed of stones and beams." It was just such a materialistic conception of *ecclesia*, says Francis, that led the Jews to misconstrue the prediction of Christ, "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up again" (*John* 2: 19-22).

¹³ This particular conclave lasted from May, 1314 until after Francis' death in May, 1316.

¹⁴ *Regestum Clementis V*, Annus V, 123, #5445; & 213, #5675; *ibid.*, Annus VII, 153-54, #8245.

¹⁵ Boniface VIII, promulgator of the *Liber Sextus*, and Clement V, author of the *Constitutiones* (promulgated by John XXII in 1317).

¹⁶ St. Celestine V, elected July 5, 1294, resigned the papacy on December 13 of the same year. The exact details and reasons for the resignation have been clouded by the process against Boniface VIII, in which Celestine was made into a veritable martyr.

¹ The title given in the index (fol. 33v) is worded somewhat differently: "... an magis expediat bonus iurista ad regendam ecclesiam quam bonus theologus"; cf. IV, 12. Since the first title is in the corrector's hand, we cannot be certain that it was, in fact, the one originally proposed by the chancellor himself. Indeed, medieval writers as a rule felt no compulsion to entitle their works, and quite often it was left to a copyist (or an editor) to affix some designation. Note: "jurist" here refers primarily to the canonist; see II, n. 1.

Nor does Francis understand by *ecclesia* the temporal goods by which the ministers of the Church are supported. Such goods, he argues, are common to good and bad alike, as Augustine says², common likewise to the faithful of the true Church and the unfaithful of the synagogue. To that extent they must not be regarded as true "goods," nor indeed do they make men good. Worldly possessions, in fact, follow no law but the whim of fate or, as Francis puts it, the *nutum fortune*.

Ecclesia, on the contrary, designates for him the *multitudo fidelium*, the believers themselves.³ And to support this interpretation, Francis finds a number of Scripture texts, as well as passages in Hilary and Augustine. This exegesis of *ecclesia*, moreover, so closely parallels the introductory remarks of Godfrey's *quodlibet* that it seems almost a paraphrase:

Dicendum quod per Ecclesiam possumus intelligere primo: domum materialem, scilicet templum lapideum vel ligneum in quo principaliter Deus extrinsecus colitur corporaliter; secundo: domum spiritualement, scilicet fideles in quibus Deus colitur spiritualiter per virtutes theologicas, scilicet per fidem, spem et caritatem.... Ita bona exteriora temporalia, scilicet redditus et possessiones et huiusmodi, quibus ministri Ecclesiae corporaliter sustentantur.⁴

According as the Church is conceived of in any of the above-mentioned senses, it is seen as administered either by artisans and stone-cutters,⁵ by stewards (*oekonomi*),⁶ or by the "learned and virtuous." Having already opted for the third meaning, Francis proceeds to elaborate upon it. Taking his cue from Huguccio, Caraccioli translates *ecclesia* (ἐκκλησία from ἐκκαλέω) by *convocatio*, a "calling-together," while *synagoga* (συναγωγή from συνάγω)

² *De Civitate Dei* I, 8; Augustine says that Providence willed temporal goods and evils to be distributed indiscriminately between the just and the unjust, so that the former should not seek such goods too avariciously — seeing that evil men also possess them — nor should they dishonorably avoid evils, with which good men are often inflicted. Temporal goods, therefore, cannot be ultimate goods.

³ Caraccioli employs the same expression in his letter to Robert of Anjou, king of Jerusalem and Sicily: "... debent singuli mundi rectores et principes, debet et universa fidelium multitudo tanto fortius vestros regnicolas," *Chartularium*, 2, 146, #686.

⁴ Godfrey of Fontaines, ed. Hoffmans, 4, 395.

⁵ Indeed, the casual visitor to thirteenth-century France might easily have come away with this impression — i.e. that the "Church" was being presided over by the masons' and builders' union; cf. Henry Adams, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (New York, 1905), 100-01.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle: "Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management of the household," *Politics* I, 3. 1253b1-2 (Jowett tr.). Francis also cites book VII of the *Politics*; this book treats among other things of the need that the virtuous life has for external goods as *instruments*. For the canonists, "iconomia" was a branch of "civilis sapientia," dealing with the study of the administration of estates and other resources of society — the "regimen familiae" as it was rather loosely called. Cf. Ullmann, 26-27.

is translated as *congregatio*.⁷ Now there is as much difference between the Church and the Synagogue as there is between a calling-together (*convocatio*) and a gathering-together (*congregatio*). Properly speaking, one "gathers" sheep (*greges*); one "calls" only those who have the use of reason. The infidelity of the Jews is indicated, claims the chancellor, by the fact that their assembly is termed a *synagoga*, "id est congregacio quasi pecorum et indiscretorum." The *ecclesia*, on the other hand, is made up of rational and prudent beings.

Quite abruptly Caraccioli introduces another threefold division ("fient ergo tria"). He will discuss, he says, first those to whom ruling properly belongs and secondly those who are qualified not only to rule but also to retain the rule. Finally, he will draw conclusions and applications from the above. The government belongs by nature to those possessed of a powerful intellect. This is the clear doctrine of Aristotle in his *Politics*.⁸ "And because prudence is the perfection of the practical intellect, it is truly the right plan which should guide man in his actions. And wisdom is the principal perfection of reason; as it belongs to the wise man to dispose and not to be disposed, so also to rule and not to be ruled."⁹ Therefore, concludes the chancellor, it belongs to the wise and prudent man to rule: wise with respect to contemplating truth, prudent with respect to doing good.

To rule, however, means to order things to an end; and the more important the end, the better the *regimen* must be. Prudence, moreover, designates that moral virtue which executes the desire of true wisdom.¹⁰ Wisdom, the chancellor feels constrained to point out, derives from *sapor*

⁷ Cf. A. Ernout & A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1959), 191, 671.

⁸ E.g. "...that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave," Aristotle, *Politics* I, 2. 1252a32-34 (tr. Jowett); and in another chapter: "Where then there is such a difference as that between souls and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in rational principle enough to apprehend, but not to have such a principle, is a slave by nature," *ibid.*, I, 5. 1254b15-22. For Aristotle the natural slave is very near to a brute in capacity, use, and bodily make, although he is willing to concede a certain difference.

⁹ Caraccioli, fol. 33ra 42-44.

¹⁰ Cf. Aristotle: "We credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art," *Nic. Ethics* VI, 5. 1140a28 (tr. Ross). And Aquinas: "Prudentiae autem proprium est. ordinare alia in finem," *ST* I, 22, 1c.

(taste, sense of taste, etc.),¹¹ the point being that wisdom also embraces the *affective* side of man. Thus the conclusion is reached that the prospective ruler must be not only a man of profound understanding but also "rectum in affectu," of upright desire. This is the man described by Gregory in his *Pastoral Rule*,¹² and the type of the Christian emperor eulogized by Augustine in the *City of God*.¹³

Having determined, with the help of the Aristotelian *Ethics* and *Politics*, the qualities requisite for the ruler, Francis is now ready to apply his conclusions to the government of the Church. If the good theologian is one who knows theology well (which embraces both speculative and practical knowledge about things divine and human),¹⁴ it follows that the good theologian is also proficient in the Sacred Scriptures (in divinis scripturis profecit). This proficiency, says Augustine, consists not in having read and memorized much, but in understanding and investigating the deeper (spiritual) meanings of the Holy Writings.¹⁵

That Sacred Scripture was the text-book of the faculty of theology, moreover, was a commonplace argument for the superiority of the latter over the canonists. Thirteenth-century theologians customarily titled themselves *magistri sacrae paginae* or *magistri sacrae scripturae*.¹⁶ Sacred Scripture was the basis of their teaching; theology was, in fact, the science of Sacred Scripture.¹⁷ The canonists, on the other hand, could adduce as

¹¹ Cf. Isidore's *Etymologies* X, n. 240. Aquinas treats the argument that if *sapientia* is derived from *sapor*, then it belongs more to the affective part of man than to the intellective, and cites the same Scripture text quoted by Caraccioli (*Ecclesiasticus* 6: 23). The Angelic Doctor's reply contains a curative for the type of etymological speculation that Francis (and others) indulged in so freely: "Si tamen iste sit intellectus illius auctoritatis. Quod non videtur: quia talis expositio non convenit nisi secundum nomen quod habet sapientia in latina lingua. In graeco autem non competit; et forte nec in aliis linguis. Unde potius videtur nomen sapientiae ibi accipi pro eius fama, qua a cunctis commendatur," *ST* II-II, 45, 2, ad 2.

¹² *PL* 77, 26-27.

¹³ *De Civitate Dei* V, 24.

¹⁴ Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I, 1, 4.

¹⁵ *De Doctrina Christiana* IV, 5.

¹⁶ Maccarrone, 22.

¹⁷ This doctrine was especially dear to the Franciscan school. Thus St. Anthony calls theology "divinae scripturae scientia," *Sermones*, In dom. II post Pascha; ed. Padua (1895), 1, 149a. Olivi identifies the one with the other: "Sacra scriptura... dicitur theologia vel scientia divina," *In Sent. Libros*, proem., (unedited). Matthew of Aquasparta says: "Doctor istius scientiae... docere debet novum et vetus Testamentum," *Tractatus de excellentia sacrae scripturae* 4, 14, in *Quaestiones disputatae selectae*, ed. Quaracchi (1903), 1, 18. And Scotus, who died in 1308, so delimited the field of theology that it became practically coterminous with Scripture: "Theologia nostra de facto non est nisi de his quae continentur in scriptura, et de his quae possunt elici ex eis," *Ordinatio*, Prologus, 3, 3; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Vat. (1950), 1, 132, n. 195. Cf. also Oediger, 7 ff.

auctoritates only their glosses, that is, only human authorities.¹⁸ Thus, for the theologians their science was as superior to canon law as divine authority was superior to human.¹⁹

Given such a definition of theology and the *theologus*, Francis states his thesis: through the help of the good jurist who knows well the positive laws, the good theologian is more suited to rule the Church. This is supported by a three-fold evidence: (1) on the part of the Church-to-be-ruled; (2) on the part of the end to which it is to be directed; (3) on the part of the nature of the rulers themselves.

The preference for a theologian as ruler becomes evident first from the viewpoint of the *ecclesia regenda*, the Church to be ruled. Since it is a *convocatio* of the faithful, argues Francis, the Church must be guided in matters of faith and instructed in moral conduct:

Ex parte quidem ecclesie regende quia ecclesia, cum sit convocacio fidelium, dirigenda in credibilibus, informanda moribus.²⁰

But this falls under the competency of the theologian rather than the canonist. For since theology is the same as faith, or at least about faith (*de fide*), it belongs to the theologian to teach what must be believed. Theology is, moreover, involved in a special way in the formation of the moral life, says Francis, because it propounds principally the life of Christ — which is, as Augustine says, the “*disciplina morum*.”²¹ Scripture like-

¹⁸ The canonists were by no means disposed to concede this argument. Hence, Henry of Cremona (†1312), an eminent *doctor decretorum* and supporter of Boniface VIII, insisted that the canons were no less divinely inspired: “...ipsi canones sunt per spiritum sanctum dictati, ergo qui hoc contempnunt et non credunt, sunt blasphematores spiritus sancti, xxv, q. c. I. violatores quoque, et qui blasphemant spiritum, non dimittitur eis in hoc seculo nec in futuro,” *De potestate papae*, ed. R. Scholz, in *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Phillips des Schönen und Bonifaz VIII* (Stuttgart, 1903), 459 ff.

¹⁹ In the words of Caraccioli: “... quantum distat regimen Dei ab hominis regimine, tantum regimen per theologiam, que a Sancto Spiritu inspirata est a regimine iuristarum que sunt ab homine compilata,” fol. 33rb 67-33va 2.

²⁰ Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines: “Haec patent si considerentur ea quae ad bonum talis ecclesiae pertinent, scilicet instructio in fide et moribus per praedicationem veritatis in fide et exhortationem in moribus. Sed per theologiam, non per iura secundum quod huiusmodi, scit quis quae debeat praedicare; scit etiam errantes in talibus revocare et derigere, etc.,” ed. Hoffmanns, 4, 396. This is also the argument of Humbert de Romanis: “Alii sunt, qui tantum extollunt scientiam [eorum], quod venerunt, ad hanc stultitiam, ut dicerent, quod melius regitur Ecclesia Dei per ista iura, quam per theologiam. Ad quod respondit quidam dicens, quod istud verum esset, si Ecclesia Dei esset campi et vineae, et huiusmodi possessiones, sed si Ecclesia Dei sunt animae melius regitur Ecclesia per theologiam, quae docet fidem et mores ad animarum salutem pertinentia, quam per ista iura,” ad studentes in iure canonico, 490b. Cf. also John Peckham, ed. Leclercq, 140.

²¹ *De Vera Religione* I, 16.

wise has a part to play in our moral formation, serving, according to Gregory,²² as a kind of mirror, held before our mind's eye, in which our innermost face, with all its blemishes, may be viewed.

Secondly, the theologian-prelate, says Caraccioli, is preferable from the viewpoint of the end to which the Church is guided and directed. That end is eternal life for all. Now life eternal is belief in Christ Jesus, and it was to this end that the Scriptures were written: "These things have been written that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name" (*John* 20:31). Furthermore, Gregory says that Sacred Scripture is like a sea upon which we are borne to the land of the living on the wood of the cross.²³ A knowledge of the end, however, is necessary. Such knowledge likewise gives new energy and direction to our life — just as archers, says Aristotle, who have a mark to aim at will more surely hit upon what is right.²⁴ None, moreover, spurs us more truly toward our end than the knowledge of man's beatitude.

Lastly, from the viewpoint of the qualities demanded of the rulers themselves, the theologian is found to be more suited than the canonist. This is true in general insofar as ruling, as we have seen, belongs to the wise and prudent man. But the *habitus* possessed of wisdom and prudence, says the chancellor, is theology.²⁵ In particular, it is the theologian who better fits the description of the good *rector* sketched by Gregory: that is, pure in thought, exemplary in conduct, discreet in keeping silence, profitable in speech, a sympathetic neighbor to everyone, in contemplation exalted above all the others, a humble companion to those who lead good lives, upright in his zeal for righteousness, etc.

Briefly, Francis summarizes, as distant as the rule of God is from the rule of man, so far is the *regimen* through theology — *which is inspired by the Holy Spirit* — from the rule of the canonists, which is by laws compiled by man.²⁶ Indeed, the law is for fearful servants, etc. This argument we have already met: theology is "inspired by the Holy Spirit" precisely because it is eminently the science of Sacred Scripture which is divinely inspired.²⁷

²² *Moralium* II, 1.

²³ *Homiliarum in Ezechielem* I, hom. 6. As we have seen, of course, the study of Sacred Scripture is the vocation of the theologian; this premiss is implicit in this whole argumentation.

²⁴ "Will not the knowledge of it [i.e. the end], then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?" Aristotle, *Nic. Ethics* I, 1. 1094a22-24 (tr. Ross).

²⁵ Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I, 1, 6: "Utrum haec doctrina [theologia] sit sapientia"; note that Thomas quotes the same texts from the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* as well as the text from *Deuteronomy*.

²⁶ Cf. n. 70 to the edition (VI), below.

²⁷ Cf. above, pp. 14-15.

The chancellor next cites two texts which at first glance appear to be somewhat irrelevant. The first, Augustine's letter to Marcellinus, is an apology for the Christian State: specifically, that Christianity and good citizenship are not in the least incompatible. The second, Bernard's letter to his disciple, Pope Eugene III, is a polemic against Roman law rather than canon law. The point Francis seems to be making here, however, is that the superiority of the *regimen per theologiam* extends to all things "que per se ad ecclesiam pertinent."²⁸ Thus, the Church — when governed by a theologian — will make its influence felt in every stratum of society and will replace the law of Justinian (i.e. Roman law) with the *lex Domini*.²⁹

As for purely temporal affairs such as civil lawsuits, Francis adopts St. Bernard's position in deeming them unworthy of the prelate's attention. Such at least was the gist of the latter's exhortation to Pope Eugene.³⁰ The unbecoming nature of temporal authority is furthermore deduced from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians: "If, therefore, you have cases about worldly matters to be judged, appoint those who are rated as nothing in the Church to judge" (I *Cor.* 6: 4). We should not, however, conclude, as Ullman seems to do, that these "contemptibiles" were necessarily the laity.³¹ At least Caraccioli says nothing to indicate such an interpretation.

A policy of permitting the *gladius materialis*³² to do what was useful for

²⁸ Caraccioli, fol. 33va3.

²⁹ Theology was sometimes called the "science of the divine law," as opposed to the civil and canonical sciences; e.g. Humbert de Romanis: "Si ergo tolerabile sit studere in legibus illis [i.e. saecularibus], quibus non est interdictum, et si utile est studere in iure canonico, tamen super omnia alia laudabile est studere in scientia legis divinae [i.e. theologia], quae omnes alias scientias excedit," cap. 70, ad studentes in theologia, 490b. Cf. Ullmann, 27.

³⁰ "What wonder is it if they pass judgment on such matters, they to whom judgment in greater matters has been entrusted; therefore, you are not unworthy, but it is unworthy for you, to judge such matters, as being occupied with more important matters," *De Consideratione* I, 6. Cf. Pierre Dubois' vehement condemnation of prelates who involve themselves in civil affairs: "Prelati... videat qualiter controversiis rerum temporalium vacant; qualiter, deserta cura animarum, pro modico parlamenta, scaccaria, et alia principum auditoria frequentant; qualiter student et laborant, ecclesiarum bona que sunt pauperum Jhesu Christi consument in his litibus, patronis et ministris earum.... Nonne frequenter plus impendunt prelati per annum propter modice rei temporalis defensionem, plus in hoc et ob hoc de se laborant, quam ob salutem omnium sibi commissarum animarum? Quando canonicus qui presbyter erat fit episcopus, quantum videmus ipsum litibus temporalium intendentem, plus in salute animarum laborare quam ante?" *De recuperatione terre sancte*, ed. C. V. Langlois (Paris, 1891), cap. 15, 29, 22-23.

³¹ "Now those least esteemed — the Latin has in fact 'contemptibiles' — were of course the laymen. The term 'contemptibiles,' after the fashion of Gratian was invariably interpreted: 'id est laici,'" Ullmann, 88. Cf. Stickler's highly critical review of Ullmann's book in *Traditio* 7 (1949-51) 460. The passage in Gratian is C. XI, 1, 47; ed. Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879), 641.

³² The *gladius materialis* should not be unreservedly identified with the jurisdiction of the State. Such an identification is a "great mistake common to many medievalists, Dr. Ullmann among them," according to Stickler, 463.

the spiritual power had the advantage of thereby freeing the latter from the tedious and burdensome tasks which could only serve to impede its chief function. Thus Aristotle observed in his *Politics*:

Those who are in a position which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics.³³

It has been argued *in oppositum* that the canonists can better defend the laws of the Church.³⁴ This is not true, insists Francis, for ecclesiastical law deals primarily with the sacraments and their administration, and in crimes and their examination. As Bernard had said: "Your power lies not in possessions but in *crimibus*; it was because of the latter, not the former, that you received the keys of the kingdom of heaven...."³⁵ Besides, the more important consideration of any regimen is to lead its subjects to the intended end and to turn aside anything which may stand in the way—rather than simply to defend the regime against the attacks of its enemies. But this, Francis concludes, lies more within the competence of theology than canon law.

From the very similarity of their titles, one would expect to find certain similarities in Godfrey's and Francis' treatment of the question. The latter's work, however, does present several novel arguments not touched on by Godfrey. For one thing, Francis quotes Aristotle (although freely at times) a total of eight times, while Godfrey completely neglects the Stagirite. Moreover, the chancellor seems more preoccupied with the theoretical aspects of the problem, with what it means to rule and the qualities demanded of a ruler, whereas Godfrey is more concerned with practical problems, with how *in praxi* the theologian-prelate would cope with the everyday demands of Church administration. Indeed, Godfrey is willing to admit that the prelate who is distinguished in both sciences is superior to either the theologian or the canonist alone;³⁶ Francis makes no

³³ *Politics* I, 7. 1255b35-38. William Durandus, who wrote in 1311, offered the same advice: "... omnes ecclesiae habentes episcopos, habeant etiam oeconomos de proprio clero, per quos res ecclesiasticae cum arbitrio episcopi gubernentur.... Videretur esse utile... quod etiam episcopi habeant advocatos, per quos eorum lites ducantur, ne ipsi ex hoc a laude Dei, et ab actionibus spiritualibus retrahantur," *Troctatus de modo generalis concillii celebrandi*, 2, 24; ed. Paris (1671), 115.

³⁴ This argument is also found in Godfrey: "Quantum ad secundum modum autem verum est quod melius valet iurista quam theologus; ut scilicet contra tales iniuratores sciat quis defendere bona et libertates Ecclesiae et ab iniuriantibus talibus etiam recuperare. Quia etiam aliquando subditi praelatorum inter se habent lites in quibus etiam oportet quod via iuris procedatur, quas oportet auctoritate praelati terminari, quantum ad hoc etiam plus valet iurista quam theologus," ed. Hoffmans, 4, 396.

³⁵ *De Consideratione* I, 6.

³⁶ "Si enim perfectus esset in utraque [scientia], melius valeret quam quilibet seorsum," Godfrey of Fontaines, ed. Hoffmans, 4, 396.

such concession, although he appears to admit that the theologian needs the assistance of the lawyer for temporal duties.

Mention might be made in concluding of a question in the same tradition which was written approximately a decade later (1326) by Augustinus Triumphus.³⁷ In his *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica*, composed at the behest of John XXII, the Augustinian friar poses the following question: "Utrum teneatur collegium cardinalium magis eligere iuristam quam theologum."³⁸ As might be expected, the theologian Augustinus opts in favor of the theologian, but in another question in the same work he decides that an incepting theologian is bound (*tenetur*) to acquire a knowledge of canon law.³⁹ The reason is, says Augustinus, that both sciences to a great extent deal with the same matters; they differ only in the viewpoint (*modus considerandi*) under which these matters are considered.⁴⁰

It should be noted that the Church to this day has not resolved the question. The present Code of Canon Law (promulgated in 1917) places theology and canon law side by side under the academic requisites for the episcopate without indicating which of the two disciplines deserves priority for the governing of the Church:

Laurea doctoris vel saltem licentia in sacra theologia aut iure canonico potitus in athenaeo aliquo vel in Instituto studiorum a Sancta Sede probatis, vel saltem earundem disciplinarum vere peritus; quod si ad religionem aliquam pertineat, a suis Superioribus maioribus vel similem titulum vel saltem verae peritiae testimonium habeat.⁴¹

IV. THE MANUSCRIPT

The present edition has been prepared from the only known copy of Francis Caraccioli's *quaestio*, found on fols. 33^r-33^v of MS. Vat. Borghes. 171, which for the rest contains the *quaestiones* of Henry of Harclay, "quondam cancellarii Oxoniensis" (fol. 1^r). The manuscript is in Gothic script

³⁷ The date is gauged from John XXII's letter of thanks (Ep. 104; *Reg. Vat.* 114, fol. 19v). Cf. Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1963), 6. See also Grabmann, 14-18. For a biography, see Blasius Ministeri, *De Vita et Operibus Augustini de Ancona* (Rome, 1953).

³⁸ Augustinus Triumphus, 3, 5 [no pagination in the Augsburg ed.].

³⁹ "Utrum dignus magistratui in theologia teneatur scire ius canonicum," *ibid.*, 108, 3. See Appendix I and II.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Codex Iuris Canonici*, Pii X Pont. Max. iussu digestus, Benedicti Papae XV auctoritate promulgatus (Vatican City, 1961), can. 331, § 1, 5.

with very cursive tendencies and dates from the early fourteenth century; it contains 36 folios pages, measuring 298×214 mm., in two columns.¹

At the top of f. 33^r there appears in the copyist's hand the following notation: "a francisco Cancellario parisiensi". On the *verso* side of the same folio is inscribed in a different hand the title, "Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie". The latter hand, however, is identical with that which annotates folio 1^r: "quelibet bone memorie Henrici de Harclay quondam cancellarii Oxoniensis".² The title of the question with which we are here concerned also appears at the bottom of the index on folio 33^v: "In fine questio cancellarii an magis expediat bonus iurista ad regendum ecclesiam quam bonus theologus".

The manuscript is the product of a number of copyists. At least three distinct hands are in evidence on fols. 33^r-33^v with corrections by a fourth. Annotations and divisions have been added both by the copyists and by the corrector. Unfortunately, however, part of the marginalia has been cut away by a careless binder.

Father Pelster, in his study of the codex, considered Caraccioli's question to be an autograph on account of the many corrections and deletions ("wegen der vielen Streichungen und Änderungen").³ Because of the distinctly different hands in the body of the manuscript, however, such an opinion is clearly untenable. On the other hand, there are a number of indications which point to a *reportatio* — that is, an unofficial version of the question taken down probably by students. The work as a whole seems to be in a rather unpolished state; the truncated sentences, the character of the orthography and grammar, and the somewhat imprecise line of argumentation all add to such an impression. Furthermore, the numerous corrections — especially of quoted texts — suggest that the original version was unauthorized. It is, however, entirely possible that the corrector was Caraccioli himself.⁴

Of the manuscript as a whole we possess a very ancient account; already in the year 1369 it was to be found in the papal library at Avignon.⁵ In the *Recensio librorum Palatii Avenionensis*, compiled under Bl. Urban V (1362-1370), there is the following entry: "Item quodlibet magistri Henrici de Archilay, coopertum pergameno, quod incipit in secundo folio: quod

¹ Cf. *Codices Burghesiani*, 219, & Franz Pelster, "Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford, und seine Quästionen," in *Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle* (Vatican City, 1924), 1, 323-24.

² Pelster, 323.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Since, however, Caraccioli's autograph was not readily available, this opinion could not be verified.

⁵ "Codex memoratur in Catal. Avin. anni 1369, num. 782 et in Catal. anni 1375, num. 650," *Cod. Burghes.*, 220.

a [MS reads *autem*] et finit in penultimo folio: perfectum".⁶ The opening words of the second folio, "quod autem," prove that our MS Vat. Borghes. 171 is identical with the Avignon manuscript. Since, however, the concluding word "perfectum" is not found in our codex, Pelster concludes that one or more pages must be missing at the end.⁷

V. THE EDITION

In preparing the present text, the editor has attempted to follow the orthography of the manuscript throughout. While such a procedure admittedly does not add to the facility of reading the text, it is felt that a unique manuscript deserves a faithful transcription of the original spelling.¹ The frequent corrections have been read for the most part without their being noted as such; indeed, in many cases what was written before correction is simply illegible. Where the original text, however, seemed to shed some light on the meaning, it has been reproduced in the *apparatus criticus*. The following critical signs have also been employed: < > = editor's addition; [] = editor's deletion.

The editor has tried to use enough punctuation and paragraph divisions to aid the reader of modern English.² In attempting to present a readable text, moreover, it has been found necessary to make a number of emendations, and where the manuscript was occasionally illegible, to suggest a reading. Some attempt has been made to find all the sources quoted by Caraccioli. The foliation has been indicated by parentheses within the text.

VI. THE TEXT

Utrum iurista vel theologus plus proficiat ad regimen ecclesie

Assit principio sancta Maria meo. Amen, amen, amen. A Francisco Cancellario Parisiensi.

Hic exclusa equivocacione nominis ecclesie quia non intelligo per ecclesiam domum manufactam seu templum ex lapidibus et lingnis constructum sicut intellexerunt Iudei, *Ioanne* 2^o, et male Christo dicente: *Solvite templum hoc et in tribus diebus excitabo illud; dixerunt ergo ei Iudei: 4<0> et 6 annis edificatum est templum et in tribus diebus excitabis illud; ille autem dicebat de templo corporis sui*,¹ quo modo accipitur ec-

⁶ F. Ehrle, *Historia Bibliothecae Romanorum Pontificum tum Bonifatianae tum Avinionensis* (Rome, 1890), 347.

⁷ Pelster, 324.

¹ Cf. the criteria set down by Ludwig Bieler, "The Grammarian's Craft: A Professional Talk," *Folia*, 10, #2 (1958) 28-29.

² *Ibid.*, 29.

¹ *Iohannes* 2: 19-22.

clesia in scriptura frequenter, et maxime *Iudith* VI^o: *Omnis populus per totam noctem intra ecclesiam oraverunt petens auxilium a Deo Israel*.² Nec intelligo eciam per ecclesiam bona temporalia quibus ministri ecclesie sustentantur. Hec enim minima bona sunt bonis et malis secundum Augustinum, primo *de civitate*,³ fidelibus et <in> fidelibus ecclesie vere et synagoge. Et pro tanto bona non putanda nec bonos faciencia, sed sunt fortune nutum sequencia. Sed intelligo per ecclesiam fidelium multitudinem:⁴ *Ecclesiastici* 3^o: *Filii sapientie ecclesia iustorum*;⁵ et 44^o: *Laudes eorum nunciet ecclesia*;⁶ prima *Timothei* tercio: *Scias quomodo oporteat te in domo Dei conversari que est ecclesia Dei vivi columpna et firmamentum veritatis*.⁷ De qua Hyllarius, 7^o *de trinitate*: Hoc <enim> ecclesie proprium ut tunc vincat⁸ cum leditur, tunc intelligat<ur> cum arguitur, tunc optineat cum deseritur.⁹ Et Augustinus, 4^o *de trinitate*: Contra ecclesiam nemo pacificus senserit¹⁰ (et contra *epistulam Fundamenti*: Evangelio non crederem...).¹¹

Si ecclesie non crederem,¹² primum est regimen manuartificum et latthomorum¹³; secundum yc<on>omorum, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, primo *Politice* et 7^o;¹⁴ tertium vero est sciencium et virtuosorum. Ecclesia enim, secundum Hugucionem, convocacio interpretatur quia omnes ad se advocat et est proprie fidelium. Et synagoga congregacio interpretatur et est proprie Iudeorum. Inter quarum utramque tantum distat sicut inter convocacionem et congregacionem. Congregacio pecorum est quorum et greges dicitur. Convocari autem est magis utencium racione; quales sunt homines. Ut ergo notaretur Iudeorum infidelitas, dicta est eorum synagoga, id est congregacio quasi pecorum et indiscretorum. Et ut fidelitas nostra ipso vocabulo notaretur vel innueretur, dicta est nostra ecclesia, id est convocacio racionabilium et discretorum.¹⁵

² *Iudith* 6: 21. The text reads "petens" (for "petentes"), probably in psychological agreement with "populus."

³ Aug., *De Civitate Dei* I, 8; ed. Welldon (London, 1924), 1, 15.

⁴ Cf. Hugh of St. Victor: "Quid est ergo ecclesia nisi multitudo fidelium, universitas christianorum. Universitas autem haec duos ordines complectitur, laicos et clericos," *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei* II, 2, 2-4; PL 176, 416 ff. In contrast, a contemporary of Caraccioli's was writing as follows: "Summus pontifex, qui tenet apicem Ecclesiae et qui potest dici Ecclesia,..." Giles of Rome, *De Ecclesiastica Potestate* III, 21; ed. Richard Scholz (Weimar, 1929), 209.

⁵ *Ecclesiasticus* 3: 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 44: 15.

⁷ *I Tim.* 3: 15.

⁸ Corrected from "vinat."

⁹ Hilary, *De Trinitate* VII (contra Arianos); PL 10, 202.

¹⁰ Augustine, *De Trinitate* IV, 6; PL 42: 895.

¹¹ "Ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae Ecclesiae commoverit auctoritas," Augustine, *Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti*, cap. 5; PL 42, 176.

¹² Corrected from "audierunt."

¹³ From *λατομός* = a stone-cutter. Cf. Aristotle, *Politica* I, II. 1258b31. Variants: latamus, latimus, latomus, lauthamus; cf. *Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources*, ed. Baxter & Johnson (London, 1962), 242.

¹⁴ "Quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus civitas constat, necessarium primum de yconomia dicere. Omnis enim compositus civitas ex domibus," Aristotle, *Politica* I, 3. 1253b1-2; ed. P. Michaud-Quantin (Bruges, 1961), 6. Probably Francis had no specific text in mind citing Book VII.

¹⁵ Huguccio, *Derivationes* (Cambridge: Gonville & Caius MS 459/718), fol. 63v. Cf. Isidore, *Etymologiarum* VIII, 1; 1 ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1957).

Fient ergo tria. Primo ostendetur quorum proprie sit regere, ex quo apparebit qui sunt ydonei regere, et illud tenere. Secundo ex hoc veritatem quam concipio concludere. Propter primum est advertendum quod regere est intelligencium et intellectu vigencium. Est enim actus principantis. Principari autem est intellectu et mente vigentis. Primo *Politice*: Quod quidem potest mente providere,¹⁶ hoc principans natura et dominans natura; quod autem subiectum et natura servum.¹⁷ Et in alio capitulo: Iterum autem est aliis, et cetera... quorumcumque est opus corporis usus ethoc est ab ipsis optimum; isti quidem sunt natura servi quibus melius est regi.¹⁸ Seneca: Multos reges si ratio te rexerit.¹⁹ *Proverbiorum* primo: *intelligens gubernacula possidebit*.²⁰ Et quia prudentia est perfectio intellectus practici, est enim recta ratio agibilium.²¹ Et sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis; sicut ordinare et non ordinari sapientis est, sic et regere, non autem regi.²² *Ieremias* 23: *Regnabit rex et sapiens erit*.²³ Histeron proteron,²⁴ qui[a] sapiens vere erit, regnabit. Sic ergo sapientis et prudentis est regere: sapientis quoad speculationem veri, prudentis quoad actionem boni. *Diligite lumen sapientie, omnes qui preestis populis, Sapientie* VI.²⁵ Et quanto sapientiores vel prudentiores, tanto magis ydonei ad regendum. Regere iterum est ordinare quod regitur in finem.²⁶ Et quanto finis pocior, tanto regimen melius. Et quia prudentia annuitur²⁷ virtus moralis que perficit appetitum sapientie vere que a sapore dicta²⁸ est.²⁹ *Sapientia enim doctrine*³⁰ *secundum nomen eius, Ecclesiasti-*

¹⁶ Moerbeke's translation reads "providere."

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Politica* I, 1. 1252a30-34; ed. Michaud-Quantin, 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* I, 5. 1254b10-20; 9.

¹⁹ Seneca, Ep. 37 (Lucilio), 4; ed. Capps, Page & Rouse (New York, 1925), 1, 254.

²⁰ *Prov.* 1: 5.

²¹ Cf. Aquinas: "Cum enim prudentia sit 'recta ratio agibilium,' requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines ad quos bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis," *ST* I-II, 56, 3c.

²² Aristotle, *Nich. Eth.* VI, 5. 1140b20. Aquinas also raises the question (*ST* II-II, 47, 12c), "utrum prudentia sit in subditis an solum in principibus," and concludes: "...ideo prudentia non est virtus servi inquantum est servus, nec subditi inquantum est subditus. Sed quia quilibet homo, inquantum est rationalis, participat aliquid de regimine secundum arbitrium rationis, intantum convenit ei prudentiam habere."

²³ *Ieremias* 23: 5.

²⁴ "Late Latin (Servius), a Gr. ὑστερον πρότερον... 1. *Gram. & Rhet.* A figure of speech in which the word or phrase that should properly come last is put first.... 2. Inversion of the natural or logical order; as by placing the conclusion before the premisses, etc.," *OED* 5, 516.

²⁵ *Sap.* 6: 23. Misquoted in Leclercq (p. 139) in favor of law.

²⁶ Cf. Aquinas: "Prudentiae autem proprium est, sec. Philosophum in VI *Ethic.* [5. 1140a28], ordinare alia in finem," *ST* I, 22, 1c.

²⁷ Corrected from "annuetur."

²⁸ Emended from "dicto."

²⁹ "Sapiens dictus est a sapore; quia sicut gustus aptus est ad discretionem saporis ciborum, sic sapiens ad dinoscentiam rerum atque causarum; quod unumquodque dinoscat, atque sensu veritatis discernat," Isidore, *Etymologiarum* X, no. 240; ed. Lindsay. Cf. Huguccio, *Derivationes*, fol. 192r. Cf. also Humbert de Romanis, cap. 70, ad studentes in theologia; 491a.

³⁰ Emended from "doctrina."

ci 6.³¹ Agnoscitur veritas³² in affectu et spes. Tria enim hec sunt, quibus propheta omnis et scientia militat, fides, spes, caritas, primo *de doctrina christiana*.³³ Ydoneum regere oportet esse profundum in intellectu et rectum in affectu ut sit talis qualem eum describit Gregorius, prima epistularum, epistula 23,³⁴ et idem repetit in *pastorali*.³⁵ Omni cura vigilandum est ut rector noster cogitatione sit mundus, operatione precipuus, discretus in silencio, utilis in verbo, singulis compassione proximus, pro cunctis contemplacione suspensus, bene agentibus per humilitatem socius, contra delinquencium vicia per zelum iusticie erectus. Item secundum Gregorium: inesse rectoribus, et cetera.³⁶ Et quales felicitat Augustinus, 5 *de civitate*: Felices eos dicimus si iuste imperant, si inter linguas sublimiter honorancium et obsequia nimis humiliter salutancium non extolluntur, sed se homines esse meminerunt; si suam potestatem ad Dei cultum maxime dilatandum maiestati eius famulam faciunt; si Deum timent, di-(33rb)ligunt, colunt; si plus amant illud regnum ubi non timent habere consortes; si tardius vindicant, facile ignoscunt; si eandem vindictam pro necessitate tuende, regende, curandeque rei publice, non pro saturandis inimiciorum odiis exerunt; si eiusdem veniam non ad impunitatem iniquitatis, sed ad spem correctionis indulgent; si quod as<pere> coguntur plerumque discernere, misericordie lenitate, et beneficiorum largitate compensant; si luxuria tanto est eis castigacior, quanto posset esse liberior; si malunt cupiditatibus pravis quam quibus libet gentibus imperare et si hec omnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis glorie, sed propter caritatem felicitatis eterne; si pro suis peccatis humilitatis et miseracionis et oracionis sacrificium Deo suo vero immolare non negligunt. Tales christianos imperatores dicimus esse felices in spe, postea reipsa futuros, cum id quod expectabimus advenierit.³⁷ Incomiis³⁸ ergo visis dicendum quod si bonus theologus est qui theologiā bene novit, que est speculativa et practica de divinis et humanis,³⁹ activam et contemplativam complectens, at per hoc bonus theologus est qui in divinis scripturis profecit; non dico <in eis> multum legendis memorieque mandandis, sed intelligendis et spiritualiter earum sensibus investigandis, secundum Augustinum, 4^o *de doctrina christiana*.⁴⁰ Per bonum iuristam qui scit bene iura positiva, prescindendo quod pertinet ad theologum, ad regendum ecclesiam magis ydoneus est bonus theologus quam iurista. Quod patet primo ex parte ecclesie regende, secundo ex parte finis, tercio ex parte condicionum regencium in universali et particulari. Ex parte quidem ecclesie regende quia ecclesia, cum sit convocacio fidelium, dirigenda in credibilibus, informanda moribus. Hoc autem potest maxime theologus melius quam iurista. Cum enim theologia vel sit idem quod fides vel de fide, ad eam spectat maxime docere quid credendum. Huic enim scientie tribuitur illud tantum-

³¹ *Ecc. 6: 23*. See *The Holy Bible*, tr. Knox (London, 1955), 593; also *La Sainte Bible*, tr. Duesberg & Auvray (Paris, 1957), 5, 45.

³² Corrected from "caritas."

³³ Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 37; PL 34, 35.

³⁴ Gregory I, *Epistolarum* I, ep. 25; PL 77, 469b.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, *Regulae Pastoralis Liber* II, 1; PL 77, 26-27.

³⁶ The editor was unable to find the source of this quote.

³⁷ Augustine, *De Civ. Dei* 5, 24; 1, 240.

³⁸ i.e. "encomiis."

³⁹ Cf. Cicero's definition of *sapientia*: "... sapientia... rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia," *De Officiis* I, 153.

⁴⁰ Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* IV, 5; ed. T. Sullivan (Wash., 1930), 58.

modo quo fides saluberrima, secundum Augustinum, 14 *de trinitate*.⁴¹ Informacio eciam morum maxime ad ipsam spectat, quia ipsa tradit principaliter Christi vitam, que disciplina morum fuit, secundum Augustinum, *de vera religione* XXIX.⁴² Dicente Gregorio, secundo *Moralium*: Scriptura sacra mentis oculis quasi quoddam speculum opponitur ut interna nostra facies in ipsa videatur. Ibi enim feda, ibi pulcra nostra cognoscimus. Ibi sentimus quantum proficimus, ibi a propectu quam longe distamus. Narrat gesta virorum, et ad imitationem corda provocat infirmorum. Dumque illorum victricia facta commemorat, contra viciorum prelia debilia nostra confirmat. Nonnumquam vero non solum nobis eorum virtutes asserit, sed eciam casus innotescit; ut et in victoria forcium quid imitando debeamus arripere, et rursus videamus in lapsibus quid debeamus timere.⁴³ Et ad idem Gregorius, omelia 15 *super Ezechiel*: Que edificant, omnia que erudiunt, scri<p>ta continentur in hoc volumine;⁴⁴ per tria: quia ostendit st<r>ucturam suam in edificatione morum, altitudinem in promissione premiorum, oribilem aspectum in terroribus suppliciorum. Recta est in preceptis, alta in promissionibus, terribilis in minis.⁴⁵

Secunda ratio ex parte finis ad quam regitur et dirigitur. Ille omni est⁴⁶ vita eterna, et⁴⁷ habitus verius quam theologia. *Hec scripta sunt ut credatis quia Iehsus est... et ut credentes vitam habeatis*.⁴⁸ *Scrutamini scripturas in quibus vos putatis, et cetera, Iohanne* 5.⁴⁹ Inquit Gregorius, *super Ezechielem*, omelia 5, prime partis: Nobis qui ad eternam patriam tendimus scriptura sacra per 4 suas facies mare est quia crucem annunciat, quia nos ad terram vivencium ligno portat.⁵⁰ Cognicio finis necessaria est. Igitur et ad vitam cognicio eius magnum habet incrementum, quemadmodum sagittatores signum habentes facilius utique adipiscuntur quod oportet.⁵¹ Et nulla verius <quam>⁵² sit hominis beatitudo. *Hec est vita eterna*, et cetera.⁵³

Tercia ratio ex parte condicionis regencium in universali:⁵⁴ quidem primo quia si regere sapientis est et prudentis, igitur maxime secundum habitum qui est⁵⁵ sapientia et prudentia. Talis est theologia. *Hec est sapientia vestra et intellectus coram populis*,⁵⁶ et quemadmodum caput habens altissimorum est encium, 6 *Ethicorum*,⁵⁷ et primo *Metaphysicorum*: Si regere est eciam principantis, hic principor⁵⁸ omni-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, *De Trinitate* XIV, 1; PL 42, 1037.

⁴² *Ibid.*, *De Vera Religione* I, 16; PL 34, 135.

⁴³ Gregory I, *Moralium* II, 1; PL 75, 554-55.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, *Homiliarum in Ezechielem* I, hom. 9; PL 76, 885-86.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, hom. 6; PL 76, 837.

⁴⁶ Corrected from "ex."

⁴⁷ Corrected from "et quis."

⁴⁸ *Iohannes* 20: 31.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 5: 39.

⁵⁰ Gregory I, *Homiliarum in Ezechielem* I, hom. 6; PL 76, 834-35.

⁵¹ Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* I, 1. 1094a22-24 (antiqua tr.); in Th. Aq., *Omnia Opera*, ed. Vivès, 24, 235.

⁵² Emended from "quid"; it has possibly been corrected also in the MS.

⁵³ *Iohannes* 17: 3.

⁵⁴ Corrected from "aliis."

⁵⁵ "Secundum" deleted.

⁵⁶ *Deut.* 4: 6.

⁵⁷ "Et quemadmodum caput habens scientia honorabilissimorum," Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* VI, 7. 1141a20; in Th. Aq., ed. Vivès, 24, 497.

⁵⁸ Corrected from "pincipatur."

bus:⁵⁹ super omnes enim gentium litteras, XI^o, etcetera.⁶⁰ Si in particulari: ut cogitatione sit mundus, operatione precipuus (*Lavamini, mundi estote auferte malum*, et cetera.⁶¹ *Operemur bonum ad omnes*⁶²), discretus in silencio (*Dixi custodiam*, et cetera⁶³), utilis in verbo (*Ephesios 4: Omnis sermo malus*, et cetera;⁶⁴ *Sermo vester semper sit in gracia*, *Colossenses 4*⁶⁵), singulis compassione proximus (*Ysaiae 58: Frange erusienti*, et cetera;⁶⁶ *estote misericordes*, <et> cetera⁶⁷), pre cunctis contemplatione suspensus (*Que sursum sunt querite*, et cetera, *Colossenses 3*;⁶⁸ *Abacuch 2: Contemplabor quid dicetur mihi*⁶⁹). Et breviter, quantum distat regimen Dei ab hominis regimine, tantum regimen per theologiam, que a Sancto Spiritu [inspir] (33^{va}) inspirata est a regimine iuristarum⁷⁰ que sunt ab homine compilata. Timentibus servis lex est,⁷¹ transmissa per servum, et cetera.⁷² Et hec dico quantum ad regendum in omnibus que per se ad ecclesiam pertinent. Unde Augustinus, *prima epistola ad Marcellinum*: Proinde⁷³ qui doctrinam Christi adversam dicunt⁷⁴ esse rei publice, dent exercitus tales quales doctrina Christi esse milites iussit; dent tales⁷⁵ provinciales, tales maritos, tales coniuges, tales parentes, tales filios,⁷⁶ tales dominos, tales servos, tales reges, tales iudices, tales denique debitorum fisci creditores et exactores,⁷⁷ quales esse precipit doctrina Christiana, et audeant eam dicere adversum rei publice;⁷⁸ immo vero confiteri non dubitent magnam, si ei obtemperetur salutem esse rei publice. Et Bernardus, primo *de consideratione ad Eugenium*: Denique quando oramus? Quando docemus populos? Quando edificamus⁷⁹ ecclesiam? Quando meditamur in lege? Et quidem cotidie perstreperunt in palacio leges, sed Iustiniani, non Domini. Iustene est istud? Tu

⁵⁹ "Sapientis est ordinare, et non ordinari," Aristotle, *Meta. I*, 2. 982a18; in Th. Aq., ed. Vivès, 24, 343.

⁶⁰ The editor has been unable to find the source of this quote.

⁶¹ *Isaias* 1: 16.

⁶² *Gal.* 6: 10.

⁶³ *Ps.* 38: 2.

⁶⁴ *Eph.* 4: 29.

⁶⁵ *Colos.* 4: 6.

⁶⁶ *Isaias* 58: 7.

⁶⁷ *Luca* 6: 36.

⁶⁸ *Colos.* 3: 1.

⁶⁹ *Hab.* 2: 1.

⁷⁰ The author (or scribe) possibly intended to write (or thought he had written) "iurium" or "per iura," following which "que sunt... compilata" would make sense. As it stands, the clause is both ungrammatical and illogical. Possibly also this is an occurrence of a homoeoteleuton on the part of the scribe, the original reading being: "... regimine iuristarum *que est per iura* que sunt ab homine compilata."

⁷¹ "da" deleted in MS.

⁷² The editor was unable to find the source of this quote. Cf. *Iohannes* 1: 17: "... lex per Moysen data est, gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est."

⁷³ "Dicunt esse rei publice" deleted in MS.

⁷⁴ Corrected in MS.

⁷⁵ Corrected in MS.

⁷⁶ Dittography in MS.

⁷⁷ Corrected from "debitores et exanones."

⁷⁸ Augustine, *Epistola ad Marcellinum* (ep. 138), cap. 2; PL 33, 532.

⁷⁹ Dittography in MS.

videris. Nam lex Domini immaculata, hec autem non tam leges quam lites sunt, et cavillationes subvertentes iudicium. Tu ergo, pastor et episcopus animarum, quamente, obsecro, sustines coram te semper silere illam, garrire istas? Fallor si non [tibi] movet tibi scrupulum perversitas hec. Puto quod interdum compellat clamare cum propheta: *Narraverunt mihi*, et cetera.⁸⁰ Et tamen quantumcumque iudicare <d>e istis minoribus non debent, sed per minores, sicut docet Apostolus, *I Corinthios* 6: *Secularia iudicia si habueritis, contemptibiles, qui sunt in ecclesia, illos constituite ad iudicandum*.⁸¹ Bernardus, *I de consideratione*, hec certans: Quid mirum si de talibus iudicent, quibus datum est iudicium in maiora; non ergo indigni vos, sed indignum vobis talia iudicare, utpote pocioribus occupatis.⁸² Propter quod Aristoteles primo *Politice*: Quibus potestas est ut ipsi non talia paciantur, procurator accipit hunc honorem, ipsi vero civiliter vivunt, aut philosophantur.⁸³

Et cum arguitur in oppositum quod iurista magis potest defendere iura ecclesie, <d>icendum quod non; quia illa principaliter in sacramentis et eorum aministratione, in criminibus et eorum discussione. In criminibus, non in possessionibus potestas vestra est, secundum Bernardum.⁸⁴ Et preter defensio quantum ad impugnantes, principalior consideracio regiminis est inducere ad finem per se intentum, et prohibere plus impediencia: quod magis facit theologia.⁸⁵

APPENDIX I

Augustinus Triumphus, *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica*, q. 3, art. 5: "Utrum teneatur (collegium cardinalium) magis eligere iuristam quam theologum."

"Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur enim quod collegium magis teneatur eligere iuristam quam theologum in papam; quia papa potissime eligitur ad questiones et iurgiorum litigia determinanda quae tot quotidie insurgunt ut nisi iusticia conatus eius sua virtute repriment ius humani federis litigatorum abusus extingueret; et dato libello repudiū concordia extra mundi terminos exularet ut scribitur extra de electione, *rex pacificus*. Sed in questionibus terminandis et imponendo finem litibus plus valent iuriste quam theologi. Scribitur enim xx. di. c. *decretales*: quod in sacrarum scripturarum expositionibus sacre scripture tractatores pontificibus preponantur. Sed in negociis diffiniendis et in causis determinandis sedis apostolice eius locum merentur tenere. Videtur ergo quod magis iuristam quam theologum collegium tenetur eligere.

Preterea super illo verbo prophete: *Canes sunt non volentes*, dicit Augustinus: quod baculo et manu arcendi sunt lupi. Et super illo verbo *Ezechiel* xiii: *Hec dicit Dominus de prophetis insipientibus non ascendistis ex adverso nec posuistis vos ut murum pro domo Israel ut*

⁸⁰ Bernard, *De Consideratione* I, 4; ed. Leclercq & Rochais (Rome, 1963), 3, 399.

⁸¹ *I Cor.* 6: 4.

⁸² Bernard, *De Consolatione* I, 6; 3, 402.

⁸³ Aristotle, *Politica* I, 7. 1255b33-37; ed. Michaud-Quantin, 12.

⁸⁴ Bernard, *De Consolatione* I, 6; 3, 402.

⁸⁵ Cf. Iohannes Andreae († 1348), an eminent canonist, who had written in his *Quaestiones mercuriales*, ad reg. 2 *Possessor non praescribit*: "... ius canonicum... intendit terminare litigia propter conservandam iustitiam, nam suus finis principalis est ordinare in Deum et in legem evangelicam, ut homo gloriam assequatur," fol. 60vb in ed. Venice (1581); quoted in Kuttner, 60, n. 29.

staretis in prelio in die Domini, dicit Gregorius in *pastorali*: quod ex adverso quippe ascendere est pro defensione veritatis libera voce huius mundi potestatis contraire; sed hec omnia ut videtur melius potest homo facere per iura quam per theologiam. Magis ergo collegium tenetur eligere iuristam quam theologum.

Preterea quanto oppositum alicuius est magis periculosum, tanto illud est magis necessarium. Sed oppositum iuris et iusticie est iniusticia de qua dicit Philosophus, v. *ethice*: quod est crudelissima et seivissima habens arma, quia sicut homo lege et iusticia est pessimum hominum. Cui concordat illud quod scribitur *ecclesiastici* x: *Regnum a gente in gentem transfertur propter iniusticias et iniurias et contumelias adversus dolus*. Sed papa debet esse optimus inter homines quantum ad omnia ista. Videtur ergo quod plus expediat ecclesie Dei quod papa sit iurista quam theologus.

Preterea super illo verbo *exodi* xxviii: *apostolica quoque tibi Aaron fratrem tuum dictum est Moysi*. Dicit Gregorius: quod qui ad summum sacerdotium assumuntur tanto studio et amore debent eligi et iusticie adherere ut germana videantur cognatione coniungi; videtur ergo quod papa magis debeat esse iurista quam theologus. In contrarium est Hieronymus in quadam epistola ubi fortiter reprehendit clericos et prelatos ecclesie qui potius in manibus portant codices imperatorum quam evangelistarum.

Preterea scribitur xxxvi. di. quod ad summum sacerdotium non aspiret qui divinis stipendiis et disciplinis non est eruditus.

Responsio: Dicendum quod papa quantum ad presens quatuor modis considerari potest primo ex parte ecclesie cui preficitur. Secundo ex parte status in quo constituitur. Tercio ex parte scientie quo perficitur. Quarto ex parte iudicii quod per ipsum fertur. Omnibus autem istis modis liquide potest apparere quod collegium magis tenetur eligere bonum theologum quam bonum iuristam in summum pontificem. Primo quidem ex parte ecclesie cui perficitur. Nomine nanque ecclesie principaliter non intelliguntur muri oliveta et bona temporalia de quibus insurgunt omni die lites et discordie ad quarum terminationem valent iura et leges sed magis intelliguntur anime ipsorum fidelium ad quarum informationem ut Christo sponso ecclesie coniungantur non est necessaria nisi sacra theologia; pro ecclesia enim ut nominat muros castra civitates et alia temporalia bona Christus mortuus non fuit nec passus imo omnia talia in tantum contempsit ut diceret nolenti (leg. volenti) sequi ipsum propter temporale subsidium: *Vulpes foveas habent et volucres celi nidos; Filius autem hominis non habet ubi caput reclinet*. Sed pro ecclesia et nomine ecclesie intelliguntur anime fidelium Christus mortuus est et sanguinem suum effudit. Unde dicit Chrysostom in quadam omelia de pentacosta: Magna cura est Deo de ecclesia sua non muro circumdata, sed fide circumsepta. Et Apostolus *ad Corinthios* xiii (12: 15) Christi vestigia sequens dicit: *Ego autem libentissime impendam et superimpendar ipse pro animabus vestris*. Secundo hoc patet ex parte status in quo papa constituitur. Nam papa idem sonat quod pater patrum ita quod debet esse medius inter Deum et alios pastores et prelatos ecclesie. Nam super illo verbo quod dictum est Moysi *exodi* iiii: *Tu eris in his que ad Deum pertinent et Aaron frater tuus loquetur pro te ad populum*. Dicit Augustinus, Quod summus pontifex cuius figuram gerebat Moyses medius debet esse inter Deum et Aaron qui gessit figuram aliorum prelatorum. Nam cum ipse Moyses vellet terminare questiones et iurgia in populo audiverit a Iethro cognato suo, *exodi* xviii: *Stulto labore consumeris. Esto tu in populo in his que ad Deum pertinent et ostendas populo ceremonias et ritum colendi Deum. Ad lites vero et questiones determinandas provide de omni plebe viros timentes Deum in quibus sit veritas et qui oderint avariciam*. Tercio istud patet ex parte scientie qua summus pontifex perficitur. Sicut enim ipse papa prefertur omnibus aliis prelati et pontificibus, ita scientia qua ipse perficitur et qua

debet esse perfectus preferenda est omnibus aliis scientiis, ut sicut scientia preferatur scientie ita professor preferatur professoribus. Constat autem quod sacra scriptura est illa que preferatur omnibus legibus et scientiis. Ergo theologus in electione pape preferendus est omnibus iuristis et aliarum scientiarum professoribus. Quarto hoc patet ex parte iudicii quod per ipsum papam preferatur. Est enim ipse papa universalis iudex totius orbis et omnium questionum insurgentium. Constat autem quod iura civilia non corrigunt omnia mala et multa impunita relinquunt que per divinam legem et sacram theologia iudicantur. Et. x. di. scribitur quod legibus imperatorum non in omnibus ecclesiasticis contraversiis utendum est, presertim cum inveniuntur evangelice ac canonice sanctioni aliquotiens obviare.

Ad primum ergo est dicendum: quod ad lites et questiones terminandas papa assumere debet contemptibiles de ecclesia puta seculares iudices sicut dicit Apostolus non autem ipse per seipsum. Unde et apostoli vii (*Actus* 6: 2 ff.), dyacones elegerunt qui temporalibus insisterent quatinus ipsi orationi et ministerio verbi Dei quietius possent insistere nec bonus theologus nudus est a legibus quantum ad illud quod veritatis et iusticie est in eis; aliter leges dicende non sunt, si non sunt iuste et vere ut dicit Augustinus: quod lex ut michi videtur dicenda non est quo iusta non est. Quicquid enim veritatis et iusticie est in omnibus scientiis et in sacra scriptura perfectius invenitur. Quicquid autem falsum et noxium est in ea damnatur secundum Augustinum. Nam ipsa de semetipsa loquitur *proverbiis* viii: *Per me reges regnant et legum conditores iusta decernunt*.

Ad secundum est dicendum quod latrare contra lupos ne animas fidelium rapiant et stare ex adverso contra volentes invadere dominicum gregem melius est per sacras scripturas quam per leges et iura facere, quia finis eius est caritas. Iuxta illud Apostoli finis precepta est caritas, que ut scribitur in *cantico* (*canticorum* 4: 4), est *omnis armatura fortium* qua expoliatus Petrus, una enim mulieris voce percussus dum mori timebat vitam negavit. Et qua vestitus dixit obedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus.

Ad tertium est dicendum: quod summus pontifex debet esse perfectus principaliter lege divina de qua scriptum est, *Lex Domini immaculata convertens animas*; legem autem humanam aliquando assumere potest non ad intentum principale, sed ad aliquod adiutorium temporale et corporale. Unde dicit Augustinus et ponitur x. di. Si in adiutorium vestrum terreni imperii leges assumendas putatis non reprehendimus nam fecit hoc Paulus: cum adversus iniuriosos Cesarem appellavit et civem romanum se esse protestatus est.

Ad iiii est dicendum: quod illud verbum Gregorii de lege divina intelligitur. Si vero intelligatur de lege humana quod summus pontifex lege humana germana cognatione debeat esse coniunctus. Intelligendum est sicut dicit Cyprianus et ponitur x. di. Quod Christiani imperatores pro eterna vita pontificibus indigent et pontifices pro cursu temporalium tantummodo imperialibus uti debent quatinus spiritualis homo negociis secularibus se non implicet".

APPENDIX II

Augustinus Triumphus, q. 108, art. 3: "Utrum dignus magistrari in theologia teneatur scire ius canonicum".

"Ad iii sic proceditur: videtur enim quod dignus magistrari in theologia non teneatur scire ius canonicum. Scientia enim iuris canonici videtur esse quedam

practica theologica. Sed dignus magistrari in theologia non tenetur scire theologiam practicam cum finis eius non sit praxis sed contemplatio veritatis ut dicit Augustinus, i. *de trinitate*. Preterea sciens scientiam subalternantem non tenetur scire scientiam subalternatam alias philosophus naturalis teneretur scire scientiam medicine et alias scientias que subalternantur ei. Sed ius canonicum subalternatur theologie. Dignus ergo magistrari in theologia non tenetur ipsum scire. Preterea in iure canonico multe questiones determinantur per leges et iura civilia. Scribitur enim x. di. Si in adiutorium nostrum terreni imperii leges assumendas putatis non reprehendimus. Sed dignus magistrari in theologia non tenetur scire leges et iura civilia. In contrarium est qui eiusdem scientie est considerare finem et ordinem ministrorum subservientium illi fini sicut eadem lex mosaica que determinavit de ordine multorum servientium in cultu illo. Sed tota scientia iuris canonici est de ordine ministrorum et ecclesiasticorum negotiorum prout pertinet ad cultum Dei; ergo theologus qui considerat de Deo tanquam de fine precipue habet de talibus considerare. Responsio. Dicendum quod distinctio unius scientie ab alia non accipitur penes rem que cognoscitur sed penes diversum modum sciendi; unde penes diversum modum considerandi Philosophus, vi. *metaphysice*, posuit distinctionem scientiarum. Illa ergo eadem que tractantur in theologia tractantur in iure canonico et illi idem canones qui recipiuntur in theologia recipiuntur in iure canonico; et que respuuntur ibi respuuntur hic. Scribitur enim auctoritate Augustini, xii. di. Omnia que neque in sanctorum auctoritatibus continentur nec in conciliis sanctorum patrum inveniuntur nec consuetudine universalis ecclesie roborata sunt sine ulla dubitatione resecanda estimo. Differunt tamen in modo considerandi quantum ad quinque. Primo quidem quia a theologo determinantur modo subtili et quasi propter quid et modo quo propter quid in theologia assignari potest. In iure vero canonico modo grosso et solum. Secunda quia a theologo terminantur principaliter propter veritatis contemplationem; a canonistis vero magis principaliter propter actionem et questionum occurrentium solutionem. Tercio quia a theologo determinantur (?) principaliter de cultu Dei et de his que spectant ad integritatem fidei unius Dei. A canonistis vero magis de ordine ministrorum et ecclesiasticorum negotiorum spectantium ad talem cultum. Quarto quia a theologo determinantur canones qualiter piis opulentur et contra impios defendantur. In iure vero canonico taxatur modus quo opulentur piis et defendantur contra impios. Quinto quia a theologo determinantur magis universaliter et in foro conscientie in quo agitur causa inter hominem et Deum. A canonistis vero magis particulariter applicando ad particularia negocia in foro exterioris iudicii in quo agitur causa inter hominem et hominem. Et quia sermones universales in materia morali parum sunt utiles ut dicitur i. *ethice*; ideo puto quod provida ordinatio esset ut dignus magistrari in theologia post lecturam libri sententiarum teneretur legere librum decretorum quatinus magis tritus et expertus assumeretur in his que sunt necessaria ad consulendum saluti animarum fidelium.

Ad primum ergo est dicendum quod praxis non subterfugit determinationem theologie imo aliqui ponunt eam principaliter speculativam et specialiter practicam pro eo quod contemplatio Dei ad quam ordinatur theologia tanquam ad finem acquiri non potest nisi per caritatem et opera virtuosa et observationem mandatorum Dei. Ad secundum est dicendum quod scientia subalternans tradit principia scientie subalternate ideo eadem considerantur in utraque scientia non tamen eodem modo sed ibi universaliter et scientificè, hic autem particulariter et modo grosso. Sic illos canones tenentur scire theologi quos tradunt canoniste et secundum veritatem illorum questiones debent determinare non quidem modo iuristarum in foro exterioris iudicii

ubi agitur causa inter hominem et hominem. Sed magis modo theologico et in foro conscientie in quo agitur causa inter hominem et Deum. Ad tertium est dicendum quod sicut theologia non respuit scientias philosophorum que pluribus erroribus sunt admixte quam leges imperatorum ita nec in iure canonico sibi subalternato respuit leges terreni impii quia ubicumque et unacumque insonuerunt veritas ab illo est qui dicit. Ego sum via veritas et vita ut dicit Augustinus. Unde sicut dignus magistrari in theologia tenetur scire primitivas (?) scientias humanas ut clarius et subtilius possit sacram scripturam intelligere. Sic multo magis tenetur scire sanctorum canones ut melius et fructuosius possit saluti animarum consulere."

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Ockham and some Mertonians

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IN 1264 Walter de Merton, former Chancellor of England, founded a 'Domus Scholarium de Merton' at Maldon in Essex. During the next ten years plans for a domicile similar to that established by Robert de Sorbonne at Paris gradually took shape in the mind of Walter de Merton, and Oxford was eventually chosen as the site. In the definitive Statutes of 1274 the Bishop-elect of Rochester set forth clearly his idea of a permanent lodging at Oxford for scholars who would devote their energies to the study of the arts and then proceed to the higher faculties of theology and canon law.¹ Scholars were elected while still bachelors in arts for one year's probation before full admission to the society. The first visitation of the college was made by Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, during the lifetime of the founder in 1276. The University statutes of Oxford required that a master in arts lecture *ordinarie* for at least two years after inception, but Kilwardby extended this necessary regency in arts to three full years from inception.² In accordance with Merton statutes the young regent master in arts had to be approved by the Warden and Fellows before he could begin study in one of the higher faculties. Nevertheless it was the normal procedure to enroll in one of the higher faculties as soon as possible. The ordinances of Archbishop Peckham's visitation, dated 1284, forbade the admission of medical students and suspended "arrogant" clerics who presumed to study canon law without the Warden's

* This study is part of a research project made possible, in part, by the generosity of the American Council of Learned Societies, through a grant-in-aid that provided necessary sources and assistance.

¹ "Hanc igitur formam statuo (quam et in perpetuum observandum decerno), ut in ipsa Domo, quae Scholarium de Merton nuncupatur, perpetuo sint scholares litterarum studio deputati, qui artium seu philosophiae, canonum seu theologiae, studio vacare tenebuntur. Quorum pars maior artium liberalium et philosophiae studio vacent, donec de sui Custodis et Sociorum arbitrio, tamquam in hiis laudabiliter proveci, ad studium se transferant theologiae. Quatuor autem vel quinque ex sui superioris providentia, quos ipse humiles et ad hoc aptos decreverit, in iuro canonico licenter studeant." *Merton Muniments*, ed. P. S. Allen and H. W. Garrod (Oxford 1928) 21.

² "Magistri quoque Artium Lectiones suas habeant a tempore suae Inceptionis usque ad finem trium Annorum integre sequentium, nisi forte per corporis imbecillitatem aut alias ex causis necessariis et evidentibus impediuntur." *Merton College Injunctions of Archbishop Kilwardby 1276*, ed. H. W. Garrod (Oxford 1929) 15.

leave, or who spent too long a time in the study of civil law.³ The founder's wish clearly was that the majority of Fellows proceed to theology when they had completed their study and regency in arts. Thus Merton College was established primarily as a residence hall for students in sacred theology, since only four or five were allowed to study canon law.

Perhaps we shall never know why among all Oxford Masters the Mertonians in particular contributed so much to the development of logic and physics in the early fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the personalities that made the faculty of arts at Oxford world famous in the fourteenth century were predominantly Fellows of Merton College, at least at some period in their careers. Walter Burley, Thomas Bradwardine, William Heytesbury, John Dumbleton, Richard Swyneshed (Swineshead) are only five of the more prominent Mertonians who contributed to the study of physics in their day. It is significant to note that many of their major contributions were made while they were theological students or masters at Merton college, the college established principally for theological students. The contributions of these Mertonians, however, cannot be appraised properly without reference to William of Ockham, a Franciscan Friar, whose influence was felt far beyond the fourteenth century. For the historian Ockham is, without doubt, the most important single personality in early fourteenth century English thought. Many of the later writings of Walter Burley, for example, were directed against the nominalism proposed by William of Ockham under the guise of "true" Aristotelianism. The fundamentally new physics as well as the vigorously orthodox theology of Thomas Bradwardine stands in sharp contrast to the teaching of Ockham. But later Oxonians, even at Merton, were more favorably disposed toward the views of Ockham until the end of the century when John Wyclif reacted strongly against the nominalism of William of Ockham.

In order to understand better the new problems of physics raised at Oxford in the early fourteenth century, we should consider the life and works of these eminent men who made the study of physics a new adventure.

I. WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

Contrary to popular legend, Merton cannot claim Ockham as one of its illustrious Fellows.⁴ William, 'de civitate Occam',⁵ was born about 1285,

³ *Statutes of the Colleges of Oxford*, vol. 1 (London 1853) "Injunctions of Visitors of Merton College," cap. 1-2, pp. 40-41.

⁴ The earliest mention of Ockham as a Fellow of Merton seems to have been made by Sir Henry Saville. Cf. G. Brodrick, *Memorials of Merton College* (Oxford, O.H.S., 1885) 194. Saville, no

probably in Surrey. Neither the date nor place of his entrance into the Franciscan Order are known. According to A. B. Emden he entered the Oxford convent around 1308.⁶ According to Winchelsey's episcopal register, a certain "Gulielmus de Okam" was ordained subdeacon in the conventual church of St. Mary, Southwark, in 1306.⁷ It is possible that he is our William of Ockham who was sent to the Oxford convent some time around 1310 to pursue theological studies at the University. Apparently by August 1323 John Lutterell, Chancellor of the University from 1317 until 1322, had charged Ockham with heresy.⁸ During the early months of 1324 Ockham was summoned to the papal court at Avignon by John XXII to answer to these charges. He remained at Avignon "almost four whole years".⁹ Then on the night of May 26, 1328, Ockham fled from Avignon in the company of the Minister General of the Franciscans, Michael of Cesena, and Bonagratia of Bergamo, eventually to find refuge in Munich

doubt, relied on some earlier list of 'illustrious Fellows of Merton,' the kind that included Roger Bacon and Duns Scotus. Fellowship in the College was restricted entirely to the secular clergy. Not only is there no contemporary record of Ockham at Merton, but unless his birth is put much earlier than 1285, it would have been impossible for Ockham to have been a Fellow before becoming a Franciscan.

⁵ London MS Brit. Mus., Arundel 367 (membr. xiv), fol. 153 in a colophon to the first part of Ockham's *Summa logicae*. It is pointless to insist, as do P. Boehner, H. Shapiro and others, that the name should be simply William Ockham and not William of Ockham. This is contrary to all the extant official records, e.g., those quoted here, Ockham's own letter of 1334, his signature to the protestation of 1338, and some letters of John XXII. English names generally retained the designation 'of' until the end of the 14th century; thus in early manuscripts and in official documents all the Mertonians discussed in this study are commonly given the designation 'of'.

⁶ *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford* (Oxford 1958) 2, 1384.

⁷ *Registrum Roberti Winchelsey*, P. IX, ed. R. Graham, Cant. & York Soc., (Oxford 1940) 981. Twenty was the canonical minimum age for receiving subdiaconate. Presuming Ockham received no dispensation, he would have been born before 1286. There is no unanimity among Ockham's biographers as to the date of his birth. Older biographers, who assumed that Ockham studied under Duns Scotus († 1308), were forced to give a date before 1280. Recent biographers, however, tend to place his birth between 1290-1300, or even as late as 1300. But these dates are too late if Ockham did in fact become "baccalarius formatus Oxonie" by Nov. 1320, since the minimum age for inception in theology was thirty-five both at Paris and Oxford.

⁸ On August 20, 1323, Lutterell was granted permit to travel beyond the seas for two years "to prosecute an appeal". *Close Rolls*, 18 Edw. II, 12 May 1325 (iii, p. 373); *Patent Rolls*, 17 Edw. II, part I (IV, pp. 329, 336). Concerning the charge of heresy and Lutterell's role see A. Pelzer, "Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés, en Avignon, en 1326," *Rev. d'hist. ecclési.*, 18 (1922), 240-270, and J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon Geführten Prozess," *Rech. de Théol. an. et méd.*, 7 (1935), 353-380; 8 (1936), 79-93, 168-197.

⁹ "Noveritis... quod fere quatuor annis integris in Avenione mansi, antequam cognoscerem, presidentem (i.e., John XXII) ibidem pravitatem hereticam incurrisse." Letter to the General Chapter of Friars Minor at Assisi, written before May 15, 1334, ed. K. Müller, *Zeitsch. für Kirchengesch.*, 6 (1883), 108-109.

under the protection of Ludwig, King of Bavaria, who had been excommunicated some years previous.¹⁰ Ockham is supposed to have died in Munich about 1349, a victim, it is assumed, of the Black Death.¹¹

It would seem that all of Ockham's non-political works were written before his departure from Avignon in 1328. It is generally supposed that Ockham devoted his attention to the *Sentences* from about 1317 to 1319 or 1320, and that he lectured cursorily on the Bible from about 1315 to 1317.¹² Within this schema Miss Maier has argued that the first version of Book I was prepared between 1317 and 1319, while the actual lectures on the *Sentences* were delivered at Oxford during the academic year 1319-20.¹³ Books II, III, IV are a *reportatio*¹⁴ and so are presumed to have been delivered during the same year 1319-20. The final version of Book I, the *ordinatio*, found in the printed edition of Lyons, 1494, was prepared at the same time as his commentary on the *Elenchi*; thus at some time between 1320-23.¹⁵

It is possible that an earlier date may have to be assigned for Ockham's lectures on the *Sentences*. In Mortival's Register a certain 'Willelmus de Ocham', a Franciscan of the Reading Convent, was licensed to hear confessions on 5 November 1320; this license was transferred to Friar John of Bledelow on 17 August 1328.¹⁶ If this is our Ockham, he must have

¹⁰ Fuller details of Ockham's life can be found in the standard biographies, especially in L. Baudry's *Guillaume d'Occam*, vol. 1 (Paris 1950). The work of recent scholars has sufficiently established the fact that our William is distinct from "Guillelmus Angliae provincialis" (William of Nottingham), who took part in the General Chapter of Perugia in 1322, and from "Guillelmus dictus Anglicus ordinis fratrum minorum" (probably William Alnwick) against whom John XXII wrote to the bishops of Bologna and Ferrara on Dec. 1, 1323.

¹¹ P. Boehner, *The Tractatus De Successivis Attributed to William Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1944) 15.

¹² A. Maier, "Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamforschung," *AFH*, 46 (1953), 163, 173-4; see L. Baudry, *op. cit.*, 65, 270; P. Boehner, *op. cit.* 3.

¹³ A. Maier, *ibid.*

¹⁴ A copy of this redaction is contained in Florence, Bibl. Naz., cod. A. 3, 801, and an abbreviation was discovered by Maier in MS Vatican Borgh. 68. C. Michalski has proved beyond doubt that Books II, III and IV are a *reportatio*; see "Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du xiv^e siècle," *Bulletin de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres*, Classe d'histoire et de philosophie, 1925.

¹⁵ Cf. A. Maier, "Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamforschung," *AFH*, 46 (1953), 161-174.

¹⁶ *Mortival Register* (Salisbury) II, fol. 186v: "Nomina fratrum minorum conventus Radynges admissorum per dominum de gracia speciali ad audiendos confessiones, etc. videlicet Willelmus de Sottesbokes, Willelmus de Ayschewelle, Richardus de Wanetynges, Willelmus de Ocham, Willelmus de Clere, et Thomas de Stokes. Item fr. Warnerus Gardianus admissus apud Sonnyngges. Non. Novembris anno XXmo." There can be no doubt that *anno XXmo* is to be taken as 1320; the previous entry is dated "anno domini millesimo CCCmo xviiiij," and the following entry is dated "anno domini CCCmo XXmo." Fol. 187r: "Item xxvi Kal. Septembris, anno domini

left Oxford by November 1320. Even if this reference is not to our man, our Ockham must have left Oxford some time around 1320. First, between 1320 and 1323 Ockham must have written at least five lengthy treatises besides revising his *Ordinatio*,¹⁷ of which four are strictly philosophical works, namely a commentary on the *logica vetus* and *Elenchi*, an exposition of Aristotle's *Physics*, and a series of questions on the *Physics*.¹⁸ If these philosophical works were the outcome of classroom lectures, they certainly could not have been given at Oxford, since, as we know, religious were excluded from the faculty of arts. It may perhaps be presumed that these lectures, if such they were, had to be given in some *studium artium* of the Order outside Oxford. Further, we know that Ockham's *Quodlibeta* could not have been disputed at the University, since he was never a regent master in theology; thus the Quodlibets were disputed at some Franciscan *studium* outside Oxford or at Avignon, which is highly unlikely considering the circumstances of his visit. Since the *Venerabilis Inceptor* was for some unknown reason prevented from becoming regent master in theology at the University, it is not likely that he would have remained at the Oxford convent.¹⁹ Therefore it would seem that Ockham taught at some convent of the Order after leaving the University of Oxford and before he was summoned to Avignon early in 1324.²⁰

Second, we know that before Ockham left the University he had completed his course in theology short of actual inception or immediately thereafter. That is to say, he was a 'baccalarius formatus Oxonie'. But if Ockham was withdrawn from the University by November 1320, as suggested, then his lectures on the *Sentences* could not have been given during the academic year 1319-20. It is not always sufficiently recognized that the procedure at Oxford was not identical with that of Paris in regard to the bachelor in theology. At Paris the bachelor gave cursory lectures on the Bible for one or two years before he was allowed to lecture on the *Sentences*. At Oxford the order was reversed, allowing the bachelor to lecture on the

M^oCCC^o xxviii, apud Sonnyngges, Dominus fratrem Johannem de Bledelawe ordinis minorum Radyngges, loco fratris Willelmi de Okam subrogavit, etc." I am indebted to Mr. C. K. Brampton for pointing this out and for loaning me his infra-red photographs of these pages of Mortival's Register. Dr. A. B. Emden has also discovered a William of Ockham who was presented to Bishop Dalderby together with sixty-one other friars for hearing confessions in the Lincoln diocese on 12 Kal. July 1318 (*Dalderby Register*, Lincoln, III, fol. 390v). If our conjecture date for Ockham's lectures on the *Sentences* is correct, namely 1317-18, it is not improbable that our Ockham is the one mentioned in Dalderby's register.

¹⁷ Cf. A. Maier, *Studien* 4, 178; P. Boehner, *The Tractatus de Successivis*, ed. cit., 16-21.

¹⁸ See the numerous articles on the question by C. K. Brampton.

¹⁹ This is the view proposed by C. K. Brampton.

²⁰ This also is the view of C. K. Brampton.

Sentences before giving cursory lectures on the Bible in preparation for his inception.²¹ The Oxford statutes are explicit about this. In the compromise between the University and the Dominicans, dated 7 April 1314, the Oxford custom was reiterated that no one was to read the Bible *biblice* or *cursorie* unless he had previously lectured on the *Sentences* at the University.²² The statutes enacted 'before 1350' clearly state that a period of two or almost two years is to elapse between the lectures on the Lombard and inception in theology: "Post lecturam insuper libri sentenciarum, ad minus per biennium vel ferre studio incepturus insistat, antequam scandat cathedram magistralem."²³ Thus if Ockham left the University by November 1320, having completed all the requirements for inception, his lectures on the *Sentences* would have been given during the academic year 1317-18, assuming that he took only one year for his entire course. For somewhat similar reasons C. K. Brampton is convinced that Ockham "completed his reading of the *Sentences* in June 1318 and terminated his thirteen years of study at Oxford in June 1320."²⁴

Third, it is certain that Ockham's treatise *De sacramento altaris* was written after his lectures on the Lombard: "quando Sententias legi."²⁵ But Miss Maier has shown²⁶ that Francis de Marchia attacked the arguments of this treatise in his lectures on Book IV of the *Sentences* delivered at Paris during the academic year 1319-20. Therefore it would seem that Ockham had completed his lectures on the *Sentences* and had written his 'second' treatise *De sacramento altaris* before Marchia's Parisian lectures of 1319-20. This treatise, therefore, would have been written while Ockham was still at Oxford, presumably as *cursor biblicus*. The controversies

²¹ "Post lecturam insuper libri sentenciarum, ad minus per biennium vel ferre studio incepturus insistat, antequam scandat cathedram magistralem." *Statuta Antiqua Univ. Oxon.* (Oxford, 1931) 50 lines 16-19. Continental biographers of Ockham do not seem to have realized sufficiently that the procedure at Oxford was the reverse of Paris. At Oxford bachelors in theology lectured on the *Sentences* BEFORE lecturing on the Bible *cursorie*.

²² *Statuta Antiqua Univ. Oxon.*, ed. S. Gibson (Oxford, 1931), 116-8.

²³ Cf. above note 21.

²⁴ C. K. Brampton, *op. cit.*, p. 374. The strongest argument against such an early dating of Ockham's lectures on the *Sentences* seems to be the mention of the "impetus theory" in Lib. IV, q. 26 M (ed. Lyons 1495). See A. Maier, *ADH* 46 (1953), 166-168. But the earliest known exponent of the "impetus theory" is Francis de Marchia. In actual fact the passage in question does not necessarily imply or presuppose any "theory of impetus" such as that proposed by Francis de Marchia.

²⁵ *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham*, ed. T. B. Birch (Iowa, 1930), I Prol. (p. 160) and also I, cap. 10: "Quaestiones de Eucharistia pertractavi... et tantum recitative dixi ad exercitandum studiosorum ingenia. Propter calumniam aliquorum praesens negotium suscepi" (p. 210).

²⁶ A. Maier, *op. cit.*, *AFH*, 46 (1953), 174-177.

reflected in the two Eucharistic treatises, which will be discussed at a later time, may help to explain why Ockham never became regent master in theology at Oxford.

Two possible objections against the proposed dating of Ockham's lectures on the *Sentences* must be considered briefly. L. Baudry has shown²⁷ that Ockham knew and discussed various views of Pierre Auriol, who lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris during the academic year 1316-17, but who revised his commentary for publication in 1318-19.²⁸ But even when Ockham was preparing his final *ordinatio* of Book I, some time between 1320 and 1324, he had not found the opportunity to study the work of Auriol thoroughly, as he himself tells us: "Since, however, I have seen little of that doctor's work, for if all the occasions on which I examined his writings were added up, they would not equal the space of one natural day, I do not intend to argue much against his views."²⁹ At the present time I have not yet been able to compare the first version of Ockham's *ordinatio* found in Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr. A.3.801, with the two commentaries of Pierre Auriol. However, there is no reason why Ockham, lecturing at Oxford in 1317-18, could not have seen an early version of Auriol's Parisian commentary of the previous year, as Brampton suggests.³⁰

The second objection will be discussed in greater detail at a later date. Nevertheless the objection ought to be noted here. In the *reportatio* on the *Sentences* (Book II, q. 26 in the Lyons edition of 1495) Ockham mentions the theory of impetus briefly, only to reject both the problem and solution as meaningless. Miss Maier has shown that the earliest known proponent of the theory of impetus was the Paris Franciscan, Francis de Marchia, who proposed the theory while discussing sacramental causality in Book IV of the *Sentences* at Paris during the academic year 1319-20, completing Book I early in 1320.³¹ It would seem, therefore, that Marchia must have completed his lectures on Book IV before Ockham raised the point in his own lectures on Book II of the *Sentences*; Ockham could even have got wind of the new solution before Marchia propounded it in class.

According to the generally accepted chronology, however, Ockham and Marchia lectured simultaneously on Books II-IV during the spring of 1320.³² Four or five months is a comparatively short time in which to

²⁷ L. Baudry, *Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris, 1949) 62-65.

²⁸ Cf. *Ibid.*

²⁹ I *Sent.*, dist. 27, q. 3.

³⁰ C. K. Brampton proposes this hypothesis in two of his numerous articles to get around the difficulty.

³¹ See A. Maier, *op. cit.*, *AFH*, 46 (1953), 174-177.

³² *Ibid.*

discuss three difficult books. Even if both bachelors lectured on these books in reverse order, IV, III, II, as Maier suggests, we could hardly expect news of Marchia's views to have reached Ockham so quickly! After all, the views of a 'baccalaureus Sententiarum' are not particularly momentous. This argument is admittedly insufficient. A more convincing argument, however, is presented by the facts already mentioned. Miss Maier has shown that Marchia in his lectures on Book IV of the *Sentences* directly attacked the views of Ockham expressed in the 'second' treatise *De sacramento altaris*. In the prologue to this treatise Ockham declares that he is undertaking his little work in order to show that he had spoken blamelessly and temperately when he had lectured on the *Sentences* ("quando Sententias legi"). In Chapter X Ockham remarked that he had undertaken the present task "propter calumniam aliquorum." Clearly this treatise presupposes an attack upon lectures already given on the *Sentences* and written his defensive treatise before Marchia lectured on Book IV at Paris. The only alternative explanation is that Ockham lectured on the Lombard elsewhere before coming to Oxford, and there is no evidence for this. In the light of evidence known we must conclude that Marchia's lectures on the Fourth Book, delivered at Paris early in 1320, cannot be the source of Ockham's information concerning the theory of impetus. Perhaps Francis de Marchia was not the originator of the famous theory preserved in his writings. In any case, the second objection against the suggested dating of Ockham's lectures on the *Sentences* at Oxford is not insurmountable.

Fortunately there is less difficulty concerning the other non-political writings attributed to William of Ockham. It seems clear that Ockham commented on the *logica vetus* (commonly known as the *Expositio Aurea*) and the *Elenchi* between 1320-23 while he was revising his *ordinatio* of Book I of *Sentences*. The *Expositio aurea* is prior to the theological *Quodlibets* and to the two commentaries (*Expositio* and *Quaestiones*) on Aristotle's *Physics*, as can be demonstrated from internal evidence. Ockham's *Expositio librorum Physicorum* was certainly written after the logical commentaries, while his *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum* were written after the *Quodlibeta* or possibly at the same time. Since Ockham left England for Avignon early in 1324, we may say that all the above were composed between the middle of 1320 and the end of 1323. The relative order of these non-political writings may be given as follows:

- 1) *Expositio Aurea*
- 2) *Expositio in duos libros Elenchorum*
- 3) *Ordinatio in Lib. I Sententiarum* (final version). Composed simultaneously with previous items.
- 4) *Expositio librorum Physicorum*

5) *Quodlibeta VII*

- 6) *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum*. It is not impossible, however, that this lengthy work was composed during the same academic year in which the *Quodlibets* were disputed, since cross references may refer to sections rather than to the whole.

From Ockham's sojourn in Avignon only one of his works need concern us here, namely his *Summa logicae*. At one time Boehner believed that this work was composed while Ockham was still at Oxford, that is to say before he departed for Avignon.³³ But later research led Boehner to the view that the *Summa* was completed at Avignon between 1324-27.³⁴ In the *Summa logicae*, composed at the request of a confrere, Ockham not only summarized his complete logic, but also a great deal of his natural philosophy. There can be no doubt that it was written after his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.³⁵ Thus the *Summa logicae* is a valuable aid toward understanding Ockham's view of natural science, particularly of physics.

One other treatise attributed to Ockham needs to be considered here, and that is the so-called *Summulae in libros Physicorum*, an incomplete work corresponding to the first three Books of Aristotle's *Physics* and part of the Fourth.³⁶ Pierre Duhem considered this treatise, "le plus parfait, peut-être, que sa plume ait produit," to be the earliest of Ockham's works on physics, because it is less profound than the *Tractatus de successivis* and the *Quaestiones*.³⁷ L. Baudry also considers it to be "une œuvre de jeunesse," but he places the date of its composition immediately after the *Expositio* on the *Physics*.³⁸ On the other hand, P. Boehner³⁹ and A. Maier⁴⁰ consider the *Summulae* to be the last of Ockham's treatises on physics, and perhaps his

³³ P. Boehner, *Tractatus de successivis* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1944) 4.

³⁴ William Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, Pars Prima, ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1951), p. xii.

³⁵ "Et quod haec sit intentio sua, declaravi per eundem 2^o *Physicorum*, ideo hic causa brevitatis omitto," *Summa Logicae*, P.I, c. 45 ad 6, ed. cit., p. 131.

³⁶ Ed. Venice 1506, fol. 1-32. In P. I, c. 6 (fol. 3ra) the author described the complete plan of the *Summulae* based on the order of the Aristotelian books: "Iuxta predictam distinctionem accipiende sunt partes istius tractatus: Prima pars erit de conditionibus communibus et magis notis omnium naturalium. Secunda erit de corporibus celestibus et eorum proprietatibus. Tertia erit de corporibus inanimatis et eorum passionibus. Quarta docebit de corpore animato, anima rationali et actibus eius. Quinta erit de ceteris animalibus et eorum proprietatibus. Sexta erit de plantis."

³⁷ *Le Système du Monde*, t. 6, 602-603. Duhem did not know of Ockham's *Expositio in lib. Physicorum*.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 59. N. Abbagnano also considered the *Summulae* to be "un' opera giovanile di Ockham." *Guglielmo di Ockham* (Lanciano. 1931) 34-35.

³⁹ P. Boehner, *The Tractatus de Successivis*, ed. cit., 19.

⁴⁰ A. Maier, *Studien* 4, 194.

last philosophical work, because it is an unfinished summary of his fully developed view.⁴¹

While the *Summulae* is generally taken to be authentic, C. K. Brampton has recently cast some doubt on its authenticity.⁴² Four of the ten known manuscripts⁴³ were written in the fourteenth century, and three of these ascribe the work to Ockham. Personally, however, I must confess that I find the work strikingly unworthy of the Venerable Inceptor. The reasoning throughout the *Summulae*, except for the appended treatise *De loco*, is bad and in places actually appalling. Consider, for example, the argument which one editor characterizes as "pulchre dictum":

Unde idem argumentum est contra alios qui ponunt instans esse quoddam accidens primi mobilis et tempus esse quoddam accidens primi motus. Nam arguo sic: Mutatio non est aliquo accidente primi mobilis; mutatio est in instanti: ergo instans non est accidens primi mobilis. Et sic: Motus non est in aliquo accidente primi motus; motus est in tempore; ergo tempus non est accidens primi motus. *Summulae* P. IV, cap. 12, (Venice, 1506), fol. 27rb.

Even apart from the invalid change of supposition for both major and minor terms of the two arguments, a syllogism in the third figure cannot validly yield a universal conclusion. On the whole, however, this treatise is a concatenation of repetitious assertions rather than a coherent series of proofs such as are found in the other writings unquestionably produced by Ockham himself. Throughout the first part of the *Summulae* the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form is clearly implied, while in Ockham's commentary on the *Sentences* and *Quodlibeta* the doctrine of plurality of forms is explicitly defended.⁴⁴ In Part I, chapter 24, the author rejects St. Albert's 'inchoatio formae' in substantial change, but there is no reason why Ockham should reject it; the arguments given in the *Summulae* all rest on the absolute unity of substantial form and the pure potentiality of first matter.⁴⁵ Further, the explanation of motion given in the *Summulae*

⁴¹ That it is unfinished cannot be doubted, but there are grounds for doubting that it is an accurate summary of his fully developed view.

⁴² C. K. Brampton, "Ockham and his authorship of the *Summulae* in libros *Physicorum*," *Isis* 55 (1964), 418-26.

⁴³ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁴ II *Sent.* q. 9 cc; IV, q. 7 F; *Quodl.* II, a.10-11.

⁴⁵ This is a peculiar chapter (*ed. cit.*, fol. 8ra-va); it has the appearance of an excerpt from some commentary. The chapter begins "Consequenter quia bonum est. quia bonum est. Et fuit opinio Alberti. Dubitabit aliquis an aliquid ipsius forme precedat in materia, quod potentia activa vocatur secundum aliquos vel inchoatio forme secundum alios..." . This chapter with the same beginning is present in MSS Pal. lat. 1202, fol. 338vb-339va, and Chis. E. V. 161, fol. 13v-14 (= cap. 27). However, the phrase "Et fuit opinio Alberti" is found as a marginal note in MS Pal. lat. 1202.

neglects entirely the crucial argument for Ockham's view in *Sentences* II, q. 9, and the explanation of quantity is contrary to the views actually expressed by Ockham in the *Sentences*, the Eucharistic treatises and the *Quodlibeta*.⁴⁶ Moreover, none of the internal references listed by Baudry⁴⁷ necessarily refers to any of Ockham's own works, nor is there any reference to a commentary on the *Physics* already written; this alone is surprising, if Ockham composed the *Summulae* toward the end of his career. Finally, it is well known that the last section of Part IV, *De loco*, found in the printed edition (cc. 20-22) and in some manuscripts, is taken from Ockham's *Expositio librorum Physicorum* and is also found in the composite *Tractatus de successivis* attributed to him.⁴⁸ There can, of course, be no doubt that practically all the views expressed in the *Summulae* represent Ockham's well-known theses, but I find it difficult to consider Ockham personally responsible for the composition of the *Summulae*. I suspect that the treatise was written by an unknown and less capable English disciple, although I have no means of proving this.

The attractive simplicity and disturbing unorthodoxy of Ockham's views both in theology and in philosophy had the inevitable result of arousing sharp opposition as well as ardent enthusiasm. While he was still at Oxford, the 'Doctor Singularis', as later generations entitled him, was impelled to defend his Eucharistic teaching against the "calumny of some critics", who were probably contemporary Oxonians. This defensive treatise was the object of attack at Paris as early as 1319-20. About this same time or shortly after, Walter Burley began his long series of attacks on the whole teaching of Ockham. For some reason still unknown the

⁴⁶ See James A. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Matter in Fourteenth century Science," *The Concept of Matter*, ed. E. McMullin (Notre Dame, Ind. 1963) 157-162.

⁴⁷ L. Baudry, *op. cit.*, 54-55. Baudry admits that these references "sont conçus en des termes extrêmement vagues."

⁴⁸ A remark at the end of the *Summulae* contained in MS Pal. lat. 1202 (15th century) states: "Hic deficient tria magna capitula" (fol. 371rb). Boehner (*op. cit.*, 28) assumed that this referred to the three treatises *De successivis*; but this scribal note could refer merely to the three long chapters *De loco*. Certainly the treatise *De loco* was added in the printed editions and in some MSS. Boehner has rightly shown that the *Tractatus de successivis* is only a compilation literally taken from Ockham's *Expositio super lib. Physicorum* (*op. cit.*, 28-30, also 22). This would suggest the work of a disciple. Boehner further remarks, "We are of the opinion that the *De loco* went from the *Tractatus* into the *Summulae*, because it is a natural part of the *Tractatus* and compiled in the same manner." In no way can the *Summulae* be considered "a natural part" of the *De successivis* or vice versa, since they overlap. It does not even seem probable that the author of the *Summulae* himself appended the chapters *De loco*, because it is appended in the wrong place; they should have come before the discussion of time, as the Aristotelian order requires. Rather, it seems that the chapters were appended later by someone who realized that the author of the *Summulae* neglected to discuss "place." These chapters were taken from the already compiled *Tractatus de successivis*.

'Venerable Inceptor' was prevented from taking the master's chair at Oxford. It is not unreasonable to presume that Ockham was recalled from the University after Trinity Term of 1320 because of the unorthodox views defended in his commentary on the *Sentences* and in his treatise *De sacramento altaris*. It is clear that within three or possibly four years he was denounced at Avignon most probably by John Lutterell, who had been Chancellor of the University during the troubled years 1317-1322. We know that Ockham's views were frequently reported and rejected by the Franciscan, Walter Chatton, in his Oxford lectures on the *Sentences* delivered during the academic year 1322-23.⁴⁹ A few years later, however, the Ockhamist views found an ardent defender in the Franciscan, Adam Woodham, who lectured on the *Sentences* at Oxford in 1332.⁵⁰ As we shall see, later Mertonians accepted the Ockhamist teaching in logic and natural philosophy as a matter of course, but before this stage was reached there was much opposition from the well-known Mertonian, Walter Burley.

II. WALTER BURLEY

Of all the early fourteenth century Mertonians, perhaps the most familiar is Master Walter de Burley, commonly known to the schoolmen under the title of 'Doctor Amenus', and sometimes under the title of 'Doctor Perspicuus' or 'Planus'.⁵¹ But it is only within recent years that clear factual information concerning the man and his writings has been obtained, principally through the patient efforts of Constantin Michalski, Anneliese Maier, Léon Baudry, S. Harrison Thomson, Alfred B. Emden and Conor Martin. Among Franciscan biographers Walter Burley was long thought to have been a Franciscan disciple of Duns Scotus and a confrere of William of Ockham.⁵² The Austin Friars likewise have claimed Walter Burley as a Hermit of St. Augustine.⁵³ Today we know that Burley

⁴⁹ F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias P. Lombardi*, n. 267, See L. Baudry, "Gauthier de Catton et son commentaire des Sentences," *AHDLMA*, 14 (1943), 344-53.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 39, "Et sic finitur 4us liber fratris ade Wodeham doctoris in theologia, qui legit oxonie anno domini M^oC^oC^oC^oxxxij" MS Vat. lat. 1110, fol. 135v. See C. Michalski, "Die vielfachen Redaktionen einiger Kommentare zu Petrus Lombardus," *Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle* (Rome, 1924), I, 239-244.

⁵¹ For these titles of Walter Burley see Franz Ehrle, "Die Ehrentitel der scholastischen Lehrer des Mittelalters," *Sitz. d. Bay. Akad.* (Munich, 1919) 9 Abhandlung.

⁵² J.-H. Sbaralea, *Suppl. et Castig. ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci* (Rome, 1806) 314; A. Parkinson, *Collectanea Anglo-Minoritica ad an. 1337* (London, 1726) 151; also H. Hurter, *Nomenclator Literarius Theol. Coth.* (Innsbruck, 1906) 2, 525a.

⁵³ D. A. Gandolfo, *Dissertatio Historica de Ducentis Celeberrimis Augustinianis Scriptoribus* (Rome 1704) 141-4; J. Lanteri, *Postrema Saeculi Sex Religionis Augustinianae* (Toledo, 1858) I, 195-6.

was a secular, a one-time Fellow of Merton College and a master in theology of Paris. The many misconceptions found in popular text-books concerning his doctrinal position, however, can be rectified only by a complete study of his works and sources. In this paper we are concerned primarily with establishing the chronology of the more important of his writings. A more complete list of Burley's works will be found in our *Repertorium Mertonense* to be published later.

From a colophon to the final version of Walter Burley's *ars vetus* found in Lambeth Palace MS 143 and in MS. Vat. lat. 2146, we know that Burley was born about the year 1275, probably in Yorkshire: "Completa est hec expositio quinta die mensis Augusti anno domini millesimo CCC^o tricesimo septimo et anno etatis exponentis sexagesimo secundo."⁵⁴ The first mention of Burley in the Merton Records is dated 1305 where he is not designated 'magister', whereas eight other Fellows in that list are so designated.⁵⁵ But we cannot infer from this that Burley was not already a master in arts at this time, since two known works of "Magister Walterus de Burley" bear earlier dates. Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, MS 668*/645, fol. 60-76, contains "questiones date a m. Waltero de Burley super libros peryarmenias a.d. M.CCC primo," and British Museum MS. Royal 12. F. XIX, fol. 138-148, contains an "optimus tractatus de obligationibus datus a mag. Waltero de Burley anno domini Millesimo trecentesimo secundo." Thus Walter Burley was already a master in arts by 1301. It would seem that during his long regency in arts⁵⁶ he expounded practically all of the Aristotelian books before taking up residence in Paris. These early versions, however, seem not to have circulated widely; later Burley revised and expanded his commentaries on the more important Aristotelian books and these, becoming tremendously popular, earned for him an enviable reputation as a philosopher.

In 1310 Walter Burley was at the University of Paris as the companion of Baldwin of St. Alban's, a nephew of Archbishop Greenfield.⁵⁷ Most

⁵⁴ Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 84rb, has an unintelligible abbreviation for 'septimo', which M. R. James omitted: *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Lambeth Palace* (Cambridge 1930-32) 113; the abbreviation, undoubtedly, stands for 'septimo'.

⁵⁵ Mert. Rec. 3634. See A. B. Emden, *Biog. Reg.*, I, 312b. Dr. Emden has informed me that these records of Merton College are by no means a complete list of resident Fellows and that the mere absence of a name or title does not of itself prove anything.

⁵⁶ In Lambeth Palace MS 70 (membr. xiv), fol. 109vb, we read: 'Explicit tractatus de puritate artis logice mag. Walteri Burley Anglici, optimi logici, famosi naturalis philosophi, et subtilis theologi, utpote qui in universitate Oxon. quammultis annis rexit in artibus et tandem Parisius in theologica facultate.' At least part of this colophon is verified by our reckoning Burley's regency at Oxford from about 1300 until 1310.

⁵⁷ Emden, *Biog. Reg.*, I, p. 313a. Conor Martin's suggestion that Burley started his studies at Paris in 1306 needs to be better established; there is no need for him to have studied theology

probably Burley began his theological studies at this time. He is listed according to Feret as a member of the Sorbonne in 1324,⁵⁸ and he seems to have remained in Paris until his appointment on 28 February 1327 as envoy of Edward III to the papal court for the promotion of the canonization of Thomas, Earl of Lancaster.⁵⁹ By 1324 Burley was already a master in theology at Paris.⁶⁰ It seems that Burley was again at the papal court on 7 March 1330.⁶¹ During Richard de Bury's episcopacy at Durham (1333-1345), Burley "inter ceteros minimus clericos eius,"⁶² received constant encouragement from his patron and numerous benefactions through his petitions.⁶³ We do not know how often Burley traveled abroad, but besides his stay in Paris, 1310-27, and his mission to Avignon, February 1327 to about 1330, we know that he held a *disputatio de quolibet* at Toulouse before 1327, that he was overseas on the king's business from 7 September 1338 until Easter of 1339,⁶⁴ that he held a disputation at Bologna in 1341, as Maier has pointed out, and that he was present in Avignon on 23 November 1343.⁶⁵ The date of Burley's death is not known, but we do know that he was still alive on 12 January 1344, when he made a petition to the

16 years before incepting in 1320-22. See C. Martin, "Walter Burley," *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus*, O.H.S., n.s. XVI (Oxford, 1964), p. 209. S. Harrison Thomson has asserted that a MS of Burley's *De potentiis anime*, namely Perugia, Bibl. Comm. H. 65, fol. 74a, affirms Burley's presence in Paris in 1305. See Thomson's "Unnoticed questions of Walter Burley on the Physics," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 62 (1954), 390-391. Miss Olga Marinelli, librarian of the Biblioteca Comunale of Perugia, was kind enough to examine this fifteenth-century manuscript for me, but she was unable to locate the alleged statement; the only colophon in the entire codex apparently is found on fol. 60 and has nothing to do with our problem. See below, next note, 88.

⁵⁸ P. Feret, *La Faculté de théologie des Paris et ses docteurs les plus célèbres*, t. 3 (Paris, 1896) p. 243. Paris MS, Bibl. Nat., lat. 16130, fol. 110vb, also refers to Burley as a member of the Sorbonne: 'Explicit tractatus de puritate artis logice Magistri Gualteri Burley socii domus de Sorbona parisiensis.' For Burley Dr. Emden has discovered two licences to study, one dated July 25, 1317 (for one year), the other dated November 5, 1321 (for two years). Emden, *loc. cit.* In our discussion of Burley's commentary on the *Physics* we shall show that Burley was still in Paris at late as 1326.

⁵⁹ T. Rymer, *Foedera*, ed. London, 1821, t. 2, P. 2, p. 695.

⁶⁰ See below note 85 dealing with Basel MS, Univ. F. II. 30.

⁶¹ T. Rymer, *Foedera*, ed. cit., t. 2, P. 2, p. 782.

⁶² Burley's *Epistola dedicatoria* to the University of Paris, All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86, fol. 1r. Connor Martin has shown that Burley was ordained priest by 1321, *loc. cit.*, p. 205.

⁶³ See the list of benefices in Emden, *Biog. Reg.*, I, 313.

⁶⁴ *Cal. Pat. Rolls.*, Edw. III, 1338-40, 123.

⁶⁵ A. Maier, "Zu Walter Burleys Politik-Kommentar," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 14 (1947), 332-6. Burley's *Epistola nuncupatoria* presenting a copy of his *Expositio Lib. Politicorum* to Pope Clement VI is clearly dated: "Scriptum Avinionis in die sancti Clementis papae et martyris, pontificatus Vestri felicitis anno secundo..." Vatican MS, Borgh. 129, fol. 2r.

Holy See on behalf of his nephew, Nicholas de Borbach, "whom he regards as the light of his eyes and the staff of his old age."⁶⁶

With regard to Burley's numerous works we can reserve the major part of them for the *Repertorium Mertonense*, considering here only the chronology of his principal works in philosophy and the question of his mastership in theology.

A. Works on Logic

Concerning logic Burley wrote extensively at least from 1301 until 1337. These writings may be grouped into three categories: commentaries on the Aristotelian books, 'notabilia' and treatises on the *parva logicalia*, and independent treatises.

The commentaries of Walter Burley are of three distinct types, representing the various aspects of medieval teaching already discussed elsewhere. The most elegant is a detailed exposition of the text, often with special questions raised in the course of the explanation. The second type is a collection of disputed questions corresponding to and occasioned by the text. Finally there are brief summaries of the text, such as would be given to a beginner.

On the *ars vetus* there are at least two complete versions by Burley. One of these, the earliest of Burley's works, is found in St. John's College, Cambridge, MS 100, fol. 47-54v. This is an exposition of Porphyry, the *Predicamenta* and the *Peryermenias*, beginning "Primo querende sunt cause huius libri quia secundum Aristotelem 1^o phisicorum tunc arbitramus..." The same codex contains another version of Burley's commentary on the *Predicamenta* (fol. 55-56v, beginning "Impossibile est cognoscere totum partibus ignotis...") and on the *Peryermenias* (fol. 67-73rb, beginning "Cum cognicio sillogismi sit finis logice et cognicio partis precedit cognitionem totius..."). At the end of this second commentary on the *Predicamenta* Burley states that the species of relation "in libro de sex principiis plenius apparebit". But there are at least three versions of Burley's commentary on *Liber de sex principiis* prior to the printed version. Lambeth Palace MS 70 contains two of Burley's commentaries on this work, both of which precede the well-known printed version. An 'expositio vetus' is found on fol. 35-43⁶⁷; it depends heavily on Albertus Magnus and always speaks of

⁶⁶ *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, I, p. 34.

⁶⁷ Beginning: "Iste liber intitulatur de sex principiis. Cum tamen sit de sex predicamentis, genera enim generalissima et sunt principia..." (ending) "...et cum aer generatur ex igne, est generacio secundum quid respectiva. Ista satis portent in 1^o De generatione. Et [in] hoc finitur liber sex principiorum. Explicit expositio Burley super librum sex principiorum, que dicitur expositio vetus." This version is also found in Lambeth Palace MS 143, fol. 141-150.

the "auctor sex principiorum". Another version 'que communiter dicitur expositio nova', is found on fol. 43v-55v;⁶⁸ this seems to be a revision of the 'vetus', still with heavy reliance on Albertus Magnus and no mention of Ockham's doctrines. Both of these versions in Lambeth Palace MS 70 are different from the version discovered by Miss Maier⁶⁹ in MS, Vat. lat. 2147, fol. 80v-102v, which was certainly written after Burley had left Paris.⁷⁰ Finally there seems to be at least two other versions of Burley's commentary on the *Liber de sex principiis* different from those already noted and composed before the final version of 1337.⁷¹ Concerning the *Peryermenias* we have already noted that five "Questiones date a m. Waltero de Burley super librum Peryarmenias" bear the date 1301 in Caius College, Cambridge, MS 668*/645, fol. 60-76. The final version of the complete *Expositio super artem veterem* was written by Burley in 1337, as already mentioned, and was directed against William of Ockham's *Expositio aurea*. This is the version found in all the printed editions.

On the *Analytica Posteriora* Burley wrote a detailed commentary based on Albertus Magnus and Grosseteste,⁷² certain *Questiones super librum Posteriora* found in Caius College MS 668*/645, fol. 117v-132v, and possibly the summary attributed to him in the Venice edition of 1497. None of these commentaries indicates the slightest awareness of Ockham, and thus may be dated before 1319.

The detailed 'expositio' of Aristotle's *Topica* must also be dated early. For although Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 170-268, has two marginal notes asserting "contra Ockham," the internal evidence does not bear this out.

⁶⁸ Beginning: "Quamvis Aristoteles in libro Predicamentorum sufficienter ..." (ending) "... Et cum aer generatur ex igne, est generacio secundum quid respectiva. Ista satis patent ex 1^o De generatione. Explicit expositio Burley super librum sex principiorum." In this later version Burley acknowledged that "Gilbertus Porretanus hunc librum composuit."

⁶⁹ A. Maier, *AFH*, 46 (1953), 189-191.

⁷⁰ "Et istam opinionem tenui Parisius et eam declaravi in primo tractatu de formis accidentibus." MS Vat. lat. 2147, fol. 102r.

⁷¹ Caius College, Cambridge, MS 448/409, fol. 57-87v and Peterhouse, Cambridge, MS 184, fol. 156v-171, beginning "Quamvis Aristoteles in libro... generatur minus nobile sive in substantiis sive in accidentibus. Et opposito modo est de corruptione. In hac completur intentio Porretani in sex principiis." Caius College, Cambridge, MS 139/79, fol. 131-153, beginning "Iste liber intitulatur... fit minus nobile sive in substantiis sive in accidentibus. Et opposito modo est de corruptione. Et in hoc [completur] liber sex principiorum." The commentary "super sex principia" ascribed to "Wilhelmo burley" in Florence, Laurenziana, Plut. 71, cod. 25, fol. 74-105v, should be attributed to William Mulverly as in MSS Oriel College, Oxford, 35, fol. 134v-152, Magdalen College, Oxford, 47, fol. 67v-85v, and British Museum, Royal 12.B.XIX, fol. 96-123.

⁷² I have consulted British Museum, Royal MS 12.B.XIX, fol. 244-301, Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 149-169, and Caius College MS 448/409, fol. 117-171v (anon.).

Of early date also are a summary of Aristotle's *Elenchi*, known as *Tractatus de modo arguendi*,⁷³ and seventeen questions on the text, found in St. John's College, Cambridge, MS 100, fol. 153-162v.

The earliest treatise by Burley on the *parva logicalia* is perhaps the "optimus tractatus de obligacionibus datus a mag. Waltero de Burleye anno domini Millesimo trecentesimo secundo" found in British Museum MS, Royal 12. F. XIX, fol. 138-148.⁷⁴ Burley's better known treatise bearing the same title and beginning "Obligaciones secundum quod nos utimur..." seems to be a later composition. As yet no date can be assigned to his popular *Insolubilia*,⁷⁵ but since this work does not mention the views of Ockham or Bradwardine concerning enigmatic propositions, it may be safe to date this work some time before 1320. Similarly Walter Burley's treatise *De consequentiis* appears to antedate the early version of his *De puritate artis logicae*, composed before the advent of Ockham's logical works. The small collection of 'notabilia' discussed by Miss Maier⁷⁶ has not yet been traced to any particular text of which they are notations, but it may be observed that the logical 'notabilia' are conspicuously free of any concern about the views of Ockham. Finally, of all Burley's treatises on the *parva logicalia* the best known is undoubtedly his famous *Tractatus de suppositionibus*, concerning which Burley said in later years (between 1326-29), "plurimas divisiones suppositionibus in iuventute mea memini me scripsisse."⁷⁷

It is well known that Walter Burley composed two treatises entitled *De puritate artis logicae*, both of which have been edited by Father Boehner. The probable relationship between these two treatises has been very convincingly argued by Father Boehner in his introductions. The shorter version seems to be the earlier work, begun and left incomplete before Ockham wrote his *Summa logicae*. For the longer version Burley revised his original plan in view of Ockham's treatise and composed a second treatise entitled *De puritate artis logicae* some time after Ockham's *Summa* and before

⁷³ Beginning "Modi arguendi sunt duo, ut ait Philosophus 1^o Elencorum... et sunt apta nata videre sunt ceca." I have used the text found in Lambeth Palace MS 70 and Caius College MS 448/409.

⁷⁴ Beginning "In disputatione dialectica due sunt partes, scilicet opponens et respondens... non fit una obligacio tantum, sed plures et diverse." Another copy of this text is preserved in Venice, S. Marco MS, Z. lat. 301 (1576), fol. 47-57v.

⁷⁵ Beginning "Circa insolubilia queruntur duo, primo circa insolubile simplex..." The best text I have found is that contained in Royal MS 12.F.XIX, fol. 133v-138.

⁷⁶ A. Maier has given a description of those contained in Vat. lat. 2146. Cf. *AFH*, 48 (1955), 247-9. These "notabilia" are also found in Lambeth Palace MS 70 and in All Souls College, Oxford, MS 85.

⁷⁷ *De puritate artis logicae*, ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1955), p. 2, lines 14-15.

1329.⁷⁸ Boehner has suggested that the longer version may have been written between 1325 and 1328.⁷⁹

Burley's short treatise *De universalibus realibus*, as it is found in the printed editions and in many manuscripts,⁸⁰ was probably written after Ockham's *ordinatio*. The basic elements of this treatise, however, are to be found in Burley's early commentaries on Porphyry, and only at the end of this realist treatise does Burley attack directly the opinion which postulates universals as having no "esse in rerum natura," but only "esse obiectivum in intellectu." The noticeable absence of any detailed refutation of Ockham's arguments might suggest that it was written before Burley found an opportunity to study Ockham's *ordinatio* carefully, but such an absence could just as easily presuppose a detailed refutation already written.

B. Works on Natural Science

Walter Burley's predilection for philosophy can be seen in his numerous writings on natural science. These writings range over the vast field of medieval science and they take the form of detailed expositions of Aristotle, collected questions on the Aristotelian books, summaries, disputed questions and some original treatises.

At least two distinct versions of an *Expositio librorum Physicorum* are known to have been written by Burley. The earliest version known at present is the one preserved in Caius College, Cambridge, MS 448/409, pages 172-543v, a parchment codex of the fourteenth century. It is a detailed exposition of all eight Books "cum questionibus optime disputatis."⁸¹ I have discovered a fragment of this commentary in St. John's College, Cambridge, MS 100, fol. 76-85v.⁸² On the top margin of fol. 80v

⁷⁸ This is clear from a scribal note found in Erfurt, MS Amplon. O. 67, fol. 123v. Cf. P. Boehner's introduction to *De puritate artis logicae*, ed. cit., pp. vii-viii.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁸⁰ Printed at Venice in 1492-3 [GW 5770]. I have relied primarily on Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 110-113v and on Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 14/14, fol. 40-46; this latter MS has the name "Ocham" in the margin of fol. 40 referring to the text "alia tamen est opinio seu potest esse, quod nullum universale realiter existit in rerum natura, sed solum habet esse fictum in intellectu."

⁸¹ Beginning "Quoniam autem intelligere etc. Iste liber habet duas partes... nam ille motor est actualiter infinite. Sed probatum est prius quod in magnitudine finita non est virtus infinita. Primus igitur motor nec est corpus nec in corpore, sed etiam indivisibilis et impartibilis, nullam habens magnitudinem. Explicit expositio omnium librorum phisicorum edita a magistro Waltero de Burley cum questionibus optime disputatis."

⁸² In the table of contents, of much later date, this fragment is entitled "Quedam questiones de motu" without author. It is Burley's commentary on *Phys.* V, text 9, agreeing with Caius College MS 448/409, pp. 361a-376b.

there is written out in full "anno domini Millesimo CCC^oXVI^o" in what appears to be a different hand. From this one might safely conclude that Burley wrote a complete commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* some time before 1316. The principal sources of this version are Averroes, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, and Grosseteste's commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*.⁸³

The printed version of Burley's commentary on the *Physics* was written at two different periods in his life. The commentary on the first six books was composed while Burley was teaching or "studying" theology at Paris.⁸⁴ At the beginning of this version in Basel Universitätsbibliothek MS F. II. 30 there is a rubric which reads: "Scriptum magistri Galteri de Burley doctoris sacre theologie super librum phisicorum Aristotelis editum parisius Anno domini M^oCCC^oXXiiii — Incipit primus liber."⁸⁵ It is not altogether clear whether the date 1324 refers to the edition or to the copying; and assuming that the date refers to the edition, it is not clear whether "editum" is supposed to include all six books or only the first one. In any case, it is certain that Burley had completed at least the first book of his commentary by 1324. In certain manuscripts there is a colophon at the end of Book IV which reads: "et completus est iste liber quartus anno domini M^oCCC^o vicesimo quinto, secunda die mensis Martii, dominica qua cantatur in ecclesia catholica Letare Jerusalem." At one time Miss Maier was inclined to consider this colophon in MS Vat. lat. 5934 as referring to the date when a particular scribe finished copying the first four books.⁸⁶ But in a more recent study she has agreed that the date most probably originated with the author himself, and not with the copyist.⁸⁷

⁸³ At this early date Burley was apparently unaware of Grosseteste's *Notulae in libros Physicorum* (ed. R. C. Dalce, *Commentarius in VIII libros Physicorum* (Boulder, Col., 1963), which he used so extensively in his later exposition. Cf. D. A. Callus, "The Oxford Career of Robert Grosseteste," *Oxoniensia*, 10 (1945), 45-6.

⁸⁴ Florence, Bibl. Naz., MS Conv. Soppr. D.I.1362, fol. 147rb: "Et in hoc finitur expositio super toto libro phisicorum secundum extollendum doc. mag. Gualterium de burleo Parisius compilata... [completur] anno domini M^o364, die Febr. 3a hora noctis ab incarnatione." Burley himself confirms the Parisian composition of the first six books in his dedicatory letter to the Parisian masters and scholars in philosophy: "ut cum dudum Parisius studens sex primos libros phisicorum Aristotelis exposuerim..." All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86, fol. 159v.

⁸⁵ S. Harrison Thomson has read this date as 1314, but there can be no doubt that the manuscript has M^oCCC^oxxiiii. See Thomson, "Unnoticed questions of Walter Burley on the Physics," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 62 (1954), 391. I am indebted to Dr. Max Burckhart, keeper of manuscripts at the Öffentliche Bibliothek der Universität Basel, for procuring microfilms of the first Book and for giving me a detailed description of the manuscript.

⁸⁶ A. Maier, *AFH*, 46 (1953), 183-4, and *Studien*, 4, 199 note 1. S. Harrison Thomson also considers this date to be that of the particular codex; see S. H. Thomson, *loc. cit.*

⁸⁷ A. Maier, *AFH*, 48 (1955), 243.

Since this same colophon is to be found in at least five other manuscripts of distinct provenance,⁸⁸ there can be no doubt that Burley himself finished this commentary on Book IV of the *Physics* on Laetare Sunday, 2 March 1326. Even the Basel manuscript "editum parisius Anno domini M^oCCC^oxxiiii" contains this same colophon: "Completus est iste liber quartus Anno domini Milesimo CCC— vicesimo quinto, secunda die mensis martii, dominica qua cantatur in ecclesia catholica letare Jerusalem' (fol. 156vb).⁸⁹ But Burely did not stop with Book IV. Some time after 2 March 1326 he proceeded to comment on Books V-VI. Many years later Burley referred to this work of his 'youth'⁹⁰ and stated that he commented on the first six books of the *Physics* while he was studying at Paris.⁹¹ Since Burley left Paris early in 1327, the first six books of his definitive commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* was composed about 1323/4 and February 1327. These first six books of Burley's commentary are a direct attack on Ockham's views expressed mainly in his *Expositio librorum Physicorum*, as Maier has already shown.⁹²

When Walter Burley was "iam senex" he was encouraged by his friend, Richard de Bury, then Bishop of Durham (1333-45) to complete his commentary on the *Physics* with an exposition of the last two Books as "dudum modo meo textus logicales Aristotelis exposueram."⁹³ This Burley

⁸⁸ Oxford, All Souls College MS 86, fol. 119rb; Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 6528, fol. 187; Florence, Bibl. Naz. Cent., Conv. Soppr. D.I.1362, fol. 78ra; Naples, Bibl. Naz. VIII.E.47, fol. 172; and Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.II.30, fol. 156vb. The Paris manuscript has also been noted by S. H. Thomson (*loc. cit.*). Prof. Thomson further states that "an almost identical colophon appears in Perugia, Bibl. Communale MS H. 65," and that he considers these dates to be that of the particular codex. The Perugia manuscript, however, does not contain the *Physics*, and the only date found in the entire codex is a scribal one on fol. 60v after the *Questio de universalibus*: "Scripta per me fratrem Franciscum de Monte Sancto M^oCCCC^oL^o2, die xvii mensis Julii." I am indebted to Miss Olga Marinelli for this information and for the photograph of this passage.

⁸⁹ I am indebted to Dr. Max Burckhart for transcribing this colophon from the Basel MS.

⁹⁰ "...qui quondam iuvenis scripseram super sex libros Phisicorum, super duos reliquos scribam iam senex." *Epistola dedicatoria*, All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86, fol. 1. C. Michalski had already noted that Burley wrote his commentary on the first six books of the *Physics* some years before commenting on Books VII-VIII; he also stated that the dedication of Books VIII-VIII preserved in Venice MS, S. Marco, Z. lat. CCV.B, fol. 243, is addressed to Richard de Bury (cf. *La Physique nouvelle* (1928), 5-6). However, Michalski did not know that these same two books were also dedicated to the masters and scholars of Paris, and that all eight books were dedicated a new to these same masters and scholars, as we know from All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86.

⁹¹ "... ut cum dudum Parisius studens sex primos libros phisicorum Aristotelis exposuerim, complerem super duos residuos opus illud, factus sum timidus et perplexus." All Souls College MS 86, fol. 159v. This is also found in Florence, Bibl. Naz. Cent., Conv. Soppr. D.I.1362, fol. 106, and in the MS directly copied from this, namely Conv. Soppr. A.I. 1361.

⁹² A. Maier, AFH, 46 (1953), 84-88.

⁹³ *Epistola dedicatoria*, All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86, fol. 1.

did by merely revising his early version of the *Physics*, Books VII-VIII, immediately after he had completed his commentary on the *Ethics*, which he had written at the request of the same Bishop.⁹⁴ The final version of Books VII-VIII was dedicated once to Richard de Bury⁹⁵ and twice to "Carissimis amicis suis et dominis magistris et scholaribus Parisius in philosophia studentibus."⁹⁶ Since Burley speaks of his logical commentaries as something in the distant past, it is clear that he had not yet written his monumental exposition of the *ars vetus*, which is dated "1337 et anno etatis exponentis sexagesimo secundo." Therefore the revision of the last two books of the *Physics*, the two dedications to the University of Paris, and the dedication to Bury were written before 1337 and immediately after his revision of the *Ethics*, thus at some time between 1334-37.

S. Harrison Thomson has discovered at Basel in Universitätsbibliothek MS F. V. 12 various "questions" by Burley on the *Physics*.⁹⁷ This manuscript, although incomplete,⁹⁸ seems to contain an early commentary in the form of "quaestiones annexae". These "quaestiones" are quite distinct from the questions found in the two versions of his commentary already discussed and hence constitute a separate commentary on the *Physics*. It should be noted at this point that a number of extant manuscripts contain "Questiones Burlei in VIII Physicorum," but these are merely questions extracted from the final version of Burley's *Expositio in libros Physicorum*.⁹⁹

Except for the *Expositio super libros de Anima*, all the other expositions attributed to Burley of the 'libri naturales' seem to be summaries or mere paraphrases of the Aristotelian text with occasional 'dubia'. Possibly all of them could be dated before 1320, but further study would be required to ascertain this.

Perhaps the earliest reaction of Burley to William of Ockham's physics is to be found in his *Tractatus de formis*.¹ In it Burley answers each argument

⁹⁴ "Eundem modum et ordinem observando in septimo et octavo quos tenui in sex libris physicorum supradictis et eciam in expositione libri Ethicorum quam nuper ad preceptum dicti Patris aliter qualiter compilavi." *Epistola dedicatoria prior*, All Souls College MS 86, fol. 1. "...tenendo modum et ordinem quos tenui in sex libris supra dictis et in expositione libri Ethicorum quam nuper ad preceptum dicti Patris venerabilis compilavi." *Epistola dedicatoria altera*, *ibid.*, fol. 159v.

⁹⁵ See C. Michalski, *La Physique nouvelle* (1928), 5-6, referring to Venice, S. Marco, Z. Lat. CCV.B, fol. 243.

⁹⁶ All Souls College, Oxford, MS 86, fol. 1 and 159v; also found in Florence, Bibl. Naz. Cent., Conv. Soppr. D.I.1362, and in its copy, Conv. Soppr. A.I.1361.

⁹⁷ S. H. Thomson, "Unnoticed questions of Walter Burley on the Physics," *loc. cit.*, 390-405.

⁹⁸ The codex is incomplete, according to Thomson, ending on fol. 169v in question 43. But the complete list of questions found on fol. 108 has been published by Thomson.

⁹⁹ For example, Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 1-53v.

¹ Beginning "Notandum quod materia prima est materia remotissima..." I have relied primarily on the text preserved in Lambeth Palace MS 70, fol. 125-134v. Tanner, *Bibl. Brit.-Hib.*,

proposed by Ockham concerning the identification of substance and quantity, and he defends the traditional view, "quod quantitas est alia res a substantia et a qualitate, et quod corpus de genere substantiae est alia res a corpore de genere quantitatis." This treatise, it would seem, antecedes Burley's revised *Expositio in libros Physicorum*; thus it could date some time before 1323 and after 1320.

After Walter Burley had become a master in theology he held a disputation 'de quolibet' at Toulouse, which became the object of much discussion in the schools of Bologna. This 'quodlibet', *De primo et ultimo instanti*,² has not yet been dated. However, it is explicitly cited in Burley's so-called *Tractatus primus*,³ which must be dated during the time when Thomas Wilton was chancellor of London (1320-27). Therefore Burley must have held this disputation at Toulouse before 1327 at the very latest.

The so-called *Tractatus primus*, discussed in some detail by A. Maier,⁴ is really a collection of three successive replies to "quidam reverendus socius et magister" who objected to four points in Burley's commentary on the *Sentences*, namely (i) that a quality can produce a substantial form "virtute propria," (ii) that at the instant in which a substantial form is effected there is no need for an agent to be acting upon the composite, (iii) that celestial, elementary and animal heat all belong to the same ultimate species, (iv) that contrary forms, such as black and white, belong to the same ultimate species.⁵ Who was this "quidam reverendus socius et magister" with whom Burley carried on the protracted polemic?⁶

(London, 1784) 141) erroneously identified this treatise with *De intensione et remissione formarum*, which will be discussed later.

² This was printed at Venice in 1501. A very good text is to be found in the Bodleian Library, Canon. Misc. 177, fol. 11-14.

³ "Quando autem et in quibus formis est dare primum vel ultimum et in quibus non, patet in quolibet meo Tolose determinata questione." Vienna Dominikarkloster MS 160/130, fol. 81ra.

⁴ A. Maier, *AFH*, 48 (1955), 235-243. This work was copied under a great variety of titles; see our *Repertorium*.

⁵ "Dixi quatuor conclusiones que videbantur quibusdam dubie vel false. Prima quod qualitas in virtute propria potest producere formam substantialem vel in virtute propria esse principium totale productivum forme substantialis, v.g., calor ignis potest virtute propria producere ignem, et calor qui est in semine potest in virtute propria producere animam sensitivam. Secunda conclusio que etiam videtur dubia, fuit ista, quod in instanti inductionis subite forme substantialis in materia non requiritur agens pro tunc inducens formam. Tercia conclusio quod isti tres calores quod Philosophus distinguit in 2° De gen. animalium, scil. calor celestis, elementaris et animalis sunt eiusdem speciei athome. Quarta conclusio quod forme contrarie, viz. calor et frigus, albedo et nigredo sunt eiusdem speciei specialissime." Vienna, Dominikanerkloster MS 160/130, fol. 83rb.

⁶ On fol. 89v-91v of the Vienna MS there is to be found a "Tractatus mag. Chunradi de Monte Puellarum qui probat oppositum quarte conclusionis principalis ipsius Burley." Also noted by A. Maier, *AFH*, 48 (1955), 240. This Conrad of Megenberg, "rector universitatis Parisiensis"

The text contained in Vienna, Dominikanerkloster cod. 160/130, clearly reveals the *Tractatus Primus* to be a collection of three successive replies to three successive attacks.⁷ The first reply (fol. 83-86ra) was to certain objections raised against the four propositions held by Burley in his commentary on the *Sentences*. The opponent, at least to the first proposition, was "reverendus magister noster dominus Cancellarius London,"⁸ who is none other than Thomas Wilton, former Fellow of Merton College. Burley's defence of the fourth and most peculiar proposition was answered ("respondet") by "quidam reverendus socius" in "prima replicatione sua,"⁹ to which Burley replied with eight new propositions (fol. 86ra-rb). After a "replicatio secunda" Burley replied with a third "reprobatio replicationis" (fol. 86vb-89va), adding new arguments in favor of his theory of intension and remission of forms. The structure of these replies strongly suggests that only one opponent is envisaged throughout the polemic, namely the Chancellor of London, Burley's master in theology and "socius." Thomas Wilton was Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, between August 1320 and 1327. Therefore the polemic known as the *Tractatus primus* must have taken place between 1320-27. It was certainly begun after Burley commented on the *Sentences*; and the last set of replies, at least, were written after his 'quodlibet' at Toulouse, thus after Burley had become a master in theology of Paris. Burley seems to imply that Wilton was also a 'socius' of the Sorbonne, but this has not yet been confirmed by other sources.¹⁰ The theory of intension and remission of forms

(MS *cit.*, fol. 91v), or more accurately, proctor of the English Nation at the University of Paris, cannot have been Burley's opponent. Conrad's treatise is clearly posterior to the entire polemic. Moreover, Conrad, who was born on February 2, 1309, would have been eighteen years old or less at the time of the controversy. Cf. A. Pelzer & T. Käppeli, "L'Oeconomica de Conrad de Megenberg retrouvée," *Revue d'hist. ecclési.*, 45 (1950), 559-616.

⁷ In MS, Vat. lat. 2148, fol. 46-56, this work is called a *quodlibet*: "Questio prima nostri quolibet est utrum in virtute propria..." (fol. 46). A fifth question is also added, "Utrum contradiccio sit maxima opposicio," and ends "Expliciunt quinque questiones determinate a magistro Gualterio dicto burleo de quolibet..." However, the *Tractatus Primus* does not at all reveal the technique of a disputation *de quolibet*; and the fifth question is an entirely distinct work.

⁸ "Huic rationi respondet reverendus magister noster, dominus Cancellarius Landon [*sic*], quod calor in virtute propria non potest in aliquam dispositionem necessitantem ad formam ignis, quia nulla dispositio precedens dispositionem forme ignis necessitat ad formam ignis." (fol. 83rb). MS, Vat. lat. 2148, fol. 46, has a corrupt reading: "huic rationi respondent Cancellarius et Iandunum".

⁹ "... illa sunt dicta in ipsa responsione dictis suis in prima replicatione sua." fol. 86vb.

¹⁰ Thomas de Wilton was a Fellow of Merton College from about 1288 until about 1301. On April 26, 1304, he was granted licence by his Bishop to study at a university in England or abroad (*Reg. Gainsborough, Worc., Worcs., Hist. Soc.*, p. 134). In a papal provision of March 2, 1311, he is mentioned as having studied at Paris (*Cal. Pap. Let.*, 2, p. 82). By May 1314 Wilton was master

against which Burley argued is known to be that defended by Thomas Wilton.¹¹

Burley's *Tractatus secundus*, as Maier has shown,¹² is his famous treatise *De causa intrinseca intensiois et remissionis formarum*.¹³ This treatise was undoubtedly written after the polemic with Thomas Wilton; thus it was written after Burley had become master in theology.

C. Theological Career

There can be no doubt that Burley became a master in theology of Paris. From Basel, Universitätsbibliothek MS F. II. 30, fol. 3ra, already quoted, we can infer that Burley had incepted in theology and probably had completed his regency at Paris by 1324. The earliest known official document, however, that designates him as "sacrae paginae professor" is dated February 1327, when Burley and two companions were appointed envoys of Edward III to the papal court.¹⁴

We know that Burley's master at Paris was the former Mertonian, Thomas Wilton, who had become master in theology by May 1314. Although Wilton was appointed Chancellor of St. Paul's in August 1320, he continued to receive papal dispensations to be absent from his benefice. The last known dispensation granted to Wilton expired on 1 November 1322.¹⁵ It is, of course, possible that Wilton obtained further dispensations. But from the evidence known at present, it would seem that Wilton had departed from Paris by November of 1322. If this were indeed the case, then Burley's inception in theology must have taken place before 1322; the most probable date however of his inception seems to be the spring of 1320. Burley's lectures on the *Sentences*, which have not yet been identified,¹⁶ might very well have been delivered during the academic year 1319-20 while Francis de Marchia was lecturing at the Franciscan school.

in theology of Paris (*Chart. Univ. Par.*, II, n. 791). See P. Glorieux, *Répertoire*, I, 460-62; Emden, *Bibl. Reg. Oxford*, III, 2054-5; M. Schmaus, "Thomas Wylton als Verfasser eines Kommentars zur aristotelischen Physik," *Sitz. d. Bay. Akad.*, 1956, heft 9.

¹¹ *Questio de susceptione magis et minus qualitatis*, beginning "Utrum qualitas suscipiat magis et minus. Quod non probo, quia tunc aliqua qualitas foret infinita." Bodleian Library Ms, Canon. Misc. 226, fol. 38-43.

¹² A. Maier, *AFH*, 48 (1955), 236-5.

¹³ Beginning "In hoc tractatu secundo intendo perscrutari de causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus..." Ed. Venice, 1496, fol. 2-15v.

¹⁴ T. Rymer, *Foedera* (London, 1821), 2, P. 2, p. 695; Emden, *Biog. Reg. Oxford*, 1, 313.

¹⁵ *Cal. Pap. Lev.*, II, p. 225. Not only does Burley speak of Wilton as "reverendus magister noster", but also in one place he says "quod dicit magister meus."

¹⁶ Tanner notes that Bale and Pits ascribe to Burley a commentary on the *Sentences*, beginning "Cupiens aliquid etc. In hoc pro[logo]..." Cf. Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 142. This work does not appear

In spite of his mastership in theology, Burley's predilections were for logic and natural science; practically nothing is known about his theological writings.¹⁷

D. *Works on Moral Philosophy*

Late in life Burley completed his *Expositio librorum Ethicorum* and dedicated the complete work to Bishop Richard de Bury. In his letter of dedication Burley mentioned that he recalls having commented on the first six Books many years earlier, and that he has returned to this work in order to complete it.¹⁸ This commentary seems to have been the first composition completed under Richard de Bury's episcopal patronage. We know that the final version of the *Ethics* was completed immediately before Burley revised books VII-VIII of the *Physics*. Therefore, it would be safe to say that his *Expositio librorum Ethicorum* was completed between 1333-34.

Burley also wrote a long commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* and dedicated it twice to Richard de Bury,¹⁹ and once to Pope Clement VI, whom he had known as Pierre Roger at the University of Paris.²⁰ Burley dedicated his commentary to Clement VI on 23 November 1343. From the formal dedication of this work to Bury we learn that Richard Bentworth, Bishop of London, had asked Burley to publish a commentary on the *Politics* of Aristotle. But because of Bentworth's untimely death on 8 December

in Stegmüller's *Repertorium Commentariorum* (Wurzburg, 1947) nor in V. Doucet's *Supplément, AFH*, 47 (1954), 88-170 and "Quelques Commentaires sur les 'Sentences' de Pierre le Lombard," *Miscellanea Lombardiana* (Novara, 1957) 275-294; nor have I found this *incipit* in any of the lists of anonymous manuscripts thus far examined.

¹⁷ The fragment published by S. H. Thomson may well be part of a theological question, but it is of little value, since it contains only the objections to the question and not the solution or replies. Cf. "An Unnoticed *Questio Theologica* of Walter Burley," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 6 (1950), 84-88.

¹⁸ "Inde quum super sex primos libros Ethicorum diffusius alias memini me scripsisse, nec completo opere super quatuor ultimis libris, revertor ad scribendum." Ed. Venice 1481, fol. 1.

¹⁹ Conor Martin has pointed this out in his unpublished thesis, *The Commentaries on the Politics of Aristotle in the late Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries, with reference to the Thought and Political Life of the Time* (D. Phil. Thesis, Oxford, Hilary Term 1949), 158-162.

²⁰ A. Maier, "Zu Walter Burleys Politik-Kommentar," *Recherches de Théol. anc. et méd.*, 14 (1947), 332-6. In his dedication to Clement VI Burley had written: "Nomini igitur vestrae sanctitatis, a qua didici iam diu est in studio Parisiensi clarum, artificiosum multumque ordinatum modum loquendi ac etiam exponendi, temporibus quibus ibi lecturam sacrae scripturae ceterosque actus scholasticos exercebatis tanquam doctor in theologia excellentissimus et veritatis perscrutator subtilissimus, expositionem praedictorum librorum merito dedicavi." *Ibid.*, 334. Pierre Roger, O.S.B., lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris during the academic year 1320-21; on May 23, 1323, John XXII requested that he be given licence to incept in theology. *Chart. Univ. Part*, 2, n. 822, pp. 271-2.

1339,²¹ hardly a year and a half after his consecration, the work was dedicated to Richard de Bury. From this S. Harrison Thomson has argued that Burley's *Expositio librorum Politicorum* must have been written some time between 1340 and the date of Richard de Bury's death, 14 April 1345.²² From what has already been said, it is clear that this commentary had been completed by November 1343.

A late fourteenth century manuscript in the University Library, Cambridge, li. 2. 8, contains a version of Burley's commentary on the *Politics* and *De regimine principum* by Giles of Rome. They are written in the same hand, beautifully written with many lacunae and richly illuminated at the beginning of each book. At the end of the last item (fol. 128v) the scribe has added 'scriptus per manum magistri Richardi Bury.' It is highly unlikely that this is the same Richard de Bury to whom the commentary was twice dedicated in the earlier part of the century. Possibly he is the same Richard Bury who died in Oxford in 1413 as a master of arts.²³ All we are certain of is that Bentworth asked Burley to publish a commentary on the *Politics*, or possibly to write one. Burley, however, did nothing about it until Bury mentioned it again after Bentworth's death in 1339. Burley complied, possibly by revising an earlier version, dedicating the final version twice to his patron and once to Pope Clement VI. Burley was about sixty-seven years old at this time.

Besides the commentary mentioned, there are early 'quaestiones' by Walter Burley on the *Politics* contained in Caius College, Cambridge, MS 505/383, fol. 1-101.²⁴

In literary studies Burley is best known for his popular *De vita et moribus philosophorum*. The treatise adds nothing to his stature as a competent philosopher and may well be reserved for historians of literature and biography.²⁵

²¹ John Le Neve, *Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae* (Oxford, 1854), 2, 290.

²² S. H. Thomson, "Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle," *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer* (Louvain, 1947), 563.

²³ See Emden, *Biog. Reg. Oxford*, 1, 326.

²⁴ Prologue: "Ut dicit Philosophus Ethicorum quinto... in hoc libro primo sunt novem. Explicit prohemium." Beginning of questions: "Prima questio est quid est servus..."

²⁵ See S. H. Thomson, *art. cit.*, *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, 561, and J. O. Stigall, "The Manuscript Tradition of the *De Vita et Moribus Philosophorum* of Walter Burley," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 11 (1957), 44-57.

III. THOMAS BRADWARDINE

Among the early fourteenth-century Fellows of Merton the one who most influenced the thought of the College toward a mathematical approach to physics was Thomas Bradwardine. He not only had a clear 'mathematical mind' and a penchant for mathematical studies, but he also determined the course of physical speculation for later generations. His writings both in philosophy and in theology were modeled on the propositional procedure of Euclid, and his mind was most facile when discussing clear and distinct ideas. A. Maier acutely observes, "One might almost say that Bradwardine would have wanted to write the *Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis* of his century."²⁶ With his important treatise *De proportionibus velocitatum motuum* he renewed interest in the application of mathematics to problems of natural science. Thomas Bradwardine has rightly been called the "founder of the Merton School," even though he was promulgating and developing the scientific ideals defended by Grosseteste, Kilwardby and Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century.

Thomas de Bradwardine was born about 1295, probably in the diocese of Chichester.²⁷ He is first noted as a Fellow of Balliol College in August 1321, but by 1323 Bradwardine had become at least a probationary Fellow at Merton, most probably after his inception in arts.²⁸ While Bradwardine was a student in the Faculty of Theology he was twice elected proctor²⁹ of the University, November 1325-26 and 1326-27.³⁰ By 1333 he had become a bachelor of theology.³¹ One would have thought that he had

²⁶ *Studien*, 1, 86 note 10.

²⁷ Cf. D. N. B. article by W. R. W. Stephens. The date usually given for Bradwardine's birth following Saville, is c. 1290, but there is no firm evidence for this. However it would seem probable that Bradwardine was born some time between 1290-1300. Saville and many biographers after him believe that Bradwardine himself claimed Chichester as his birthplace. But Bradwardine merely said, "Per similem etiam rationem, quicquid nunc scribo Oxoniae, scriberet pater meus Cicestriae, quia genuit me scribentem, immo avus et proavus, et ceteri genitores, ipsi quoque primi parentes nunc facerent omnia facta nostra." [*De causa Dei*, III, cap. 22, ed. Saville (London, 1618) 559]. This merely states that his father was then living in Chichester.

²⁸ Mert. Rec. 3652-3. See Emden, *op. cit.*, 1, 244-6, also 3, xv-xvi.

²⁹ On the office of proctor, see S. Gibson, *Statuta*, ed. *cit.*, lxxiv-lxxvii. Michalski misunderstood the role of proctor when he claimed that Bradwardine was at the Papal Curia in this official capacity in 1322; furthermore there is no evidence that he was proctor in 1322. Cf. "Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au xiv^e siècle," *Commentariorum Societatis Philosophicae Polonorum. Studia Philosophica*, t. 2 (Lemberg, 1937), 2399.

³⁰ *Snappé's Formulary*, ed. H. E. Salter (Oxford, (O.H.S.), 1924), 326.

³¹ *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 2, 395.

incepted and completed his two years regency before vacating his Fellowship at Merton College in 1335. But as late as February 1336 Bradwardine is still called "bachelor of theology and Canon of Lincoln."³² The earliest known references to Bradwardine as "Master in Theology" date from November 1348,³³ but we do not know when he fulfilled his obligatory regency. In 1335 Bradwardine relinquished his fellowship at Merton and joined the household of Richard de Bury,³⁴ who had already been consecrated Bishop of Durham. From September 1337 until 1349 Bradwardine was Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral London,³⁵ where as Chancellor he was expected to lecture on sacred theology.³⁶ After being elected "for a second time"³⁷ to the archbishopric of Canterbury, he was appointed on 19 June 1349 by Pope Clement VI, and consecrated at Avignon on 9 July 1349.³⁸ Shortly after his return to England he died of the Plague at the residence of the Bishop of Rochester in Lambeth, 26 August 1349.

During his regency in Arts, which can be placed most probably between 1321 and 1324, Bradwardine produced his treatise *De insolubilibus* in 12 chapters.³⁹ A codex now lost of the Bibl. del Noviciado de la Universidad Central ascribed the *De insolubilibus* to "mag. Thomae de Bradwardinus, de Anglia, Regentis Oxonie."⁴⁰ In this youthful treatise Bradwardine rejected the opinion, not uncommon in his day,⁴¹ that predicates of propo-

³² *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 2, 529.

³³ *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 1, 145: "Master in Theology and Canon of Lincoln." *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 3, 273: "Sacrae Theologiae Professor." Cf. Emden, *op. cit.*, 1, 245a.

³⁴ *Royal Historical Society Transactions*, 4th series, 20 (London, 1937) 160-1, 165.

³⁵ *Registrum Stephani Gravesend, London*, (Cant. & York Soc.), 313.

³⁶ See "Statutes. Baldock." P.I., cap. 56-57, in *Registrum Statutorum et Consuetudinum Ecclesiae Cathedralis S. Pauli, Londini*, ed. W. Sparrow Simpson, London 1873, p. 23. See also the "Ordinatio domini pro lectura in theologia" from the *Register of Bishop Fitz-James* (fol. 127b): "... fuerit ab antiquo salubriter statutum, provisum, et ordinatum, quod Cancellarius Ecclesie Cathedralis predicte quisunque pro tempore existens, lecturam in sacra theologia per se vel per alium continue legeret et observaret..." (ed. W. S. Simpson, *ibid.*, 413). The teaching obligation of the Chancellor is discussed by Kathleen Edwards, *The English Secular Cathedrals in the Middle Ages* (Manchester, 1949), 200-208.

³⁷ Cf. William de Dene's *Historia Roffensis*, in *Anglia Sacra*, 1, 375.

³⁸ C. Eubel, *Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi*, 1, 163; *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 3, 337, 339.

³⁹ Beginning Prol.: "Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum, ut habetur 3^o Metaph., cap. 1^o. Qui vero insolubilibus vincula..." We have used the text contained in Bodl. Canon. Misc. MS 219, fol. 53-57v (incomplete).

⁴⁰ Cod. 105. Cf. *Catalogo de los manuscritos existentes en la Biblioteca del Noviciado de la Universidad Central* (procedentes de la antigua de Alcalá), ed. J. Villa-Amil y Castro, Pt. I: Codices (Madrid, 1878) 37.

⁴¹ For example, Walter Segrave in his *De insolubilibus*, MS Erfurt, Amplon. O. 76, fol. 21v-34 (we have used the incomplete copy contained in MS Bodl. Canon. Misc. 219, fol. 1-3v), the *Insolu-*

sitions cannot represent (*supponere*) the whole proposition of which they are a part. The opinion, rejected by Bradwardine, implied that if no other statement is uttered besides "Socrates dicit falsum," this proposition cannot be objectively either true or false. Bradwardine, however, maintained that "quelibet propositio est vera vel falsa."⁴² But every such proposition claiming to signify itself as false, while in reality is true, must be considered false.⁴³ This position was later developed by Roger Swyneshed in his famous treatise in which he held that all such propositions falsify themselves (*seipsum falsificat*).

It is also probable that during his regency in Arts Bradwardine wrote the *Arithmetica speculativa*⁴⁴ and the *Geometria speculativa*⁴⁵ attributed to him. Both of these works are summaries of Euclid and Boethius, but the sections on proportions and proportionality reveal a familiarity with the *De proportionibus* of Thabit and the *De proportionibus et proportionalitate epistola* of Ahmad ibn Yusuf (Abû Ja'far).

This doctrine of proportionality was applied by Bradwardine to the specific problem of varying velocities of locomotion in the *Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum in motibus*,⁴⁶ "editus a mag. Thomas de Bradwardin

bilia magistri henrici anglici, MS Canon. Misc. 219, fol. 9v-11v (also found in MS Canon. Lat. 311, fol. 33v), and the *Insolubilia more exonie compilata edita ab eximio doctore magistro Johanne Nenatore*, MS Canon. Misc. 219, fol. 7-9, esp. fol. 7r-v. This position was later made famous by Ockham's *Summa logicae*, P. III, cap. 45.

⁴² Bradwardine, *De insolubilibus*, suppositio prima, MS Canon. Misc. 219, fol. 55ra.

⁴³ "Si aliqua propositio significat se non esse veram vel se esse falsam, postea significat se esse veram, est falsa." *ibid.*, fol. 55rb; see also cap. 9, fol. 57ra.

⁴⁴ There is some difficulty in identifying Bradwardine's *Arithmetica speculativa*. Tanner refers to the text of the printed editions of Paris 1502 and 1512 (first printed in Paris 1495), beginning, "Quantitatum alia est continua que magnitudo dicitur, alia discreta..." But the Latinity and puerility of this treatise cast certain suspicions on the authenticity of this text. Another text ascribed to Bradwardine is contained in Clm 24809, fol. 100v-106, beginning "Numerus est duplex: mathematicus qui dicitur numerus numerans..."; commentaries on this version are found in Vienna, Nat. Bibl. lat. 4953, fol. 36-61v, and 4951, fol. 273-304. We do not know how these two versions compare with that ascribed to Bradwardine in MSS Erfurt, Amplon. F. 375, fol. 15v-17, 88v-92, and Q. 23, fol. 75-81v, beginning "Horum que sunt aliud est continuum aliud discretum..."

⁴⁵ Ed. Paris, 1530, fol. 1-20. In his discussion of proportionality (Tr. III, c. 1) he says, "et hec omnia sunt dicta in arithmetica" (fol. 11).

⁴⁶ This treatise is more commonly known as *De proportionibus velocitatum motuum*, as in the edition of H. Lamar Crosby, Jr. (Madison, Wisconsin, 1955). If, however, the *Tractatus de continuo* is an authentic work of Bradwardine, then the original title of the treatise is *De proportionibus velocitatum in motibus*, as found in Rome, Bibl. Angelica MS 1017, fol. 50-56v, and in several other manuscripts. Cf. *Tractatus de continuo*, MS Erfurt, Amplon. Q. 385, fol. 24v, fol. 32v, fol. 41r, and fol. 45v-46r.

a. d. 1328."⁴⁷ This treatise will be discussed in detail later. For the present we wish only to observe that this treatise, which stimulated the Mertonians into discovering similar functional dependencies in all types of motion, was written in 1328 while Bradwardine was a student of theology at Oxford. Bradwardine's treatise quickly dominated the whole mathematical discussion of motion in the 14th century, and at least two simpler versions were arranged, as we have pointed out,⁴⁸ to help beginners acquire the fundamentals of "Bradwardine's geometrical function."

It is generally recognized that Bradwardine must have been highly skilled in the science of geometry. Some concrete proof of this may be found in the *Tractatus de continuo* ascribed to him in Torun, Poland, MS 4^o. 2, of the late fourteenth century, pages 153-192; the same text is found anonymously in Erfurt, Amplon. MS. Q. 385, fol. 17-48.⁴⁹ The authenticity of this work cannot be established from internal evidence alone. From the impersonal references to the well-known *De proportionibus velocitatum*, it is clear that *De continuo* is a later composition. However, in Paris, Bibl. Nat., Nouv. Acq. lat. 625, there is a fragment of this *Tractatus de continuo* on fol. 71v, which has not been noted in Omont's catalogue. This fragment is explicitly ascribed to 'bradwardin' in the margin, and it is written by the same scribe who penned the *Tractatus de proportionibus* (fol. 62-70va), "scriptum Parisius anno eiusdem 1348", and Dumbleton's compendium sex conclusionum (fol. 70v-71v). Thus the earliest known ascription of the treatise to Bradwardine is found in the Paris fragment that can be dated about 1348.

Bradwardine's fame as a theologian rests chiefly on his *De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum ad suos Mertonenses libri tres*.⁵⁰ Although

⁴⁷ MS Paris, Bibl. Nat. nouv. acq. 625 (a.d., 1348), fol. 62-70v; this date is also preserved in Bibl. Nat. lat. 14576, fol. 216v, latin 16621, fol. 212v, and Prague, Cath. Chapter MS 1293, fol. 19. The *Questiones de velocitate motuum* in MS Erfurt, Amplon. F. 313, fol. 166-190, are not by Bradwardine as Schum believes [*Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt* (Berlin, 1887), 217]. These are *questiones* by an anonymous master on the *Tractatus de proportionibus* of Bradwardine, as an examination of the text clearly shows. Fol. 177ra gives some indication of this anonymous master: "Ad oppositum illius videtur esse quidam Reverendus magister meus Dorem [*sic*] in tractatu suo de proportionibus in capitulo primo ubi sic dicit: Omnes proportionibus equales..."

⁴⁸ J. A. Weisheipl, "Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 173-4.

⁴⁹ Beginning "Continuum est quantum cuius partes ad invicem copulantur. Continuum permanens est continuum cuius partes singule manent simul..." See the study of this work by Edward Stamm, "Tractatus de continuo von Thomas Bradwardina," *Isis*, 26 (1936-7), 1332. Dr. John Murdoch of Harvard is preparing the text and a study of this work for publication. I am grateful to him for the use of his text.

⁵⁰ This was edited by Sir Henry Saville on the basis of six good manuscripts and published in London in 1618.

Michalski attempted to prove that this work must have been written around 1322-25,⁵¹ it is virtually certain that the work was completed at London in 1344 while Bradwardine was Chancellor of St. Paul's.⁵² As Chancellor of a Cathedral Chapter Bradwardine would be obliged to provide lectures in theology,⁵³ and the *De causa Dei* may very well have been the result of those lectures, at least in part. The fragments of a *questio* on future contingent events, edited by B. M. Xiberta,⁵⁴ would seem to antecede at least Book III of *De causa Dei*.⁵⁵

In the preface Bradwardine mentioned that he had heard certain "advocates of Pelagius" affirm that Pelagius could never have been convicted of error by purely natural and philosophical arguments, but only by the authority of the Church." To disprove this contention Bradwardine attacked the *Pelagiani* of his day "per rationes et auctoritates philosophicas." There can be little doubt that among those who "hodie cum Pelagio pro libero arbitrio contra gratuitam gratiam tuam pugnant," Bradwardine

⁵¹ "Le Problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au xiv^e siècle," *ed. cit.*, 235-9, 302. Basically Michalski's arguments rest on his belief that Bradwardine's work influenced Nicolas of Autrecourt (summoned to Avignon in 1340), Jean de Mirecourt (lectured on the *Sentences* 1344-45 or 1345-46) and Gregory of Rimini (lectures on the *Sentences* in 1344).

⁵² While it is true as Michalski observed, that "perscriptum London. 1344" does not necessarily indicate the date of publication, it would seem that in this case 1344 is the date of publication and not merely that of the particular codex. This date is given in at least three other MSS and there are none earlier. MS Lambeth Pal. 32 ends "perscriptum Cantebrigie a.d. Mill.CCC^o octogesimo quinto, editum ab eodem Thoma London. A.d. Mill.CCC^o quadregesimo quarto." There is not sufficient proof that Bradwardine influenced Nicolas of Autrecourt, as has been pointed out by S. Hahn, "Thomas Bradwardinus und seine Lehre von der menschlichen Willensfreiheit," B.G.P.M.A., Band 5, Heft 2 (Münster, 1905), 53, and J. R. Weinberg, *Nicolaus of Autrecourt* (Princeton, 1948), 66-67. For the opposite view see G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians* (Cambridge, 1957), 3, 265-6. Gregory of Rimini, as far as I can judge, shows no awareness of Bradwardine's doctrines in those questions where he would be most likely to note them; the two editorial references in the margin of II Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1 and d. 38, a. 1, a. 2 (ed. Venice, 1522, fol. 105va and fol. 125vb) are too vague to prove that Gregory read Bradwardine's *De causa Dei*. This is also the opinion of J. F. Laun, "Thomas von Bradwardina, der Schüler Augustins und Lehrer Wiclifs," *Imago Dei* (Vortrag, gehalten am 17. August 1928 auf dem Internationalen Historikerkongress in Oslo), 51-93. Bradwardine's influence on Jean de Mirecourt is better established; see Michalski, *op. cit.*, Denifle, *Chart. Univ. Par.*, 2, 613 note.

⁵³ W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1955) 111.

⁵⁴ "Fragments d'une *questio* inédite de Tomàs Bradwardine," in *Festschrift M. Grabmann* [B.G.P.M.A., suppl. III, 2 (Münster, 1935), 1169-1180]. Bradwardine refers to an earlier question in this collection, now missing: "...ut praedictum est in *queastione* de peccato, scilicet *utrum* Deus sit causa peccati." *ibid.*, 1172.

⁵⁵ After a brief discussion of human free will Bradwardine says, "Sed hoc non dico asserendo, quia istam materiam non bene studui adhuc." *ibid.*, 1176. But he does deal with this question in great detail in *De causa Dei*, III, esp. chap. 12.

intended to include Ockham and his followers. The principal charge of heresy brought against Ockham by Lutterell was one of Pelagianism.⁵⁶ By reducing "grace" to a word which signified the divine acceptance of a human act or person,⁵⁷ even though that person may be separated from God by sin,⁵⁸ Ockham denied the reality of grace as an intrinsic entity and the reality of God's activity within creatures. But it is also clear that Bradwardine intended to attack more than Ockhamist nominalism, for he developed a doctrine which denied that the human will could perform any good act⁵⁹ or overcome any temptation without God's *auxilium speciale*,⁶⁰ and maintained that in a certain sense God necessitates even the free acts of creatures⁶¹ in His way of operating through all creatures.

Although we are not particularly concerned with Bradwardine's theological works, his *De causa Dei* is important not only in revealing the intellectual climate of the mid-fourteenth century, but also in illuminating his view of physical problems.⁶² Bradwardine deals with what might be called "metaphysical" problems only in the context of *De causa Dei*.

Here mention should be made of the rather unusual victory sermon, the *Sermo Epinicius*, preached to the king and his troops in France some time after the battle of Crécy, 26 August 1346, and shortly after (*recentissime*) news reached the King of the English victory over the Scots at Neville's Cross near Durham, 17 October. Without doubt the sermon was delivered as part of a celebration of thanksgiving to God for the victories granted to the English forces before plans were made for the siege of Calais, begun shortly after. It would therefore seem that the *sermo epinicius* was

⁵⁶ See A. Pelzer, "Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam censurés en Avignon," *Revue d'hist. ecclési.*, 18 (1922), 250-254; J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham," *Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd.*, 7 (1935), 375-380, esp. art. 14, 16, 18, 20 and 35.

⁵⁷ Ockham, *Sent.*, III, q. V, *ed. cit.*, G-O.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Adam Woodham, I *Sent.*, d. 17, qq. 2-3, MS. Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15892; also III, q. 6. See A. Pelzer, *op. cit.*, concl. 2, p. 253. The extremes to which this view was carried can be seen from the opinions contained in the anonymous commentary on the *Sentences* found in MS Vat. lat. 986, esp. fol. 83v-93. This seems to be a Parisian commentary dating about 1370, delivered under "magister Amandus" (fol. 55vb); the author was very well acquainted with such English writers as Bradwardine, Ockham, Kilmington, Billingham, Rogeth, Aston, Chaton, Halifax (Eliphaz) and Granthon. See Wyclif's description of the "modern Pelagians" who claim that by God's *potentia absoluta* man may gain supernatural merit without grace, *De ente librorum duorum excerpta* (Wyclif Society, London, 1909) 195.

⁵⁹ Bradwardine, *De causa Dei*, I, cap. 41, *ed. cit.*, 373-4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, II, cap. 4-7, *ed. cit.*, 472-491.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III, cap. 1-2, *ed. cit.*, 637-649. Bradwardine's view is accurately expressed, although not explained in Chaucer's "The Nun's Priest's Tale."

⁶² See A. Koyré, "Le vide et l'espace infini au XIV^e siècle," *Archives d'Hist. doctr. et litt. du M.-A.*, 17 (1949), 80-91.

delivered in English some time late in October or early November of 1346. It is a strange sermon in which various false reasons for victory are rejected and the sole reason for victory proclaimed, namely God who rewards the virtuous English.⁶³ The sermon is not complete and exists in only one manuscript in Latin translation; at least it is sufficient to indicate Bradwardine's frame of mind.

IV. WILLIAM HEYTESBURY

P. Duhem has already indicated something of Heytesbury's great influence on the Italian schools of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,⁶⁴ but he failed to place Heytesbury correctly in his Oxford milieu. Although Duhem knew the work of R. L. Poole in the D.N.B., he insisted on dating Heytesbury's works after the *Summa* of John Dumbleton and half a century after Bradwardine's *Tractatus*.⁶⁵ A. Maier seems to be more correct in accepting the works of Heytesbury and Dumbleton as more or less contemporary.⁶⁶

William of Heytesbury must have been born by 1313, and it seems most likely that he came from Wiltshire in the Salisbury diocese. He is first mentioned in the Merton records as Fellow in 1330.⁶⁷ In February, 1340, he was named one of the foundation Fellows of Queen's College.⁶⁸ Since the statutes of Queen's required that a candidate for Fellowship should have completed his necessary regency in arts and be well fitted to study theology,⁶⁹ we may assume that Heytesbury was already a theological student in 1340. But it appears that Heytesbury did not remain long at Queen's, for he is again mentioned among the Fellows of Merton.⁷⁰ There can be no doubt that Heytesbury became a Master in Theology, but the date of his inception is not known. The earliest known document to give

⁶³ Ed. H. A. Oberman and J. A. Weisheipl, "The *Sermo Epiniarius* ascribed to Thomas Bradwardine (1346)," *Archives d'Hist. doctr. et litt. du M.-A.*, 25 (1958), 295-329.

⁶⁴ *Études*, 3, 493-510.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 406, 420, 469.

⁶⁶ *Studien*, 3, 265-281.

⁶⁷ Mert. Rec. 3660. Heytesbury was first bursar of the College in 1338-9. A fragmentary record of three college scrutinies held during 1338-9, containing Heytesbury's comments, was published by Allen and Garrod, *Merton Muniments* (Oxford, O.H.S., 1928) 32-35.

⁶⁸ *Statutes of the Colleges of Oxford* (London, 1853), vol. 1. Statutes of Queen's College, Oxford, p. 7. Cf. J. R. Magrath, *The Queen's College* (Oxford, 1921), 1, 91-94.

⁶⁹ *Statutes of Queen's College*, ed. cit., 12.

⁷⁰ Mert. Rec. 3673, 3679. See A. B. Emden, *op. cit.*, 2, 927-8.

him the title of "Doctor in Theology" is dated July 1348.⁷¹ In a University roll for papal graces compiled before February 1363 he is called "late Chancellor of the University."⁷² If this statement is correct, Heytesbury must have held office 1353-1354, the only period for which no chancellor is known,⁷³ or else he merely filled the office temporarily between two chancellorships. According to another document he was Chancellor again on November 9, 1371⁷⁴; hence Salter surmised that Heytesbury held office from Pentecost 1370 until Pentecost 1372.⁷⁵ It appears that Heytesbury died in December of 1372 or in January 1373.⁷⁶ His will, dated 17 December 1372, was proved on February 5, 1373.

It would seem that all of Heytesbury's known works date from his regency in arts, which may be placed approximately between 1331 and 1339. According to an Erfurt MS, Amplon. F. 135, fol. 17rb, the *Regulae solvendi sophismata* was "datus Oxonie a mag. Wilhelmo de Hyttisbyri a.D. M^oCCC^oXXXV^o." This particular codex, begun on 22 July 1337,⁷⁷ was purchased by Amplonius in Prague on 12 March 1399.⁷⁸ Although the treatise bears no title in the codex, Amplonius added the note "et vocatur communi nomine loyca Hesbri." The treatise in this codex is without prologue and begins "Secundum Philosophum in Predicamentis quarto capitulo, quadratura circuli..." The printed edition of 1494 claims to be a "corrected" version, but apart from the prologue and the opening of the first chapter, the Erfurt text is practically identical with that of the printed edition, as Miss Maier has shown.⁷⁹ It would seem, however, that the *prohemium* was added by Heytesbury after he had completed the original text of his "summula," as he called it, that is, shortly after 1335.

In the *prohemium* Heytesbury seems to address the "juvenes studio logicalium agentes primum annum," and says that he would like to have

⁷¹ When he was a witness to an indenture together with William de Haukesworth, who was then acting on behalf of the Chancellor. *Mun. Acad. Oxon.*, London (R.S.), 1, 167. Two documents of early 1349 testify to his doctorate in theology, *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 1, 146, and *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 3, 298, dated March 7.

⁷² *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 2, 402; this petition was granted at Avignon on February 15.

⁷³ *Snappe's Formulary*, ed. H. E. Salter (O.H.S.), 328.

⁷⁴ *Mun. Civ. Oxon.*, ed. H. E. Salter (O.H.S.), 149.

⁷⁵ *Snappe's Formulary*, ed. cit., 330.

⁷⁶ For Heytesbury's will, see Emden, *loc. cit.*

⁷⁷ Fol. 1 in upper margin: "Inceptum est hoc opus in festo Magdalene a.d. 1337 littera dominicale c."

⁷⁸ Amplonius' note is added at the end of the treatise, fol. 17rb.

⁷⁹ *Studien*, 3, 266, note 26. I have carefully compared photographs of the Erfurt text with the printed edition of Venice 1494 and with MS Canon. Misc. 221, fol. 60-85. Generally the reading of the Erfurt MS is superior and I have relied upon it for the most part.

written a short summa of rules for the solving of *sophismata*, but this was rendered impossible by the inflated words of the old sophisters and the indignation of promotors seeking higher things.⁸⁰ Although Heytesbury addressed students of first year logic, the treatise itself would certainly have surpassed their capacities. The real purpose of the treatise was to help sophisters *respondere* in disputations.⁸¹ It presupposes a certain amount of knowledge of physical problems and covers all the new treatises of logic. The *Loyca* or *Regulae solvendi sophismata* is divided into six chapters: (1) *De insolubilibus*, (2) *De scire et dubitare*, (3) *De relativis*, (4) *De incipit et desinit*, (5) *De maximo et minimo*, (6) *De tribus predicamentis*. Many questions of physics arise in the fourth and fifth chapters, and the last chapter is devoted entirely to questions of physical motion. The five chapters of *De probationibus conclusionum*,⁸² undoubtedly written in conjunction with or shortly after the *Regulae*, correspond perfectly to the *Regulae*, with the exception of the treatise on *insolubilia*. Thus, although many problems of physical science arise in these works of Heytesbury, they are primarily works of logic.

Besides these works and *De sensu composito et diviso*, *Sophismata XXXII*, and *De veritate et falsitate propositionis* found in the printed edition of 1494, certain other works of Heytesbury should be noted here. A *Tractatus consequentiarum* was printed in the Venice edition of 1517 (fol. 106v-115v) but this text differs somewhat from the manuscripts that have been examined.⁸³ A unique *Tractatus Hentisberi de propositionum multiplicium significatione valde raro inventus* is contained in Venice, S. Marco, lat. Cl. VI, cod. 160 (2816), fol. 252-253v; the codex is dated 1443, but the work is clearly ascribed to Heytesbury and internal evidence does not contradict this. It begins, "Qui autem nominum virtutis sunt ignari et ipsi disputantes et alios audientes paralogizant de facili, primo Elencorum. Cum igitur in disputatione cuiuslibet..." Moreover, there are a series of *Casus obligatorii* ascribed to him in certain manuscripts beginning, "Primo ponitur talis

⁸⁰ Here the reading of the printed edition is better than MS Canon. Misc. 221.

⁸¹ "atque responsalem oportet nosce evellere," "...responsalem efficit certiore," etc. MS Canon. Misc. 221, fol. 60ra.

⁸² Ed. Venice, 1494, fol. 188v-203. MS Canon. Misc. 376, fol. 23-32, contains only chapters three to five, but chapters three and five are themselves incomplete. The authenticity of the *De probationibus conclusionum* is not beyond dispute. See C. Wilson, *William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1956) 210. The usual phrase in the manuscripts "probationes conclusionum hentisberi" could be interpreted as meaning an anonymous commentator's proofs of the conclusions in Heytesbury's *Regulae*. The clearest ascription is found in Florence, Laurenz. Ashburn. 171, fol. 13-31ra: "Expliciunt conclusiones Tisberi super suis regulis." But this manuscript is dated 1440.

⁸³ Cambridge, Caius College MS 182/215, pp. 102-116, Corpus Christi College MS 244, fol. 39v-58, Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 277 (1728), fol. 23-33.

casus quod heri videmus: Sortes et nullus alius...".⁸⁴ Finally, the well known *Termini naturales*, beginning, "Natura est principium motus et quietis..." is ascribed to Heytesbury in Clm 8997, fol. 167. This treatise, as we have pointed out, is a beginners' text of definitions and divisions in natural philosophy, and may very well have been "compilata a magistro Wilhelmo Hesbri," but it is of little speculative importance. However, as this treatise was very widely used, "secundum usum Oxonii," we will publish this work at a future date as an example of a beginner's text in physics. Heytesbury's *Sophismata* were frequently copied and commented upon. MS Vat. lat. 3056, fol. 1-41, contains an epitome of these *sophismata* completed "anno domini M^oCCC^o octogesimo octavo in nostro collegio de Mertone."⁸⁵

Thus far no theological works ascribed to Heytesbury have been discovered.⁸⁶

Although Heytesbury was never outspoken in his defence of Ockham's doctrines, he clearly did accept the fundamental ideas of Ockham's logic and natural philosophy. In logic Heytesbury implies an acceptance of Ockham's view of *suppositio simplex* in his complicated rules of distribution, requiring that a complete enumeration of singulars be made before a word can truly represent a singular.⁸⁷ In natural philosophy Heytesbury tacitly accepts Ockham's doctrine of substance and quantity, motion and time. He represents a curious combination of a logician who accepted most of Ockham's philosophy and at the same time had an interest in developing Bradwardine's mathematical approach to physical problems. Nevertheless, in spite of Heytesbury's contributions to the mathematical development of physical problems, he was formally a logician. He always approached physical problems through a logical analysis of terms which in his day in-

⁸⁴ Oxford, Bodl. Canon. Lat. 278, fol. 70-72, and Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 310 (1577), fol. 96 va-b. There are also two different treatises *De insolubilibus* ascribed to Heytesbury besides the printed version.

⁸⁵ Beginning "Adspiciens a longe conditionem iuvenum elegancium suis ingeniis tanquam visibus auelinis..." Venice, S. Marco, Z. lat. 310 (1577), fol. 54-78v, contains "Sex sophismata principalia edita et compilata per mag. Guilielmum Hentisberum, doctorem anglicum, regem sophistarum."

⁸⁶ The theological *Repertorium argumentorum* of Stephen Patrington includes arguments taken from Heytesbury, but all of these are from his logical works. MS Cambridge, St. John's College 103, fol. 1-109; another copy is to be found in Venice S. Marco, Z. lat. 280, fol. 21-131.

⁸⁷ "Nam ad hoc quod universalis aliqua per inductionem probetur, requiritur quod pro tot singularibus fiat inductio, pro quot in universali fit distributio, ut in tali universali, ut praetactum est, pro quolibet quod de necessitate erit, et etiam pro quolibet quod erit, fiat distributio requiritur, quod pro illis singularibus fiat inductio, et tunc habebit universalis ista aliquas singulares falsas." MS Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 160 (2816), fol. 252va.

volved mathematical proportions.⁸⁸ Intellectually Heytesbury belonged to the generation after Ockham, Burley and Bradwardine. Instead of reacting to Ockham's doctrines, as Bradwardine had done, he became a disciple of both Ockham and Bradwardine. However it can be doubted that Heytesbury ever met Ockham or was ever a student under Bradwardine.

V. JOHN DUMBLETON

Dumbleton was much more open in his adherence to Ockham's doctrines than Heytesbury, although he never quoted Ockham once by name. Very little is known about John de Dumbleton. Undoubtedly he was a native of the village of Dumbleton in Gloucestershire within the diocese of Worcester. We know that he was a Fellow of Merton College in 1338⁸⁹ and that he was still there in 1347-8.⁹⁰ The Merton scrutinies of 1338-39 mention him in the company of William Heytesbury, John Ashinden, William Sutton, Simon Bredon and Thomas Buckingham. However it would seem that Dumbleton was somewhat younger than Heytesbury, who is first mentioned at Merton in 1330.⁹¹ We also know that Master "Johannes de Dumbelton" was named as a Fellow of Queen's College in the founder's statutes of February 10, 1340.⁹² This means that Dumbleton had completed his regency in Arts by that date and that he at least intended to study theology and to take Holy Orders.⁹³ Clearly he did not remain at Queen's, for he is again mentioned in the Merton records for 1344-45.⁹⁴ Nothing more is known about him except that he wrote a large *Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis*.⁹⁵ It is assumed that Dumbleton died of the plague around 1349, since nothing more is heard of him.

⁸⁸ See C. Wilson, *op. cit.*

⁸⁹ *Merton Muniments*, ed. P. S. Allen and H. W. Garrod (Oxford, 1928) 34, 35. Merton Records 3673, 3676-7.

⁹⁰ Mert. Rec. 3680. See Emden, *op. cit.*, I, 603.

⁹¹ R. L. Poole in the D.N.B. rightly distinguished the Merton Fellow from John of Dumbleton, a monk of Worcester, who in November 1299 was appointed prior of Little Malvern (*Annales Wigorn. Monast.*, London (R.S.), ed. H. R. Luard, 4, 548). See also Little and Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians* [Oxford (O.H.S.), 1934], 236-8. But he must also be distinguished from Thomas de Dombelton, M.A., to whom Pope John XXII on July 6, 1330, reserved a benefice in the gift of the abbot and convent of Abingdon (*Cal. Pap. Let.*, 2, 321); see also Merton Rec. 3660 for 1330: "magister Thomas Dumbelton."

⁹² *Statutes of the Colleges of Oxford*, (London, 1853), vol. 1, "Statutes of Queen's College, Oxford," p. 7.

⁹³ See "Statutes of Queen's College, Oxford," *ed. cit.*, 6, 12-14.

⁹⁴ Mert. Rec. 3676-7. Cf. J. R. Magrath, *The Queen's College* (Oxford, 1921), 92-93.

⁹⁵ This work has been variously called "Summa theologiae maior," "Summa philosophiae," "In philosophiam moralem libri X," etc. See Tanner, *Bibl. Brit.-Hib.*, *ed. cit.*, 237. But these are

Further details of his life can be obtained from a study of the manuscripts of his work. A late 14th or early 15th century manuscript of Dumbleton's *Summa* in the Antoniana Library, Padua, Scaff. XVII, n. 375, notes at the end of the first part (fol. 21rb): "Explicit prima pars Summe magistri Johannis de dulmenton anglici baccularii sacre theologie." The first two folios are missing in the codex and Part IX is unfinished. This is the only evidence known of Dumbleton having been a bachelor in theology, but there is no reason to doubt this testimony. If the scribe were merely giving Dumbleton titles gratuitously, he surely would have made him a master. Furthermore if Dumbleton began his theological studies around 1340, as he apparently intended, he would have been a bachelor in theology by 1349, the assumed date of his death, and not a Master.

The *Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis* is a huge work divided into ten parts. The first part, or the *Summa logicae*, is not a summary of the traditional Aristotelian books. Rather it has a peculiar unity of its own centered around the new logical treatises and deals particularly with the intension and remission of certitude. It is divided into four "articles":⁹⁶ (i) on the signification of terms and the *insolubilia*, (ii) the treatise *de scire et dubitare*⁹⁷ and the intension and remission of knowledge and doubt, (iii) questions of more or less in knowledge, (iv) on the principles of knowledge and the increase of credulity and science. Unlike Heytesbury, Dumbleton does not concern himself with questions of pure physics in his logic; but he is concerned with the psychology of logic more than with the Aristotelian books.

Part II-X of Dumbleton's *Summa*, the only one produced by the early Mertonians on natural philosophy, is really a collection of certain *dubia*

all one and the same work. It is difficult to know what Tanner meant by "Summam theol. minorem, lib. i" and "Summam artium, lib. i," as he gives no initium or reference to where he saw these works.

⁹⁶ The manuscript readings are faulty on this division: "Prima pars quatuor pertractat articulos: 1° significationis termini et eius impositionis ad placitum cum aliis incidentibus, causam si que sit naturem ostendit. 2° [sic] quid est prius esse alio, ac magis scire nature et nobis, qualiter confusa magis distinctionis universalis plus particularibus cognoscimus, et de cognitione diffinitionis respectu diffiniti, et eius partium investigat. 3° [sic] de principiis doctrine nostre primarie ac de intensione credulitatis et sciencie quasdam asserit conclusiones." We quote the reading in MS Vat. lat. 6750, fol. 1ra, which basically corresponds with MSS Pal. lat. 1056, Worcester Cath. F. 6 and F. 23, Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 79, and Magdalen College 195. The enumeration in MS Magdalen College 32 is clearly wrong, and the forced distribution into four found in MS Merton College 306 does not agree with the actual division.

⁹⁷ Dumbleton himself refers to this "article" in this way: "Hec responsio improbat tractatu de scire et dubitare diffusius." MS Vat. lat. 6750, fol. 1vb; the reference is to cap. 20, according to the chapter divisions given in Vat. lat. 6750.

"magnorum librorum naturalium quinque."⁹⁸ Parts II and III correspond to the first six books of the *Physics*:

Secunda pars de primis principiis, scilicet materia et forma, et de opinionibus multipliciter formarum substantialium primarum qualitatum ac secundarum intensionem ponentibus, et de intensione qualitatis uniformis et difformis latitudinis secundum rem seu secundum nomen dicte, cum descriptione intensionis mixtorum quedam sustinenda demonstrat.

Tertia pars causam veri motus in tribus predicamentis et quam proportionem motus sequitur consignificat distanciam et penes quam velocitates motus alteracionis et augmentacionis, et de latitudine raritatis et densitatis vere habent attendi concludi; ultimo de motu et tempore quid et qualia sint rationibus inquit et in eadem, motum uniformiter acquisitum medio gradui equivalere cum conclusionibus aliis demonstratur.

Parts IV, V and VI basically correspond to *De caelo et mundo*, *Meteora* and to part of the Eighth Book of the *Physics*:

Quarta pars de natura elementorum inquirens: 1° si summa elementa utramque qualitatis summe habeant et qualiter prime qualitates sunt active ostendere insistit, 2° de reactione inter easdem et qualiter qualitates prime formas primas, et densitas et raritas summa et remissa corpora naturaliter consequantur diffinit, et si eadem ab aliis qualitativis sunt distincte, 3° item qualiter potencie corporum magnitudines eorum sequantur, et si iuxta sese alterent, et qualia sint pura hec eadem quarta demonstrat.

Quinta pars agens de actione spirituali, si lux alicui elemento competat, qualiter simplex vel resultans existat enarrat. Item eadem de differentia formarum superiorum et inferiorum, lumen agencium, et de accione earum uniformi et difformi respectu agentis et passi dubia edisserit.

Sexta pars de finibus potenciarum tractans: 1° potenciam activam difficultate terminare docet, 2° de accione naturali et fine formarum, ut sunt motus et quies deducendo si forma sit proprie mobilis, et si forma et locus attribuuntur equaliter generato iuxta ceteras partes hec sexta pars exprimit. Insuper eadem iuxta processum Philosophi circa motores et motus celestes dubia commovens, quomodo corpora naturalia quantitate terminantur, et si ad primum motorem sit deveniendum, attendendo que corpora ex se moventur, et de aliis que in eodem deficiunt determinat.

Part VII corresponds to the two Books of *De generatione et corruptione*, the Seventh Book of the *Physics* and to the remaining part of the Eighth:

Septima pars causam individuorum et specierum generabilium et corruptibilium quantum ad numerum et ordinem potenciarum materie et agentis persuadet, et numquid primum motorem infinite virtutis existere, et mundum et motum non incepisse ratione philosophica comprobantur.

The last three parts of the *Summa* are devoted to the generation of living creatures, the operation of senses and intellect. Hence they correspond

⁹⁸ Here we quote the text contained in MS Vat. lat. 6750.

to the problems of *De anima* together with the other books of biology and botany:

In octava parte primo de generacione substancie a simili et animalium perfectorum et putrefactibilium pertractatur. Item de unitate anime numerali respectu anime sensibilis et intellectualis, et de operacionibus anime intellective tractatum suum consummat.

Nona pars iuxta seriem processus 2^o De anima de quinque sensibus dubia et plurima pertinencia eedem materie et plurimas questiones decidit.

Decima et ultima pars de universalibus que idee apud Platonem dicuntur et de passivitate intellectus humani quantum ad susceptionem intentionum aliquius eiusdem operatione simplici atque complexa quamdam sententiam concludens huius summe finem imponit. Cuius prima parte et decima intellectus propositionum significancium pro complexis qualitercumque nobis naturalis solucio intimatur.

Among the 19 known MSS of Dumbleton's *Summa* not one contains the tenth, and perhaps most interesting part. All the "complete" manuscripts end in Part IX with the words "...asserunt sic, rem visualem in se continere activitatem, naturalium enim exemplum sepe stat procul respicit et a longe." It is not clear whether this is all Dumbleton intended to include among the "plurima pertinentia" of the ninth part. It is possible that Dumbleton died around 1349 without completing his *Summa*. Further considerations tend to confirm this view.

A noticeable difference of procedure can be detected from about the middle of part VI onward. The earlier portion discusses *dubia* with lengthy discussions "contra," "respondetur" and "contra responsionem," the structure of which gives the impression of material drawn from actual classroom disputations. The second portion, on the other hand, deals rather with certain difficult passages in Aristotle, Avicenna or in the Commentator, giving the impression that Dumbleton never actually lectured on those questions of embryology, botany or the physiology of sensation, but wished to complete his *Summa* according to plan, even though he was then studying theology. In this case it is not at all unlikely that Dumbleton was overtaken by death before he could complete his *Summa*.

The date *post quem* of the *Summa's* composition can be fixed with some certainty. First, it must be noted that Cajetan de Thienis is misleading on this point. In his commentary on Heytesbury's *Regulae solvendi sophismata* Cajetan ascribes the first erroneous opinion listed concerning *insolubilia* to Swineshead, the second to Dumbleton and the third to Richard Kilmington.⁹⁹ At first sight one would assume that Heytesbury's work was

⁹⁹ "Prima harum posicionum est suisset; secunda ponitur a dulmentone; et tertia est ricardi Clientonis in sophismatibus suis." MS Venice, S. Marco, lat. VI, 160 (2816), fol. 122rb.

posterior to those of the others mentioned by Cajetan. In actual fact Heytesbury's *Regulae* was prior to the first part of Dumbleton's *Summa*. Although the second opinion which Heytesbury rejected was defended by Dumbleton, neither the actual phrasing of this opinion in Heytesbury nor the arguments are to be found anywhere in Dumbleton's work. But Heytesbury's opinion (the fourth listed by Dumbleton) is rejected and answered verbatim by Dumbleton, as a comparison of the two texts will indicate.

Heytesbury, *Regulae*, cap. 1 MS Am-
plon. F. 135, fol. 2va.

Una [suppositio] est: casus de insolubili est in quo fit mencio de aliqua proposicione que si cum eodem casu significaret precise sicut verba illius communiter pretendunt, sequeretur eam esse veram et etiam esse falsam. Alia est quod propositio est insolubilis de qua fit mencio in casu de insolubili, que si cum eodem casu significaret precise sicut verba communiter pretendunt, sequeretur eam esse veram et etiam esse falsam, v.g., si ponatur quod Sortes dicat talem proposicionem "Sortes dicit falsum" et nullam aliam, vel talem "Sortes non dicit verum," vel talem "Sortes dicit aliter quam est," aut quod talis propositio "Falsum est" sit quelibet propositio, aut quod hec sit quelibet propositio "Nulla propositio est vera"; et sic de talibus quibus talis casus dicitur insolubilis. Et ista propositio "Sortes dicit falsum" in tali casu dicitur propositio insolubilis, quia si ista in tali casu significaret precise quod Sortes dicit falsum, sequitur eam esse veram et etiam eam esse falsam...

[Secunda regula] Secundo est advertendum quod si ponatur casus de insolubili et cum hoc supponatur quod illud insolubile significat precise sicut termini illius pretendunt communiter, casus ille nullatenus admittatur, sicut cum supponatur quod falsum ista propositio "falsum est," sic quelibet propositio; et quod ista propositio significet precise "falsum est" statim reiiciendus est ille casus et quelibet convertibilis cum eodem.

Dumbleton, *Summa*, P.I., c. 6, c. 10
MS Vat. lat. 6750, fol. 3rb, 4ra.

Tertia [opinio] dicit seipsum insolubile falsificatur, non obstante quod significat precise sicut est, quam *quarta* [opinio] redarguens ponit pro principio quod nullum insolubile significat sicut verba pretendunt, in quo convenit cum *secunda* nominata. Tamen discrepat in hoc quod negat causam falsitatis insolubilis assignatam ab eadem, nec dicit aliquam significacionem quare insolubile est negandum.

Quarta opinio scribit quod nullum insolubile significat precise sicut verba pretendunt; et quia non dicit qualiter precise significat, nec que sit significacio propter quam insolubile est negandum, ideo hec positio prius attemptat solvere quam scit precisam significacionem proposicionis solvende. Quare non ordine competenti procedit, cum prius requiritur cognicio totalis significacionis proposicionis antequam ab aliquo ipsa solvatur.

Secundo: licet hec positio dicit hanc "falsum est" non solum sic significare, non tamen exponit utrum sit impossibile vel possibile. Et per consequens non solvit, cum solutio sit manifestacio falsitatis secundum quam propositio solvenda falsa est.

Tercio: si hec "falsum est" ipsa sola existente significat aliter quam quod "falsum est," vel igitur eo ipso quod significat quod "falsum est" significat aliter, vel ex hoc quod ita est omnis propositio, quorum neutrum hec positio dicit nec manifestat.

In the second and third parts of the *Summa* certain opinions concerning the velocity of alteration and augmentation are rejected. These opinions were proposed verbatim by Heytesbury in Chapter V of his *Regulae*. Therefore it seems clear that Dumbleton began his *Summa* some time after 1335. The composition would require a considerable number of years and may very well have been left unfinished by Dumbleton's death in 1349.

Besides the *Summa* certain other works have been attributed to Dumbleton.¹ Merton College MS 306, fol. 3-7, contains a logical work on *insolubilia*, the signification and supposition of terms, and *de arte obligatoria*, beginning "De sophismatibus, que non re sed nomine insolubilia extant, superest pertractare..." This treatise is anonymous and without title.² A late table of contents ascribes this to Dumbleton, whose *Summa* fills the rest of the codex. On the basis of this table of contents Tanner,³ Coxe⁴ and R. L. Poole⁵ have attributed this work to Dumbleton. This treatise is in reality a commentary on an unidentified logical "summulae" dealing with *insolubilia* and *obligatoria*.⁶ It seems more probable, however, that this commentary should not be attributed to Dumbleton. Concerning the first type of insoluble propositions, the anonymous author maintains that "intentiones in anima non ad placitum, sed naturaliter significant."⁷ But it is precisely this notion which Dumbleton rejects so vehemently in the first part of his *Summa*, maintaining that "nullus terminus aliquam rem significat naturaliter,"⁸ but "quilibet terminus cuiuscumque rei est signi-

¹ I make no mention of the Commentary on the Canticles ascribed to Dumbley, which Leland listed together with Dumbleton because of the confusion of names (cf. Tanner, *loc. cit.*). Nor do I mention the verses contained in Merton College MS 306, fol. 8, noted by Wood (cf. R. L. Poole, article in D.N.B.).

² At the end of the treatise there is written "Expliciunt tractatus de diversis insolubilibus, et de significatione et suppositione terminorum et confusione et distributione eorum et de modis... signis universalibus, et de arte obligatoria cum aliis incidentibus." (fol. 7rb).

³ *Bibl. Brit.-Hib.*, ed. cit., 237.

⁴ *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum qui in Collegiis Aulisque Oxon. hodie adserventur* (Oxford, 1852) t. 1, Mertonenses, p. 121.

⁵ R. L. Poole, article in D.N.B.

⁶ "Disciplinarum logicalium tria inter ceteras ut utiles exercentur. Prima de termini significatione, que non in principio illius summule distinguitur. Set secunda et tertia aliquantulum possunt ulterius et summarie indicari (?), ut que in eis obscure et superflue conscribuntur exponi liceat et restringi. Quarum prima est de suppositione termini, secunda ars obligatoria." fol. 2r.

⁷ "Quorum primus casus sit ille quod quilibet homo intelligens verum sedeat et solum talis, habente Sorte in anima sua solum hanc 'Sortes non sedet,' que sit A, de qua non oportet supponere illam solum se significare, quia intenciones in anima non ad placitum, sed naturaliter significant." *ibid.*, fol. 1r.

⁸ *Summa*, P. I, c. 1, MS Vat. lat. 6750, fol. 1rb.

ficativus ad placitum,"⁹ and then only when there is "actualis comprehensio per eundem."¹⁰

P. Duhem believed that he discovered a *sophisma* of Dumbleton in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16621.¹¹ This philosophical miscellany is a paper codex of the second half of the 14th century, formerly belonging to the Sorbonne. It seems to be a student's notebook containing various works of Burley, Bradwardine, Dumbleton, Swineshead, Oresme and others.¹² But the fragmentary selections from Dumbleton and Swineshead are badly ordered, since the scribe copied the *sexterni* and *quaterni* as they became available, and it is difficult to determine the beginning and end of distinct treatises. Duhem believed that this notebook contains not only extracts from the *Summa* of Dumbleton, but also a fragment not derived from the *Summa*. This fragment Duhem believed to be composed of three parts: *De motu locali demonstrata per Dulmenton* (fol. 114v-116v), a *sophisma*, "Uniformiter continue variabitur alteratio uniformis..." (fol. 124r-130r), and an *alia questio* "de maximo spacio lineari pertransito" (fol. 130v-139r). Duhem attributed these three "parts" as though they were one work to Dumbleton because of two tables of contents, which appear to group them together.¹³ On further examination these "parts" prove to be distinct works. The first of these is undoubtedly by Dumbleton, but it belongs to his *Summa*, P. III, cap. 7-8, beginning "Sequitur dicere qualiter motus sequitur proportionem..." This is a very poor text and actually continues on fol. 117r, where part of the following chapter is repeated and cancelled, and immediately precedes the subsequent text contained on folios 117v-124v. The "part" noticed by Duhem is really based on Bradwardine's *Tractatus de proportionibus velocitatum*, and for this reason the scribe called it "Dulmenton de proportionibus motuum." The second work is not actually ascribed to Dumbleton in the codex either in the two tables of contents or in the text. But on the top margin of fol. 130 there is inscribed the name "Dulmenton". The authenticity of this attribution is not at all clear. Bale attributes a *sophisma* beginning "Uniformiter continue variari..." to a certain John of

⁹ *Summa*, P. I, c. 2, *MS cit.*, fol. 1vb.

¹⁰ *Summa*, P. I, c. 13, *MS cit.*, fol. 5ra.

¹¹ *Études*, III, 426.

¹² L. Delisle already noted that the same hand wrote MSS lat. 16533-5. Cf. *Inventaire des manuscrits latins...*, 31 (1870), 71.

¹³ "Item de Dulmenton de uniformiter difformi varia cum quodam sophismate forti de uniformiter difformi in sequenti cisterno. Item de maximo spacio lineari pertransito questio, una cum articulis notabilibus. Hec in duobus cisternis." (fol. 13v). "Dulmenton de proportionibus motuum, gradu medio et similibus; unum sophisma de alteratione uniformiter difformi; questio una de maximo spacio lineari cum quibusdam similis materie." (fol. 64v).

Tewkesbury, who is said to have flourished around 1350.¹⁴ But Bale gave no source for this information and no work with this beginning ascribed to John of Tewkesbury has yet been found.¹⁵ The third work, or "part" of a fragment, contained in Bibl. Nat. 16621 is not explicitly ascribed to Dumbleton at all. Duhem merely assumed that it belonged to the first "part" and attributed it to Dumbleton. But this *quaestio* is clearly a distinct work and remains anonymous.

A hitherto unnoticed work explicitly ascribed to Dumbleton is found in Paris, Bibl. Nat. Nouv. Acq. lat. 625, fol. 70v-71v¹⁶ It is a revision of the six conclusions on rotational motion given by Bradwardine in his *Tractatus*. Dumbleton's treatise begins "In hoc compendio intellectum sex conclusionum quarti capituli tractatus proportionum mag. Thome Bradwardin intendo brevissime declarare...". The ascription is clearly stated on fol. 71va, "Explicit Dummulton." This treatise is preceded by Bradwardine's *Tractatus*, "scriptus Parisiis Anno eiusdem 1348," and followed by a fragment of Bradwardine's *De continuo* beginning, "Continuum est quantum cuius partes adinvicem copulantur..." These three works are written in the same hand, which is distinct from that of the other treatises in the codex. Thus Dumbleton's *Compendium sex conclusionum* was apparently composed before 1348, but it is impossible as yet to give a more precise date.

There can be no doubt that Dumbleton accepted the nominalist logic and natural philosophy of Ockham.¹⁷ In many ways he could justly be described as a precursor of John Locke or David Hume. Nevertheless, he, like his contemporary, Heytesbury, was a disciple of Thomas Bradwardine in the sense that he sought to explain physical phenomena through mathematical proportionality. A Vatican manuscript of Dumbleton's *Summa* P. II-IX (Vat. lat. 954) is ascribed by a later hand to William of Ockham and is called "super tribus principiis rerum naturalium." Although both Heytesbury and Dumbleton were intensely interested in the proportions of velocities and did much to develop the mathematics of

¹⁴ Bale, *Script. Illustr.*, 5, 86. Cf. Tanner, *op. cit.*, 706.

¹⁵ An anonymous *sophisma* beginning "Uniformiter continue variabitur alteratio uniformis. Ad quod sophisma arguitur sic..." is contained in Venice, S. Marco, lat. VIII, 19, fol. 193-211. Cf. A. Maier, *Studien*, 3, 365, note 16. I have not compared this text with Bibl. Nat. lat. 16621, fol. 124-130.

¹⁶ Formerly Phillipps MS 3122. This item is listed in Omont's catalogue without author as "Declaratio super sex conclusiones predicti magistri Thome de proporcionibus." *Nouvelles acquisitions...*, 1898, p. 9.

¹⁷ J. A. Weisheipl, "The Place of John Dumbleton in the Merton School," *Isis*, 50 (1959), 439-454.

physical motion, Dumbleton's approach to these problems is quite different from that of Heytesbury. Dumbleton was not so much interested in a verbal analysis of terms as he was in the psychology of meaning, especially of intension and remission. His own philosophy is a curious combination developed from Ockham, Bradwardine and Plato — all within an Aristotelian framework. A study of the Platonic influences on Dumbleton would prove most illuminating and remains to be done. The mathematical approach to nature, developed by Dumbleton and Heytesbury, was brought to completion in the Merton school by Richard Swineshead.

VI. RICHARD SWINESHEAD

One of the great difficulties in obtaining accurate biographical information concerning the author of the *Calculationes* is due to the multiplicity of persons bearing the name Swineshead and the great confusion of names in various manuscripts. Our concern is principally with Richard Swineshead, author of various works on physics, notably *Liber calculationum*, and Fellow of Merton College.

Toward the middle of the 14th century there were two Fellows at Merton bearing the name "Swineshead" or its variants, one called Richard, the other John. John's career is much clearer, at least after the middle of the century. He was certainly a Fellow of Merton by July 2, 1343, when "John de Swynesheved, M.A., of the diocese of Lincoln" was included in an Oxford University roll of a benefice in the gift of Bardney Abbey, Lincolnshire.¹⁸ He is still mentioned at Merton in 1346-7, but by 1353 he was a "scholar of Canon Law."¹⁹ John Swineshead must have transferred to Cambridge University, because by 1363 "John de Swynesheved, M.A., Bachelor of Canon and Civil Law, priest of the diocese of Lincoln," was included in a Cambridge University roll for Papal graces for a canonry of Exeter with expectation of a prebend.²⁰ It is clear from Dr. A. B. Emden's research that John Swineshead devoted his life to Canon Law from about 1350 until his death in October 1372.

The earliest entry in the Bursar's rolls of "Swynschened" is that for 1340-41 (Mert. Rec. 3673). It is not certain whether this entry refers to John or to Richard. The earliest mention of Richard as a Fellow of the College is found in the rolls for 1344-5,²¹ and he is still listed in 1355.

¹⁸ *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 1, 62; *Cal. Pap. Let.*, 3, 104. See Emden, *op. cit.*, 3, 1836-7.

¹⁹ *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 1, 252.

²⁰ *Cal. Pap. Pet.*, 1, 407.

²¹ Mert. Rec. 3676. See also 3677-9, 3683, 3685-9 and Emden, *loc. cit.*

We know that together with Richard de Bylyngham and others, Richard de Swynheved was a supporter of Master John Wylyot in his tumultuous election to the Chancellorship in 1349.²² In the Lincoln registers A. B. Emden has found that Richard Swineshead was ordained deacon to the title of Fellowship on March 29, 1354. Thus we know that Richard was at Merton at least between 1344 and 1355, and possibly the entry for 1340-41 refers to Richard as well.

In the manuscripts and printed editions Swineshead is variously called John, Roger, Richard, Raymond, or William; but more often he is called Roger or Richard. In the Merton records there is no mention whatever of a "Roger" Swineshead. The only known Roger Swynshed of the period was a Benedictine monk of Glastonbury, a Master in Sacred Theology, who borrowed two volumes from the library of Malmesbury Abbey, which were returned on May 12, 1365.²³ Since the work of James Brucker²⁴ and George Brodrick²⁵ most authorities have agreed that the true name of the Merton Calculator was Richard. And since the work of Bale, confirmed by Tanner, most of the authorities have attributed all the known works of Swineshead to the same person, the Merton *Calculator*.

However, on the basis of one manuscript (Bibl. Nat. lat. 14715, fol. 90vb) P. Duhem²⁶ has suggested an ingenious theory, namely that all the logical treatises should be attributed to John, while *De primo motore* should be attributed to Roger (or Richard). Although such a distribution of the known works is not impossible, this theory has not been sufficiently proved, especially as earlier manuscripts explicitly attribute the *De obligatoriis* to Roger.²⁷

²² *Calendar of Close Rolls*, Edw. III, 1349-1354, p. 74 (letter dated April 2, 1349). Cf. *Snappes's Formulary*, ed. cit., 305.

²³ Brit. Mus., Arundel MS 2, fol. 80v. Since the volumes were returned by the Abbot of Glastonbury to the Abbot of Malmesbury, Roger Swineshead may have been dead at that date. Evidence for the distinct personality of Roger Swineshead has been presented in my study "Roger Swynshed, O.S.B., Logician, Natural Philosopher and Theologian," in *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus*, Oxford (O.H.S., n.s. XVI), 1964, 231-252. Much of the evidence presented in that study is repeated here.

²⁴ Jacobi Bruckeri, *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, t. 3, (Leipsig, 1743), p. 849; cf. P. Duhem, *Études*, 3, 417.

²⁵ *Memorials of Merton College*, [Oxford, (O.H.S.) 1885], 213, who utilized the unpublished material of Anthony Wood.

²⁶ *Études*, 3, 413.

²⁷ Vienna, Dom. Klos., cod. 160/130, fol. 125v: "Explicit textus de obligatoriis mag. Rudegeri dicti Swineshaupt Anglici." Fol. 122v: "Explicit expositio mag. Rudegerii Swineshaupt Anglici super de obligatoriis." This last is an anonymous commentary on Swineshead's text. Also Bruges 500.

The surname of this author also presents certain difficulties in the manuscripts. In English manuscripts the surname is usually written "Swynyshed." But as this would have been pronounced "Swinised," as it is actually written in one of the Paris manuscripts,²⁸ the corruption of this name into "Suiset" on the continent is not hard to imagine. Before long the *Calculator* became confused with the Franciscan, Roger Rogeth, and another Master Rosset; by the end of the 14th century a work of this Franciscan was ascribed to "Rugerio Suiscepto sive Roseto in studio Anglicano."²⁹

Although Duhem's attribution of the logical works to John must be rejected, it is not at all improbable that the works of Roger Swynyshed must be distinguished from those of Richard. We know that by May 1365 Roger was or had been a Benedictine monk of Glastonbury, a Master in Sacred Theology. Undoubtedly it is this Swineshead who is mentioned by Richard Tryvytlam, O.F.M., in his poem *De laude Universitatis Oxoniae* as:

Subtilis Swynyshed, proles Glastoniae,
Revera monachus bonae memoriae,
Cuius non periit fama industriae,
Sinebat pauperes in pace vivere.
Iste, vix aliquam habens scienciam
Respectu Swynyshed, ut verum exprimam,
Indignus solvere eius corrigiam,
Minatur fratribus mortis sentenciam.³⁰

Two known works are explicitly ascribed to Roger in early manuscripts and not to Richard. First there is the well known logical text, *De obligationibus et insolubilibus*, ascribed to Roger in a Vienna manuscript, Dominikanerkloster 160/130, and in Bruges 500. In Heytesbury's *Regulae* of 1335 the second erroneous opinion listed concerning *insolubilia* is verbatim that of Swineshead's text. Although this does not necessarily prove that Heytesbury had Swineshead in mind when he wrote the treatise, a hand

²⁸ Bibl. Nat. lat. 14715, fol. 90vb; Duhem's "Swinised" (*Études*, 3, 413) is undoubtedly a typographical error. However the colophon in B.N. lat. 16621, fol. 84v has been rendered by Duhem (*ibid.*, 414) as "Explicit tractatus M. Rogero Suinctet datus eximio." This should read: "Explicit tractatus M. Rogeri Suiset datus Oxonie."

²⁹ Bodl. MS Canon. Misc. 177, fol. 182, dated "1395 die 12 Februarii in studio Paduano." Vat can MS Chigi, E. V. 161, written about 1401 describes the treatise "sec. Rogerium Swynsset" (fol. 63v).

³⁰ *Collectanea*, 3, ed. M. Burrows [Oxford (O.H.S.), 204]. Burrows observed that Bale, Pits and Tanner may be wrong in stating that he was a Fellow of Merton (*ibid.*, note to line 321); in this Burrows was right. However, the *Elucubrationes* in *P. Lombardum*, noted by Tanner and Burrows is not to be attributed to any Swineshead, as we shall see. Moreover, Ludovicus Vives objected to the *Calculaciones* of Richard and not to any of the works of Roger.

contemporary, if not identical, with the Erfurt manuscript dated 1337, wrote in the margin next to this opinion the name "Swynshep." If Heytesbury did have Swineshead's famous treatise in mind, then Roger Swineshead must have written his work before 1335.

The second work ascribed to Roger Swineshead is a work on physics. Duhem called it *De primo motore* from the opening words, "Motore primo primitus invocato..."; but in Erfurt MS Amplon. F. 135 it is correctly called *De motibus naturalibus*. The Erfurt text seems to be the only complete copy known.³¹ The rubric of this manuscript (fol. 25va) describes the work as "tractatus magistri Willemi Swineshep datus Oxonie ad utilitatem studentium," while the colophon (fol. 47rb) states "Explicit tractatus de motibus naturalibus datus a magistro Rogero Swynshede."³² This is the work of a young, but ambitious Master in Arts. After a short introduction, similar to that of Heytesbury and Dumbleton, Roger Swineshead presents the division of his treatise:

Tocius autem operis substantiam octo distincionibus sive differentiis assignabo. Quarum prima prohemii vicem habet. Secunda motum et tempus diffinet [*sic*]. Tercia quedam insueta quamvis non nova de generatione declarat. Quarta de alteratione determinat. Quinta circa agumentum et diminutionem versatur. Sexta de motu locali perscrutatur. Septima proportionales possibiles in motibus manifestat. Octava maximum a minimo dividit et limitat. (MS Amplon. F. 135, fol. 25vb).

In the treatise, the fundamental Ockhamist doctrines of natural philosophy seem to be rejected, for Roger maintained that there are three distinct *res*, namely substance, quality and quantity,³³ and that motion and time are *modi rei* distinct from the body in motion and time.³⁴ He hurried

³¹ The text which Duhem used, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16621, seems to be fragmentary. Only a detailed comparison of the scattered *quaterni* with the Erfurt text could determine whether this be so. Tanner mentions "*Descriptiones motuum*, lib. i. 'Motore primo primitus invocato.' MS. Cantabr. in coll. Caii inscribitur, *De motu coeli et similibus*, lib. i." I have not been able to find this work in Gonville and Caius College Library.

³² This treatise is also ascribed to Roger in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16621, fol. 84r: "Explicit tractatus m. rogeri suisset datus Oxonie." Miss A. Maier insists that the title of this treatise is simply *De motibus* "denn sie handelt nicht nur von den 'natürlichen Bewegungen,' sondern von der Bewegung im allgemeinen und ihren vier Unterarten — generatio et corruptio, alteratio, augmentum et diminutio, motus localis —, von den Bewegungsgesetzen und vom Problem der maxima und minima." Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, 1 (Rome, 1964), 494. But this is no argument against the manuscript evidence; generation and corruption, alteration, augmentation and diminution are just as natural as free fall of bodies.

³³ "Harum autem propositionum hec est prima: secundum differencias rerum generalissimas tantum tria sunt predicamenta... substantia, qualitas et quantitas." *MS cit.*, fol. 26rb. The other predicaments he called *modi rerum*.

³⁴ "Quinta [propositio] est hec: motus non res, sed modus rei positive [*sic*] existit." *ibid.*, fol.

over questions of generation³⁵ in order to consider the more important questions of physical motion and intensity of forms. Since Roger utilized the Bradwardine function, the treatise must have been written after 1328. The Erfurt text is written in the same hand which wrote Heytesbury's *Regulae*, "inceptum... in festo Magdalene a.d. 1337." Therefore Roger's *De motibus naturalibus* must have been "datus Oxonie ad utilitatem studentium" some time before 1338, or at the latest before 1339.³⁶

Duhem rightly pointed out the vast difference between *De motibus naturalibus* (or *De primo motore*) and the *Calculationes*,³⁷ but he drew an untenable conclusion. Instead of attributing the former to Swineshead, the Mertonian, and the latter to a mythical "magistro Riccardo de Ghlymi Eshedi," we ought perhaps to attribute *De motibus naturalibus* to Roger Swineshead, one time Benedictine, and the *Calculationes* to Richard Swineshead, Fellow of Merton. It is not impossible that Roger Swineshead lectured in arts at Oxford around 1330 and produced his logical and physical treatises before becoming a Benedictine and Master in Theology before his death in 1365. This would explain more easily the confusion in the names between Roger and Richard.

There can be no doubt that Richard Swineshead, Fellow of Merton, wrote the well known *Liber calculationum*; it is explicitly ascribed to "mag. Ricardo de Swyynshede" in MS Chis E. IV. 120³⁸ One point, however, which has not been studied is the fact that *tractatus VII (De reactione)* of the printed edition of Venice 1520 is not found in a considerable number of manuscripts. This requires looking into. Swineshead's *Calculationes* corresponds in general to Dumbleton's *Summa*, Parts II-VI, discussing those novel questions of the early 14th century, rather than expounding the traditional Aristotelian books. But there can be little doubt that it was composed after Heytesbury's *Regulae* and Dumbleton's *Summa*, P. VI.

26va. Roger explicitly rejected the "erroneous opinion" which identifies motion with the body in motion, cf. fol. 25vb. "... igitur tempus modus rei positivus existit." fol. 28ra.

³⁵ "Inter singulas siquidem questiones generationes concernentes duas materie presenti maxime spectantes sufficet ad presens pertractare circa varias nature curiositates, quoniam altioris est negotii, nec parvitas experientie mee iam poterit attingere, sed principia quedam communia ad cognitionem generationis mixtorum introductoria manifestare temptabo." *ibid.*, fol. 31vb.

³⁶ Roger's *De motibus naturalibus* seems to reveal no awareness of Dumbleton's *Summa*, nor even of Heytesbury's *Regulae*. Hence it may have been "datus Oxonie" well before 1335.

³⁷ "D'ailleurs, la comparaison de cet ouvrage au traité *De primo motore* qui, lui, est incontestablement de Swineshead, montre, au premier coup d'œil, que ces deux ouvrages ne sauraient être du même auteur." *Études*, 3, 419.

³⁸ Also MS Vat lat. 3095: "Expliciunt calculationes... D. Magistri Riccardi Suisset Anglici." Cf. A. Maier, *Studien*, 3, 269-270, n. 35.

Miss Maier is undoubtedly correct when she dates the *Calculaciones* before 1355 and around 1350.³⁹

The *Calculaciones* had an enormous influence on the thought of following centuries. Humanists denounced the abominations of such types of argumentation, and Luis Vivès accused Swineshead of having contributed to the development of the calculus of which he always had a horror.⁴⁰ But Leibniz was sufficiently impressed with Swineshead's work to think that he was the first to introduce mathematics into scholastic philosophy.⁴¹ And such mathematicians as Wallis and Fermat began with the problems posed by the *Calculator*.

Besides the *Calculaciones* other works have been attributed to Richard Swineshead. Some of these must be considered briefly. In Cambridge, Caius College MS 499/268, two short treatises on motion are ascribed to Swineshead. The first (fol. 204-211v) is a treatise beginning "In primo de celo Philosophus com. 35 arguit corpus infinitum circumvolvi non posse..." It is a treatise in six chapters treating of intensity of forms.⁴² The second (fol. 213rb-215rb) is a "tractatus de Swineshede de motu locali" beginning "Multe possint elici conclusiones sive regule super variationem proportionum et motus..." (also in Seville, Bibl. Colom. 7-7-29, fol. 31va-34rb). Between these two items there is an anonymous *Tractatus de motu locali difformi* beginning "Cum omnis effectus naturalis per motum ad esse producitur, inquisitionem naturalium volenti insistere..." (also in Bibl. Colom. 7-7-29, fol. 28va-31va). The mere fact that this work is between two ascribed works and together with the *Calculaciones* is not sufficient grounds for attributing it to Swineshead. The other two works are without doubt by the *Calculator*, and seem to antecede his larger treatise.

The four questions on the *Sentences* ascribed to "Rogerio Swynissed" in Oriel College MS 15 have been shown by V. Doucet to be part of a commentary by Roger Roseth, O.F.M., given at Norwich before 1337.⁴³ The

³⁹ *Studien*, 3, 361.

⁴⁰ J. L. Vives, *De causis corruptarum artium liber V, Opera* (Basel, 1555) t. 1, 412-413.

⁴¹ Letter to Thomas Smith (1696): "Vellem etiam edi scripta Suisseti vulgo dicti Calculatoris, qui mathesin in philosophiam scholasticam introduxit." [Quoted by Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York, 1934), 3, 370]. See also his letter to Wallis in J. Wallisii *Opera*, t. 3, 673.

⁴² This work is listed by Tanner as *De coelo et mundo*, lib. ii, because of the opening words, *op. cit.*, 701.

⁴³ "Le Studium Franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d'après le MS Chigi B. V. 66 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane," *AFH*, 46 (1953), 89-93. A. de Poorter, relying on C. Michalski's identification of Rossetus and Swineshead, attributed MS 192 of the Library of Bruges, fol. 1-44 to Swineshead (cf. "Un Recueil peu connu de questions sur les Sentences," *Revue Néo-Scholastique*, 2^e série, 32 (1931), 487-9; *Catalogue des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Publique de la Ville de Bruges* (Paris, 1934),

first article of the first question was frequently copied separately as a *Tractatus de maximo et minimo* and the author was sometimes confused with Swineshead.⁴⁴ If Roger or Richard did write a commentary on the *Sentences*, that work is still not identified.

Miss Maier has already noticed the "quatuor questiones compilate a Rev. viro mag. Ricardo super libro Phisicorum" contained in Venice, S. Marco, lat. Cl. VI, cod. 72 (2810), fol. 81-112. She believes that these questions might belong to Richard Swineshead.⁴⁵ Other works listed by Tanner have either not been located or are not explicitly ascribed in the manuscripts examined.⁴⁶

On the whole Richard Swineshead was more successful than Heytesbury or Dumbleton in separating a mathematical analysis of physical problems from an Ockhamist natural philosophy. In many ways Swineshead can be considered the bridge between the Merton school and the beginnings of modern physics in the 17th century. But for our period he is rather the culmination of the intense interest shown in problems of physical science in the early 14th century. At least he completed the work of Thomas Bradwardine, profiting much from his own contemporaries and predecessors.

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240-41; C. Michalski, "Le Criticisme et le Scepticisme..." Cracow, 1926) 7; "La Physique nouvelle" (1928), 14-17). For this reason F. Stegmüller assigned the work of Rogeth to Richard Swineshead in his *Repertorium*, ed. cit., 1, n. 330, p. 357.

⁴⁴ To Doucet's list of MSS may be added the following: Bodl. Canon. Misc. 177, fol. 174-185, and Seville, Colombina 7-7-29, fol. 145-165; Vatican, MS Chigi, E. V. 161, fol. 50-63v.

⁴⁵ *Studien*, 3, 269, note 34.

⁴⁶ Tanner lists *De divisionibus* lib. i, beginning "Quatuor sunt divisiones proposit[ionum]..." An anonymous work with this beginning is found in Bodl. MS 676 (SC 2593), fol. 126-131, and also in Cambridge, Corpus Christi College MS 378, fol. 77-80 and MS 244, fol. 59-77, where it is called *Insolubilia*. The beginning which Tanner gives for *De intensione et remissione*, lib. ii, is identical with the *Calculations*, which he apparently listed separately, giving the printed editions. For a lost work *De consequentiis*, see J. A. Weisheipl, "Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century," *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 162.

On Rhetoric in Fourteenth-Century Oxford

R. J. SCHOECK

IT is well to begin with the observation that the subject of rhetoric can scarcely be studied by itself, important though it is, and with the reminder that the history of medieval rhetoric has yet to be written in full.¹ To detach the story of rhetoric during a single century is likely to distort, to present a part without sufficient consideration of the whole; and the fourteenth century is a particularly crucial period in the long continuum of rhetoric.² In like manner, one should begin an essay on rhetoric in England with the caveat that at least until the end of the fifteenth century, the thought and letters of Western Europe can be, and for some figures and problems must be, considered as an organic whole.³

In our times, the study of rhetoric in fourteenth-century England has been both strongly influenced and at the same time severely limited by Manly's now-classic lecture on Chaucer and the rhetoricians. It is little wonder that in the forty years since the appearance of his seminal lecture there have followed more than forty studies;⁴ but since the time of that

¹ At present, the nearest we have is the survey *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400)*... by Charles Sears Baldwin (New York, 1928; rptd. Gloucester, Mass., 1959). The admirable bibliography by J. J. Murphy is therefore a valuable and necessary tool for present study: see 'The Medieval Arts of Discourse: An Introductory Bibliography', *Speech Monographs*, 29 (1962), 71-8. Professor Murphy, who has in progress a history of the medieval arts of discourse, writes: "the history of rhetoric is a major part of [study of the arts of discourse from Augustine to approximately 1400 A.D.], but is not the only factor to be considered. The impact of logic and grammar upon rhetoric, and of rhetoric upon grammar, can only be understood in the light of the various ways in which medieval man taught the art of discourse — *ars dicendi*. Consequently, any investigation must proceed in full awareness of the complexity of the subject..." (p. 71).

² While it may be possible to consider Dante and rhetoric in the light of the traditions of medieval rhetoric, shifts begun with Petrarch are manifest in *Salutati*, and the impact of humanism upon rhetoric during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (especially in Italy) cannot be ignored: see footnote 5 below.

³ Cf. (for a convenient statement) R. R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage* (Cambridge, 1954), 303, and *passim*. For an admirable statement on the cultural or intellectual unity of Christendom, see Denys Hay, *From Roman Empire to Renaissance Europe* (London, 1953).

⁴ See J. J. Murphy, 'A New Look at Chaucer and the Rhetoricians', *R.E.S.*, n.s. 2, xv (1964), 1-20. In the first footnote to this welcome challenging of Manly's excessive claims and assertions, attention is called to "more than forty such studies" following the Manly thesis, in addition to a still-growing number of doctoral dissertations.

lecture there has been a growing body of research upon the sources, conventions and uses of late medieval and early Renaissance rhetoric. Studies of rhetoric in Dante and Petrarch (and the Trecento generally) have been developing our understanding of the force of rhetoric in their thought and expression; the pivotal position of Coluccio Salutati has recently been illuminated by the scholarship of Ullman and O'Donnell;⁵ and, further, there have been recent studies of the widening rôle of the grammarian, and of the interrelationship of grammar and rhetoric, in late fourteenth and early fifteenth-century letters. One may feel secure in holding the conclusion that from the late thirteenth century to the end of the fifteenth, for all of the changes and developments, there is an essential continuum.⁶ Although we should not be surprised that the pendulum has swung sharply in recent years to challenge some of Manly's premises and assertions, nonetheless we should examine closely any thesis which assumes that there was not a continuum. In this present discussion, then, I hope to offer a view both of the state of rhetoric in fourteen-century England and of the questioning whether there was an English tradition of rhetoric. I shall begin by suggesting that the form in which the question has recently been put has produced a forced (that is, an unnecessarily limiting) and premature conclusion, and that we must be concerned with how rhetoric is used as well as how it is taught;⁷ yet I want to declare at the

⁵ From the wealth of Dante studies, especially during 1965, one may single out these two; J. Cremona, 'Dante's Views on Language', in *The Mind of Dante*, ed. U. Limentani (Cambridge, 1965), 138-62; and Erich Auerbach, *Literatursprache und Publikum in der lateinischen Spätantike und im Mittelalter* (1958, translated by R. Manheim as *Literary Language & Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages* [New York, 1965], see my review in *Thought*, 41 [1966], 601-2). In another form, much recent scholarship is cited in my notes on Croll: see *Style, Rhetoric and Rhythm — Essays by Morris W. Croll*, edited by J. Max Patrick... and R. J. Schoeck (Princeton, 1966), 237 ff.

On Salutati, see B. L. Ullman, *The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati* (Padua, 1963); and J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B., 'Coluccio Salutati on the Poet-Teacher', *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 240-56. On humanism generally, see Paul O. Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (Rome, 1956), and his survey-article with its splendid selective bibliography, 'Studies in Renaissance Humanism during the last Twenty Years', *Studies in the Renaissance*, 9 (1962), 7-30. For a lucid and persuasive argument for the high rôle of 'Rhetoric and La Civile Conversazione' see ch. vi, 'Logic, Rhetoric and Poetics' in Eugenio Garin, *Italian Humanism*, trans. Peter Munz (Oxford, 1965), 158 ff.

⁶ Cf. J. E. Seigel, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism from Petrarch to Valla: Studies in the Development of Quattrocento Thought and Its Classical Antecedents* (Princeton University Ph.D., 1963); and Aldo Scaglione, 'The Humanist as Scholar and Politian's Conception of the Grammaticus', *Studies in the Renaissance*, 8 (1961), 49-70.

⁷ This problem has been studied closely in a seminar on medieval rhetoric (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1965-66), and I owe much to the members of this seminar. This expression of indebtedness and gratitude is not merely conventional, and I should like to thank members of the seminar individually: my colleague, Sister St. Francis (for placing Geoffrey of Vinsauf in the

outset how much students of the history of rhetoric are indebted to Professor J. J. Murphy for his searching analysis of the Manly thesis, as for his valuable bibliography and other studies of the rhetorical tradition.

I. ON CLASSIFICATION OF THE ANCIENT RHETORICAL TRADITIONS

We are told that "the ancient world — which for this purpose ends about A.D. 426" [*i.e.*, with the publication of the final book of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*] — "produced four separate traditions within the general preceptive framework", and Murphy lists these as:

the Aristotelian tradition
the Ciceronian tradition
the grammatical tradition
the 'sophistic rhetoric'⁸

For some purposes, this classification will be most serviceable, and for most classroom purposes it is clearly valuable. But let us be cautious about the restrictive force of the term *separate*, and let us examine carefully the consequences of putting a complex work like the *Ars poetica* of Horace entirely or exclusively, within the 'grammatical tradition' and then using this classification later as the grounds for throwing out the evidence of the 1431 Oxford statute (which we shall discuss later in section III).

So strict a classification for the ancient period compels the author to re-group the rhetorical traditions of the mediaeval period into three parts (without fully considering the inter-relationships of four ancient with three mediaeval categories): these are termed "the truly mediaeval forms of the arts of discourse" which "fall into three major categories":

ars dictaminis
ars praedicandi
ars grammatica

"If it is desirable to be taxonomic, then, and include classical rhetoric as a fourth category, we find that we must approach the mediaeval history of the arts of discourse through a study of either *dictamen*, or preaching, or grammar, or classical rhetoric, or all four", Murphy writes (p. 6).

Taxonomies, one may reflect, are admirable servants but poor masters: they are admirable when used to order data, whether for heuristic

tradition of poetic *artes*, and for the still-unwritten story of the manuscript tradition of the *Poetria Nova* in thirteenth and fourteenth-century England), and Miss D. Karpman, Miss Paula Neuss, and Mrs. M. A. Stouck.

⁸ 'Rhetoric in Fourteenth-Century Oxford', *Medium Aevum*, 34 (1965), 1 — hereafter references in the text to this article will appear in parentheses following the quotation.

or mnemonic purposes, but they must not be used to legislate or adjudicate.⁹

II. ON THE *ars dictaminis* IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

In this area, the argument against rhetoric can be only a negative one, from the lack of sufficient evidence in the statutes, and from the fact that there is a dearth of vernacular *dictamen* manuals in fourteenth-century England:

"In England, with the single exception of Peter of Blois about 1181, there was no native production of *dictamen* manuals until John de Briggis and Thomas Sampson toward the end of the fourteenth century." (p. 8).

But here too taxonomies may limit the conclusions which the evidence permits. An important figure in the *ars dictaminis* tradition is that of Richard de Bury, at Oxford from 1302 to 1312, active in Oxford affairs before becoming chancellor of England; his well-known *Philobiblon* is strongly rhetorical.¹⁰ Observing one thirteenth-century manuscript which had its origin in Oxford, with later versions of this collection in the 1270's and still later in the fourteenth century, one may argue for the likelihood that such collections were circulating with some currency in England.¹¹ Murphy has called our attention to the work of de Briggis and Sampson, but seems to imply that they were isolated examples; from Sampson's writings we can be sure that the *ars dictandi* was being taught by other teachers.¹² Some of the students of Sampson's period were Cistercians, proceeding to Oxford degrees, others we might call 'business students';¹³

⁹ The art of memory has of course been one of the traditional divisions of rhetoric almost since the invention of the art of memory by the Greeks. See Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London, 1966), 1 ff.

¹⁰ See N. Denholm-Young, 'Richard de Bury (1287-1345)', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 20 (1937), 137. Miss Karpman has called my attention to the relevance of the study by H. G. Richardson, 'Cistercian Formularies', *Formularies which bear on the history of Oxford*, c. 1204-1420, ed. H. E. Salter, W. A. Pantin, and H. G. Richardson (Oxford, 1942), 2, 298.

¹¹ Chiefly upon the work of H. G. Richardson's two studies: 'An Oxford Teacher of the Fifteenth Century', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 23 (1939), 447-8; and 'Letters of Oxford Dictatores', in *Formularies*, 2, 346 — thus D. Karpman, in her unpublished seminar paper on manuscript evidence relating to the *ars dictaminis* in fourteenth-century England.

¹² In Longleat MS 37 (c. 1385), there is the statement that "Sampson concludebat plures Oxoniensis dictatores" (elaborated in the text as an example of *circuitio*; and in another place Sampson expresses annoyance that his works are imitated by other *dictatores* — see Richardson, 'Business Training in Medieval Oxford', *American Historical Review*, 46 (1941), 275; and 'An Oxford Teacher', *loc. cit.*, 455.

¹³ Richardson, 'Cistercian Formularies', 281; 'Business Training', 269.

the important point is that the two works singled out by Murphy, the two by de Briggis and Sampson, when coupled with the evidence already discussed by Richardson and others, amply testify to considerable interest in dictamen. But we must press further to make the point that de Briggis and Sampson were not operating in isolation.

From Richardson we know that a collection was made just after 1300, a *Tractatus de litterarum compositione*, and that other collections were being made in and circulating in England.¹⁴ John de Briggis was a teacher at Merton and clearly working within a university (and larger) tradition. The only manuscript of de Briggis's *Compilatio de arte dictandi*, it has been observed, is preceded by extracts of Bernard de Meung and Guido Faba; that de Briggis knew his English predecessors is clear from his quotation of Geoffrey of Vinsauf (manuscripts of whose *Poetria Nova* were in circulation in England during both the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries), and that he had connections with continental traditions is clear from his quotations of Peter de Vineia and Thomas Capua.¹⁵

Letters from Bern MS 69, which also contains some notes on *cursus*, were contemporary with Sampson's treatises; also contemporary were the *Summa dictaminis* of Thomas of Capua and Magister Dominicus. Still another indication of the lively state of the *ars dictaminis* in fourteenth century England is the significant *Tract. de coloribus rhetoricis* described in the catalogue of Corpus Christi College, which contains letters from the end of the twelfth century to the end of the fourteenth and includes a selection on the beauty of rhetorical ornament.¹⁶ Further, M. Dominica Legge has identified as John Stevens (in his later years scribe to the archbishop of Canterbury) the compiler of the letter-book in All Souls MS 182 (dated c. 1412).¹⁷ It would in fact have been curious, one must reflect, if the archbishop of Canterbury and indeed other ecclesiastical officials in England had been blind to the resources of the *ars dictaminis* of the fourteenth century and did not avail themselves of those resources in every possible way, including the encouragement of teaching as well as the compilation of letter-books, manuals, and other tools, particularly when those resources were not merely available to but used by chancelleries elsewhere in Europe.

¹⁴ Richardson, 'Letters of Oxford Dictatores', 355.

¹⁵ Cf. Margaret Nims, introd. to *Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Poetria Nova* (Toronto, 1967).

¹⁶ See Pantin, 'Oxford Letters from Bern MS 69', in *Formularies*, loc. cit., 2, 250; and M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge*, 2 (Cambridge, 1912), 191.

¹⁷ M. Dominica Legge, introd. to *Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions from All Souls MS. 182* (Oxford, Anglo-Norman Text Society, 1941).

In the place of an extreme view of a weak or non-existent *ars dictaminis* tradition in fourteenth-century Oxford, one must, I think, accept the conclusion that of the English dictaminal treatises composed between 1220 and 1450 which we possess, all are connected with the University of Oxford. Combining precept and method and including citations from Italian *dictatores*, treating the *cursus* and dealing with the traditional five parts of a letter, they are therefore to be related to a dictaminal tradition, which must be taken as part of a larger tradition of fourteenth-century rhetoric at Oxford, for elsewhere we find that a strong dictaminal tradition contributed significantly to the larger teaching and use of rhetoric.

III. EVIDENCE FROM THE STATUTES

The heart of the matter lies in the evidence from the Oxford statutes, in the conclusion drawn from that evidence, and in the way in which those conclusions are handled in the larger argument about rhetoric in fourteenth-century England. All of the statutory evidence on rhetoric has not been presented, and with Murphy's conclusions I disagree: specifically with the statement that "the statutes of Oxford University seem to confirm the judgment that systematic training in rhetoric was a feature of the fifteenth century rather than the fourteenth" (p. 13).

In his valuable reconstruction of the normal curriculum of arts at Oxford in the early fourteenth century, Weisheipl has made clear that "by the early fourteenth century the course in arts embraced the whole of the *trivium*, *quadrivium* and the three philosophies":¹⁸ that is, by the *early* fourteenth century, the trivium was well established, and rhetoric had its place. To be sure, we know less about the curriculum of studies in the faculty of arts in the medieval university than we do about that in the faculty of theology; but we need not draw back from firm statements about rhetoric in the curriculum, although, as Weisheipl writes generally, "we must piece together bits of information contained in a great variety of sources".

Two preliminary points should be made, which involve fourteenth-century Oxford first with the rest of Europe and second with an already-established continuum of tradition:

The medieval university always followed legitimate custom and "the common practice in the schools". It is clear, moreover, that statutes were enacted by the university, faculty or nation only to correct abuses or to clarify obscure points then in dispute. In order to obtain a clear picture of "the common practice in the schools" we must piece together bits of information contained

¹⁸ James A. Weisheipl, O.P., 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies*, 26 (1964), 168 (143-85).

in a great variety of sources. Whatever may be said of the faculty of arts in the later Middle Ages, it is safe to assume that the general practice at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century closely resembled that of Paris, and by way of Paris that of Toulouse, Montpellier and other continental universities. Further it may safely be assumed that the practice in the early Fourteenth Century did not differ from that of the late Thirteenth Century, unless there is evidence to the contrary.¹⁹

Now, there are two further points which are crucial, and these must be weighed against the consideration that we are here dealing only with university statutes, which do not attempt to legislate for all of the academic life of the university, nor is everything in the university teaching functions legislated by university statute. First, one must distinguish those statutes which legislate on *pro forma* lectures and refrain from assuming that those lectures were the only ones given;²⁰ second, lectures were not the only method of education in medieval universities; disputations and the *recitatio* (or *repetitio*) were also practised forms. Here it may simply be recalled that it has been shown from other evidence than that of the statutes that thirteenth as well as fourteenth-century friars attended the daily repetition, whereas "the earliest statutory reference to the repetition at Oxford... dates from the fifteenth century".²¹

What is the evidence, then, for the teaching of rhetoric in late medieval Oxford? Weisheipl calls our attention to the fact that the fourth book of Boethius' *Topica* is stipulated in the thirteenth-century statutes.²² This much establishes the teaching of rhetoric in thirteenth-century Oxford, but it must not be taken as the whole story; for these statutes pertain to the lectures required *pro forma determinatorum* and given by the masters — they are not necessarily the only lectures given. We can argue with great

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁰ The books required *pro forma* were simply set books required for the degree, and the ordinary lectures on these books as required by university statutes, "could normally be given only by regent masters lecturing *magistraliter*" (Weisheipl, *op. cit.*, 150). See further, 149, n. 14.

By contrast, "a cursory lecture was nothing more than an unpretentious reading and paraphrase of the official text", and it might be given by a bachelor *ex officio*" (*ibid.*, 151).

²¹ *Ibid.*, 153 n. (citing Strickland Gibson, *Stat. Antiq.*, 579, 26-8).

²² Weisheipl, *op. cit.*, 169. The first three books of Boethius' *Topica* were required under Logic, the fourth under Rhetoric; there was of course an overlap of logic and rhetoric, and while I would not accept all of the conclusions of Richard McKeon ('Rhetoric in the Middle Ages', *Speculum*, 6, 1932, 1-32) for different reasons from those on the strength of which Murphy rejects McKeon's argument, nonetheless I feel that the connections between logic and rhetoric were rather stronger than Murphy allows. This was particularly true at Oxford where, as Weisheipl stresses (169), "the greatest emphasis was placed on the study of logic, which occupied about half of the actual curriculum".

certitude that there would have been cursory lectures by the bachelors,²³ as well probably as the *recitatio*, and there is no reason for believing that these would not have been given for rhetoric as well as for other parts of the arts curriculum.

By the early fourteenth century we are on firmer ground with respect to the fourth book of Boethius' *Topica*: this book was "also mentioned in the thirteenth century statutes (*Stat. Ant.*, 26, 3-4) as well as in the early fourteenth century *forma* published by F. M. Powicke (*Medieval Books*, p. 34)".²⁴

There is another bit of statutory evidence from 1335. According to Richardson, this statute of 1335 cited a *studium* for theology and *scientiae primitivae*, that is, grammar, rhetoric and logic. Although rhetoric was not specifically mentioned, Richardson has argued that it was to be understood as included.²⁵

Further, it is highly likely that the religious orders in and around the university would have established some instruction in rhetoric, formal or otherwise, as a part of the *ars praedicandi*. Weisheipl, in a later study, points to the general practice of the Order of Preachers, from which one can "only surmise that the [particular] practice at Oxford in the early Fourteenth Century was not vastly different," and

Later, when young men entered religious life without some previous training in philosophy and arts, an equivalent education had to be provided, not only as a preparation for studying the *divina pagina*, but also as a requirement for entering the faculty of theology..."²⁶

The statutes of 1431, one can urge with great probability, were but clarifying certain points and confirming what had for some time been customary in the teaching of rhetoric in the university. We can only conclude, I submit, that rhetoric was taught in early fourteenth-century Oxford and that the statutes of 1431 must be read in this light. Ancient references for rhetoric had been only to Aristotle and Boethius, but the

²³ "Under the direction of their masters, bachelors could lecture at any time not closed to them by custom or university statutes [and they were obliged to give cursory lectures on certain books]; and we may presume that undergraduates normally attended these cursory lectures of the bachelor" (Weisheipl, 151).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 169.

²⁵ H. G. Richardson (citing *Statuta Capitulum Generalium* iii 429, no. 31, pp. 393, no. 2, 467 no. 4), 'Cistercian Formularies', *Formularies which Bear on the History of Oxford, c. 1204-1429*, ed. H. E. Salter, *et al.*, (Oxford, 1942), 2, 298.

²⁶ J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., 'Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies*, 28 (1966), 152 (151-75).

'new' statutes of 1431 mention other alternatives and give the required time as three years *pro forma*:

- a) The Fourth Book of Boethius' *Topica* — already mentioned, as we have seen, in thirteenth-century statutes as in early fourteenth-century *forma*.
- b) The *Rhetorica* of Aristotle (*Stat. Ant.*, 33, 19).
- c) Cicero's *De Inventione* (known as the *Rhetorica vetus*, or *prior*) and pseudo-Cicero's *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (known as *Rhetorica nova*).
- d) Various classical authors, such as Ovid and Vergil (*Stat. Ant.*, 234, 24), who were studied as examples of rhetorical style (cf. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* [London, 1953], 62-78, 148 ff.). L. J. Paetow, *Arts Course at Medieval Universities...* [Illinois, 1910, 67-91], and manuals of the well-known *ars dictaminis*.²⁷

Upon this statute, Murphy has commented:

It will be recalled that we identified several distinct and separate traditions or tendencies in the long history of the arts of discourse. This statute, plainly, mixes three of them together under the heading of rhetoric: the Aristotelian, the Ciceronian, and the grammatical.²⁸

But it is only in Murphy's assertion that they were separate: more than once during the classical period they were fused, or confused; certainly, they were during the late patristic and early medieval period. What this 1341 statute does, however, is to list alternatives — as many a twentieth-century department will do in its prescriptions to allow for a range of approaches or interests. Murphy continues:

Without going any further into the meaning of this particular statute, let me merely suggest that this peculiar blurring of disparate traditions may indicate the *lack* of a coherent and continuous academic course of rhetoric in Oxford University. (p. 14).

But that suggestion is merely that, it seems to this writer — nowhere has there been proof for a continuing separation and distinction of the several taxonomically established traditions of rhetoric — and in any case, as we have seen, there was earlier than 1431 a tradition, reasonably coherent and apparently continuous, in the academic status of rhetoric in Oxford.

One may agree in part with the statement that "in any case, the statutes tell us very little for certain" (p. 14), provided that by this one means that the statutes do not tell the whole story; Weisheipl has shown that in fact the statutes tell us a good deal, when other bits of evidence are put together with them.

If we were to look simply at Rashdall's summary presentation of the

²⁷ Weisheipl, 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts', 169.

²⁸ Murphy, 'Rhetoric in Fourteenth-Century Oxford', 14.

statutes, we should be misled. It is worth observing that rhetoric stands in much the same position as grammar and logic with respect to the state of the evidence, and if we were to follow Murphy's argument in denying that there was a specifically English tradition of rhetoric, we should have to do the same for logic and grammar. Yet Weisheipl has made unmistakably clear that there was a strong tradition of logic at Oxford and that the Oxford school of logic attracted "the attention of the whole academic world with [its] 'English subtleties' and 'calculations'".²⁹

IV. ON ENGLAND AND THE CONTINENT

One cannot too frequently stress the essential unity in university affairs of England with the Continent, and there are several strong affinities relevant to a discussion of fourteenth-century rhetoric and the universities.

There is everywhere a circulation of the same texts and a similarity of libraries, *mutatis mutandis*. Indeed, in considering fourteenth-century library catalogues, Murphy has himself made the point that "English library holdings of this period seem to follow the pattern familiar throughout Europe" (p. 12 *n.*).

Next, there was considerable mobility both of students and of teachers. We should know if students trained at Oxford in the arts curriculum had been found unusually unprepared in rhetoric or logic when they went to Paris for theology. And with the high mobility of clerks and masters, it would be an extraordinary thing if in the one area of rhetoric an English university were as remarkably different from all other European universities as we are asked to believe: especially among the friars and other religious orders and communities there was too much movement among universities for this to have passed unnoticed.

In general, then, European university education in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was too much of a piece, too much interrelated, to give credence to a theory that assumes that the university of Oxford is separated from and quite different from other universities — no one could seriously question the teaching of rhetoric in fourteenth-century Paris.³⁰

²⁹ Weisheipl, 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts', 185.

³⁰ It is important to observe that in England the native vernacular lagged as the language of learned and cultivated expression: until the beginning of the fourteenth century, in point of fact, English remained a rather poor third to both Latin and French. In view of this fact, one could not expect that there would be very much material for a fourteenth-century English rhetorician to draw from as examples of rhetorical figures in English. That the treatises of de Briggis and Sampson show interest in rhetoric in England cannot be denied, and, by their very derivativeness they show indeed (as Mrs. Stouck has well argued in her still-unpublished seminar paper) "the continuity of the European tradition. Their cursoriness may well be a reflection of the extent to which that underlying tradition was taken for granted..."

V. OTHER ASPECTS

It would be a mistake, further, to attempt to evaluate the role of rhetoric in the fourteenth century, and the teaching of it in a given university, by manuscript evidence alone, or only by that kind of evidence which relates to the teaching texts of the arts of rhetoric. There are other kinds of testimony to the role of rhetoric and its place in the university curricula. To take a single example, one should look to the prestige of Cicero among the teachers, poets and other writers — and elsewhere.

Frances A. Yates has recently called our attention to a fourteenth-century fresco on the walls of the Chapter House of the Dominican convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence, glorifying the wisdom and virtue of Thomas Aquinas, and she signalizes the figure of rhetoric among the fourteen female figures who symbolize the "vast range of the saint's knowledge". In front of Rhetoric is Tullius, "an old man with a book and upraised right hand":

"After our study of the medieval Tullius in this chapter we may look with renewed interest at Tullius, sitting modestly with Rhetoric in his right place in the scheme of things, rather low down in the scale of the liberal arts, only one above Grammar, and below Dialectic and Aristotle. Yet he is, perhaps, more important than he seems? And the fourteen female figures sitting in order in their places, as in a church, do they symbolise not only the learning of Thomas but also his method of remembering it?..."³¹

I leave this only as a question, a suggestion, emphasizing only that the mediaeval Tullius is a character of considerable importance in the scholastic scheme of things. Certainly he is a character of major importance for the mediaeval transformation of the classical art of memory. And though one must be extremely careful to distinguish between art proper and the art of memory, which is an invisible art, yet their frontiers must surely have overlapped..."³¹

The role of rhetoric in scholasticism — to put the problem in its largest terms — has yet to be dealt with in its fullness. Bolgar and others have reminded us in recent years of the enormous prestige of Cicero among the humanists of the Trecento and Quattrocento; we need also to be reminded that the scholastics too read their Cicero, though no doubt for differing ends and in other lights.³²

³¹ Yates, *Art of Memory*, 80-1.

³² Cf. E. K. Rand, *Cicero in the Courtroom of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee, 1946). See R. J. Schoeck, 'Rhetoric and Law in Sixteenth Century England', *Studies in Philology*, 50 (1953) 110-127.

VI. CONCLUSION

The full history of rhetoric in the middle ages has yet to be written, and the gap which should be filled by that history is still one of the more serious gaps in the history of medieval thought and letters. Among other problems is the lack of all of the texts necessary to base such a history, as well as more complete study of the rôle of rhetoric in various curricula and all of the major writers. The question of whether rhetoric was taught in fourteenth-century Oxford is, therefore, a central problem indeed.

It has been one of the underlying themes of this discussion that the Ciceronian tradition of rhetoric remained strong throughout the middle ages, and that this is manifested in a number of forms. Further, it has been argued that we isolate with peril under the *ars grammatica* such treatises on style as those of Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Matthew of Vendôme, and John of Garland, unless we rather substantively modify and expand our sense of the *ars grammatica*.

Having begun by questioning the recently-argued case against rhetoric in fourteenth-century Oxford, I trust that there has been sufficient strength of argument and evidence to warrant the conclusion that rhetoric in fact was taught in Oxford during this period. The implications for our reading of the poetry of Chaucer, Gower, and most English poetry and prose of the fourteenth century are enormous, but that is another chapter in a future history of medieval rhetoric and poetic. It must finally be stated that the import of a positive theory for the teaching and use of rhetoric in fourteenth-century England reaches beyond literature into the history of chancelleries and other institutions; if we were to believe that rhetoric was not taught and used in fourteenth-century England, we should then have to alter most radically our present view of diplomatics and relations among ecclesiastic and educational institutions. With the conclusion that rhetoric was in fact taught, we need not alter the understanding of the rôle of rhetoric which has been developed by Maitland, Denholm-Young, Jacob, Cheney and others.

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Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent

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I

ARTICLES 22 and 25 of the *Summa* of Henry of Ghent, taken together as their author clearly intended them to be, form a landmark in the history of natural theology. They do so because in Article 22, Question 5, Henry of Ghent proposes a new proof for the existence of God whose necessity he then vigorously goes on to defend in Article 25, Question 3. The title of the Question setting forth the new proof is: *Utrum esse deum possit fieri notum homini alia via quam ex creaturis*. The title of the Question defending the need for such a new proof is: *Utrum sit possibile esse plures deos quam unum*.¹ The new proof is more than a simple addition to his predecessors' proofs of God, of which Henry has a rather extensive digest; according to the intention of its author, it is the only proof that will reach God in an adequate way, that is, in a way that terminates with necessity in a being that is unique in its very existence. Henry's proof, therefore, is more than a new proof of God; it is a critique of the proofs of his predecessors. Without contesting their validity, it contests the method and the data of the proofs by which his predecessors proved the existence of God and the God whom these proofs reached at their terminus. All theologians had agreed that God was one and unique, but what Henry wanted to know was the philosophical method to be followed in reaching the one God in an appropriate way. For unless the proof (or proofs) leading to God reached a being that was so necessarily one that He could be only one, how was it philosophically certain that the one God had in fact been reached? Here Henry of Ghent had serious misgivings about what the theologians before him had done.

¹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa Quaestionum Ordinariam Theologiae...* (Paris, 1520), A. 22, Q. 5, foll. 134r-135v; A. 25, Q. 3, foll. 152r-157r. On the interpretation of Henry of Ghent, see: M. de Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Louvain-Paris, 1894) (= *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique dans les Pays-Bas et la principauté de Liège* [Louvain-Paris, 1895], 46-272); by the same author: *Histoire de la philosophie en Belgique* (Brussels-Paris, 1910), 80-116; J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris, 1938) and "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique" (*Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, vol. 10-11, 1935-1936, 265-323); E. Bettoni, *Il Processo Astrattivo nella Concezione di Enrico di Gand* (Milan, 1954); F. A. Prezioso, *La Critica di Duns Scoto all' Ontologismo di Enrico di Gand* (Padua, 1961), 60-112; José Gomez Cafferina, *Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafisica de Enrique de Gante* (Rome, 1958).

To understand the issue at stake, it is useful to recall the natural theologies of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Bonaventure had said in the opening article of his *De Mystério Trinitatis* that the existence of God was an indubitable and inescapable truth for the human mind. He had argued that that which was in any way relative could not be or be known except in and through the absolute being that it revealed as its source. The littleness and the mutability of creatures rested on the divine immensity and the divine immutability. Participation was therefore St. Bonaventure's way of reaching God, and the divine exemplarism was its starting point and its grounding. Being mutable, each creature was held back from descending into nothingness by the divine immutability present within it. The human mind itself lived within this immutability when it experienced an order of truth that a mutable world could not give it and that its own mutability could not cause or explain. God was there in the mind of St. Bonaventure, stabilizing its possession of truth through His presence and making possible the experience of a universe revealing, beyond its mutability, the sustaining light of a transcendent God. Participation grounded in the special and illumining presence of God in creation, including the mind of man, this was the rich Augustinian highway that St. Bonaventure traveled with unfailing confidence to his everpresent God.²

St. Thomas followed a radically different way to God. The world in which his proofs took their origin was not, in its structure, the Platonic world that St. Bonaventure had accepted from St. Augustine. The Thomistic physical universe was a world of natures that everywhere proclaimed their stability and their intelligible purpose. God was not present in such a universe in any special way; He was present as a creator, which meant, at once, that He was infinitely transcendent and yet that He was intimately present in the being and the causality that He gave to His creatures. The Thomistic proofs of God, therefore, reach God across His creation. They reach Him in two moments, namely, as the cause of phenomena in the world of nature, and in Himself. The two moments are totally continuous with one another, as can be seen from St. Thomas' procedure, but in their very continuity they are also distinct. Thus, St. Thomas proves the existence of God in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 13 and in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 2. At the end of these proofs St. Thomas thinks that he has reached God, the supreme being, and he thinks so because, as he says, men call by the name God the highest cause of things that the human mind can reach.³ Even

² See A. C. Pegis, "The Bonaventurian Way to God," *Mediaeval Studies*, 29 (1967) 206-242.

³ St. Thomas, *De Substantiis Separatis*, c. 1, § 2; ed. F. Lescoe (West Hartford, Conn., 1963), 36. On the problem of the existence of God in St. Thomas, see E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (6th ed.,

so, at the end of his proofs St. Thomas has reached God in a relational way; that is, he has reached God, not as He is in Himself and in virtue of His own being, but as He is known by the proofs leading to Him. And since these proofs are grounded in the physical universe to which for St. Thomas human knowledge is limited, they reach a God who is known as the supreme source of these phenomena; they do not, directly and in themselves, reveal God as He is in Himself. That is why in *SCG*, I, cc. 14-22 and in *ST*, I, q. 3 St. Thomas goes on to examine the existence of God in terms of itself rather than as reached from creatures. It is only at this moment that St. Thomas recognizes explicitly that God is *ipsum esse subsistens*, that as such He is absolutely simple and one, and that, if we look at the universe from the absolute standpoint of the divine simplicity, we can see that the ways leading to God are so many partial but genuine glimpses of the presence of God in the universe, reaching to Him in all its processes and hierarchies because He reaches to it in its very existence⁴.

If we consider St. Thomas' favorite, because most evident, way to God, namely, from motion, we can see the blending of two moments in a single way leading to God. At the end of the proof from motion, we know that there is a supreme prime mover, separate and unmoved, whom we call God. We then consider this prime mover, using the way of remotion, in order to discover what He is in Himself. We discover that He is pure existence, so that the God whom we began by knowing as the prime mover we now know as the supreme actuality. But since the method of reaching this highest being is grounded, in its first moment, in the famous argumentation of the eighth book in Aristotle's *Physics*, St. Thomas is inviting us to think that he can somehow proceed from God as the prime mover of Aristotle to the supreme being who is the creating God of Christian theology. This Thomistic procedure raises two questions, the one historical and the other philosophical. Was it not a violent baptism to make Aristotle's prime mover into the creating God of Christian teaching? Had Aristotle done it, that is, was Aristotle's prime mover, even within the perspective of the *Metaphysics*, anything more than a prime over? Suppose, indeed, that Aristotle were freed of all his own historical limitations, how far would he carry us toward the one God of Christianity? What is the maximum term of Aristotelianism on its way to God? Those who remember chapter seven of the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics* may believe in an Aristotelian

Paris, 1967), 49-97, and "Trois leçons sur le problème de l'existence de Dieu", *Divinitas*, 1 (1963) 23-87.

⁴ See St. Thomas, *De Sub. Sep.*, c. 9, § 48 (*ed. cit.*, p. 86); *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 1: q. 3, a. 4. On the notion that the first principle is known in two ways, namely, "per hoc quod habet relationem ad ea quae ab ipso sunt," and "per hoc quod non est ab alio," see *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 33, a. 4.

monotheism; but how is monotheism to be reconciled with the opening words of the next chapter? This complex Aristotelian question leads to a second and more directly philosophical one. Is it possible to proceed as St. Thomas has done, namely, to reach God in two stages: first, as things lead to Him and, second, as (once reached) He leads to Himself? We can ask this question in a way that is nearer to the concern of Henry of Ghent. Is it possible to begin the approach to God from the world of sensible creatures, and on the basis of sensible data, and by one continuous movement reach God in the absolute and necessary uniqueness of His being?

It is a fact that the question, so asked, troubled the mind of Henry of Ghent when he was confronted by the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Perhaps St. Thomas Aquinas had been living at a time when it seemed necessary to subordinate the critique of Aristotle's errors and the assessment of his shortcomings to the overall need to assimilate his virtues within the world of Christian theology. It is a fact that the limitations of the Aristotelian natural theology are a rather muted theme in the Thomistic writings. More than this, while St. Thomas could not have been unaware of the quarrel of Averroes with Avicenna in their interpretations of Aristotle, what was to take on the character of a celebrated quarrel for Henry of Ghent and later theologians is not even mentioned by St. Thomas. We can only wonder why this is so, but we are not in any doubt on the framework of Henry of Ghent's personal reflections on the problem of the existence of God. He knew, and said, that Avicenna had formulated an *a priori* proof for the existence of God, and he frankly thought that this proof was the only one that could reach God in His uniqueness. He also knew that Averroes had more than once objected to the Avicennian way of proving the existence of God and had, in two important instances, laid down the principle that within Aristotelianism the existence of separate substances was proved only in physics.

Here are the three important texts in this discussion. Avicenna:

Postea vero manifestabitur tibi innuendo quod nos habemus viam ad stabilendum primum principium non ex via testificationis sensibilium, sed ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium per se notarum quae facit necessarium quod ens habet principium quod est necesse esse et prohibet illud esse variabile et multiplex ullo modo, et facit debere illud esse principium totius, et quod totum debet esse per illud secundum ordinem totius. Sed nos propter infirmitatem nostrarum animarum non possumus incedere per ipsam viam demonstrativam quae est progressus ex principiis ad sequentia et ex causa ad causatum, nisi in aliquibus ordinibus universitatis eorum quae sunt sine discretione.⁵

⁵ Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, Tr. 1, c. 4 (Venice, 1508), fol. 71v (A). On the Avicennian proof of the necessary being see L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris, 1951), 35-68; O. Chahine, *Ontologie et théologie chez Avicenne* (Paris, 1962), 57-94.

Avicenna was proceeding toward God, but not *ex via testificationis sensibilium*; he was proceeding *ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium per se notarum*. These expressions need to be remembered, since they mark the true location of Henry of Ghent's starting point in proving the existence of God. But Henry knows the texts in which Averroes had strenuously objected to Avicenna's turning away from the world of sensible things as the ground of proving the existence of separate substances. Replied Averroes to Avicenna:

Sed notandum est quod istud genus entium esse, scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali, et qui dicit quod prima philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat; haec enim entia sunt subiecta primae philosophiae, et declaratum est in *Posterioribus Analyticis* quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse aut quia manifestum per se aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime cum dixit quod primus philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse et processit in hoc in suo libro de scientia divina per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia. Et peccavit peccato manifesto.⁶

The parallel text from Averroes' commentary on the *Metaphysics* is no less clearly opposed to the method of Avicenna:

Et ideo principia subiecti naturalis non demonstrantur nisi per res posteriores in scientia naturali. Et ideo impossibile est declarare aliquid abstractum esse nisi ex motu, et omnes viae quae reputantur esse ducentes ad primum motorum esse praeter viam motus equaliter sunt insufficientes, et si essent verae essent numeratae in prima philosophia... Et Avicenna hoc absolute dixit quod primus philosophus habet declarare prima principia sensibilis substantiae, sive aeternae sive non, et naturalis ponet positione naturam esse, et quod primus philosophus demonstrat eam esse; et non distinxit inter duas substantias. Si igitur aliquis dixerit quod philosophus considerat de principiis entis in eo quod est ens, ergo considerat de principiis substantiae, sicut dictum fuit in principio istius tractatus, et principia substantiae sunt principia naturalis subiecti; divinus igitur habet probare principia naturalis subiecti, et naturalis ponere ea positione: — et dicemus nos quidem quod philosophus inquit quae sunt principia substantiae secundum quod substantiae, et declarat quod substantia abstracta est principium substantiae naturalis; sed hoc ponendo accipit pro constanti hoc quod declaratum est in naturalibus de principiis substantiae generabilis et corruptibilis, scilicet quod declaratum est in primo *Physicorum*, scilicet quod est compositum ex materia et forma, et quod declaratum est in octavo, scilicet [quod est compositum ex materia et forma] quod movens aeternam substantiam est abstractum a materia.⁷

⁶ Averroes, In *Aristotelis Physicorum*, I, Comm. 83 (Venice, 1562) fol. 47rv [F].

⁷ Averroes, In *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum*, XII, Comm. 5 (Venice, 1574) fol. 293r [CEF]. The words in square brackets are a repetition and have been deleted. On the controversy of Averroes with Avicenna, see E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot" *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 2 (1927) 91-100; by the same author: *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris, 1952), 81-82, 139-140, 201-202, 256-257.

Henry of Ghent finds himself standing between the method adopted by Avicenna and the opposed method of Averroes. If Averroes is right, metaphysics does not prove the existence of God because the data forming the starting point of such a proof belong to the world of motion and are examined by the natural philosopher. Averroes is therefore a partisan of the view that Avicenna had already called the proof of God *ex testificatione sensibilium* and had wished to transcend. Henry of Ghent disagrees with Averroes' critique of Avicenna, and, in so doing, inaugurates among Christian theologians a new problem: what philosophical science proves the existence of God?

Articles 22 and 25 of Henry's *Summa* are devoted to an answer to this question. The answer is both historical and doctrinal, and on both counts it is a radical one as well as a new one in the thirteenth century. Article 22 contains what may be called the principle of Henry's solution. In agreement with St. Thomas, he argues in Question 2 that the existence of God is not self-evident. Then, in Question 4, he offers an elaborate set of proofs, which he will later designate as *a posteriori*, and which are based on the testimony of sensible creatures. He considers these proofs to be *irrefragabiliter* valid. Nevertheless, in Question 5, he goes on to take from Avicenna the idea of an *a priori* proof of God and to state why, in principle, it is superior to the proofs in Question 4: it reaches God in an absolute way. But, on reaching this point, Henry says that he will explain himself more fully on the superiority of the new proof when he turns to the study of the divine unity in Article 25. And indeed he does explain himself. Divided into three Questions, Article 25 is a steady and unrelenting approach to the divine unity. In question 1 he acknowledges that God is one simply because He is a being; but since every other being is, on the same ground, one, the argument does not prove that there is only one God. In Question 2, therefore, Henry goes on to the further consideration of the unicity of God and to an examination of the reasons for arguing that there is only one God. In historical terms, his great concern here is both to measure the accomplishment of the Aristotelian natural theology and to discover how far one could go on the way to God if he followed Aristotelian principles. Behind this historical concern there is in Henry's mind a philosophical one. How far do *a posteriori* proofs take us to the one God? In Question 2 he argues that by *a posteriori* proofs we know that there is only one God; but our knowledge stops here, since there is something still to be known that we do not yet know: there can be only one God. This knowledge we have, not from *a posteriori* proofs, but from the *a priori* proof of the necessary being set forth by Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* and taken from him by Henry of Ghent in Question 3 of Article 25.

It is thus clear that, in Henry's procedure, Article 25 is the justification

of Article 22. What needs to be justified is the fact that, having written Question 4 of Article 22, Henry felt compelled to transcend his digest of *a posteriori* proofs and to take from Avicenna his proof of the necessary being. The justification can be seen, in Article 25, in the transition from Question 2 (there is only one God) to Question 3 (there cannot be many Gods because only one is possible). The problem of the proof of the existence of God in Henry of Ghent, therefore, falls into two parts: (i) the location and general statement of the *a priori* proof in *Summa*, Article 22, Question 5; (ii) the justification of that proof in the name of the divine unity in Article 25, Question 3. The present study is limited to the first of these two points in Henry of Ghent.

II

Questions 2, 4, and 5 form the core of Article 22. Question 2 asks whether *deum esse* is known by man *naturaliter per se*. Agreeing with St. Thomas on the main issue, Henry denies categorically and systematically that the proposition *deum esse* is in any sense naturally evident to man in its truth in virtue of the meaning of its terms. Questions 4 and 5 form, in two stages, the proof that God exists.

Question 2, whose sources and procedure are strongly reminiscent of St. Thomas' *De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 12, offers three arguments in defense of the position that the existence of God is self-evident to man. There is the argument of St. John Damascene to the effect that the knowledge that God exists has been naturally inserted in all men and is therefore known naturally and through itself. There is the argument of Hugh of St. Victor that from the beginning God so tempered the knowledge of Himself in relation to man that man could never comprehend fully what God was, nor could he ever be ignorant that God existed. But what we cannot be unaware of is naturally known through itself. There is, finally, the argument drawn from Aristotelian texts. That is naturally known through itself which is immediately known when the terms expressing it are known. This happens in the case of first principles which, according to Aristotle, we know insofar as we know their terms. But when we know the meaning of the terms *deus* and *est*, we know immediately that *deus est* because in God *esse* and *essentia* are absolutely the same, so that the essence of God is His very being. Against these views stands the position of Avicenna. The existence of God (*an sit deus*) is not part of the subject of metaphysics, it is a matter of inquiry as something not manifest in itself.⁸

⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 2, fol. 130rv (P). The sources are: St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, I, c. 1 (PG, 94, 789B); Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, 3, c. 1 (PL 176,

That God exists (*deum esse*) can be known in two ways, according to Henry of Ghent, namely, either in general or in particular. It is known in general, "insofar as God is understood under the name *being* or the *good* taken absolutely, or of some other high attribute that befits Him as well as creatures." As St. Augustine says, "understand this good and that good, understand the good absolutely if you can: you will understand God." This is a text to which Henry will return more than once and in more than one context. It is known in particular, "as it is signified under the name *God*, namely, as a certain most excellent nature, as Augustine says in the *De Doctrina Christiana*."⁹ In the first way, the knowledge that God exists is naturally inserted in us "because in the first concepts, when we understand *being*, *one*, or *good* absolutely, in a general way we understand God under a certain confusion; just as, in the order of affection, in willing any particular good all men will to be happy and in this will — at least universally — the first and highest good, which is God." Thus, "by knowing in this way that the good or the beautiful, or the like, exists, we necessarily know thereby, in a confused and general way, that God exists — as will appear later on." But this way of knowing that God exists does not prevent a man from not knowing that He does or from not recognizing it. "Nevertheless, just as from the aforementioned will it is not to be said that everyone wills to possess God, so neither from such a universal knowledge is it to be said that all know that God exists; just as he who knows that someone, so far as he is a man, exists, does not know him to exist as Socrates. Hence, in spite of such a knowledge, by which it is known that God exists so far as being absolutely or the good absolutely is known to exist, in the particular — namely, so far as He is signified under the name *God* — a man can rather not understand that God exists, as was said above. For as the Philosopher says, something can be known universally and doubted in the particular."¹⁰

For the proposition *deus est* to be self-evident, the term *deus*, so far as *deitas* is signified by it, should enable us to co-understand in the subject *deus* that the subject in particular exists; it is not enough to understand it in general, as *deus* is understood to exist under the universal name being or good, by understanding that He is being or the good absolutely. Otherwise the proposition *deus est* would not be self-evident, in virtue of its

217 A); Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, II, 19. 100b 3-5; Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, Tr. I, c. 1, fol. 70r (BC).

⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*, fol. 130v (Q); St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 6. 6 (PL 34, 21); see also p. 242, below.

¹⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*; see Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 1. 71a 17-26.

terms. Damascene was speaking only of the general knowledge of God's existence as naturally inserted in all of us. Indeed, "such a general knowledge that God exists a man forms in his first concept naturally, without inquiry and investigation, as will be said below, just as he grasps first principles, and not because any knowledge is innate in us." The conclusion is clear. The knowledge that God exists, taken in the particular, is in no way inserted in us, and thus the proposition *deus est* is in no way self-evident.¹¹

Henry emphasizes that this whole question of the self-evidence of the existence of God concerns a proposition. Is it self-evident that the predicate *est* inheres in the subject *deus*? Can a man, on hearing this proposition *deus est*, know thereby that it is true? It is noticeable that Henry does not accept from St. Thomas the distinction between a proposition being self-evident in itself and being self-evident to a knower. To him a proposition is self-evident to a knower, and this is the case when the knower immediately (that is, without inquiry or further clarification) knows it to be true on the basis of the meaning of the term. Henry follows Boethius in dividing self-evident propositions into those known to all men (these are the principles common to all the sciences, e.g. that every whole is greater than its part) and those known only to the learned (e.g. that incorporeal beings are not in place).¹²

The issue with *deus est*, consequently, rests with our knowledge of the terms, the subject and predicate of the proposition itself. No general and indeterminate knowledge of the notion "God" can make it self-evident to us that God exists. As far as a determinate and particular knowledge is concerned, we must distinguish. There is first the situation of those who see God, the blessed; in seeing the divine essence, they see self-evidently that God exists. But, in this life, a prophet may have the infused knowledge that God exists, and a metaphysician can have acquired from creatures the wisdom to see the truth of the proposition *deus est*; in neither case, however, is the proposition *per se nota*, for a proposition is so called "only from the fact that the terms so of themselves present the knowledge of a thing that in virtue of them the predicate is known in the nature of the subject".¹³ In the sense in which the proposition *a whole is greater than its part* is self-evident, the proposition *deus est* cannot be self-evident. Henry's

¹¹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.* (QR).

¹² *Summa*, *ibid.*, foll. 130v-131r (ST); see Boethius, *Quomodo Substantiae*, Prop. 1 (in *Boethius, The Theological Tractates*, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand [Loeb Classical Library, London-New York, 1926], 40).

¹³ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*, fol. 131r (U).

conclusion is clear and unambiguous: "Nullo ergo modo ista propositio *deus est* cuicumque intelligenti potest esse per se nota quasi per ipsam propositionem quantacumque certitudine nota sit. Iterum ergo et iterum resolvendo sermonem dico quia, etsi homo per studium suum scire potest et intelligere hoc nomine *deus* significari id quo maius excogitari non potest et ita quod non potest cogitari non esse, etiam si cum hoc studio suo sciat quod est purum esse et ita quod non possit non esse, hoc nihil est ad faciendum propositionem per se notam. Immo ad hoc quod dicatur propositio per se nota oportet quod termini, scilicet subiectum et predicatum, ultro praetendant talem rem per se significari, ut omnes, vel saltem sapientes, statim terminis prolatis praedicatum inesse subiecto percipiant, sicut ista nomina *totum*, *pars*, *maius* sic ultro praetendunt sua significata ut per ipsos omnes aliquid cognoscentes de significato horum terminorum cognoscant statim veritatem huius, *totum est maius sua parte*."¹⁴ Thus (and here Henry sides with St. Thomas), the question at issue is not whether, in truth and in fact, God is *suum esse*, nor whether St. Anselm's celebrated formula that God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest* is true; the question is concerned simply with a proposition. The name *God* does not self-evidently reveal in its meaning the truth that He exists. To conclude:

"Simpliciter ergo dicendum quod ista propositio *deus est* non est per se nota alicui, nec stulto nec sapienti, nisi forte quatenus ex pueritia assueti sumus homines audire confitentes deum esse et sic ex consuetudine factum est nobis quasi connaturale assentire propositioni qua dicitur *deus est* tanquam per se notae. Sed hoc nihil ad faciendum propositionem esse per se notam, ut patet ex dictis."¹⁵

III

Except for the question whether a proposition can be self-evident in itself, which he denies, Henry of Ghent is in agreement with St. Thomas that *deum esse* is not self-evident to man. It is not self-evident to man in any way, however much it may be evident to him from infused knowledge, philosophical penetration or long familiarity. Yet the being of God suffers no imperfection or uncertainty in itself since God is most evident in His very existence. Hence, if, as is true, many doubt that God exists, the reason must be the weakness of the human intellect. It cannot see God as He is in Himself, and therefore it must gather its certitude concerning Him by reasoning from the things that are evident to it in the world of creatures.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 131v (X).

¹⁵ *Ibid.* (XY).

It must *prove* that God exists, that is, manifest the invisible through the visible and the uncertain through the certain.

But let us be careful to distinguish between what is demonstrable of its own nature and what is demonstrable to us because of the disposition of our own intellect. As far as the nature of God is concerned, that He exists is not demonstrable to man. There is no middle term between the divine essence and the divine existence to allow for an inference from essence to existence; for, since they are identical, there is nothing prior to, or more known than, the divine existence. When, in the beatific vision, man sees the divine essence he will not be able to doubt that God cannot not exist or to think that He does not exist. That is why Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics* that the supreme being has no definition, He cannot be the subject of demonstration, but He rather is the demonstration of everything that is. As far as the state of our intellect is concerned, that God exists can certainly be demonstrated to it. Naturally this *exists* refers, not to the divine existence in itself, but to the predicate of the proposition *God exists*. Proof in this situation means that we can make the proposition *God exists* to be true. We can demonstrate the divine existence, so understood, from creatures which are, in comparison with God, more known to our intellect; indeed because of their essential dependence on God as their cause and source, we can prove *irrefragabiliter* that God exists. So St. Augustine and St. Paul thought.¹⁶

The existence of God is proved in two ways, namely, demonstratively and analytically. Dionysius had said that from the order of existing things we can return to God in three ways, namely, by negation, eminence and causality. But by the way of remotion we do not know that God exists since this negative way removes the being (*esse*) of all creatures from God, and from negative propositions we never reach an affirmative conclusion. Thus we can know from creatures that God exists only by following the way of causality or the way of eminence. There are many arguments, within each of these ways, to prove that God exists, but the way of causality is the strongest.¹⁷ Henry's proofs now follow.

God is related to creatures in three orders of causality, namely, efficient, formal and final. There are proofs of God in each one of these orders. Indeed, there are three proofs under efficient causality, of which that from motion in the eighth book of the *Physics* is the *prima et manifestior* way. It

¹⁶ *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 4, fol. 132v (KL); St. Augustine, *In Ioan. Evang.*, Tr. 1, nos. 13-17 (PL 35, 1385-1388); St. Paul, *Rom.* I. 20. For Avicenna, see *Metaphysics*, Tr. 8, c. 4, fol. 98v (AB).

¹⁷ *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 4, fol. 132v (L). For the Pseudo-Dionysius, see *De Divinis Nominibus*, VII. 3 (PG 3, 869D-872A).

leads to a first and unmoved mover, whom we understand to be God. The second argument under efficient causality concerns the existence of a movable being, which as such can exist only if it is caused to exist. In such a situation the only source of existence is a being that exists by its own necessity. This is God, the first cause of all things. Similarly, generable things are caused, but not self-caused. Hence, unless we wish to pursue an endless journey of caused causes, which has no beginning and hence no other terms, we must come to a first term (single or multiple: Henry here leaves the point open until Article 25).¹⁸

If Aristotle dominates the way of efficient causality, St. Augustine is the master of the way of formal causality. And since form is the principle of being and of knowing, there are two proofs in the line of formal causality, though both follow the same mode of procedure as the arguments from efficient causality. St. Augustine pursues the argument from form in relation to being at some length in the *De Vera Religione*, just as he pursues the argument from form in relation to our knowledge in the second book of the *De Libero Arbitrio*. The first argument holds that since even the lowest of natures has a certain befittingness and beauty that is pleasing to us, and there is increasingly more beauty in plants and animals and considerably more in the rational creature (which judges all the rest below it), we must either say that the ladder of beauty and perfection has no highest term (an infinite regress that we know to be impossible) or it leads to a supreme beauty, unequalled by all other things and their measure. This we call God. Knowledge tells the same story — at least to St. Augustine. We judge colors by the eye, and sounds by the ear. What they have in common we judge by an interior common sense, and we judge among all of them by a still higher power, the reason. Since, then, that is higher which judges, in comparison with what is judged, we must come (if, once more, we discard an impossible infinite regress), to a supreme source of judgment, by which all other things are judged and which is not judged by any one. This is undoubtedly the immutable wisdom existing above all rational minds and all mutable things. For mutable things are to be judged only in something immutable. This immutable wisdom we call God.¹⁹

Henry offers a single argument from final causality derived from Aristotle. We can see that particular things are ordered to particular ends, and these ends are ordered to other ends. This is true among all beings. The good of each thing, indeed its nature, is its end. Once more, we must either come to a prime end, which is the end and the good of what precedes it,

¹⁸ *Summa, ibid.*, foll. 132v-133r MNO).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 133 r (PQ).

or face the impossible, an endless series of ends. The highest end, the most perfect being, is God.²⁰

The way of eminence, which Henry of Ghent finds in Richard of St. Victor, St. Anselm and St. Augustine (and somewhat in Aristotle and Averroes), proceeds in a twofold way, namely, from the imperfect to the perfect and from the less perfect to the more perfect leading to a supreme term in the hierarchy of perfection. St. Augustine illustrates the first of these two ways. "Those who through their understanding strive to see that God exists set Him above all visible and corporeal natures, intelligible and spiritual natures as well, and all mutable natures. All however fight earnestly in behalf of God's excellence, nor can anyone be found who thinks that God is that than which a better [Henry says, a "greater"] can be found." The second or hierarchical way can be seen toward the beginning of St. Anselm's *Monologion*. In whatever things it is possible to find more and less, in the same genus it is possible to find something that is such absolutely. But among beings it is possible to find the good and the better, the beautiful and the more beautiful, the enjoyable and the more enjoyable. In a similar way, therefore, it is possible to find among beings something that is absolutely good, absolutely beautiful, absolutely enjoyable, which is the standard of more and less in other things. This is none other than God, in whom pure goodness is to be found, and likewise beauty and joy, and the rest. Therefore God exists.²¹

After the demonstrations for the existence of God Henry turns to what he has called analytical arguments for God and which he now also characterizes as probable arguments. Such proofs for God need to be reduced to one or another of the demonstrations already set forth if they are to be more than probable. An example of an analytical argument is to be found in the *De Trinitate* of Richard of St. Victor who there argues for the existence of God by assuming two self-evident disjunctive propositions: (i) Everything that is or can be thought is either from eternity or began to be in time; (ii) Everything that is has being (*esse*) either from itself or from another. Taken together, these propositions produce four possible alternatives: every being is either (a) from eternity and from itself, or (b) neither from eternity nor from itself, or (c) from eternity but not from itself, or (d) from itself but not from eternity. The last alternative is discarded as impossible. On the basis of the second assumption, moreover, the second and third alternatives are shown to prove the first one. For alternatives two and

²⁰ *Ibid.*, foll. 133rv (R).

²¹ For St. Augustine, see *De Doctrina Christiana*, I, 7.7 (PL 32, 22); for St. Anselm, *Monologion*, c. 4 (ed. F. S. Schmitt, *S. Anselmi... Opera*, vol. I [Edinburgh, 1946], 16-18).

three are both from another. Hence, rejecting an infinite regress, we arrive at the existence of that being that is from eternity and from itself. This is God.²²

Henry of Ghent's main conclusion is quite clear. Given the existence of some being, it can be proved irrefutably that God necessarily exists: *sic igitur patet irrefragabiliter quia necesse est ponere deum esse ex quo ponimus aliquod esse entium*.²³ As set forth in Question 4, the arguments for God, in beginning with things, are proofs that Henry will follow Avicenna in designating as *ex testificatione sensibillum*, and as *a posteriori*. Question 4 contains no reservation on the proofs of God themselves. Henry has said twice that the demonstrations prove God *irrefragabiliter*. If there is a reservation in his mind, it bears, not on the strength of the proofs themselves, but on God as reached from the testimony of the sensible universe. What this means we shall see more clearly when we turn to the new proof in Question 5.

IV

Judging by the setting of the discussion, the issue raised by Question 5 does not seem to be as radical as, in fact, it will turn out to be. It is asked: Can man know that God exists by a way other than from creatures? Two arguments, both taken from St. Augustine, favor an affirmative answer. That which reveals to the intellect the existence of all things, as light makes other things visible to the eye, shows first that it itself exists. Corporeal light naturally reveals itself to the eye before it reveals colors. So, too, God. As Augustine says, the earth is visible and so is light, but the earth can be seen only because it is illumined by light. In the same way, the procedures of the sciences cannot be understood unless they are illumined by some light in their own order. This is God.²⁴ Augustine also says that, without the interposition of any creature, the mind is formed by truth itself, which is God. But, in informing without the intervention of a medium, truth is known without a medium.²⁵ Against this view is Jacob's ladder. According to Hugh of St. Victor, the angels do not need a ladder since in their contemplation of God they are suspended in flight. But man, who cannot fly, needs a ladder — the ladder of creation — in order to know God.²⁶ Henry of Ghent will agree with Hugh of St. Victor. But he

²² *Summa, ibid.*, fol. 133v (S); Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, I, c. 6 (PL 196, 983D-894A).

²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 134r (T).

²⁴ St. Augustine, *Soliloquia*, I, 8 (PL 32, 877).

²⁵ St. Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus* LXXXIII q. 51. 4 (PL 40, 33).

²⁶ I have not located this text.

will travel up the ladder in his own way, following the philosophical guidance, not of Aristotle, but of Avicenna.

Man is by nature directed to a twofold intellectual knowledge, the one natural, the other supernatural. The first has to do with all those realities that he can reach, by means of his natural powers, through study and inquiry. Such a knowledge investigates God and creatures as far as philosophy can go: *quantum philosophia se potest extendere*. The second cannot reach anything except it be aided by a gift of supernatural light, whether of grace or of glory. In both of these ways, man can come to know that God exists. And this is what is commonly said, namely, that the existence of God is knowable to man in two ways, by way of the natural reason and by way of supernatural revelation. Following the road of reason and philosophy, Avicenna (if indeed, Henry reflects, Avicenna spoke as a pure philosopher!) was of the opinion that "in addition to the knowledge of God that we have from sensible things *a posteriori*, another knowledge is possible *a priori*: *praeter notitiam quam habemus de deo ex sensibilibus a posteriori, possibilis est alia a priori*." Henry now quotes the text from the first tractate of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* that we have seen: "You will be shown later that we have a way of establishing the first principle, not by way of the testimony of sensible things, but by way of universal intelligible propositions, which make it necessary that being has a principle, that this is the necessary being, and that the whole [of being] is required to exist through it, according to its order. But, because of the weakness of our souls, we are not able to follow this demonstrative way, which is a movement from principles to their consequences, and from a cause to what is caused, except by means of certain orders in the universe of existing things."²⁷

This view, Henry continues, exposed Avicenna to the criticism of Averroes who, in his commentary on the end of the first book of the *Physics*, charged him with having made a very grave error by saying that the first philosopher ought to demonstrate the existence of the first principle. The criticism would have been quite justified, Henry pursues, if Avicenna held "that the knowledge of these universal propositions does not arise from sensible creatures. For we have absolutely no way of proving that it [the first principle] exists except from sensible things, nor likewise of knowing its nature and essence, nor anything else about intelligible realities, whether natural or supernatural, but much less so concerning supernatural realities, and least so concerning divine realities. And I mean by a knowledge that is natural and acquired by purely natural powers."²⁸ We have a first

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 5, fol. 134v (B). For the text of Avicenna, which Henry has quoted with only minor changes, see above, p. 229.

²⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, *ibid.*

clarification, therefore. The new proof is to be from sensible creatures, since it proceeds by way of certain universal intelligible propositions that are themselves derived *ex sensibilibus creaturis*.

There are three ways in which we can try to know that a thing is actually existing. In one way, we can know it by its presence, as we know that a fire exists because it is present to our eyes. Second, we can know it by knowing the nature and essence of a thing, as we know the nature of fire without seeing it present to us. Third, we can know it by the relation and dependence of other existing things to the existence of the thing to be known as existing.²⁹ In the first way, God is known to exist only by those who see His essence, namely, the blessed in heaven. In this life, it is not possible for a man to know that God exists by way of seeing Him and His essence. The second way is the crucial one for Henry of Ghent. In this way "no thing can be known to exist actually unless its quiddity includes its existential being, which is the case in God alone because in God alone are essence and existence identical." In this second way, we cannot know, from knowing its essence, that any creature exists; indeed, in knowing its essence we can, at the same time, understand that it does not exist. "Only in the case of God can we know that He exists by knowing His essence and quiddity — because He is such that essence and existence are identical in Him—and thereby know from His essence that it is a necessary existence, so that it is not possible to understand His essence and understand at the same time that it does not exist." In this way, then, we can know that God exists by knowing His essence to this extent, namely, that it includes existence itself: *per hunc modum deus cognoscitur esse cognoscendo eius essentiam quo ad hoc quod eius essentia includit ipsum esse*.³⁰

According to Henry of Ghent, this was the way that Avicenna had in mind when he said that man can know that God exists by way of universal intelligible propositions, and not by way of the testimony of sensible things. But how does this way to God proceed? First of all, the universal propositions in question have to do with *being*, *one*, *good*, and the primary notions of things which are first conceived by the intellect. In these notions a man can see being absolutely (*ens simpliciter*), the good absolutely, or the true absolutely. But such a reality is of necessity something subsisting necessarily in itself and unparticipated in another. Such a being is being itself (*ipsum esse*), the good itself, truth itself: it is God. As Augustine says, God is truth, and when you hear that truth exists, do not ask what truth is. Clouds of corporeal images immediately settle on your mind, and they

²⁹ *Ibid.* (C); see also A. 22, Q. 1, fol. 130r (L).

³⁰ *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 5 (C).

disturb the clarity that shone on your mind when you said that truth existed. Remain in that first flash of light, if you can, the flash that touched you when truth was spoken. If you cannot, you will fall back into these ordinary earthly things. Again, consider *this* good and *that* and see the good itself, if you can. You will thus see God, who is not good by another good, but who is the good of every good. And because, continued Henry, the concept of the good grasped in this absolute way is the concept of the universal good, as well as the first concept of the Good, which is followed by other concepts, that is why Augustine went on to say, in the same discussion, that we would not say truthfully that one thing is better than another unless there were impressed upon us the notion of the good itself. A man would have nowhere to turn — and, after a change of heart, to return to — if the good did not abide in itself. We can therefore bring this whole discussion to its proper term by following the lead of Avicenna and Augustine. “And since, according to Avicenna and the truth of the matter, the more our concepts are simple the more they are prior, so that *one, thing*, and the like, are immediately impressed on the soul by means of an impression that is not acquired from others more known than itself; and since, according to Augustine, in understanding the being of every being and the good as such of every good we understand God: — therefore, from such concepts of universal propositions it is possible, following Avicenna and Augustine, to understand and to know that God exists, but not by way of the testimony of sensible things, which is undoubtedly a true procedure. For this way is different from the way of knowing that God exists by the testimony of sensible things, in which the being of the creature is testimony for the being of God.”³¹

We now see in principle the line of demarcation between Question 4 and Question 5. Ideo ex talibus conceptibus propositionum universalium, Henry of Ghent has just said, contingit secundum Avicennam et Augustinum intelligere deum esse, non ex via testificationis sensibilium, quod procul dubio verum est. Est enim iste modus alius a via cognoscendi deum esse ex testificatione sensibilium, qua esse creaturae testificatur esse dei, secundum quod apparuit in quaestione praecedenti. In Question 4 the procedure was to begin with sensible things; in this sense, the *esse creaturae* was the testimony used to reach the *esse dei*. Now, in Question 5, we see a historic change in the procedure of natural theology. St. Thomas had said, often enough, *secundum Aristotelem et veritatem*. Now Henry of Ghent is saying *secundum Avicennam et secundum veritatem*, just as he will say in Article

³¹ *Ibid.* (D). For Avicenna, see *Metaphysics*, Tr. I, c. 6, fol. 72r (A); for St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII, 2. 3; c. 3. 4 (PL 42, 949-950).

25, Question 3: *dicamus secundum Avicennam et veritatem*.³² Nor should we fail to notice the alliance of Avicenna and St. Augustine. Whatever the validity of reading the texts of St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* within the Avicennian transcendentals, the procedure marks a new moment both in natural theology and in the interpretation of Augustine himself. Only, can abstractions bear the weight — and the light — of St. Augustine's intellectual world?

Henry is concerned at this precise point to argue and even to insist that his new Avicennian-Augustinian way to God, though different from the *a posteriori* way of the proofs in Question 4, is not entirely different. For this new way is in a sense through creatures since it takes its origin in the knowledge of the essence of the creature: *non tamen [non] est omnino iste alius modus a via cognoscendi deum esse per creaturas, quia iste modus ortum sumit a cognitione essentiae creaturae*.³³ How so? "From the goodness of the creature we understand what is true and good absolutely. For if by abstracting from this good and that good we can understand what is good and true absolutely, not as in this and that good but as in itself, in this good in itself we understand God." Henry admits with St. Augustine that to do this — i.e. to go from this and that good upward to the good as such — is not at all easy. Our souls are so weak that we can barely do so. The reason, as St. Augustine had said, is that, having deserted itself and become involved in sensible things, our mind finds it difficult to return to itself, whence it could proceed to the unity above it. In any case, this way of knowing that God exists, "though not based on the testimony of creatures, as Avicenna finely says, does nevertheless take its origin from creatures." As for Averroes, "he criticized Avicenna as though he had not granted this, and criticized him wrongly. For Avicenna quite clearly insinuated this when he added that, because of the weakness of our souls, we cannot proceed along that way except by means of certain orders [i.e. orderly structures] in the universe of existing things." Henry thinks that, according to St. Augustine himself, what he was to call his *a priori* proof took its origin from creatures.¹ In the text of the *De Trinitate* that we have seen, St. Augustine had said that, when we hear this good and that good, if we could see without them the good in which they participate and by participation in which they are good, we would see God. For in understanding them in their particular goodness we somehow also understand the good in which they participate. If, then, we could see that good without them, we would see God.³⁴

³² *Summa*, A. 25, Q. 3, fol. 156r (S).

³³ *Summa*, A. 22, Q. 5, fol. 134v (E). The bracketed "non" clearly needs to be deleted.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 135r (E). For St. Augustine, see *De Ordine*, II, l. 2-2.4 (PL 32, 993-996).

Henry of Ghent is quite aware, in his present discussion, of what he has done and not done in Question 5. In one sense, he has formulated his new proof and contrasted it with the *a posteriori* proofs of Question 4. How the new proof proceeds, however, he has not yet said; in fact, Henry looks forward to Article 25, on the divine unity, as the place where he expects to deal with this precise question: *istum autem modum probandi deum esse ex propositionibus universalibus, aliter quam supradictum est ex testificatione sensibilibus, videbimus infra loquendo de dei unitate*.³⁵ Because the *modus* of the new proof is not contained in the present discussion, there is a sense in which we now know Henry's new proof by its general formula and by some of its external characteristics or symbols; but we do not know as yet the actual procedure of the proof. In looking forward to the problem of the divine unity, therefore, Henry is locating the issue that will both dominate and characterize the new proof. Here he is content to conclude his reflections by defending the perfection of the new way to God in Question 5 as compared with the way of Question 4. Granted that the ways of Question 4 and Question 5 are both from creatures, Henry argues that the new way is much more perfect as an argument — and the reasons go to the heart of the problem. In the way from creatures as followed out in Question 4, "we could know that God existed without knowing that *to exist* (*esse*) is of the nature of the subject; this is necessarily known in the present way. And therefore the divine essence, and what God is, is known in the present way more particularly and distinctly than in the other way. In the other way, indeed, we know only that there exists some nature superior and prior to every creature, without knowing that in Him [God] there is the supreme simplicity and identity of existence (*esse*) and essence, as we know in the present way." Henry's own words need to be read at this point:

Et est ista via sciendi deum esse multo perfectior quam secunda, licet ambae sint ex creaturis, quia in illa potest sciri deus esse absque eo quod cognoscatur praedicatum esse de ratione subiecti, quod necessario scitur in ista. Et ideo in ista cognoscitur divina essentia, et quid sit deus, magis in particulari et distincte quam in illa. In illa enim scitur solum quod est aliqua natura superior et prior omni creatura, absque eo quod sciatur quia in ipso est summa simplicitas et identitas esse et essentia, quod scitur in ista.³⁶

V

It is now possible to consider the overall intention and outcome of Question 5. Henry began by asking whether man could know that God existed and do so in a way that was not by the testimony of sensible creatures

³⁵ *Summa, ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

as such. To this question his answer is emphatically in the negative. He repeats this view throughout his discussion, and he seems anxious that the *a priori* proof of God's existence, taken from Avicenna, be understood as being based on creatures. Since Question 4 was devoted to proofs from the testimony of sensible creatures, proceeding *a posteriori* from their existence to the existence of God, in Question 5 Henry is called upon to emphasize that his new proof is indeed from creatures and yet differs from the proofs followed in Question 4. Question 5 proceeds, at the level of Avicenna's transcendentals, from the essence of the creature to the necessary existence of the divine essence. How this procedure works Henry does not say; he rather looks forward to Article 25, Question 3, as the place where his Avicennian proof will be spelled out. He does say, in Question 5, that in this proof we go from this good to the good as such, as St. Augustine had done; but he does not explain how and why we can do this. That if we could suppress *this* from this good and still see the good we would see the absolute good, God, may be true, but why is it an inference? Is Henry saying that participation is a visible part of the structure of being, and that, within *this* being, we can see our way to going from this being to absolute being? These questions mean no more than, in fact, we have not seen Henry's proof at work. We do not yet know its metaphysical structure.

There are further puzzles that need to be considered. Henry may not have given us his proof of God as of the end of Question 5, but he has done at least two things to focus our attention on its character and perspective. He has argued that, by its *a priori* procedure, it is distinct from and superior to the *a posteriori* proofs of Question 4. In historical terms this means that, since it is quite possible to locate all of St. Thomas' five ways among Henry's *a posteriori* demonstrations, the proof of Question 5 is intended by him as superior to the Thomistic five ways. And since the point of the superiority is that St. Thomas merely proves that *deus est* whereas, in his new way, Henry proves that *deus est esse*, the issue at stake — including the superiority in question — is far-reaching in more than one direction. Granted that St. Thomas' ways are perfectly valid as demonstrations, after Henry's Question 5 we must at least consider the point of saying that they prove only that God exists, they do not prove that, in His very nature, He is existence, and this uniquely. Thus, whatever it may mean, there is no doubt that St. Thomas proves the existence of God in *ST*, I, q. 2, a. 3, but he does not prove until q. 3, a. 4, that God is pure *esse*; and in the earlier *SCG*, he proved the existence of God in I, c. 13, but he did not prove that God was *ipsum esse* until I, c. 22. And the point is not merely that St. Thomas came to such knowledge *after* proving the existence of God; the point — I mean, Henry's point — is the very possibility of doing so. To take the most crucial and relevant example in Henry's mind, can

Aristotle's prime mover, who is the *deus* of the first way, be transformed so as to become the Christian God, the supreme and absolute being?

Henry's complex reaction to Aristotle forms a decisive moment in his own natural theology. How far did Aristotle go toward God? Indeed, how far could a purified Aristotelianism, such as that of St. Thomas Aquinas, go toward the one God by means of its *a posteriori* ways? Only as far as the fact of the one God — such is the conclusion that Henry has so far indicated and that he will vigorously defend in Article 25, Question 2. It is not far enough. Henry is dreaming of being able to prove the uniqueness and the unique necessity of God by a single and necessary argument. If the failures of Aristotle to reach the one God stand between Henry of Ghent and St. Thomas, Avicenna's argument for the existence of the necessary being is Henry's remedy for the removal of the shadow of Aristotle. Henry's willingness, therefore, to follow Avicenna and to say *secundum Avicennam et veritatem* has deep historical roots. No more than two decades separate the age of Henry of Ghent from that of St. Thomas, but the intellectual distance traveled by Christian theologians during this short time is immense. The Christian Aristotelianism of St. Thomas is a dead letter for Henry of Ghent, and so is the metaphysics that St. Thomas placed at the service of the Christian revelation. Henry is clearly living after the effort to assimilate Aristotelianism had failed. At least, so Henry thought, and his preference for Avicenna is the symbol of the new Christian synthesis that he is building. It is a further fact that the great John Duns Scotus was to find the origins and the shape of his problems within this new intellectual world of Henry of Ghent.

Let us ask a final question before concluding the present discussion, simply with a view to preparing the transition to the examination of Article 25. How is it that Henry of Ghent is able to accomplish by means of metaphysical notions what he declares himself unable to accomplish by beginning with the sensible universe? He needs the *a priori* metaphysical proof of Question 5 because he is not satisfied with the outcome of the proofs in Question 4. But if metaphysical notions are themselves derived by abstraction from the world of nature, why is the being considered by the metaphysician able to ground a proof leading to the divine necessity when the physical universe, which is the only world of being available to the metaphysician himself, cannot? However it is to be answered, this question needs to be posed.³⁷ Without in the least condemning the Tho-

³⁷ This question is asked within the limits of the present text (Q. 5). There are noticeable Aristotelian — not to say, empirical — elements in Q. 5 that should not be ignored, whatever the ultimate interpretation of Henry's metaphysics may be. Toward the end of Q. 5, in comparing the theologian and the philosopher, Henry points out that "*scientiae philosophicae est incipere a*

mistic ways to God on the score of their probative value, Henry thinks he needs — and, in Avicenna, he has found — a better proof, better because its terminus is much higher. It consists, not in a journey from the physical universe to God, but in an absolute metaphysical journey within being to the necessary being. In spite of the effort of St. Thomas, Aristotle plays no part in such a journey, since Avicenna is to be its philosophical teacher. In the age of Henry of Ghent, the Christianized Aristotle of St. Thomas is an achieved monument, not to say a museum piece. The optimism that had built that monument is gone and Christian theology is in search of a new synthesis, beginning with a new proof of God. *Summa*, Article 25, with its open conflict between Aristotle and Christianity, and its remarkable harmony between Avicenna and philosophical truth, is Henry of Ghent's statement of that proof.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

creaturis et procedere in creatorem," which does not go beyond the principle common to QQ. 4 and 5; but he goes on to say that "philosophus omnem scientiam suam debet reducere ultimo in veritatem ultimam quae est sensibilibus apprehensorum per sensum, et in prima principia speculabilium accepta via experientiae ex sensu" (Q. 5, fol. 135r [F]). This is surely the spirit of the conclusion of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*. Similarly, the replies to the two Augustinian objections are both quite reminiscent of St. Thomas Aquinas. Man may know truth by being immediately formed by the divine truth; but in the present life this immediately present divine truth is known "per speciem alienam, ut creaturae"; as for the argument that we know the truths of the sciences in and by the divine light, which we know by priority, as we see light by priority to the colors it reveals, Henry replies: "Deus non est qui ostendit omnia intelligibilia intellectui ita quod non cognoscuntur nisi in ipso determinate cognito sicut non videntur colores et corpora nisi in luce visa, vel sicut non videntur conclusiones nisi in principis per se notis: quo ad hoc enim non est simile; sed quia per eius influentiam et ab ipso nobis inditum naturale lumen, et forte cum aliqua illustratione generali, omnis causatur in nobis cognitio" (*ibid.*, foll. 135rv [HI]). There is a naturalism in these words that does not immediately accord with Augustinianism; indeed the new Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent visualizes, via Avicenna, a synthesis of St. Augustine and Aristotle that was unknown to St. Thomas. In this sense, since the very possibility of the argument for the existence of God in Q. 5 rests on the possibility of the metaphysics on which it is based, to ask how Henry can do in metaphysics what he cannot do *ex testificatione sensibilibus* is to question the nature and the coherence of his metaphysics. How, we ask in the light of Q. 5 taken as a whole, but staying within its limits, can Henry of Ghent both transcend and also follow the Aristotelian empiricism that he seems to profess? See the concluding reflections of E. Bettoni, *Il Processo Astrattivo*, 89-90.

English Prose Style from Alfred to More a Bibliography

JAMES R. BENNETT

IN making my selections I have treated grammar as a part of style, as an element, that is, in the complex range of choices an individual author makes when writing. As Nils Enkvist has said, "There is no styleless language" (*Linguistics and Style*, ed. John Spencer, p. 32), since all choices of words and their arrangements involve options within norms, and tell us something about the individual writer. But I have tended to slight strictly grammatical studies, or those systematic descriptions of linguistic patterns common to the language, those choices between a small and limited number of possibilities. Thus I have omitted descriptions of the temporal subjunctive or the genitive case. I have stressed in my selection, on the other hand, items which tend to reveal the individuality of a writer, not only studies of uniqueness but also of traditions and norms which compose a frame of reference for that uniqueness. The selections are, therefore, my own, and are not presented either as definitive or as complete.

In my search for titles I have examined the *Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature*, Volumes 1 (600-1660) and 5 (Supplement), which cover scholarship to 1955; the *Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature*, Volumes 26 (1945)-32 (1956); and the *PMLA Annual Bibliography*, Volumes 60-80 (1945-65).

Algeo, John Thomas, ed. "Aelfric's 'The Forty Soldiers': An Edition." *DA*, 20 (1960), 4656 (Florida).

"Aelfric's alliterative style, widely used in the *Lives of Saints*, is well exemplified in 'The Forty Soldiers.' ...[I]t is supposed that the alliterative prose style reflects the influence of Latin rhyming, cadenced prose" (from *DA*).

Anderson, G. K. *The Literature of the Anglo-Saxons* (Princeton, 1949).
Scattered comments on style.

Andrew, S. O. *Syntax and Style in Old English* (Cambridge, 1940).

Distinguishes three different kinds of order for Old English: common order, conjunctive order and demonstrative order, the difference consisting in the presence or absence of a conjunction or a demonstrative pronoun. "Perhaps the most important result of our investigation is the light which it throws on the characteristic features of OE

style.... Chapter XI ["Parataxis"] deals directly with the problem of style and seeks to show that the supposed 'paratactic' structure of Old English, whether in prose or verse, is an illusion" (from the Preface). Rev. by Simeon Potter in *MLR*, 36 (1941), 252-255: "In general it must be said that Andrew's main argument is too lucid to be true. He simplifies overmuch.... On the other hand, the author's contention that the asyndetic nature of Old English has been over-emphasized may be accepted with gratitude." Also rev. by Angus Macdonald in *RES*, 17 (1941), 499-501.

Atkins, J. W. H. *English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase* (Cambridge, 1943).

The various critical and literary influences that helped shape medieval prose.

Auerbach, Erich. *Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1965).

Through works of such writers as St. Augustine, Dante, Bernard of Clairvaux, Gregory the Great, and William Langland, Prof. Auerbach traces the evolution of classical Latin rhetoric and style into that of medieval Latin and the Romance languages. Relevant to the study of English prose style because of the great influence on English style of translations of Latin writings.

Aurner, R. R. *Caxton and the English Sentence*. Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 18 (1923), 23-59.

"His prefaces and epilogues are composed of long masses of structure which are rambling, unorganized, loose, and formless to the last degree. About the sentence as a whole he seems to have had no worry: he fixed his mind only on (a) the preceding clause, and (b) the clause issuing from his pen" (p. 28).

Baldwin, Charles Sears. *Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic* (London and New York, 1928).

A survey of medieval rhetorical theory, including the problem of levels of discourse. Presents the salient tendencies and the actual theory and practise of composition down to 1400. Rev. by W. B. Sedgwick in *Speculum*, 3 (Oct., 1928), 599-600, and by G. Saintsbury in *Dial*, 85 (Sept., 1928), 246-8.

Baugh, Albert C., ed. *A Literary History of England* (New York, 1948).

Various chapters in Bk. I, Pt. II. Ch. III, "The Ancrene Riwe."

Baum, Paull. "Chaucer's Metrical Prose," *JEGP*, 45 (1946), 38-42.

Deals almost exclusively with *Melibeus*. See Schlauch's criticism of the essay in "Chaucer's Prose Rhythms."

Bennett, H. S. "Fifteenth Century Secular Prose," *RES*, 21 (1945), 257-63.

Qualifies Chambers' stress upon religious and homiletic prose as the

chief instruments of continuity. Denying Chambers' argument that secular prose in the fifteenth century was not in the true English tradition, since it was spoiled by clumsiness and pedantry, Bennett claims for secular prose an important place in the development of the main English tradition of the clear and easy plain style.

Bethurum, Dorothy. "The Connection of the Katherine Group with Old English Prose," *JEGP*, 34 (1935), 553-64.

First pointed out the great variety of prose styles to be found within this collection.

——, ed. *The Homilies of Wulfstan* (Oxford, 1957).

The "Introduction" contains a section on style: "Wulfstan's homilies are the work of a skilled rhetorician and illustrate the teachings of the manuals of rhetoric which he must have studied. He shares with Aelfric and with the anonymous composers of Latin charters and vernacular writs the fondness of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries for ornate language and exhibits unique skill in turning it to oratorical uses."

——. "Stylistic Features of the Old English Laws," *MLR*, 27 (1932), 263-279.

"The conclusion warranted by an investigation of legal style in the Old English period seems to be that the impetus to codification came from Latin ecclesiastical sources, but that the kings who wrote the laws and the bishops who assisted were a Germanic people, in whose hands whatever foreign material they used underwent a transformation into Germanic terms. They had behind them a tradition of a poetic, highly adorned prose, and in their writing they used the poetic device they knew best, alliteration" (p. 276).

Burnham, Josephine May. *Concessive Constructions in Old English Prose*. Yale Studies in English, 39 (1911).

Main types, origins, and history.

Caplan, Harry. "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching," *Classical Philology*, 27 (April, 1933), 73-96.

Shows the clear distinction made between secular and divine oratory.

Chambers, R. W. "Introduction," *The Life and Death of Sr. Thomas More, Knight, Sometime Lord Chancellor of England*, by Nicholas Harpsfield (Oxford, 1932).

Chambers' earliest effort to demonstrate the continuity of English prose from Alfred to More through the chronicle and devotional writings.

——. *On the Continuity of English Prose from Alfred to More and His School* (London, 1932).

Chambers agrees with Krapp concerning the nature of the essential

English prose tradition (clarity and intelligibility, simplicity and directness), but unlike Krapp, he traces this tradition back to Alfred (which Krapp thought impossible), and then forward through Aelfric and Wyclif to More and modern prose. The prose of the eleventh century derived directly from the tenth, and the fifteenth century prose directly from the eleventh. The sudden output of English prose in the late fourteenth century that Krapp emphasizes as the proper starting point is a survival of the old prose of Alfred and Aelfric. The full revival of English prose in the fifteenth century, therefore, is the consequence of the steady development of English prose since Alfred, which was a tradition of plain and open style, typified by the *Ancrene Riwe*, and the writings of Rolle and Hilton, all of which forecast the prose of More, and therefore of Bunyan, Defoe, Dryden and modern prose. Chambers' argument has been attacked by several critics. Williamson: "Chambers is content with native tradition; for him English style is like the long bow, even if Ascham required something more to write *Toxophilus*." Zeeman: "It does not, in the first place, admit the interest of growth and development in the East of the country. Moreover, in failing to distinguish between widely varying kinds of prose style within the Western Group, it ignores the existence of different traditions of English devotional prose, marked in the Old English period, but unmistakable by the fourteenth century." Cf. Norman Davis, R. M. Wilson, and S. K. Workman.

Chatman, Seymour B. "Structural and Lexical Distributions of Function Words with Substantives in the *Paston Letters* (1440-1460)." *DA*, 16 (1956), 1440-41.

A description of the use of prepositions in one body of Late Middle English. Cf. Norman Davis.

Clark, A. C. *Prose Rhythm in English* (Oxford, 1913).

Extends his earlier work, *Cursus in Medieval and Vulgar Latin* (1910), into an analysis of native and Latin rhythmical developments from Old English to Middle English.

Clark, Donald Leman. "Rhetoric and the Literature of the Middle Ages," *QJS*, 45 (1959), 19-28.

"All boys who grew up to be writers went to school to learn to read and write, and... they were drilled in rhetoric, not only by *De Inventione* and *Ad Herrenium*, but by the elementary exercises of Priscian.... Rhetoric did teach the poets, as well as the prose writers, to find arguments and to use an embellished and copious style."

Cleaveland, Elizabeth W. *A Study of Tindale's Genesis Compared with the Genesis of Coverdale and of the Authorized Version*. Yale Studies in English, 43 (1911).

- Intended to show "the debt of the language to the translation of the Bible by one who sought to make the Bible 'a book for the ploughboy,' for simple folk.... Yet in this endeavor... there is nowhere any descent to what is common; the simplicity is ever dignified.... to show that it was Tindale's not Coverdale's translation that was made the basis of the Authorized Version of 1611, is another purpose of this study."
- Cook, A. S. "The *Authorized Version* and Its Influence," Ch. 2 of Vol. 4 of *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, ed. A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller (Cambridge, 1909).
- Craik, Sir Henry. *English Prose; Selections with Critical Introductions to Each Period* (New York, 1893-1896).
Vol. I., "Fourteenth to Sixteenth Century." "The object of this collection is to show the growth and development of English Prose, by extracts from the principal and most characteristic writers." The introductions to each writer (52 in all) include a brief "critical description of his style and methods, and of his place in the development of English Prose."
- Davis, Charles R. *Biblical Translations in Aelfric's Catholic Homilies* (New York, 1949).
- Davis, Norman. *The Language of the Pastors* (London, 1955).
A lecture of twenty-five pages. Part I describes the great variety of grammatical usage among the letter writers. Part II concerns "more general features of vocabulary and style." Cf. Chatman.
- . "Styles in English Prose of the Late Middle and Early Modern Period," *Langue et Littérature: Actes du VIII^e Congrès de la Fédération Internationale des Langues et Littératures Modernes* (Paris, 1961), 165-181.
"In the formation of what seems to us today to be the most successful English prose of the early modern period I would give much more weight than is commonly allowed to the two factors of French example and conversational use. If pressed, I should hold that conversational use was the more important in providing the essential rhythms, and French example in ordering the construction of sentences" (p. 181).
- Doyle, A. I. "A Survey of English Prose in the Middle Ages," *The Age of Chaucer*, ed. Boris Ford. Vol. 1, Pelican Guide to English Literature (Baltimore, 1954).
- Earle, John. *English Prose: Its Elements, History and Usage* (London, 1890).
Chs. 10 and 11. Considers the tenth century one of the "three epochs in the history of English" when language "culminated into a standard."
- Francis, Nelson. *The English Language* (New York, 1963).
Ch. 3, "The History of English," describes briefly the "inner history" of syntactical changes from Old English to Middle English.

Frederick, P. W. H. *John Wycliff and the First English Bible* (Fremont, Neb., 1957).

Funke, O. "Some Remarks on Wulfstan's Prose Rhythm," *ES*, 43 (1962), 311-318.

A critique of McIntosh's two-stress thesis, which concludes that, "there is a good deal of variety in Wulfstan's two-stress phrases, and this variety also appears in longer groups and — at least to a certain extent — in a mixture of rhythmical passages with prose. Thus on the one hand we meet with *three-stress* phrases, and on the other — by natural unprejudiced reading — with *prose* passages."

Goodman, John Stuart. "The Syntax of the Verb 'To Be' in Malory's Prose." *DA*, 23 (1963), 3363-64 (Mich.).

"The purpose of this study is to estimate the stage of development of English verb periphrases containing forms of the verb 'to be' in the fifteenth century by means of a synchronic description of the syntax of that verb in a corpus of the Winchester College Manuscript of the works of Sir Thomas Malory."

Graves, Robert and Alan Hodge. *The Reader Over Your Shoulder: A Handbook for Writers of English Prose* (New York, 1943).

Ch. 5, "The beginnings of English Prose," presents a general survey of the development of style from Alfred to Lyly and Sidney. Rev. by D. C. Bryant in *QJS*, 30, 354-5.

Greenfield, Stanley B. *A Critical History of Old English Literature*. New York, 1965.

Ch. 1, "The Beginnings of a Prose Tradition"; Ch. 2, "Alfredian and other Ninth-Century Prose"; Ch. 3, "Aelfric, Wulfstan, and Other Late Prose."

Greenwood, Alice D. *Cambridge History of English Literature*. Vol. 2, Ed. A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller (New York, 1917).

Chs. 3, 12, and 14: exceedingly little on style. Discusses Trevisa, Mandeville, Pecoock, Fortescue, Paston Letters, Caxton, Malory, and Berners.

Hastings, George S., Jr. "Two Aspects of Style in the A B Dialect of Middle English." *DA*, 26 (1966), 5425 (U. of Penn.).

A study of alliteration and pronoun reference in two manuscripts by the author of the *Ancrene Riwe*: 1) *Ancrene Wisse* and 2) lives of Saints Katherine, Margaret, and Juliana, "Hali Meiðhad," and "Sawles Warde." Questions Chambers' belief that the style of the *Ancrene Riwe* was the particular one that influenced a later style.

Humbert, Sister Agnes Margaret. *Verbal Repetition in the Ancren Riwe*. Catholic Univ. Diss. (Washington, 1944).

The *Ancren Riwe* is immediately indebted to the rhetorical systems of

the time, rather than to the ornate prose of the late Old English period (cf. R. M. Wilson, p. 487).

- Jackson, W. T. H. *The Literature of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1960).
Ch. 1, "The Survival and Influence of the Classics," includes a brief discussion of classical rhetoric in the Middle Ages.
- Kinard, J. P. *A Study of Wulfstan's Homilies, Their Style and Sources* (Baltimore, 1897).
- Kingsford, C. L. *English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century* (Oxford, 1913).

Some description of prose style in biographies and chronicles.

- Krapp, George Philip. *The Rise of English Literary Prose* (New York, 1915).
Covers the period from the fourteenth century to the first quarter of the seventeenth. He believes that the true English prose tradition did not commence until the late fourteenth century with Wyclif, the "father" of English prose, "the first intelligent writer of English prose." Discovers the same "spirit" in More, Tindale, Hooker, Milton, Burke, and Carlyle, indeed in "all the great masters of expository and oratory prose in the English language." Ch. 1, "Introduction": the fourteenth century; Ch. 2, "Wiclif"; Ch. 3, "Controversy and Free Speech."

- Lehnert, Martin. *Poetry and Prose of the Anglo-Saxons* (Berlin, 1955; London 1957).

Part II, "Prose", contains brief historical and stylistic comments followed by copious illustration. For example, concerning the *OE. Annals* Lehnert writes: "Their language is simple, like all original OE. prose writings, with a tendency towards the constant use of stock words and phrases. The sentences, especially the compound sentences with their undue use of *and*, are of a primitive type; parataxis is the rule and hypotaxis the exception." Then follow four pages of text. Rev. by H. Marcus in *Archiv.*, 193, 207.

- Lenaghan, R. T. "'Bytwene Playn Rude and Curyous': A Note on Caxton's Use of *Park*," *PQ*, 42 (1963), 95-97.

Discusses one of Caxton's synonyms doubled up in matched sets as part of the larger fifteenth-century effort to enrich the vulgar language.

- Lewis, Edwin H. *The History of the English Paragraph* (Chicago, 1894).
"The paragraph as we know it comes into something like settled shape in Sir William Temple. It was the product of perhaps five chief influences. First, the tradition, derived from the authors and scribes of the Middle Ages, that the paragraph-mark distinguishes a stadium of thought. Second, the Latin influence, which was rather towards disregarding the paragraph as the sign of anything but emphasis — the emphasis-tradition being also of mediaeval origin; the typical

writers of the Latin influence are Hooker and Milton. Third, the natural genius of the Anglo-Saxon structure, favorable to the paragraph..."

McIntosh, Angus. "The Analysis of Written Middle English," *Transactions of the Philological Society*, (1956), 26-55.

———. *Wulfstan's Prose* (British Academy Lecture, 1948).

Argues the thesis, generally accepted by other Wulfstan specialists, of a predominant two-stress phrasing in Wulfstan's sentences and periods.

McKeon, Richard. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," *Critics and Criticism*, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952).

Confirms the profound importance of rhetoric in the intellectual developments of the Middle Ages.

Malone, Kemp. Book I, Part I, Chapter 10, "Literary Prose," *A Literary History of England*, ed. Albert C. Baugh (New York, 1948).

A brief survey of Old English prose.

Manly, J. M. *Chaucer and the Rhetoricians*. Warton Lectures on English Poetry, No. 17 (London, 1927).

Chaucer's knowledge of rhetoric and rhetoricians. Also see Baldwin (*PMLA*, 42, 1927).

Morgan, Margery M. "A Talking of the Love of God and the Continuity of Stylistic Tradition in Middle English Prose Meditations," *RES*, 3-4, N.S. (1952-53), 97-116.

An analysis of the tradition of Latin rhetoric underlying the style of the *Wooring of Our Lord*, the *Orison of God Almighty*, and *A Talking*. "The most satisfactory explanation of the many widespread parallels would seem to be that Latin and vernacular influences operated side by side, and that English writers of devotional works had in mind at once certain Latin sources and already existing English versions of them."

———. "A Treatise in Cadence," *MLR*, 47 (1952), 156-164.

Presents evidence that the author of *A Talking of the Love of God* was deliberately and consciously writing within a medieval rhetorical tradition.

Muir, Lawrence. "Influence of the Rolle and Wyclifite Psalters upon the Psalter of the Authorized Version," *MLR*, 30 (1935), 302-310.

"It may well be that an English 'Psalter tradition' extends back even farther than the fourteenth century, into the Old English Period. One of the continuous threads of English prose, connecting the time of Alfred with the time of Thomas More, may be the thread of English Biblical translation" (p. 310).

Nichols, Ann E. "A Syntactical Study of Aelfric's Translation of Genesis." *DA*, 25 (1965), 5270-71 (Univ. of Wash.).

"The Genesis translation... exemplifies these major syntactical devices: construction classes (subject and predicate), syntactical classes (positional classes defined by the occurrence of grammatical classes), government, concord, and world order" (from *DA*).

Owst, G. R. *Preaching in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 1926).

Part Three, "The Sermons": Ch. 6, "The Sermon Literature and Its Types"; Ch. 7, "Manuals and Treatises"; Ch. 8, "Sermon-Making, or the Theory and Practice of Sacred Eloquence."

Prins, A. A. *French Influence in English Phrasing* (Leiden, 1952).

"The object of the present work is twofold. First of all it aims at offering a representative... collection of French phrases, expressions and turns of speech which have penetrated into English and have been incorporated in the language.... Its second object is to ascertain if and how far such phrases affected the general phrasal structure of English... both Middle and Modern English certainly go back to Old English for part of their phraseonomy. But the interesting fact is that, in spite of that, slowly and step by step this very framework had absorbed so many foreign, mainly French, phrasal patterns. And this process went on at any increasing rate till the second half of the fourteenth century" (pp. 1, 8-9). Rev. by A. McIntosh in *Museum*, 58, 164-7; by Norman Davis in *Neophilologus*, 38, 154; by Fernand Mossé in *E. Studies*, 35, 218-22.

Richardson, Lilla Janette. "Irony Through Imagery: A Chaucerian Technique Studied in Relation to Sources, Analogues, and the Dicta of Medieval Rhetoric." *DA*, 24 (1963), 1176-77 (Calif.).

"This study demonstrates that Chaucer developed a definitive technique for handling formal imagery within some of the later Canterbury tales.... He uses those rhetorical figures which produce imagery — *effictio*, *notatio*, *demonstratio*, *imago*, *similitudo*, and *translatio*" (from *DA*).

Saintsbury, George. *A History of English Prose Rhythm* (London, 1912).

Ch. 2, "Old English Prose Rhythm"; Ch. 3, "The Formation of Prose Rhythm in Middle English Before c. 1350"; Ch. 4, "From Chaucer to Malory." Criticism of the book is typified by Paull Baum in *The Other Harmony of Prose* (p. 34): "Saintsbury has many fine qualities and his book on prose rhythm is indispensable, but one may say without straining that his principles were wrong and his method false. His ear was good, however, and his taste generally sound."

Schlauch, M. "Chaucer's Colloquial English: Its Structural Traits," *PMLA*, 67 (1952), 1103-16.

"The recognition of levels of discourse in Chaucer's writing is not

a new thing, but it has hitherto been associated more often with aesthetic appreciation than with linguistic analysis. We have been aware that Chaucer was a great master in the adaptation of subject matter to style. We have observed how skilfully he was able to modify figures of speech, rhythms, and choice of words — in short, the rhetorical elements of his discourse — to its content, whether exalted or moderate or lowly (*grandis, mediocris, humilis*), according to the well-known medieval doctrines of composition.... The handling of sentence structure and syntax may also be shown to manifest a fine correlation with the demands of literary form and intention in Chaucer's work."

———. Chaucer's Prose Rhythms," *PMLA*, 65 (1950), 568-89.

Describes how Chaucer adapted the tradition of cadenced Latin prose to English usage, stressing the artful appropriateness of his style to purpose and reader.

Schneider, J. P. *The Prose Style of Richard Rolle of Hampole with Special Reference to its Euphuistic Tendencies* (Baltimore, 1906).

Shearin, H. G. *The Expression of Purpose in Old English Prose*. Yale Studies in English, 18 (1903).

Examination of Old English sentence-elements that express purpose or finality, viz. the purpose phrase and clause, indicating their place in the continuity of English usage.

Sheets, Louis Arden. "Wulfstan's Prose: A Reconsideration." *DA*, 25 (1965), 6611 (Ohio State).

"My work has been to set [Angus] McIntosh's theory [that Wulfstan's prose rhythm "is continuous, consciously controlled, and expressed in clearly recognizable syntactical units, each of which bears two principal stresses"] in the context of the larger subject of prose rhythm in general in an attempt to show that the theory is an oversimplification of an exceedingly complex matter." As his criterion, Sheets employs "the graphic representation of rhythmic phrases in the punctuation" (from *DA*).

Sherman, L. A. *Analytics of Literature* (Boston, 1893).

A history of the English sentence.

Smetana, Cyril L. "Aelfric and the Early Medieval Homiliary," *Traditio*, 15 (1959), 163-204.

Sutherland, James R. *On English Prose* (Toronto, 1957; London, 1958).

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"The purpose of this dissertation has been to study his prose works in order (1) to determine characteristics of his style, (2) to study stylistic relationships among the works, and (3) to determine whether or not Chaucer has a place in the continuity of English prose." Cf. Baum, Richardson, and Schlauch.

Wilson, R. M. "On the Continuity of English Prose," *Mélanges de linguistique et de philologie Fernand Mossé in memoriam* (Paris, 1959), 486-94. A valuable effort to clear away the subjective impressions of past scholarship concerning the transition from Old to Early Middle English. "In fact little definite proof either for or against continuity has so far been given." Wilson indicates "the kind of evidence that must be sought" in determining whether the changes come in gradually or with definite breaks.

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"Begun as a study in loan-words, my examination of early English translations presently involved me less in vocabulary than in syntax and in rhetoric. The study became one in the history of prose." Rev. briefly by F. E. H. in *RES*, 17, 249-50.

———. "Versions by Skelton, Caxton and Berners of a Prologue by Diodorus Siculus," *MLN*, 56 (1941), 252-258.

"The comparison of these three men's treatment of the same text shows Caxton, indeed, less expansive and aureate than Skelton, but Berners far least so of all" (pp. 253-4).

Wyld, Henry C. "Aspects of Style and Idiom in Fifteenth Century English," *Essays and Studies by the English Association*, 26, ed. Arundell Esdaille (Oxford, 1941).

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Modern Period"; Ch. 3, "The English of the Fifteenth Century." Rev. by C. K. Thomas in *QJS*, 23, 489-90; by K. Malone in *Language*, 13, 325; by H. M. Flasdieck in *Ang. Bbl.*, 48, 257-64.

Zeeman, Elizabeth, "Continuity in Middle English Devotional Prose," *JEGP*, 55 (1956), 417-422.

Primarily an analysis of *Vices and Virtues* as "the first large-scale prose work to come from the East of England."

———. "Nicholas Love — A Fifteenth Century Translator," *RES*, 6 (1955), 113-127.

"His rendering of the pseudo-Bonaventuran *Meditationes Vitae Christi*, which he called *The Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesu Christ*, was one of the most popular books of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and contains some of the finest English prose of any time. There are, in fact, few texts which can claim to illustrate so accurately the range and tastes of the devout reading public of the later Middle Ages in England, and, moreover, to point so clearly the contribution made by Medieval translators to the general development of English prose style." Zeeman emphasizes that Love, like other writers in the East of England (Hilton, Dame Juliana of Norwich), writes in the tradition of vernacular prose first established by King Alfred, rejecting sustained alliteration, elaborate cadence, and accumulation of imagery.

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Pedagogus Abbatum Ordinis Cistercii

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INTRODUCTION¹

AS full and as plentiful as the published sources for medieval Cistercian history are,² there is yet a wealth of unpublished and, as a consequence, often unexamined manuscript material available for the study of this monastic movement. In the last decade a number of inventories of Cistercian manuscripts have appeared,³ and if the documents are studied, it should be possible to enhance remarkably for the modern scholar his knowledge of medieval Cistercian life and organization. Toward that goal I have undertaken here to publish an unnoticed thirteenth century handbook for Cistercian abbots.

Whatever else the thirteenth century may have been, it was certainly an age of manuals: manuals for letter-writers, for students, for parish priests, for preachers, for inquisitors, and for abbots. If this manual literature is not significant in the sense that it deals with ordinary problems rather than highly intellectual ones, its practical character beckons to social and institutional historians, since common problems, like common people, have difficulty in finding chroniclers.

While formal statements concerning the Cistercian abbacy are to be found in the original constitution of the order, the *Carta Caritatis*, and in the statutes of the general chapters, there has been up to now no direct testimony from the thirteenth century on the office from the inside-out, as it were, that is, from the point of view of the abbot. It is precisely this sort of information that a handbook can provide, and fortunately for those

¹ The preparation of this edition was made possible by grants of time and money from the American Philosophical Society and Kent State University.

² Good discussions of these materials are found in J.-B. Mahn, *L'Ordre cistercien et son gouvernement*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1951), 40-69, 197-216, and L. J. Lekai, *Geschichte und Wirken der Weissen Mönche*, trans. by A. Schneider (Cologne, 1958). Earlier versions of Lekai's book were *The White Monks* (Okauchee, Wisconsin, 1953) and *Les moines blancs* (Paris, 1957).

³ See C. H. Talbot, "Cistercian Manuscripts in England," *Collectanea ordinis Cisterciensium Reformatorem*, Ann. 14, No. 3 (July, 1952), 208-220, 265-277; C. H. Talbot, "A List of Cistercian Manuscripts in Great Britain," *Traditio*, 8 (1952), 402-418; and the lists published by J. LeClerq in *Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* for the years following 1949.

interested in Cistercian history, such a handbook does exist. Although the manual under consideration here will not provide all the information one could want, its merit consists in large part in the fact that it appears to be the only such document of the thirteenth century available for study today.

In 1893 the Bodleian Library acquired a manuscript book composed of three elements, the first of which was a book of directions for the conduct of Cistercian abbots, bearing a title given well after its composition, *Pedagogus Abbatum Ordinis Cistercii*.⁴ The story of when and how this manuscript was removed from the library of Cîteaux, quite likely before the French Revolution,⁵ and the history of its travels to the time when it came into the hands of the bookseller from whom the Bodleian purchased it are unknown. That all trace of it was lost to Cistercian scholars is suggested by the fact that no modern writer has made any use, or mention, of it. In fact, only very recently has its existence even been recorded and then only in the summary catalog of Craster and Madan and in an inventory published by C. H. Talbot.⁶

According to Madan, who apparently relied on a skimming of the preface of the manual, the intent of the author was to show "*qui et quales debent esse prelati*." A closer reading indicates that, in addition, the author proposed to supply information as to what was "honorable, useful, and necessary" for abbots to know. Consequently it is clear that the manual was intended to embrace practical, as well as ideal, considerations.

While Madan indicated that the manuscript was written in two hands, it is possible on close inspection to distinguish five separate hands, only one of which is significant at this point. It is the hand in which there is written large, *Liber Cistercii*,⁷ and which serves to indicate that the manuscript had formed a part of the library of Cîteaux. Since the same inscription recurs elsewhere in the three-part book, it may be seen simply as the work of a librarian and of no import for the content. Just when this manuscript became a part of the library of Cîteaux is difficult to establish. In its present binding which includes an epistolary taken from Thomas of Capua and a five-page sermon composed by one Girardus, identified only as *filius bonus* (both written in fifteenth century hands), the manuscript was

⁴ Bodley MS Lat. th. f. 5; see F. Madan and H. Craster, *A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford*, Vol. 6: *Accessions, 1890-1915* (Oxford, 1924), Number 31541, p. 69. See, as well, *ibid.*, p. xvi.

⁵ T. Hümpfner, "Archivum et Bibliotheca Cistercii et Quatuor Primarum Filiarum Eius," *Analecta S.O.Cist.*, Ann. 2 (1946), 120.

⁶ Talbot, "Cist. Mss. in Eng.," *Coll. ord. Cist. Ref.*, 14 (1952), 266.

⁷ Fol. 44r.

not to be found in the library at the time an inventory of 1200 titles was compiled under Jean de Cirey, in 1480.⁸ Further, while in that inventory the epistolary is cited by itself,⁹ there is no clear identification of this handbook, at all. Two entries, however, seem to be related to this manuscript: (1) *Parvum volumen male scriptum, incipiens: Quales debeant esse prelati...*,¹⁰ and (2) *Exhortationes patris abbatis in visitatione*.¹¹ From evidence to be considered shortly there is a suggestion that the manuscript, under whatever title it travelled, was at Cîteaux at the turn of the fifteenth century.

The manuscript, a typical pocket manual, measures only 6 3/8 inches by 4 7/8 inches; it was written on paper; and there are approximately 250 words on each page. In the upper right corner of each facing page there is a modern Arabic foliation extending from 1 to 44. Actually the handbook begins with fol. 1^r and comes to an end on fol. 44^v. Chapter headings and the initial capitals for each chapter are written in red, and while there is no extraordinary calligraphic achievement, there is a noticeable degree of elaborateness in the decoration of the capital letters. To be sure there are many signs that this manuscript is not the original manual, and while treatment of this problem has been deferred to a later point, it seems worthy of mention now in connection with the matter of the decoration of capitals. It is true that in the preface the author indicates that there will be rubrics,¹² and we may assume that a measure of decoration would be consistent with the fact that the manual was intended as a gift to a man in the most eminent office in the Order, but on the other hand the quality of the work here and unmistakable marginal indications make it clear that a professional rubricator was envisioned. Thus, this manuscript did not issue from the hand of the author; rather copyists were employed.

Beyond the librarian's hand mentioned earlier there appear to be four others discernible, originating from three different periods. The rubrics and the text are in a script of the thirteenth century; the colophon and the explicit date, 1402, following the text are in a different style; immediately below the date, 1402, yet another hand composed a date, 1400; and finally the title, *Pedagogus...*, representing the last distinct script, probably dates

⁸ "Inventaire des manuscrits de Cîteaux par l'abbé Jean de Cirey," pp. 339-452, in *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France, Départements*, Tome 5, Dijon (Paris, 1889). Girardus is mentioned on fol. 128^v.

⁹ See the reference in Madan and Craster, *Summary Catalogue*, 6, xvi.

¹⁰ *Cat. gen. des mss.*, 5, 375, item 336.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 447, item 1136.

¹² Fol. 2^r.

from the late fourteenth century. Before an attempt can be made to resolve the problem of date, for both manuscript and manual, the question of authorship must be treated.

The identity of the author of the manual, consciously concealed from the beginning,¹³ is not known, nor was it known when this manuscript was written, for the thirteenth century rubric which precedes the preface, or prologue, states clearly: *Incipit prologus in libro nescio cuius*.¹⁴ If his name must be a mystery, some information about his career and inclinations can be elicited from internal evidence. In the very beginning the author tells that he had withdrawn from a public life in order to follow one of penance and literary silence from which he has emerged in this handbook because of his affection for the man to whom it is addressed, either a newly elected abbot of Cîteaux or possibly a protector outside the order.¹⁵ In his earlier life he had composed a number of treatises on the chief moral dangers besetting prelates, such as immoderate dress, carnal incontinence, cupidity, ambition, arrogance, and gluttony.¹⁶ In addition to pursuing the same themes in this work he promises to comment on selected parts of the Rule of St Benedict in order to resolve certain difficulties and thus to reenforce the observance of Cîteaux by arming the monks against the major vices. Avowals of penance and silence notwithstanding, that the author continued to lead a busy life is indicated by his comment that the manual was composed in fits and starts, as momentary respites from obligations allowed.¹⁷

The expertise of this monastic moralist in both laws, canon and civil, is everywhere evident. Since the Cistercians at this time were prohibited from studying law, it is most likely that his competence was gained prior to his assumption of the white habit, a not unusual happening. His familiarity with the law codes is noticeable throughout the text, but at one point he specifically relates that he had been an instructor of scholars in Lombardy.¹⁸ It is more than possible that conversion to the Cistercian life led him to equate a chair in law with a "chair of pestilence" (Ps. 1:1) whence he scorned the Hebrews,¹⁹ but he could not erase the laws from his mind.

If the name and biographical details of the author are beyond precision,

¹³ Fol. 1^r, "*nec nominandus*."

¹⁴ Fol. 1^r.

¹⁵ Fol. 1^r.

¹⁶ Fol. 40^v.

¹⁷ Fol. 2^r.

¹⁸ Fol. 40^v.

¹⁹ Fol. 40^v.

the date of his composition can be closely approximated, although some effort is required. The first date which must be noted is that of 1402, which appears beneath the colophon. Such a direct statement of date would set any student of a manuscript on his guard, and rightly so, for just beneath it occurs a second date, 1400. Each of these dates is in a separate hand, contemporary in form with each other but different from the script of the text of the manual. It is reasonable to presume that they represent, in the language of the librarian, accession dates. The difference between the two may be explained by reference to the fact that the preceding four-line colophon has been copied from a colophon only traces of which are now evident. The original colophon may well have faded, and the recopying offered the occasion for the inscription of a second date. Another possibility is that reference to an earlier, but no longer extant, inventory called for a correction in the date of accession to the library of Cîteaux. This indeed would help account for the fact that the earlier date is written below, and possibly after, the later one. Or, again, perhaps a combination of these two suggestions would explain the discrepancy between the two dates, so close together as they are. A completely satisfactory explanation seems impossible to attain, and in any case would not have any direct bearing on the time of the composition of the manual, since they are both clearly too late.

Each of the two men who have listed this manuscript in modern inventories has assigned a date different from the other, but both agree on a date earlier than the fifteenth century ones just discussed. Talbot, in his list of Cistercian manuscripts in England, assigns a fourteenth century origin, but he gives no reasons.²⁰ An earlier date, the second half of the thirteenth century, was posited by Madan whose paleographical talents were legendary.²¹

While Madan's dating of the manuscript seems the most acceptable, an analysis of the content of the manual may allow an even earlier date for the composition of the manual as distinguished from the manuscript. The source of many quotations utilized in the text is the *Decretals* of Gregory IX, published in 1234, and so this date may readily be accepted as a *terminus a quo* for the composition of the manual. Since the author displays an intimate acquaintance with the compilations of Gratian and Gregory IX, it is reasonable to assume that if he had known of the *Sext*, published by Boniface VIII in 1298, he would have made use of it. Yet there is not a single extract from that compilation; 1298 may therefore be taken, for the moment, as a *terminus ad quem* for the composition.

²⁰ Talbot, "Cist. Mss. in Eng.," *Coll. ord. Cist. Ref.*, 14, 266.

²¹ Madan and Craster, *Summary Catalogue*, 6, 69.

If this terminal date of 1298 is to stand, it must do so at the expense of two other considerations. First, the failure of the author to draw upon the bull, *Parvus Fons*, of Clement IV, issued in 1265 and dealing in part with precisely the same subject matter treated in the manual, suggests an ignorance of the bull and raises the possibility of composition prior to the date of its publication. In the second place, while there are quotations drawn from the decrees of Alexander III included in the *Decretals*, only once is there used the expression, "of blessed memory."²² Presumably in the other instances there did not appear to be any danger of confusing Alexander III with Alexander IV, whose pontificate extended from 1254 to 1261; nor could there have been any confusion if the manual were composed before 1254. In the end, then, it is reasonable to consider as a possible date for the composition of the manual some time in the period, 1234 to 1254.

As indicated earlier that this manuscript is not the original manual is borne out by a variety of indications, and so it would be possible to accept Madan's date for the manuscript and an earlier one for the manual. In addition to scribal errors in the text which suggest a copy rather than the original there is the initial rubric, in the same hand as the text, which disclaims knowledge of the identity of the author: *Incipit prologus in libro nescio cuius*. The scribal errors could easily have resulted simply from haste in composition, but this seems unlikely when the nature of some of the errors is correlated with the fact that the manuscript is carefully rubricated and decorated, tokens of care in production. More tenable is that scribal errors are in reality copyist's errors, particularly since the errors are chiefly of three types: word omission, incorrect expansion of contractions, and misspellings which produce wrong words. Examples of the last two types will demonstrate adequately the point: a marginal indication which was intended to point out Ambrose as the authority for a statement appears in the text as a nonsense *amborum*²³ In the table of contents the copyist betrayed the author by writing *corruptione* when *correptione* was intended.²⁴ There is yet one more bit of evidence for the copy theory: in the prologue there is an explicit statement that the work will be divided into four distinctions, but this manuscript contains only three. There is a strong urge to see that the fourth, and separated, distinction had a life of its own, coming to modern recognition in the supplement to De Visch's bibliography of Cistercian writers as an entry entitled, "*libellum insignem de observantiis regularibus in ordine Cist.*," and dated, 1239-42,²⁵ a period most compatible

²² Fol. 14v.

²³ Fol. 41v.

²⁴ Fol. 3v.

²⁵ J. Canivez, "Auctarium D. Caroli de Visch ad Bibliothecam Scriptorum S. O. Cist.," *Cistercienser Chronik*, 38 (1926), 123.

with that proposed above for the composition of the handbook, i.e., between 1234 and 1254. Since this *libellum* has not been available, nothing more than the bare possibility can be raised here.

A review of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the manuscript under consideration, although it emanates from the second half of the thirteenth century, is a copy of a handbook that was probably written in the second quarter of that century. Further, this manuscript was probably counted in the library of Citeaux at the beginning of the fifteenth century, even though it did not bear its current title until after 1480.

In common with other manuals of the time this one is a patchwork of quotations. There are, exclusive of extracts drawn from the Bible, about 240 quotations from classical sources and the Fathers, or an average of three on each page. Slightly fewer than half of these extracts come from patristic sources, but not directly; rather their inclusion in the *Decretum* of Gratian made them available, for the most part, to the author. Of the forty-three citations attributed to Gregory, the most frequently cited of the Fathers,²⁶ all but three came from the *Decretum*; even an explicit reference to the *Moralia* came not from the *Moralia*, itself, but from Gratian.²⁷ Similarly, post-Gratian authorities were drawn from the *Decretals* of Gregory IX. While these compilations of canon law had undoubtedly formed a substantive part of the professional training of the author, here they were used only as florilegia. A similar use of Justinian's *Digest* and *Codex* is apparent in the more than twenty-five references to civil law.

That Scripture should have been fertile ground for the eliciting of authority is a foregone conclusion. In addition to a host of direct quotations drawn chiefly from the Book of Proverbs and the letters of St Paul, there is throughout the entire work a biblical flavor, the result of a liberal use of phrases and references to persons and incidents introduced solely for the purpose of exegetical moralizing.

Two pieces of monastic literature seem to have been used: St. Benedict's Rule and the *Carta Caritatis*. There are several direct references to the Rule, it is true, but there are also as many, or more, indirect appropriations of themes from that guide to monastic life. Evidence for reliance upon the *Carta Caritatis* is not so clear; but it can be no accident that the problems of abbatial abdications, depositions, and visitations appear both in the *Carta* and in the manual.²⁸

²⁶ Other leading Fathers cited are Jerome (29 times), Augustine (26), and Ambrose (12).

²⁷ Fol. 5v.

²⁸ For abdications and depositions compare *Carta Carit.*, cc. 6, 10, 11 and the manual, Dist. 1, cc. 19, 22, 24, Dist. 3, c. iv; for visitations *Carta Carit.*, cc. 3-4, (manual) Dist. 3, cc. 1-3.

The Roman authors, who are well represented, are drawn from the list of moralizers that the Middle Ages respected and quoted: Seneca (more often it is Publilius Syrus than Seneca), Ovid, Horace, the medieval "Cato," Juvenal, and Lucan. Although it is possible that access to the literature of antiquity was gained only within the limits offered by florilegia which were in wide circulation,²⁹ it is worthy of note that from the twelfth century on pagan authors were studied in such schools as Chartres as much for their moral worth as for their value in the study of grammar, the heart of the *trivium*.³⁰ Indeed it was the presupposition that there was moral value in the writings that made them acceptable to Christian grammar curricula. So keenly were the classical writers studied — Bernard of Chartres reports that he was required to learn by heart a selection each day — that products of the schools carried repertoires of moral dicta in their heads.³¹ On the basis of the material available within the manual it is impossible to ascertain with any degree of precision just how familiar the author was with the writings of antiquity. His range is wide, but not unusually so; the accuracy of his citations leaves much to be desired. By comparison, the writer knew Gratian much more intimately than Ovid, or Horace, or others whom he misquoted or failed to recognize.

Occasional citations of "a poet,"³² "a certain wise man," or "a certain philosopher" must be the result of the use of a collection where the source was not known. No matter that the origins of wisdom were vague, however, for, in the last analysis, authorship was not so important as aptness or pith.

If the manual is built from the scattered authorities listed above and, therefore, lacking in originality, the author could lay claim to uniqueness in the matter of style. But it is a style that impedes the reader. At times the writer is bombastic and crude, as when he inveighs against moral weakness;³³ at other times his writing approaches the lyrical, as when he deals with an abbot's lament for a friend who has died.³⁴ Whatever the tone of language a persistent mannerism pervades the whole; literary devices, in themselves effective in varying degrees, obtrude themselves:

²⁹ G. R. Owst, *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England* (Cambridge, 1933), 41, 181-185.

³⁰ See P. Delhaye, "Grammatica et Ethica au XII^e siècle," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 25 (1958), 71, 73, 79.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

³² Sometimes the "poet" was an ancient; at other times his verses were found in *Carmina Burana* (3 eds., Stuttgart, 1847-94), cf. fol. 38^r.

³³ Cf. Dist. 3, c. 17, vol. 38^v.

³⁴ Cf. Dist. 2, c. 12, fol. 23^v.

coy alliteration,³⁵ metaphor,³⁶ hyperbole,³⁷ invective.³⁸ Again and again the writer yields to a desire to write prosodically. Words are clearly chosen, or positioned, for their metrical values rather than for their appropriateness or clarity of meaning; the result is too many beclouded passages. One example, drawn from the prologue,³⁹ will suffice:

Nec enim
presens hoc rudimentum verborum falerata
solemnizavi festivitate,
nec idem Tulliane roseo schemate
purpuravi torrentis.

The writer has chosen this way, although he put it in prose form, of saying that he proposes to write simply, eschewing ornate Ciceronian locutions. In fact, he has gilded the lily by out-Ciceroining Cicero. Rhetorical energies, ostensibly intended to produce a work of grace, are over-spent; the manual appears artificial and contrived.

Although at one level the manual provided the author with an occasion to exhibit his literary talents, the more profound purpose of the manual was to serve as a guide for abbots in their lives and offices. It was no essential part of the undertaking to interpret the monastic life, but in the course of measuring abbatial responsibilities against the dignity of the prelacy, the author found himself forced to contrast the active and contemplative aspects of monastic life. For him the active life was the more worthy; withdrawal to the contemplative life was a form of self-indulgence.

The first suggestion of this derogation of the contemplative life appears in the prologue where the writer summarized his efforts in the preparation of the treatise. According to his story he had undertaken to address himself directly to the two ways of life in the hope of enabling the "soldiers of Christ" to fight the more effectively,⁴⁰ but his failure to observe restraint had brought more trouble than relief.⁴¹ Consequently, he had imposed upon himself a life of silence, turning his hand from guidance to gardening with an aspiration for a lonesome, meditative life for his own sake, or profit, especially since his efforts at service to others had disturbed his

³⁵ "*Viro venerabili virtutum venustate vernanti,*" fol. 1^r; "*sol hominum Salomon,*" fol. 21^v; "*clamet et clamitet calamitate,*" fol. 23^r.

³⁶ "*Tubam Gregorianam sic clangentem,*" fol. 6^r; "*audi organum Gregorii dulce melos sic modulantis,*" fol. 8^v.

³⁷ Cf. Dist. 3, c. 19, fol. 41^r.

³⁸ "*O, vermis! O, fex! O, qui es vas stercorum qui vile sperma fuisti!*" fol. 39^v.

³⁹ Fol. 2^r.

⁴⁰ Fol. 1^r.

⁴¹ Fol. 1^v.

superiors.⁴² A less benevolent interpretation of his work might run thus: in his earlier writings of moral guidance he had either become too deeply engrossed in the evils he was exposing or he had touched people in high places⁴³ with the result that he had roused the ire of his superiors and had been forbidden to continue his writing.

Whether his story is taken at face value, or whether the harsher interpretation is adopted, in his own life he saw a contrast between the life of personal profit, or contemplation — “silencium... preelicens mihi soli fore utilem... sola mentis meditatione”⁴⁴ — and that of service to others: “multis calami officio aut plectro lingue prodesse.”⁴⁵ It is not difficult to see that the contemplative life ranked the lower on his scale of values.

The same attitude, revealed at more than one place in the text, is fully revealed in *Distinctio I, cap. xvi, Si monachus renuit abbas fieri, quia magis elegit esse in claustris*.⁴⁶ The reluctant monk is advised that the assumption of the administrative office offers a surer chance of salvation. To be sure, according to the writer, the active life does not exclude the contemplative — indeed, they are “sisters” — but he has established a priority: “contemplationis otium” is opposed to “negotiorum caritativorum virtuosa operatio.”

Clearly the author was confronted by a Cistercian dilemma. The vocation to life under the Cistercian observance was the call to the contemplative life; yet there had to be abbots (and priors and cellarers) immersed in an activity apparently repugnant to the vocation. To resolve the conflict the author dealt with the call to the abbacy under the head of obedience;⁴⁷ an obedient monk would forego his own desire for contemplation when his superiors assigned him to an administrative position. To resist the will of a superior, even for the pursuit of Cistercian contemplation, invited a disobedience impossible to reconcile with the monastic vow.⁴⁸ If a monk mounted the abbatial throne in a spirit of obedience, then in terms of his own salvation he might profitably undertake the active life.

In his elaboration of the spiritual merits attendant upon the active life the author has vindicated that life, but not content with this, he tried to

⁴² Fol. 1^v-2^r.

⁴³ Is there a *double entendre* in this passage: “... plagas solis peterem altiores... in profundis maris cum Ycaro me foret necesse submergi,” fol. 1^v.

⁴⁴ Fol. 1^v.

⁴⁵ Fol. 1^v-2^r.

⁴⁶ Fol. 11^r.

⁴⁷ Fol. 11^v.

⁴⁸ Fol. 11^r.

strengthen his case by discrediting the contemplative life. For him the greater merit consisted in the service of the many.

When the author's treatment of the problem is correlated with the views he held in his own life as revealed in the prologue, it seems evident that he regarded the impulse to contemplation as a kind of spiritual egoism. The reasons for his position are not totally clear, but two considerations may be adduced to shed light on the matter: (1) in writing on the abbacy, he was perforce dealing primarily with but one side of the question, and (2) his own was not a claustral personality.

Against this background the writer undertook in his first distinction to delineate the qualities of the ideal abbot. An abbot deficient in one, or more, of the virtues should be deposed, or permitted, if not encouraged, to resign his charge. The chapters of the second distinction constitute formularies, or set speeches, for a variety of occasions; their value resides not in their content but in their singling out some of the activities in which an abbot might well be involved in the normal course of events, e.g. papal or royal missions, the reception of dignitaries at the meeting of the general chapter, the reception of benefactions to the monastery, and the like. The third distinction is concerned chiefly with the implementation of the visitation program, an important part of the Cistercian observance and thus significant for an abbot. As visitor, the abbot is exhorted to be justly merciful, prudently decisive, and honorably circumspect. From the singular notice given to three faults it seems that the visitor should be especially alert to the evils of abbots who live sumptuously to the neglect of the monks and to the disrepute of the order, who disdain to consult with others but put all their trust in their own talents for decision-making, and who reach quickly for their purse when medication is needed for the livestock but offer only prayers for monks who lie moribund in the infirmary.

A handbook which exhorts an abbot to be a good abbot might well be characterized by a plethora of platitudes and consequently be devoid of any historical importance. But when the counsels of excellence are expressed negatively, that is, when the dangers to be avoided are clearly defined, the worth of the manual becomes appreciably greater. A comparison of the problems outlined in this handbook with the decrees of the general chapters or the contents of various chronicles of Cistercian houses bears out the contention that while this moralist may have indulged in occupational hyperbole, in essence he was alert to real and present dangers.

A few words concerning editorial practices are in order. Where there are passages in the text which are incomplete, or non sensical, as they stand, I have made emendations based on the sources cited by the author or on the requirements of Latinity or common sense. References by the author to sources were either to the words, themselves, or to the sense of passages.

When I have located the source cited, I have merely indicated it; I have not distinguished the reference as *ad verbum* or *ad sensum* since it is not certain that the author was using the same textual traditions available to me. It should be pointed out as well that, although I have ascribed a reference to an author, e.g. Publilius Syrus, the author of the manual may have used an intermediary, just as he derived his patristic texts from Gratian. This question, insoluble with the material at hand, has been treated above in this Introduction; it has seemed pointless to insist on the matter in the notes. Lastly, since the manuscript is unique, there seemed to be no merit in repeating, or noting, the many orthographical variations that occur. Rather, I have rendered words in their common forms, e.g. I have printed *cum* for *com*, without recognition in the notes. Where, however, word or case changes were made, the fact has been noted. The manuscript, itself, varies in the use of *ti* and *ci* (as in *etiam*, *eciam*); I have not sought to reduce this to uniformity, since there appears to be no cause of confusion.

The identification of sources has presented some difficulties. Occasionally it has been possible to find a source in substantial agreement with the manuscript, but, since the author did not claim authority, no reference is given. In cases where clearly a quotation was intended the absence of a reference is to be taken as an indication that the source could not be identified, e.g. the reference to Aristotle (fol. 15r). The reasons for this difficulty may be that the ascription, itself, is incorrect, that the quotation is corrupt, or telescoped, etc. On the face of it identification of every single source might be expected to reveal the intellectual equipment of the author and consequently something of his identity or personality, but since it is patent that the handbook was built from intermediaries, for the most part, and not the sources, themselves, the lack of a relatively few identifications does no real damage to the outline of materials used, which has been drawn above. Nor is the substance of the text injured by this lack, since the citations are used only to illustrate, to intensify, or to bring authority to bear on a proposition. The quotations are merely rhetorical devices, and a sufficient number of them have been identified to indicate the sources whence they were drawn. Completeness of identification would have been a desideratum, but it is not a hinge on which the case to be proved depends.

TEXT

Incipit prologus in libro nescio cuius. (fol. 1^r).

Viro venerabili virtutum venustate vernanti ille nec nominandus, inter fratres minimus penitencium et nunc penitens, hoc munus modicum se[t] totum, si tamen totum dici debeat, quod nichil est.

Vere fortis est ut mors dilectio, que vectes ferreos omnis rigoris atterit et propositi rigidioris rumpit repagula forciora. Nimirum deliberatione fixiori [et] immutabili constitutione decretum mihi proposui irrefragabiliter observandum: a¹ conferendis tractatibus manum retrahere² et me silentii sub conclavi conclusum in talibus reddere prorsus elinguem. Set ecce qui omnia vincit amor et me in hoc subegit, ut generali propositi mei regule sue^{2a} prerogativa [pro facto] unico saltem speciali derogaret, et vobis hoc opusculum nunc tam fructuosum quam officiosum, licet sub ruditate sua informe, destinarem. Verum propositi mei generalitas tangere nequivit amoris privilegium, quod illibatum in omnibus, me vobis tota devocione^{2b} et famulatus libentis obsecundatione alligat mancipatum.

Sane libuit aliquando scribere super regulam beati Benedicti patris nostri, et tractatum contexere tuo iudicio admodum necessarium tum propter questiunculas absolvendas que consciencias simplicium pulsant scrupulosiores, dum in easdem consciencias ex ipso textu armati videntur, tum ob informacionem et confirmacionem Cysterciensis observancie, [ut] observatores, quatinus claustrales, eo tractatu tamquam scuto circumdati scirent eciam cautius octo viciorum et eorum prave et perverse generacionis bella debellare; et filii Effrem, intendentes et mittentes arcum, nec conterentur in die belli nec timerent a timore nocturno, a sagit[t]a in die, ab incur[su] et demo[nio] meridiano; sicque [P]sychemachia suo Marte congressa phalanges viciorum erectas [et] virtutum, cuneis ordinatis [et] bellice dispositis, clipeo paulisper et hasta ut dici posset felici dimicatione — [Versus]

Iam clipeo clipeus, umbone repellitur umbo;

Iam galea galea, pede pes, et cuspide cuspis —

filii Israel, stantes in fortitudine sua, victoriosius Amalechitas superarent.

Verum, ne acies signo et signifero non preordinatis³ in conflictu[m] ruerent confusio-
riorem, inter virtutum turmas tres primipilos preconcepi vexilla virtutum preferentes;
caritatem videlicet, pacienciam, [et] humilitatem, ab austro et oriente. Viciorum
autem vexilliferos [fol. 1^v] prefixeram fraternum odium, murmuracionem, et super-
biam, a parte aquilonari et occidentali. In prima fronte exercitus virtutum producem
ordinavi prudenciam, in medio temperanciam et iusticiam, in posterioribus fortitu-
dinem; in prima autem viciorum fronte indiscretionem precipitem, in medio incon-
tinenciam, que est imperancia, et iniquitatem,⁴ que est iniusticia, in posterioribus
pusillanimitatem.

Bibliographical foreword: references for the following are to the Loeb Library editions:
Boethius, Claudian, Horace, Juvenal, Lucan, Ovid, Publilius Syrus, Seneca. For Cato,
see H. Botschuyver, *Disticha Catonis* (Amsterdam, 1952).

¹ ad.

² retraherem.

^{2a} sui.

^{2b} devocionis.

³ preordinaris.

⁴ inquietatem.

Inter hec etiam deliberavi arcem et menia Marie et Rachelis (vitam dico contemplativam) cum suis defensoribus [et] castra Marthe⁵ et Lye (vitam loquor activam) sub eiusdem serie tractatus stilo peragraré diffusiore. In quibus, quia fumus multiplicis scandali frequenter obnubilat Christo militantium intuitus et sui peccati foveat fuliginem, [hoc est] fumigationem mentis, mentis mee conceptus erat et scandali intricaciones lucidius extricare, ut elimata diligentius offensionum rubigine arma spiritualia in sacris certaminibus exererentur splendidiora, luculencius viris ecclesiasticis develaretur Symon, cum suis cantationibus⁶ repentibus repentinus e⁷ suis fraudulentis latibulis educeretur,⁸ scindenteque cultro⁹ lepra Gyezi palam, palliatione depulsa, nausearetur, et ille Macedo¹⁰ usurarius, cum omnibus suis dolosis stateris digito demo[n]stratus secularibus viris, confunderetur et, incude super quam fraudem leg[is] fabricat funditus demolita, gratuitos disceret inire contractus pia liberalitate monente et magistro Veritate¹¹ dicente: "*Date mutuum nil inde sperantes.*"¹²

Et post principalia vicia secundariis designatis, prout Dominus dare dignaretur per singula simplices ort[h]odoxi vacillantes baculum saltem [talem] qualem haberent, quo paulo forcius niterentur.

Sic, sic [scribere] pro facto aliquando libuit. Libuit plane, set non licuit. Nichilominus tamen fateor quod, qui libitum mihi reddiderunt illicitum, communi utilitati sicut et mihi consuluerunt, eo quod ultra vires presumpsi conatus, sicque dum (quod nescirem) temerarius erroris nube de facili simplicium serenitatem obscurarem, et dum in medio tuciore¹³ ignorarem librare volatus, [et] alis cereo glutino contextis plagas solis peterem altiores, cera calore resoluta in profundis maris cum Ycaro me foret necesse submergi. Hinc est quod sicut ori meo de cetero silencium indixi, ita omni calamo confracto digito[s] contrahens a scribendo, eos ad forpices, ad furcas, et ad falces extendam, preeligans mihi soli fore utilem, si Deus id dederit, sola mentis meditatione, quam multis calami officio aut plectro [fol. 2r] lingue prodesse, etiamsi prodesse scirem cum superiorum meorum turbacione.

At, ut dictum est, hoc opusculum, quod pre manibus est tibi, pater dulcissime, utcumque elaboratum prout intervallorum nostrorum brevitatis momentanea et occupationes¹⁴ iniuncte permiserunt, reseravi¹⁵: quatenus [ad] instar apis argumentose ex urtica mel eque ut ex rosis elicientis, paracius — non dico elegancius — aptetis vobis ex hoc rudi et indigesto globo, quid in proloquiis — non dico predicationum set executionum vestrorum, dum iudiciali et pastorali fu[n]cturi fueritis officio, vobis a Deo super Cysterciensem generationem, quam Dominus semine fecundo multiplicavit, iniuncto — secundum varias personas [et] negociorum¹⁶ circumstantias de splendido fecunde facundie vestre more proponatis. Nec enim presens hoc rudimentum verborum falerata sollempnizavi festivitate, nec idem Tulliane roseo¹⁷ scemate purpuravi torrentis, id eloquencie vestre relinquens artificio, cum tamen et in hoc modico, vel potius nihilo, quod presumpsi, videar temerarie solem facibus adiuvare, mari frustra guttas infundere, et lineam incassum puncto contendere

⁵ Marie.

⁶ canonibus motibus.

⁷ et.

⁸ educuntur.

⁹ scindensque cultri.

¹⁰ Cf. Dig., 14.6.1.

¹¹ Veritas.

¹² Lc. 6:35.

¹³ tuciores.

¹⁴ occupationis.

¹⁵ reservavi.

¹⁶ negocia horum.

¹⁷ roseos.

argumentari. At¹⁸ in hoc, quantumcumque sit effectum,¹⁹ vestra benignitas generosa et benigna generositas non contempnat dantis affectum; etsi opus tantillum tanto domino merito censetur indignum, dignemini tamen opificis acceptare voluntatem grandem procul dubio in minutissimo opere. Igitur grandis donatarius cum exiguisimo dono grandem pusilli donatoris amplectitur gratanter officiositatem.

Distinguitur autem presens opusculum iii^{er} distinctionibus, pre singulis capitulis suis rubricatis epygrammatibus, in quorum tribus tota principalis intencio scribentis est ostendere qui et quales debent esse prelati, et licet quolibet illarum non careat honesto, utili, et necessario, prima tamen specialiter continet plurimum utilitatis, secunda familiariter multum honestatis, tertia peculiariter predicta tria complectitur. In quarta autem distinctione tota²⁰ intencio scribentis versatur circa informationem profitentium Cysterciensis ordinis observancias, et habet locum hec distinctio in cotidianis capitulis, ubi diurne fiunt proclamationes et postulatur venie.

In hiis autem, licet plura²¹ plurium sanctorum inducam in testimonia, precipue tamen prohibitionibus inhereo Gregorianis. Non indignanter igitur hunc suscipiatis lapidem, ad hoc saltem utile[m], ut eum laminaculis, hoc est acuti ingenii vestri instancia, percutientes scintillas ex eo exilire faciatis, ex quibus flammam vestras ad libitum dilatetis.

Valete in Christo Ihesu.

[fol. 2^v]

Explicit prologus nescio [cuius].

Incipiunt preparationes ad proloquia abbatis.

Distinctio prima, continens capitula viginti quattuor.

Ex[h]ortatio patris abbatis de eligendo pastore.

Capitulum primum

Concedit abbas monachum fieri abbatem.

Capitulum secundum

Ad novum abbatem concessum.

Capitulum tertium

Si abbas concessus fuerit iuvenis, qualiter amoneatur.

Capitulum quartum

Item, si fuerit senex.

Capitulum quintum

Si monachus filie domus transferendus fuerit in abbatem matris.

Capitulum vi

Item, si monachus matris transferendus fuerit in abbatem filie.

Capitulum septimum

Cum monachus postulatus in abbatem negatur, quia prior est, aut huiusmodi.

[*Capitulum*] *viii.*

Item, cum negatur, quia est minus litteratus.

Capitulum nonum

Item, quia non est secundum ordinem bene morigeratus.

¹⁸ aut.

¹⁹ effectus.

²⁰ toto.

²¹ pluraque.

Capitulum decimum

Item, quia in temporalibus minus industrius.

Capitulum xi

Item, quia adhuc novus est et rudis in observanciis ordinis.

Capitulum xii

Item, quia iuvenis etate.²²

Capitulum xiii

Item, quia multum senex.

Capitulu[m] xiiii

Qualiter pacificatur, qui negatur dari abbas.

Capitulum xv

Si electus renuerit fieri abbas.

Capitulum xvi

De priore creando, vel subpriore, aut huiusmodi [officialibus] spiritualibus.

Capitulum xvii

De cellerario creando, aut huiusmodi [officialibus] ad temporalia.

Capitulum xviii

Cum quis renuerit suscipere officium sibi iniunctum.

Capitulum xix

Qualiter negatur licencia cedendi prelationi vel officio, et docetur²³ in hoc capitulo quibus de causis prelatus cedere valeat.

Capitulum xx

Ad monachum petentem aliam religionem intrare.

Capitulum xxi

Qualiter petenti cessionem propter senectutem, cum adhuc vigeat [tamen fe]ssus in eo [officio], respondeatur.

[Capitulum] xxii

Si fuerit ita senex quod iam inutilis est regimini.

[Capitulum] xxiii

Si debeat alicui concedi cessio ab officio prelationis sue honeste, tamen ne credatur quod fiat pro culpa sua.

[Capitulum] vicesimum quartum

Explicunt capitula prime distinctionis. [Fol. 3^r]

*Incipiunt capitula secunde distinctionis.*²⁴

Qualiter monachus concessus in abbatem petere debeat licenciam ab abbate suo.

Capitulum primum

Qualiter novus abbas captare debeat benivolenciam [domus] cui preficitur.

Capitulum secundum

Rediens abbas aliquando domum a qua assumptus est, sic poterit ordinare sermonem.

²² etatem.

²³ docentur.

²⁴ Here fifteen (or sixteen) chapters are

enumerated; within the text of the handbook, there are eighteen chapters in this Distinction.

Capitulum tercium

Qualiter abbas recedens a domo sua pro negociis domus sue accipiat licenciam.

Capitulum iiii

Item, si negocium pro quo recedit non pertineat specialiter ad domum suam set alias, ut de concordia magnatum, tunc addat hoc sequens capitulum precedenti.

Capitulum v

Et si ex mandato alicuius magni principis, utpote regis, oporteat eum proficisci, tunc addat hoc sequens precedenti.

Capitulum sextum

Qualiter rediens post longum tempus alloqui debeat conventum suum super aliquo negocio.

Capitulum vii

Qualiter suos alloquitur quando vult dirigere nuncios.

Capitulum viii

Qualiter commendet se orationibus et dilectioni fratrum ibi existencium a quocumque recedit monasterio.

Capitulum nonum

Qualiter commendet abbas personam benefactoris, presentis et absentis, et iniungat orationes pro eo, bis ponitur.

Capitulum x

Quo modo plangat abbas abbatem vel aliquem alium specialissimum amicum domus sue.

[Capitulum] xi

Qualiter exordiat, cum necesse habet aliquam constitutionem immutari.²⁵

Capitulum xii

Qualiter abbas recipiat et commendet aliquem magnum prelatum coram conventu suo.

[Capitulum] xiii

Item, in recessu eiusdem cum licenciat.²⁶

Qualiter commendat abbas Cisterciensis in generali capitulo episcopos aliosque magnates, qui venerant ad capitulum generale.

Capitulum xiiii

Qualiter abbas Cysterciensis captat benevolenciam abbatum ad generale capitulum conveniencium, et de quat[tuor] principalibus.

Capitulum xv

Item, et in fine idem ad eosdem.

Incipiunt capitula tercie distinctionis

Qualiter abbas exortatur conventum suum imminente visitatione super domum suam facienda.

Capitulum primum. [Fol. 3v]

Qualiter abbas visitans hortatur fratres ad vigilandum circa virtutes et ordinis disciplinas.

²⁵ immitari.

here, within the text this is the rubric for Dist.

²⁶ Although no chapter number is given 2, cap. 16, infra, fol. 25v.

Capitulum secundum

Qualiter abbas visitans corripit fratres visitandos diffamatos.

Capitulum iii

Qualiter [loqui debeat] quando abbas visitandus diffamatur, et agitur hic de bona fama, que valde necessaria est prelati.

Capitulum iiii

Qualiter neget abbas parcere, seu supersedere, vel misereri, cum deponit abbatem, at pro grav[i] culpa gravem penam alicui iniungit.

Capitulum v

Pro rigore observando, et de iniusta misericordia, qualiter se habeat dum iudicio presidet.

Capitulum vi

Qualiter misericordiam, et dispensationem, et rigorem, temperare debeat abbas.

[Capitulum] vii

Contra prelatos qui magis volunt timeri in suis iudiciis, predicationibus, et proclamationibus, quam zelo rectitudinis regere subditos suos.

Capitulum viii

Qualiter prelatus in pena infligenda debet habere considerationem ad dignitatem et auctoritatem eius, qui puniendus est.

Capitulum ix

Quod prelatus non debet nimiam humilitatem, et maxime in publico, circa subditum suum exercere, quamvis iniuste eum offenderit, nec familiaritatem.

Capitulum x

Contra prelatos, qui deferunt quibusdam subditorum in correctionum asperitate, cum eos castigare debeant virtute veritatis, eo quod timent, ne male loquantur de eis.

Capitulum xi

Contra prelatos negligentes in correctione²⁷ subditorum suorum, et agitur hic qualiter prelatus debeat corrigere subditos.

Capitulum xii

Contra prelatos, qui volunt videri nimis pii et benigni, et ideo semper volunt parcere et non punire.

Capitulum xiii

Contra prelatos suspiciosos, qui facile credunt sinistra et interpretantur de aliquo, et sine evidenti causa aut certa probacione dampnant et precipitant iudicia.

[Capitulum xiv]²⁸

Contra prelatos, qui ex ira vel mala voluntate, aut odio vel amore vel timore, pervertunt veritatem iudiciorum, et sic sunt acceptores personarum.

Capitulum xv

Contra prelatos, qui credunt quibusdam incusatoribus et ad funestissimam vocem [fol. 4^r] quorundam susurronum, garrulorum, et nugigerulorum facillime presumunt sinistra de bonis, et docentur hic multa.

²⁷ corruptione; cf. fol. 33^v.

²⁸ Since this enumeration is lacking, my subsequent numbering of chapters in this

table of contents differs from the MS by one; this enumeration is present within the text, fol. 34^v.

Capitulum xvi

Contra prelatos, qui laute vivunt, et epulantur cotidie splendide, et ornatis et curiosis vasis hauriunt pocula, et subditi eorum claustrales aridis²⁹ cibis et paucis vescuntur.

Capitulum xvii

Contra prelatos, qui de suo proprio ingenio confisi consilium querere a subditis suis contempnunt, et si forte aliquem de senioribus consulunt, iuniores vel minores dedignantur, vel e contrario.

xviii capitulum

Contra prelatum, qui modicam vel nullam curam habet de infirmis fratribus.

Capitulum xix

De novicio primo recipiendo in capitulo, bono clerico et magne auctoritatis.

xx capitulum

Expliciunt capitula prime et secunde et tercie distinctionis

[Incipit Distinctio I^a]*Capitulum primum.*

Exortatur abbas conventum de eligendo pastore.

Non patebit liber transitus per hoc mare vobis fugientibus a facie pharaonis, nisi aliquem prefeceritis Moysem preducem. Vergentis quippe in declivum etatis³⁰ deterioris maliciosa moderni temporis tempestas tam necessaria quam honesta urget persuasione, ut vos filii desolati ad abbatis, id est patris, anheletis recuperationem. Ubi enim defensor abest, res periclitantur indefense, et ubi patet macerie ruina, ad varios in vineam transitus infesti festinant permeantes, (Versus)³¹ quia hodie

“vivitur ex rapto: non hospes ab hospite tutus,
non socer a genero, fratrum quoque gratia rara est;
victa iacet pietas.”

“Absente Ulixē marito clamat Penelope;”³² itaque necesse est, ut unum vobis preferatis et preficiatis. Sepe enim parilitas vel simul equiparancia conversancium parit discidium confusionem et dissensionis nutrit inconformitatem, recitante Ieronimo quod “Roma condita duos fratres simul habere non potuit reges et parricidio dedicatur.”³³

In apibus princeps unus est; [s]et vos apes mellificantes [vel accumulantes] unguenta devocionis³⁴ in alveario Domini, uno preside indigetis pro unitatis conservatione.³⁵ [fol. 4^v] Tam autem ignominiosum est quam dispendiosum acephalcs sub nullius disciplina gubernare. Nam Salomon dicit:³⁶ “*Ubi non est gubernaculum, populus corrui.*” Unde Seneca: ³⁷ “Ducis in consilio posita est virtus militum.” Ne igitur gregi dominico diu desit cura pastoris et grex morsibus luporum exponatur laniandus, ad electionem concordem et canonicam solum Dominum habentes pre oculis maturate, ut eliminato prorsus respectu cuiuslibet favoris humani, set pure tam regentis ydo-

²⁹ auridis.

³⁰ actus.

³¹ Ovid, *Met.*, I, 144-145, 149.

³² Ovid, *AA*, II, 355.

³³ Gratian, C. 7, q. 1 c. 41.

³⁴ devotarum.

³⁵ conversacione.

³⁶ Prov. 11:14.

³⁷ Publilius Syrus, *Sententiae*, 159.

neitate quam regendorum commoditate secundum Dominum pensata, invocata Spiritus Sancti gratia, talem vobis preficiatis, quem merito vite habere super caput vestrum constituatis. Et ipse, qui est caput vestrum, Christus Ihesus suscitetur hodie in vobis Othonielem, id est "tempus Dei mei," sub quo a Chusan Rasathaim, id est "ab humiliatione eorum qua afflicti sunt populus Israeliticus," [ut] salvi et liberi Deo humiliari valeatis. Amen.

Capitulum ii.

Qualiter concedere debeat abbas monachum in abbatem.

Do libencius et gratancius pro votis vestris. Concurrimus favore quo per effectum laudabiliorem circa honestiorem personam puriora fuisse vota declarantur. Plane inhumanitatis sapore videretur venenum, si orphanis non compacientes solacium tutoris denegaremus. Igitur, fratres dilectissimi, concedimus vobis hunc vestrum postulatam, cui subdatis vos in omni sanctitate et disciplina, cui tamquam pulli renidentibus alis applaudatis, et [quem] interdum debite et modeste acclametis. Verbera patris habes; ubera matris habe.³⁸ Sitis enim filii obediencie per abdicationem proprie voluntatis, filii reverencie per inclinationem timoris et humilitatis, et filii paciencie per connexum caritatis, ut sitis filii lucis eterne in Christo Ihesu, Domino nostro. Amen.

Capitulum iii.

Qualiter novum abbatem instruat.

Amantissime, ecce hodie preficio³⁹ [te] huic domo in officio Marthe circa plurima. Sic ergo sis intentus quomodo pascas Dominum in hiis membris tibi commissis, ut tamen tibi esse Maria non desinas, intentus quomodo et tu a Domino pascaris, qui est pabulum vite eterne. Et licet tibi debeamus et valeamus dicere: "esto dominus fratrum tuorum;" nichilominus tamen tibi iniungimus: "esto in illis quasi unus ex illis." "Non quasi dominantes in clero," ait Petrus,⁴⁰ "set forma [fol. 5^r] facti gregis ex animo." Gregorius:⁴¹ "In cervice prelati nichil nitet sp[eci]endius humilitate." Et Salomon:⁴² quia "ubi fuerit superbia, ibi et contumelia; ubi autem humilitas, ibi et sapientia."

Aut: cum pastor hodie constituaris, attendere te volumus ad quod⁴³ tibi sit necessarius baculus pastoralis in grege tuo custodiendo, ut videlicet per summitatem eius, que unca est et recurva, attrahas et revoces ovem errantem; per infimam partem, que aculeum habet, stimules et pungas desidiosam, lentam, et derelinquentem; per virgam, que in medio est, regas, defendas, et sustentas meticulosam, subditam, et morbosam. Unde Versus:

Attrahere per primum,
medio rege,
punge per imum.
Collige, sustenta,
stimula vaga[m],
morbida[m], lenta[m];
hoc est pastoris;
hec⁴⁴ virga figura⁴⁵ honoris.

³⁸ Honorius III, Decretales, 5.5.5.

³⁹ preficis.

⁴⁰ 1 Petr. 5:3.

⁴¹ Gratian, Dist. 100 c. 8.

⁴² Prov. 11:2.

⁴³ quid.

⁴⁴ hac.

⁴⁵ figurat.

Cum hoc baculo transcendendum tibi erit Iordanem, quod interpretatur "descensus," vel "rivus iudicii," vel "videns iudicium," cum in descensu huius vite labentis videre te oporteat qualiter subditos debeas iudicare, et necesse tibi sit, ut habundes tamquam rivus iudicio et iusticia. In hiis oportebit te, secundum Apostolum Paulum,⁴⁶ esse bene prepositum domui tue, ut filios tuos non ad iracundiam provoces, set enutrias in omni disciplina et correctione Domini. Sic, sic teneas virgam vigilantem quam vidit Iheremias. Attende etiam beatum Iob cotidiane obtulisse pro filiis suis sacrificia; et tu sacrifices pro tuis. Terreat te Hely sacerdos, qui ob indisciplinationem filiorum fractis verticibus corruit retro ostium templi. Memorare quod experimento didicit David indisciplinatam filiorum iuventutem perniciosam, quorum unus, Amon videlicet, sororem suam Thamar corrupit; alter, scilicet Absalon, et patrem a regno expulit et ad concubinas eius accessit, et tandem per invidia deserti quercui inhesit.

Intonat tuba apostolica a[d] Thim[otheum] quia "qui suorum et maxime domesticorum, curam non habet, fidem negavit et est infideli deterior."⁴⁷ Suavissimi beati patris Benedicti dogma recollige, ut vigile studeas esse quod diceris.⁴⁸ Adhuc memento te esse stabularium, cui verus Samaritanus eum vel eos, qui inciderunt in latrones, commendavit. Set et tu ipse interdum sis Samaritanus, ut, cum res exigerit, vini vulnus ablui asperitate, [fol. 5v] iuste increpationis acerbiterat propinans, et contra, olei demulce plagam dulcedine cum suadebit necessitas, ut per misericordiam severitati detrahatur. Disce doctrinam Gregorianam in *Moralibus* qua sic erudieris:⁴⁹ "Omnis, qui iuste iudicat, stateram in manu portat; in utroque penso iusticiam et misericordiam librans, ut iusto libramine quedam per misericordiam indulgeat." Set et audi magnum et sanctum doctorem Augustinum in *Libro Conclusionum*, qui sic ait:⁵⁰ "Iudicans alium, qui est iudicandus, condempnat se ipsum. Cognoscat igitur se, et purget in se quod videt alios sibi offerre. Caveat ut a se proiecerit, quicquam in alio dampnosum reperit." Iuste nichilominus, quisquis ille es[t], iudica[t] in se⁵¹ primo resecans quod in aliis iudicavit resecandum. Animadvertat ergo quod dicitur in Evangelio:⁵² "*Qui sine peccato est mittat prius lapidem in illam.*" Nec habeas trabem in oculo tuo si festucam vis eicere ab alieno (versus Ovidii)⁵³, nam

"sic agitur censura et sic exempla parantur,
cum iudex, alios quod⁵⁴ monet, ipse facit."⁵⁵

Itaque iuxta hanc formam te formes in interioribus sine quibus non est salus, ut primum queras regnum Dei. In exterioribus autem necesse est, ut pulcritudinem Rachelis quandoque transformes in lippitudinem Lye fecundioris circa temporalia licite acquirenda et debite conservanda, alioquin non eris bene prepositus domui tue, nisi et hanc habeas prudenciam in temporalibus, dicente Gregorio⁵⁶ quod "hoc tempore talis in regiminis arce debet constitui, qui non solum de salute animarum, verum etiam de extrinseca utilitate et cautela sciat esse sollicitus."

Ne te moneat illud Apostoli: "*Nemo militans Deo implicat se negotiis secularibus,*"⁵⁷ et item: "*secularia iudicia si habueritis: contemptibiles,*"⁵⁸ et cetera; quia si habueritis ex

⁴⁶ 1 Tim. 3:4.

⁴⁷ 1 Tim. 5:8.

⁴⁸ *Regula*, c. 2; CSEL 75 (ed. R. Hanslick), 19.

⁴⁹ Gratian, *Dist.* 45 c. 10.

⁵⁰ Gratian, *De pen.*, *Dist.* 6 c. 1.

⁵¹ *tc.*

⁵² Io. 8:7.

⁵³ *Fasti*, VI, 647-648.

⁵⁴ *que.*

⁵⁵ *fovit.*

⁵⁶ Gratian, *Dist.* 39 c. 1.

⁵⁷ 2 Tim. 2:4.

⁵⁸ 1 Cor. 6:4.

studiosa voluntate secularia iudicia et secularibus negociis fueritis implicati voluntate habendi non erogandi, seculariter⁵⁹ iudicia et negocia tractantur potius,⁶⁰ dum tamen non seculariter, set fine spirituali, ut iura monasterii tui defendas iusto zelo et ut fratres sustententes: sic enim spiritualiter tractabunt[ur] secularia.

Singula animalia in Apocalipsi Iohannis⁶¹ erant in circuitu et intus plena oculis, quod non inconuenienter referri potest ad circumspectionem [fol. 6^r] interiorem, qua necesse habet pre[e]minere prelatus circa animas regendas, et exteriorem, qua vite necessaria tenetur in exterioribus, id est in temporalibus, procurare.

Ecce Augustinus sic loquitur:⁶² "Habebat dominus loculos, a fidelibus oblata conservans, et suorum necessitatibus et aliis indigentibus tribuebat. Tunc primum ecclesiastice pecunie⁶³ forma est constituta, ut intelligeremus quod precepit non esse cogitandum de crastino, [non] ad hoc fuisse preceptum, ut nil pecunie servetur a sanctis, set ne Deo propter ista serviatur, et propter inopie timorem iusticia deseratur." Unde Ieronimus:⁶⁴ "Aurum habet ecclesia, ut eroget et subveniat in necessitatibus." Eleganter loquitur satyri[cus] Iuvenalis⁶⁵ de philosophis, quod sicut colunt deum scientie, ita colere debent deum sufficientie, (Versus)⁶⁶ nam

"quis locus ingenio, nisi cum se carmine solo
vexant et dominis Cirrhæ Nysaeque feruntur."⁶⁷

Sic claustralibus, qui exercent ingenia sua in vera et summa philosophia circa salutem eternam, opus est sufficientia. Cum enim imponimus iumento, id est corpori nostro, onus, ne lasciviat, virgam infligimus, ne recalcitret, necessario tum debemus ei pabulum, ne deficiat.

Iacob, "videns Deum" et "supplantator viciorum," licet habundaret in multis gregibus et armentis, vidit tamen per scalam erectam contemplationis angelos descendentes et ascendentes. Lyam habuit scilicet "laboriosam" et Rachelem scilicet "visum principium." Tu ergo, esto Iacob, et redde que sunt Cesaris Cesari in temporalium amministratione, et que sunt Dei Deo in spiritualium devocione. Et dicendum tibi: cogita cum sponsa, "*leva eius sub capite meo et dextera eius amplexabitur me*;"⁶⁸ *leva*, temporalium bonorum, *sub capite*, ad solacium sustentationis in terrenis necessitatibus, *dextera*, interne contemplationis, *amplexabitur me*, in amplexu affectionis et devocionis spiritualis. Et hoc est quod vidit Iezechiël cum diceret:⁶⁹ "*Similitudo quasi manus hominis subtus pennas eorum*." Manus enim sollicitè operationis subesse debet ad sustentationem et quasi subpodamentum transvolantium pennis sancte contemplationis.

Ad ultimum hortor te audire tubam⁷⁰ Gregorianam⁷¹ [fol. 6^v] sic clangentem quod "ille monachorum vitas competenti et regulari moderamine debet disponere, qui pro commissis eorum animabus compellitur reddere rationem." Sic ergo para te ad reddendum rationem huius sancte tue villicationis, ne ille tremendus iudex precipiat te proici in tenebras exteriores ubi erit fle[tus] et stri[dor] dencium.

⁵⁹ secularia.

⁶⁰ tractare positus.

⁶¹ Apoc. 4:6.

⁶² Gratian, C. 12 q. 1 c. 17.

⁶³ persone.

⁶⁴ Properly, Ambrose: Gratian, C. 12 q. 2

c. 70.

⁶⁵ Sat., XIV, 316-321.

⁶⁶ Juvenal, Sat., VII, 63-64.

⁶⁷ vexant et cure dominis Niseque fruuntur.

⁶⁸ Cant. 2:6.

⁶⁹ Ez. 1:8.

⁷⁰ turbam.

⁷¹ Gratian, C. 18 q. 2 c. 19.

Ad ultimum etiam suadeo tibi illud Salomonis: ⁷² "*diligenter agnosce*⁷³ *vultum pecoris tui. Tuosque greges considera. Non enim habebis iugiter potestatem set corona tribuetur tibi in generationem et generationem.*"

Et additur hoc in fine quat[t]uor sequencium capitulorum, scilicet "ad ultimum," et cetera.

Capitulum iiij.

Qualiter amoneatur abbas si fuerit iuuenis.

Non minus acceptandum te censemus quia caput tuum nondum⁷⁴ dealbavit canicies; dicente Apostolo ad Thim[otheum]:⁷⁵ "*Nemo contempnat iuventutem tuam,*" quia "*cani sunt hominis sensus, et etas senectutis vita immaculata.*"⁷⁶ Prudencia enim annos preveniens et ingenii capacitas industriosa plerumque supplet etatem secundum iura legalia et canonica, nam "*senectus venerabilis non diuturna, neque numero an[n]orum com[putata].*"⁷⁷ Audi etiam Salomonem, qui dicit quod "*melior est puer pauper, et sapiens, rege sene et stulto.*"⁷⁸ Qui puer secundum improprium appellatur, dum de eo dicitur "*maledictus puer centum annorum.*"⁷⁹

Daniel e[t] Ieremias ante iuvenilem etatem spiritum prophetie accepisse leguntur.⁸⁰ Adolescens Ioseph robustioris consilii maturitate fugiit [insidias] Egyptiace meretricis.⁸¹ David puerulus Goliath prostravit, et [Dominus] precepit Samueli ut adhuc adolescentulum David inungat in regem.⁸² Iacobus et Iohannes Evangelista in adolescencia sunt in apostolatam electi. Ergo longe virtuosius est canescere mente quam mento. Unde in hystoria Frigii Daretis elegantissime sic nobilis concinit versificator:

Mento canescant alii; nos mente;
capillo, nos animo; facie, nos pectore.
Tempora certe virtutem non prima negant,
non ultima donant.

Et Ovidius:⁸³

"Cesaribus virtus contigit ante diem."

Attende igitur quod de cetero vigilandum est super gregem tuum; non enim nisi vigilantibus pastoribus annunciant angeli natum salvatorem. Et dicit lex humana quod vigilantibus prodita sunt iura.

Ad ultimum, et cetera, ut supra.

Capitulum quintum.

Si fuerit senex. [fol. 7r]

Multum gravitas reverenda perorat. Probabilissimum itaque est hunc bene prestiturum regimini, qui usque ad hec tempora et operis et etatis⁸⁴ flore coruscavit.

⁷² Prov. 27: 23-24.

⁷³ agnoscere.

⁷⁴ nudum.

⁷⁵ 1 Tim. 4:12.

⁷⁶ Sap. 4:8-9.

⁷⁷ Sap. 4:8.

⁷⁸ Eccl. 4:13.

⁷⁹ Is. 65:20; for *puer* rather than *peccator*

see the quotation of Gregory in Gratian, C. 2 q. 7 c. 28.

⁸⁰ Dict. Grat., Dist. 78 c. 4.

⁸¹ *Carmina Burana*, IX, 3.

⁸² 1 Sam. 16:6-13.

⁸³ *AA*, I, 184.

⁸⁴ etate.

Et quidem scriptum est:⁸⁵ "Apud nos inconvulsis radicibus vivit⁸⁶ antiquitas, cui decreta patrum sanxere reverenciam." Et dicit iurisconsultus partier: ⁸⁷ "Semper apud nos in urbe nostra senectus fuit venerabilis," quia (Versus)⁸⁸

"magna fuerit quondam capitis reverencia cani."

Ideo precepit Dominus Moysi,⁸⁹ ut congregaret lxx⁹⁰ de senioribus Israel, quibus datis in adiutorium Moysis dedit Dominus de spiritu Moysi, et ipsi prophetaverunt.

De venerabili quidem vite melioris vini carpitur uva; obtemperate igitur de cetero huic viro seniori, de quo et dicitur, "*seniorem ne increpaveris*,"⁹¹ quia, ut dicit Gregorius:⁹² "tunc observandum est, cum senioris culpa suo exemplo non trahit ad interitum corda iuniorum."

Ad ultimum, et cetera, ut in iii^o capitulo supra.

Capitulum vi.

Si fuerit transferendus monachus in abbatem matris domus a filia domo.

Meminisse te volo, amice e[t] frater karissime, quod licet iam^{92a} de servo creatus sis in dominum, de filio factus pater per spiritualem emancipationem, non ideo te supra te extollas, set Deum laudando tanto humilior⁹³ quanto maior es. Tecum frequenter reiteres illud egregii versificatoris:

O mira Dei virtus, quam magna potencia,
quantus sum, quantillus eram
subito de stipite parvo in cedrum magnam crevi
cuius gratia sum id quod sum.

Recordare Yram, "filii vidue," quem tamen Salomon rex templi constituit ornatorem, et cum sis constitutus ad ornandum artificio tuo templum Dei ex officio tibi iniuncto, esto et tu ipse Yram, id est "excelse vivens," licet ab infimo gradu in sublimitatis officium fueris assumptus.

Ad ultimum, et cetera, ut supra.

Capitulum vii.

Si fuerit transferendus a matre domo in filiam.

Ecce filiam nostram Rebecam tibi filio nostro tradidimus nuptui, que interpretatur "multa paciencia." In multa enim paciencia te accepit in maritum. Obsecramus ergo te in Domino, ut tu sis Ysaac, id est "gaudium" vel "risus noster," quia, ut dicit Salomon:⁹⁴ "*filius sapiens letificat patrem, filius vero stultus mesticia est matris sue*." Sic esto sapiens in regimine filie nostre, ut fructificatio tue conversationis, que inter nos hucusque laudabiliter redoluit, catenus ibi doctrina et exemplo [fol. 7v] fructificet, ut et domui tibi commisse et huic, a qua procedis, cedat in fructum et honorem, tibi autem et nobis proficiat ad salutem. Amen.

⁸⁵ Zosimus, in Gratian, C. 25 q. 1 c. 7.

⁸⁶ iuventus.

⁸⁷ Callistratus, in Dig., 50.6.6.

⁸⁸ Ovid, *Fasti*, V, 57.

⁸⁹ Num. 11:16.

⁹⁰ .xx.

⁹¹ 1 Tim. 5:1.

⁹² Gratian, C. 2 q. 7 c. 28.

^{92a} tam.

⁹³ humilians.

⁹⁴ Prov. 10:1.

Capitulum viii.

Cum negatur monachus postulatus in abbatem, quia est prior, vel cellerarius.

Postulationem vestram commendamus in Domino, que ex modo postulandi et ratione persone postulate a fonte laudabilis zeli procedere se pio probat argumento. Unde eo tenerius vobis compatimur quo vos credimus puriore desiderio⁹⁵ secundum personam suspirare congruencio-rem. Verum, sicut di[c]tante Ambrosio,⁹⁶ "melius est, ut ipse subvenias tuis, quibus pudor est ab aliis sumptum deposcere quam alienis;" idcirco dum vobis ipsis prius subvenire para[vi]mus, vestris ad presens precibus adesse non possumus cum effectum sine commodi nostri defectu, quod eleganti methaphora persuadet lex humana⁹⁷ quod "durum et crudelitati proximum est ex tuis prediis aque agmen ortum scientibus agris tuis ad aliorum usum propagari." Ethicum etiam est:⁹⁸ "Cum fueris felix, semper tibi proximus esto."

Hanc nempe ordinatam opinamur caritatem, ut primo suis postea quis subveniat alienis vel aliis. De qua sponsa spirituali iactatione exultans dicit:⁹⁹ "*Ordinavit in me caritatem*," scilicet sponsus meus. Cum ergo isto a vobis postulato non possumus¹⁰⁰ carere sine dispendio nostro, saltem ad tempus non indignemini, si non annuimus, quod petitis. "*Et ne forte non sufficiat nobis et vobis, ite*,"¹⁰¹ et cetera. Set audite quia scriptum est:¹⁰² "*Ne des alteri honorem tuum*," et quia "*ubi non sunt boves presepe vacuum est*," ut ait Salomon.¹⁰³ Ne nostrum presepe vacuum deseratur, nostrum bovem a nobis ad presens non concedimus abduci.¹⁰⁴

Capitulum ix.

Quia electus minus est ydoneus propter inpericiam lit[er]arum.

Ne tam in nostrum dedecus vergat quam in vestrum dispendium, non duximus ad presens preces vestras affectui mancipandas. Ethicum est:¹⁰⁵ "quod iustum est petit, vel quod videatur honestum." Ut autem salva reverencia vestra loquar, debuistis didicisse a Ieronimo¹⁰⁶ [qui dicit] "vos debere certos esse quod prestancio-rem, doctio-rem, et sanctio-rem, ex omni populo eligeretis, ut nil in eo sapientie, nil industrie, nil scientie desit:" sapientie quoad virtutes, scientie quoad negocia et officia spiritualia, industrie [fol. 8^r] quoad secularia.

Avertisse debuissetis quod dixit Dominus ad Moysem, dicens:¹⁰⁷ "*Assume ad te ipsum Ihesum filium Nane, hominem qui habet spiritum Dei in semetipso, et imponas manus tuas super eum*." Et multa subiungit, ut audiant illum filii Israel.¹⁰⁸ Si ergo estis filii Israel, id est "Deum videntes," talem debetis audire. At¹⁰⁹ istum nondum talem reputamus, illam Salomonis parabolam¹¹⁰ formidantes, qua dicit: "*Sicut qui mittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii, ita qui tribuit insipienti[bus] honorem*," Et ideo nolumus edificare ydolis templum, templo Domini insipientem preponendo.¹¹¹ Falsa causa

⁹⁵ purioris desiderii.

⁹⁶ Gratian, Dist. 86 c. 16.

⁹⁷ Cod. Just., 3.34.6.

⁹⁸ *Catonis disticha*, I, 18, 40.

⁹⁹ Cant. 2:4.

¹⁰⁰ possemus.

¹⁰¹ Matt. 25: 9.

¹⁰² Prov. 5:9.

¹⁰³ Prov. 14:4.

¹⁰⁴ adduci.

¹⁰⁵ *Catonis disticha*, I, 31.

¹⁰⁶ Gratian, C. 8 q. 1 c. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Num. 27:18.

¹⁰⁸ MS adds illum talem.

¹⁰⁹ Aut.

¹¹⁰ Prov. 26:8.

¹¹¹ MS adds *Salomon*: it is superfluous, as is *illum talem* above (n. 108); either something has been lost from the original or a simple copying error has been made.

stultus in cathedram ecclesiasticam sublimatur; parum est ei ac si persecutio preparetur, quod idem Salomon dixit:¹¹² "*quomodo nix in estate et pluvie in messe, sic indecens est stulti gloria.*" Gombardus:¹¹³

"Accedit dignitas
animali bruto,
tamquam gemma stercorei
et pictura luto."

Salomon:¹¹⁴ "*Est malum quod vidi sub sole, quasi per errorem egrediens a facie principis: positum stultum in dignitate, et divites sedere deorsum.*" scilicet "deiectos."

Et quidem prelati est predicare, iudicare, et penitencias dare. Propter figuram scientie predicandi ferebat pontifex Veteri[s] Testamenti rationale quadrangulum in pectore, in quo scripta erant manifestatio et veritas. Ad scientiam autem iudicandi et penitenciam imponendi necesse fuit et oportunum sacerdoti scire discernere inter causam et causam, inter sanguinem et sanguinem, inter lepram et lepram, inter peccatum et peccatum.

"Debet etiam," ut docet a[u]ctoritas,¹¹⁵ "prius esse discipulus quam magister, ut possit docere quod didicit. Omnis vite institutio hac ratione, ad id quod tendit, se conformat;¹¹⁶ quod qui minime litteris operam dedit preceptor minime potest esse litterarum." Nam et prius posuit Dominus verba in ore Ieremie, et postea constituit eum super gentes. Et monachos¹¹⁷ informans Ieronimus ait:¹¹⁸ "Multo tempore discas quod postea doceas." Nam et scriptum est:¹¹⁹ "Miserum est, eum fieri magistrum, qui numquam fuit discipulus." Hinc ipse Salvator prius sedit in medio doctorum audiens illos et interrogans, et postea cepit predicare. Hinc etiam prius apostolos docuit, et demum dixit:¹²⁰ "*Ite, docete omnes gentes.*" Nam Christus prius fregit panem per doctrinam, postea dedit discipulis.

"Ignorancia," legitur,¹²¹ "mater cunctorum errorum." Unde Ieronimus¹²² hoc utitur argumento: "Si iuxta Apostolum Christus¹²³ virtus et Dei sapientia est, notitia autem Christi per scripturam habetur. Ignorancia [fol. 8v] igitur litterarum ignoratio Christi est"; Paulo at[t]estante:¹²⁴ "*Si quis ignorat, ignorabitur.*" Non enim poterit talis cum Apostolo clamare:¹²⁵ "*Munde sunt manus mee a sanguine omnium vestrum. Non enim subterfugi, quominus annunciarem omne consilium Dei vobis.*"

Ne igitur ridiculosa turbetur ordo preposteratione, non duximus videntibus cecum ducem¹²⁶ tradere et ad tuicionem gregis egregii canem dare non latrare valentem, ne ei impropereetur illud Ethicum:¹²⁷

"Cum tu non videas oculis lippus male iniunctis,
Cur in amicorum vulnus tam cernis acutum?"

¹¹² Prov. 26:1.

¹¹³ *Carmina Burana*, XIX, 19; for *luto* MS gives *luto*.

¹¹⁴ Eccl. 10:5-6.

¹¹⁵ Celestine, in Gratian, Dist. 59 c. 4.

¹¹⁶ confirmet.

¹¹⁷ monachis.

¹¹⁸ Gratian, C. 16 q. 1 c. 26.

¹¹⁹ Innocent I, in Gratian, Dist. 61 c. 4; Dist. 48 pars I.

¹²⁰ Matt. 28:19.

¹²¹ Gratian, Dist. 38 c. 1 (ex concilio Tolletano IV, cap. 24).

¹²² Gratian, Dist. 38 c. 9.

¹²³ Christi.

¹²⁴ 1 Cor. 14:38.

¹²⁵ Act. 20:26.

¹²⁶ ducere.

¹²⁷ Horace, *Sat. I, iii*, 25-26. The quotation is not exact.

Capitulum x.

Sif uerit litteratus set non bene secundum ordinem morigeratus.

Non solum credimus vobis curandum, ne minus ydoneus vobis preficiatur, set etiam satagendum, ut talis vobis presit, qui vos precedat verbo, opere, et exemplo. Unde non consentimus in aliquem vobis dimittendum, nisi [in]scientiam eius com[m]ittetur vite sanctitas, ut voci vita non discordet, quia cum vox vitam non remordet, dulcis est simphonya. Nam secundum Gregorium:¹²⁸ "Cuius vita despicitur, restat ut eius predicatio contempnatur." Et ideo non est dandus vobis piger, qui, ut ait Salomon,¹²⁹ "*manum suam abscondit sub ascella, nec ad os suum applicat eam;*" ubi dicit glossa magistralis¹³⁰ quod "manum ad os porrigere est voci opera concordare."

Est autem scientia in homine irreligioso quasi "gemma in stercore et pictura super luctum,"¹³¹ dicente Salomone:¹³² "*Circulus aureus in naribus suis,* ¹³³ *mulier pulc[h]ra et fatua.*" More enim suis voluptabrum vertentis, [ea] que odore noticie percipit, inuerecunda sordidat actione. Tradit etiam Augustinus:¹³⁴ "Vilissimus computandus est, nisi precellat scientia et sanctitate, qui est honore prestancior." Et alibi: emendaciorem convenit esse populo, quem necesse est orare pro populo.

Audi organum Gregorii¹³⁵ dulce melos sic modulantis: "Moisi preceptum est, ut sacerdos tabernaculum ingrediens tintinnabulis ambiatur, ut voces habeat predicationis, ne superni inspectoris iudicium ex silencio offendant. Scriptum quippe est:¹³⁶ '*Ut audiat sonitus, quando ingreditur sanctuarium in conspectu Domini, et non moriatur.*' Sacerdos namque ingrediens vel egrediens moritur, si de eo predicationis sonitus non auditur. Set apte tintinnabula vestimentis eius inscribuntur inserta. Per vestimenta enim iusta opera accipimus quia dicitur:¹³⁷ '*Sacerdotes tui induantur iusticiam* [fol. 9^r] *et sancti tui exultatione exultabunt.*'"

Ipsa eciam lex humana,¹³⁸ que de monachis loquitur, hortatur, ut sanctior et melior fratrum ipsis preficiatur, ut quanto quis sanctioribus preest, tanto sanctior inueniatur.

Capitulum xi.

Si fuerit litteratus et vite honestioris set in temporalibus minus industrius.

Non sufficit puero habere nutricem depectantem, balneis purgantem et demulcentem, nisi eandem¹³⁹ habeat et lacte et solido cibo pro tempore et viribus pueri pascentem. Quamvis sit prelatus Demost[h]enes phylosophando, opere precium tamen est, ut sit formica laboriose temporalia providendo, que in estate congregat, quod in hyeme consumit. "*Qui enim congregat in messe filius sapiens est,*" dicit Salomon.¹⁴⁰

Huic addi potest competenter id, quod habetur supra¹⁴¹ in capitulo iij^o, circa medium, scilicet ibi: "Necesse est, ut pulcritudinem Rachelis quandoque transformes in lippitudinem Lye," et cetera, ad hoc signum.¹⁴²

¹²⁸ Gratian, C. 3 q. 7 c. 2.

¹²⁹ Prov. 19:24.

¹³⁰ Glossa Ord., PL 113, 1103B.

¹³¹ Cf. fol. 8^r.

¹³² Prov. 11:22.

¹³³ eius.

¹³⁴ Gratian, C. 1 q. 1 c. 45.

¹³⁵ Gratian, Dist. 43 c. 1.

¹³⁶ Exod. 28:33.

¹³⁷ Ps. 131:9.

¹³⁸ Nov. 5.9.

¹³⁹ eadem.

¹⁴⁰ Prov. 10:5.

¹⁴¹ Fol. 6^v.

¹⁴² In MS this is a symbol resembling a white block X set in a black square; it seems to mean that '*supra in capitulo iij^o*' a similar sign was (or should have been) used in order so make the reference easy.

Capitulum xii.

Si fuerit usquequaque [vdoneus] praeterquam quod adhuc¹⁴³ est novus et ideo rudis in observanciis ordinis.

Ab omni specie mala, non tantum a malo, abstinendum est. Propter igitur speciem et exempli perniciem non possumus sicut nec debemus, optatum vobis concedere abbatem, contemplantes in hoc et sequentes magistrum tocius religionis, beatum Gregorium,¹⁴⁴ qui sic ait: "Sicut neophitus dicebatur, qui in initio sancte fidei erat eruditione plantatus, sic modo neophitus est habendus, qui repente in religionis habitu plantatus ad sacros ordines inordinate irrepserit. Ordinate ergo ad omnes est ascendendum. Nam casum appetit, qui ad summi loci fastigia positus gradibus per abrupta querit ascensum. Scimus autem quod edificati parietes non prius tignorum pondus accipiunt, nisi a novitatis sue¹⁴⁵ humore siccentur, ne, si ante pondera quam solidentur accipiant, cunctam simul ad terram fabricam depressant." Quod pari rationi[s] censura intelligendum est de qualibet dignitate. "Momentaneus namque prelatus," teste auctoritate,¹⁴⁶ "nescit humilitatem, modos personarum, vel sese¹⁴⁷ contempnere; non ieiunavit; non flevit; non se correxit. [In arrogantiam] (que est ruina diaboli) incidunt, qui¹⁴⁸ puncto hore nondum discipuli cum fiunt magistri." Unde scriptum est quod "longa observatione religionis cultus tradi debet."¹⁴⁹ Unde dicit imperator quod longo tempore debet esse expertus, qui ascendere debet ad dignitatem.¹⁵⁰

Populus enim Israel, cum vellet ulcisci scelus carnale, quod commiserunt [fol. 9^v] viri civitatis Gabaa, que erat in tribu Benjamin, cum prius non in humilitate, nec oratione, nec contricione cordis, set livore vindicte se accingeret, primo die ceciderunt ex eo xxv milia; secundo, xxiiij^a. Set tandem reversus in domum suam postquam flevit, et ieiunavit, et invocavit Dominum, et ita rediit ad pugnandum contra filios Benjamin de Gabaa, et percussit eos omnes in ore gladii, exceptis sexcentis viris. Non est enim aptus expugnare Gabaa, id est "collem" vel "altitudinem," hoc est "peccatorum cervicositatem," nisi prius humiliatus fuerit per penitenciam.¹⁵¹

Qui enim nondum in se sua errata correxit, in aliis ea puniendo velparcendo nescius erit. Unde dicit beatus Gregorius:¹⁵² "Magne dispensatione pietatis actum est, quod Dominus omnipotens ancille vocem pertimescere et ipsum negare permisit illum, quem cuncte ecclesie preferre disposuerat, ut scilicet is, qui futurus erat pastor ecclesie, in sua culpa disceret, qualiter debuisset aliis misereri. Prius itaque ostendit eum sibi, et tunc preposuit eum ceteris, ut ex sua infirmitate cognosceret, quam misericorditer aliena infirma toleraret." Hinc Salomon:¹⁵³ "*Iustus prior*¹⁵⁴ *accusator est sui.*" Ad hoc scriptum est:¹⁵⁵ "*qui vicerit,*" et cetera.

At iste licet campum duelli vix intraverit inexpertus, tamen pugna¹⁵⁶ est; et ideo Oracius:¹⁵⁷

"ludere qui nescit, campestribus abstinet armis."¹⁵⁸

¹⁴³ In MS the order is *adhuc quod*.

¹⁴⁴ Gratian, Dist. 48 c. 2.

¹⁴⁵ sui.

¹⁴⁶ Gratian, Dist. 48 pars I.

¹⁴⁷ non modos personarum, non sese.

¹⁴⁸ MS inserts *in* here.

¹⁴⁹ Hormisdas, in Gratian, Dist. 61 c. 3.

¹⁵⁰ Cod. Just., 12.2.3.

¹⁵¹ patriam.

¹⁵² Gratian, Dist. 50 c. 53.

¹⁵³ Prov. 18:17.

¹⁵⁴ in privo.

¹⁵⁵ Apoc. 21:7.

¹⁵⁶ pugne.

¹⁵⁷ *Ars Poetica*, 379.

¹⁵⁸ arvis.

Legitur quod beatus Gregorius repellit quemdam clericum ab episcopatu tantum quia psalmos ignorabat, cum tamen esset, ut ipse asserit, vigilans.¹⁵⁹ At iste nondum ritum ordinis et institutionis et regularia officia secundum constituta patrum nostrorum novit. Nolumus igitur arare in bove et asino, cum iste ob sui ruditatem asinus posset reputari inter boves educte¹⁶⁰ triturationis, qui potius deberet esse aratri gubernator. Nec sufficit quod ingenium habet capax ut cito discat, nisi et prius didiceret. [Horacius]¹⁶¹

"Ego nec studium sine divite vena,
nec rude quid prosit video ingenium: alterius¹⁶² sic
altera poscit opes res et coniurat amice."

Quia mo[n]struosa preposteratio esset, si iam factus abbas discere deberet id, quod ex officio suo alios tenetur docere. [fol. 10^r].

Capitulum xiiij.

Si fuerit iuvenis quamvis in omnibus aliis sit ydoneus.

Quoniam sicut scriptum est:^{162a} futuris casibus¹⁶³ prudenter occurrere debemus, et cauta circumspectione cavere, ne culpa nostra id eveniat, quod non congruit,¹⁶⁴ idcirco ad presens petitionem vestram duximus differendam. Quamvis enim probatissime indolis huius postulati primicie virum dignissimum in eo videantur pronosticare, attamen quia fervencioris etas adolescencie plerumque in inconsulte facilitatis prolabi solet instabilitatem, "melius est ante tempus occurrere," ut dicit imperator,¹⁶⁵ "quam post causam vulneratam remedium querere." Nam et post illa tria, que dicit Salomon, difficilia, scilicet viam avis in aere, viam navis in mari, viam colubri in lapide, quartum reputat impossibile scire, viam videlicet viri in adolescencia sua. Ait enim: "*quartum penitus ignoro.*"¹⁶⁶ Unde et iuvenes, quamvis discretionem pre[e]minentes, lex humana¹⁶⁷ sub tutela usque ad xxv annum coercent,¹⁶⁸ et talem tutorem esse prohibet, dicens: "Non esse ferendum eundem esse tutorem et sub tutela constitui [et] iterum¹⁶⁹ eundem esse curatorem et sub cura agere."

Interdum siquidem contingit, quod, qui reprimentis repagula discipline evasit, ruit post raptus impellentis iuventutis et rotatur vagabundus per campos licencie, quem habene regularis freni ordinario tramite incedere coegerunt. Unde Versus:¹⁷⁰

"Imberbis iuvenis, tandem custode remoto,
gaudet equis canibus[que] et aprici gramine Campi.
Utilium tardus provisor, prodigus eris,
sublimis cupidusque¹⁷¹ et amata relinquere pernix.
Cereus in vicium flecti, monitoribus asper."

¹⁵⁹ Gratian, Dist. 85 c. 1.

¹⁶⁰ edocte.

¹⁶¹ *Ars Poetica*, 409-411.

¹⁶² altius.

^{162a} Gregory I, in Gratian, Dist. 31 c. 1.

¹⁶³ causibus.

¹⁶⁴ congruat.

¹⁶⁵ Cod. Just., 2.40.5; 3.27.1.

¹⁶⁶ Prov. 30:18.

¹⁶⁷ Cod. Just., 5.30.5.

¹⁶⁸ coercent.

¹⁶⁹ item.

¹⁷⁰ Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 161-62, 165, 163.

¹⁷¹ ravidus.

*Capitulum xiiij.**Si fuerit senex.*

Utinam ita res se haberet ut petitio vestra optatum sortiri valeret effectum ! Nam persona petita adeo laudabiliter dies suos lapillis melioribus voravit, quod eius providencie circumspectio et vite speculum sufficeret ad regni regimen et informationem virtuose vivendi. Verum confracta annositate membra ad debitum secundum abbatis [fol. 10^v] sollicitum officium non possunt assurgere laboribus¹⁷² et fatigationibus. Pergit dare libellum repudii senii imbecillitas, sese quieti et torpori contendens maritali. Oracius:¹⁷³

“spectatum¹⁷⁴ satis et donatum¹⁷⁵ iam rude queris,
Maecenas,¹⁷⁶ iterum antiquo me includere ludo.
non eadem est etas.”

“Optat ephippia¹⁷⁷ bos,”¹⁷⁸ et umbram querit cervus diu canum investigatione lacessitus. Ideoque non existimamus eum vobis expedire ad laboriosum fructum, quem quies totum sibi vendicavit ad ocium, quia, ut ait Ethnicus:¹⁷⁹ “Nil sine magno vita labore dedit.” Nil ergo restat, nisi ut sustentetur refectione, qui retinetur irreparabili defectione. Et ideo potius eligere curate aliquem Iepte, id est aptum videlicet viribus expeditum, Galaditem (hoc est habentem acervum¹⁸⁰ boni testimonii per famam) virum robustum, qui ducat et defendat filios Israel impugnatos a filiis Ammonitarum, qui “callidi” interpretantur.

Nam “multa senem circumveniunt incommoda,”¹⁸¹ et ideo commodis non est accomodus. Et sepes, que multis solibus aruit, inepta est satorum defensionis.

*Capitulum xv.**Qualiter est pacificandus, qui negatur eligentibus.*

Frater karissime, cum a te tuam prorsus relegaveris voluntatem et alterius te totum subiugaveris iudicio, consequens est, ut equanimiter feras quicquid de te duximus faciendum, presertim cum nil contra bonos mores, favente altissimo iudice, de te vel de aliquo simus etiam deliberaturi. Nam secundum iura humana, qui consentit in arbitrum ex compromisso, stare oportebit eum etiam iniquo arbitrio arbitrantis ex quo eius elegit arbitrium.¹⁸² Nichilominus tamen presumere debes, quod nos potius ob profectum tuum te non passi fuimus ascendere, qui cavere debemus, ne precipiteris in ruinam, vel quod ad aliquid melius te reservaverimus. Memento quod Petro dictum est a Domino:¹⁸³ “*Quid ad te? Tu me sequere. Sic eum volo manere.*” Et cum sic te velimus manere, qui positi sumus supra caput tuum vice Dci, patienter ferre memento. Novit enim, qui nil ignorat, quod et honorem et utilitatem tuam procurare volumus quantum in Domino valemus. Memento etiam quod non illaudabiliter se excusavit ab officio predicationis ille, qui dixit:¹⁸⁴ “*A, a, a, Domine, ecce nescio loqui,*” et cetera.

¹⁷² laborem.

¹⁷³ Epist., I, i, 2-4.

¹⁷⁴ spectant.

¹⁷⁵ donant.

¹⁷⁶ ne queras.

¹⁷⁷ epithea.

¹⁷⁸ Horace, *Epist.*, I, xiv, 43.

¹⁷⁹ Horace, *Sat.*, I, 9, 60.

¹⁸⁰ acerrimum.

¹⁸¹ Horace, *Ars Poetica*, 169.

¹⁸² Dig., 4.8.27, par. 2.

¹⁸³ Io. 21:22.

¹⁸⁴ Jer. 1:6.

Capitulum xvi.

Si monachus renuit abbas fieri, quia magis elegit esse in claustro. [fol. 11^r].

Frater karissime, volumus te non latere:¹⁸⁵ non causa alicuius tue voluptatis vel nostre a grege nostro duximus te emittendum, nisi quod attendentes te utilem cure pastorali illi gregi te preficimus. Nec in hoc tue proprie utilitati in aliquo derogamus, set pocius nos dare credimus occasionem incrementi tue saluti, dum uberius merendi tribuimus oportunitatem. Cum enim "plurimorum utilitas unius utilitati preferenda sit," ut in canonica reperitur scriptura,¹⁸⁶ cui in hoc et humana iura adstipulari leguntur, plus meriti consequendum restat in exsecutione¹⁸⁷ maioris boni quam minoris.

Jacob servivit pro Rachele pulciori, set tamen sterili et minori filia. Nichilominus tamen postquam pro ea servivit, data est ei Lya, que "laboriosa" interpretatur, fecunda tamen et maior. Post quam acceptam tandem alio interveniente septennali servitio accipere meruit et minorem. Maius est ergo, et prius, ut activam vitam, laboriosam prelationem et fecundam accipias, qua multos generes et lucrifacias Christo. Sicque melius per hoc utramque habebis, neutra enim excludit reliquam, set dum illa precapienda est concinnius sub eodem marito Jacob, "Deum vidente," ambe sese amplectuntur, quia sunt sorores.

Abraham in spelunca duplici uxorem suam fecit sepeliri quia, qui carnalia et spiritualia studet sepelire, non tantum veterem hominem sub contemplationis ocio debet operire, set et totum sub negotiorum caritativorum virtuosa operatione penitus examinare.

Dictum est Job, "viro tocius perfectionis:"¹⁸⁸ "*Ingredieris in habundancia sepulcrum, sicut infertur acervus tritici in tempore suo.*" Et te ergo ingredi volumus in sepulcrum, quo te totum mundo sepelias, ut in Christo vivas resuscitatus in habundancia bone operationis per activam vitam in prelatione, sicut infertur acervus tritici in tempore suo. Triticum enim seminatur, hoc est verbum Dei, et doctrine spiritualis pluvis irrigatur, incrementum per effectum suscipiens in bonis operibus in ordine nostro. A paleis per triturationem triticum separatur, dum increpationis debite correctio disciplinalis paleam purgat viciorum et granum virtutum purum Domino facit apparere. Set et te ipsum necesse est esse triticum, illatum in tempore suo, temetipsum per bonorum operum inchoationem [et]¹⁸⁹ scientiarum [fol. 11^v] incrementum in actibus suscipientem, tamquam pluvia gratie altissimi irrigandum, sic[que] tritrandum usque ad purum.

Scire etiam debes quod, cum necesse habeas nobis obedire in hac parte, tu te non mutas, set a nobis¹⁹⁰ mutaris; non ascendis, set a nobis erigeris. Nam optime scriptum est:¹⁹¹ "Non mutat sedem, qui non mutat mentem, cum quis scilicet non avaricie aut¹⁹² dominandi causa, aut proprie delectationis, set utilitatis et necessitatis respectu mutatur."

Restat igitur tibi parendum, quia obediencia victimis preponitur eo quod, ut asseverat Gregorius:¹⁹³ "Per victimas aliena caro, per obedienciam vero propria voluntas mactatur, et peccatum ariolandi est nolle acquiescere." Unde et subiungit Gregorius: "Sola est, que fidei meritum possidet, obediencia sine qua quisquis infidelis esse convincitur, licet fidelis esse videatur."

¹⁸⁵ MS inserts *quod*.

¹⁸⁶ Pelagius, in Gratian, C. 7 q. 1 c. 35.

¹⁸⁷ excusatione.

¹⁸⁸ Job 5:26.

¹⁸⁹ In MS *et* follows *scientiarum*.

¹⁹⁰ MS inserts *a nobis*, probably a scribal repetition.

¹⁹¹ Pelagius, in Gratian, C. 7 q. 1 c. 35.

¹⁹² autem.

¹⁹³ Gratian, C. 8 q. 1 c. 10.

*Capitulum xvij.**De priore creando, vel subpriore, vel aliis huiusmodi.*

Refert hystorie veritas¹⁹⁴ quod cum David cubum Dei in templo ampliaret, ministeria sacerdotum in xxiij^{vo} sacerdotibus divisit. Hinc et Moyses Aaron ex precepto Domini in summum pontificem, filios eius in minores unxit sacerdotes. Postea David, cum ministeria domus Dei ampliaret, ianitores et cantores instituit, et post eum Salomon quosdam officio exorcizandi adduxit. Unde apostoli in Novo Testamento quosdam episcopos, alios presbyteros, alios levitas, temporeque procedente¹⁹⁵ subdiaconos et infra ministros ordinaverunt.¹⁹⁶

Porro eius gratia, a quo omne datum optimum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, non aut¹⁹⁷ humano labore aut industria cultus templi Cysterciensis ordinis hodie valde ampliatus est; quia neque qui plantat, neque qui rigat est aliquid, set qui incrementum dat Deus. Et ideo, fratres dilectissimi, cum ego solus ex infirmitatis et imbecillitatis mee insufficiencia non possim sufficere, oportet ut ordinemus vobis priorem in partem sollicitudinis nostre quamvis non in plenitudine potestatis.

Necesse nempe est, ut dum Moyses in monte manus¹⁹⁸ elevat ad celum orando, Aaron, qui¹⁹⁹ eas ei sustentet, ne lassentur quamdiu populus suus pugnat contra Amalechitas, id est "lingentes sanguinem," id est "demonēs insidiantes vite²⁰⁰ hominum." Ecce fratres mei, clamo ad Dominum cum Moyses; non possum solus sustinere populum, et ideo de senioribus, quos ego novi, [fol. 12^r] talem vobis preficio priorem, vel subpriorem, vel aliquem huiusmodi, cui reverenter humiliemini sicut et mihi in hiis, que ad officium suum pertinebunt.

*Capitulum xvij.**De cllerario creando, vel de huiusmodi officialibus creandis.*

Nisi oves, que²⁰¹ suo fecundant agros letamine, indaginis munimine sepiantur, turbine ventorum turbabuntur, et aliarum tempestatum intemperie facile poterunt deteriorari, vagabundeque queritare cogentur refugia necessitatis in dispendium lactis et lane, arescentque ariditate, que indaginis vallatio salubrius procurata preservabit.

Plane etiam nisi exterioris sacci accedat operimentum, subita rebus quantumcumque preciosis ad nundinas dilatis et irreparabilis imminebit iactura, sataque, que propatuli campi libertas pedibus transmeantium exponit sepibus aut maceria sine fossatis non ambita, ex frequentia conculcationis annullabuntur. Et sic seminis iacti iactura procedens pecuniam²⁰² docebit perisse impensam.

Fragilitas quoque edificii ruinam minabitur, nisi suppodiamentorum beneficio occurratur. Porro corpora nostra fragilissima edificia sunt, que oportet fulciri per officiales extrinsecos, quibus debemus quod non corruimus, quamvis dignius et melius videatur edificium quam eius fulcimentum. Ideo, fratres karissimi, ad officium tale talem vocamus virum ut opinamur, quantum humana fragilitas nobis permittit probabilius in eo argumentari ad hoc, secundum doctrinam beati patris nostri Benedicti competentem,²⁰³ ut per eius sollicitudinem et prudentiam, de quo agimus,

194 1 Par. 23:4.

195 procidente.

196 Cf. Dict. Grat., Dist. 21 c. 1, I Pars.

197 autem.

198 manum.

199 quis.

200 vitam.

201 due.

202 penam.

203 *Regula*, c. 31; CSEL 75, 87.

talem nobis instituimus virum, per cuius prudentiam et diligentiam "*promptuaria nostra sint plena, eru[tantia] ex hoc in illud.*"²⁰⁴

Oportet enim ut singula queque locum teneant sortita decenter; singulis viris singula officia sunt commit[t]enda, ut pro varietate personarum, temporum, negotiorum, et locorum, varie variis am[m]inistrationes deputentur ita, ut clericis suum, ayleis suum, assignetur officium prout competentius visum fuerit presidenti, qui typum gerit patrisfamilias precipientis:²⁰⁵ "*alii 'veni,' et venit; et alii 'fac hoc,' et facit.*" Sicut enim alie apes emittuntur ab alveario querere materiam aliis apibus, que intus remanent, mellificandi, e contrario intus manentes ab emissis redeuntibus recipiunt; ita et claustrales in alveario claustr[i] [fol. 12^v] mellificant, libamina orationum, vigiliarum, meditationum, et cetera huiusmodi Domino offerentes, recipiunt tamen quasi materiam mellificandi ab exterioribus officialibus, per quorum sollicitudinem sustentantur favique mellificancium cedunt commodo exeuncium sicut intra manencium.

Nec enim unus solus potest, set nec etiam honestum est, omnia per se dispensare "*Sicut in uno corpore multa membra habemus, omnia autem membra non eundem actum habent:*"²⁰⁶ ita est ecclesia, secundum Apostoli Pauli sententiam. In uno eodemque corpore spirituali conferendum est hoc officium; uni alii commit[t]endum est illud. Sic fuit Ioab super exercitum Israel; set et Banaia filius Ioiade super Ceretheos et Pheleteos; Aduram autem super tributa; Siva²⁰⁷ autem scriba, et sic de pluribus aliis, ut legitur in libro Regum.²⁰⁸ "Sicut enim," asserente Gregorio,²⁰⁹ "varietas membrorum per diversa officia et robur servat corporis, et pulcritudinem representat, ita varietas personarum per diversa distributa officia et fortitudinem et venustatem sancte Dei curie manifestat. Et sicut indecorum est, ut in corpore humano alterum membrum alterius fungatur officio, ita nimirum noxium et turpissimum est, si singula rerum ministeria personis totidem non fuerint distributa." Huic potest addi convenienter illud, supra in iij^o capitulo: "Ecce Augustinus sic loquitur," usque ibi: "Iacob, 'videns Deum,'" et cetera, ad hoc signum.²¹⁰

Et in priorem creandum dicat: Necesse fuit David creare Ioab principem et ducem exercitus milicie David. Milicia autem claustr[i] debet suum habere principem, id est priorem, qui sit Ioab, id est "inimicus inimicis sui exercitus," vel "pater" scilicet sue milicie et defensor. Et teneat vices abbatis in conventu, sicut Ioab vices David in milicia.

Judas pugnaturus contra Chanaan dixit Symeoni,²¹¹ fratri suo: "*Ascende mecum in sorte mea et pugna contra Chanaan;*" contra ergo "commotionem" vel "motum eorum," quod interpretatur Chanaan. Necesse est ut mecum ascendat aliquis in sorte mea, prior scilicet, qui et Symeon, id est "obediens," interpretatur.

Capitulum xix.

Si quis renuerit suscipere officium sibi iniunctum. [fol. 13^r].

Infallibile argumentum est proprie voluntatis sibi contra professionis vinculum reservare, preceptis [a]ut dispositionibus magistri sui refragari. Suasum nimirum est tibi a Iohanne Evangelista:²¹² "*aurum emere ignitum,*" quando ingressus es claustrum et

²⁰⁴ Ps. 143:13.

²⁰⁵ Matt. 8:9.

²⁰⁶ Rom. 12:4.

²⁰⁷ Sema.

²⁰⁸ 2 Sam. 20:23.

²⁰⁹ Gratian, Dist. 89 c. 1.

²¹⁰ Cf. supra, n. 142.

²¹¹ Symoni; cf. Jud. 1:3.

²¹² Apoc. 3:18.

mundum egressus, hoc est sapientiam, que non est ignita ardenti flamma caritatis nisi in fornace obediencie, que exigitur usque ad mortem et sine mora iuxta legis nostre sanctum latorem Benedictum,²¹³ cuius regule observantionem novisti.

Ideoque nunc contradicendo ab apostatione non poteris excusari, cum etiam seculares leges pronunciant: quod semel approbatur, de cetero reprobare non licet, nec potest quis adversus ea venire, que²¹⁴ dilucida voce protestatus est.

Cur tibi non dicam, quod dixit Dominus Ihesus Petro:²¹⁵ "*Cum esses iunior, cingebas te, et discurrebas quo volebas: cum autem senueris, alius cinget te, et ducet quo tu non vis.*" Si mundo senuisti, ut Deo preservas,²¹⁶ sub ferula claustralis magisterii ducam te certe, quo tu non vis. Et ideo precipimus, ut humiliter exequaris, quod necessarium²¹⁷ tibi duximus.

Hiis addantur satis convenienter, que diximus supra,²¹⁸ capitulo xvi^o, "De renuente ut fiat abbas," ubi dicitur: "Frater karissime," [ad] ecce signum.²¹⁹

*Capitulum xx.*²²⁰

Qualiter negare debeat licenciam cedendi prelationi vel officio.

Ieronimo dicente,²²¹ didicimus quod "non mediocriter errat, qui magno bono prefert mediocre." At²²² nulli sani cerebri venit in dubium quin maius bonum sit in officio laborioso quo communis utilitas procuratur, quam in ocio contemplativo, ubi sibi tantum quis vacare conatur, dicente torrentis facundie Claudiano:²²³

"numquam

publice cesserunt comoda private anime."

Vide ergo inde, frater karissime, ne erres, et quidem presumptionem parit contra te non modicam instancia cedendi importuna.

Legimus enim in sacrorum canonum erie²²⁴ quod quinque sunt cause propter quasquamlibet²²⁵ petere quis potest licenciam allevandi se ab officio pastoralis, videlicet debilitas corporis ex infirmitate vel senectute proveniens, [s]et tantum illa per quam redditur impotens ad exequendum officium pastorale. Alioquin frustra fateretur Apostolus se libenter gloriari in infirmitatibus suis. Sunt quidam senes, vel aliter debiles, quos in suo officio moralis [fol. 13^v] maturitas potius suadet permanere, pro quibus dicit Apostolus:²²⁶ "*Quando infirmus sum, tunc forcior sum et po[tens]*," quia nonnumquam infirmitas corporis fortitudinem mentis augmentat. De talibus senibus ait Salomon:²²⁷ "*Corona dignitatis senectus in viis iusticie.*"

Alia causa est defectus scientie circa spiritualium anministrationem necessarie, et circa curam temporalium oportune. Cum videlicet prelatus subiectos docere et procurare teneatur, nec docet eos quid facere, vel quid cavere debent, quia et ipse ignorat quid fugere debeat et quid exercere, cui merito dicitur: "*Tu scientiam repulisti,*

²¹³ *Regula*, c. 5; CSEL 75, 35-38.

²¹⁴ qui.

²¹⁵ Io. 21:18.

²¹⁶ primum es.

²¹⁷ necessarie.

²¹⁸ Fol. 11^r.

²¹⁹ In MS this is a symbol resembling a circle within which two diameters intersect; for its use see *supra*, fol. 9^r, n. 142.

²²⁰ Capitulum ix.

²²¹ Gratian, *De Consecr.*, Dist. 5 c. 24.

²²² aut.

²²³ *De consulatu Stilichonis*, I, 298-299.

²²⁴ Decretales, I.9.10, sec. 3.

²²⁵ quarumquamlibet.

²²⁶ 2 Cor. 12:10.

²²⁷ Prov. 16:31.

et ego repellam [te]." ²²⁸ Quamvis enim non eminens, set competens scientia in pastore desideretur, quia secundum Apostolum:²²⁹ "*Scientia inflat, caritas autem edificat.*" Et ideo imperfectum scientie suplere potest perfectio caritatis.

Tercia causa est malicia subditorum regendorum, cum scilicet adeo rebelles sunt et dure cervicis, ut apud pertinaces nullo modo valeat proficere. Set tanto magis deficiunt quo magis ad eorum laborat profectum, dicente propheta:²³⁰ "*Linguam tuam adherere faciam pallato tuo, quia domus exasperans est.*" Quo casu de licencia superioris non tam timide fugit, ne forte mercenario comparetur, quam pie provideque declinat. Ad hunc etiam casum grave scandalum credimus reducendum pro quo cum aliter sedari non potest, petere potest quidem licenciam cedendi et optinere. Verum inter scandalum et scandalum intuitu acutiori distinguendum est, quod tamen hic non duximus prosequendum.

Quarta causa est persone petentis licenciam irregularitas, utpote bigamia, vel irregularitas pro qua non poterit quis ad ordines promoveri, vel ordines exequi iam promotus. Cumque hodie de constitutione canonica et de celebri consuetudine sit introductum, ut abbates sint presbiteri,²³¹ si consistit de tali irregularitate, vel de alia enormi ex qua scandalum generatur, licencia cedendi potest et debet non immerito concedi. Sunt tamen alie irregularitates, ut puta sitquis non est ex legitimo matrimonio, quas per claustralis religionis assumptionem auctoritate canonum intelligimus purgari, propter quas non oportet petere nec debet superior annuere cessionem, dum tamen in aliis vite merita et strenuitas in actibus virtuosius approbata suffragentur.

Quinta causa est criminis conscientia propter [fol. 14^r] quam²³² cedendi licencia tribui potest postulanti, set tamen illius criminis dumtaxat propter quod officii executio etiam post peractam penitentiam impeditur.

Has quinque causas propter quas potest prelatus debite petere cessionem nominare poteris per hos versus:²³³

"Regula si reprobat,
Si mens mali²³⁴ conscia ledat,
Plebs mala, debilitas,
Minus apta scientia, cedat."²³⁵

Nos autem nullam istarum videmus te iure pretendere posse, quo magis cedas. Unde presumi potest quod pusillanimitate deficias, ut effugas laborem aut imminuentem persecutionem. Aut vanitate torpeas, ut liberius ocio dissolvaris et vaces voluptati, cum ociositas et voluptas arma sint hostis antiqui; (Hinc Ovidius:²³⁶

"Queritis Egist[h]us quare sit adulter?
In promptu causa est: desidiosus erat.")

aut hypocrisis agiteris superficie captans humanam gloriam dum dignitatem abicis, quasi eligas abiectus esse in domo Domini, sive quia times ne humanum favorem perdas quam adhuc simplex claustralis habuisti. Et ideo quasi sub altioris religionis pretextu tuam studes contegere pravitatem.

²²⁸ Os. 4:6.

²²⁹ 1 Cor. 8:1.

²³⁰ Ez. 3:26.

²³¹ Decretales, 1.14.1 (ex concilio Pictavensi [1078]).

²³² quod.

²³³ Cf. rubric in Decretales, 1.9.10.

²³⁴ male.

²³⁵ sedat.

²³⁶ Rem. Amor., 161-162.

Adhuc forsā visus es laudabiliter amministrasse dum hucusque tempore feliciori tibi videtur arrisisse fortuna, et cum iam tempora adversitatis invalescunt, times ne tue imputetur negligencie aut impericie, si quid tibi contingat sinistrum. Set certe reprobis nauta es, qui navis gubernaculum procellis²³⁷ imminentibus deserens naufragii²³⁸ exponit periclitationi, quod in tranquillitate non sine multo exercuit labore.²³⁹ Unde Ovidius:²⁴⁰

"Turpe referre pedem, nec passu²⁴¹ stare tenaci,
turpe laborantem deseruisse navem."

Ille gloriosus martyr Cantuariensis in solida petra, que est Christus, fixus et firmatus, respondisse legitur cuidam episcopo persuadenti ei cedere tempore persecutionis, quo exulavit in Francia sic: "persuades mihi sompnum cum remum teneam."²⁴² Cave, frater, tibi: dampnabiliter enim cedunt quidam, ut molliant [cor]²⁴³ alterius cui latenter et nimis carnaliter favent; [oportet ut efficiant in eo] suscitacionem. Ergo, cave, ne quid fraudulenter fingas, quia "*Spiritus Sanctus discipline effugiet fictum, et aufer[e]t se a cogitationibus que sunt sine intellectu.*"²⁴⁴ Cave, ne voluntas cedendi sit a temptatore suggesta. Oppone te murum pro domo Domini: si adversa minantur, ne sis piger. [fol. 14v] Unde dicitur in Parabolis:²⁴⁵ "*Abcondit piger manum suam sub ascella, et laborat si ad os suum eam convertat.*"

Qui stat, videat ne cadat. Sta in fortitudine, et prepara te ad temptationes. Inconstancie etiam est locum deserere et levitatis non solum viciose pusillanimitatis. Hinc etiam Cato:²⁴⁶ "Forti animo esto cum tempus postulat aut res."

Et gaudere debet vir fortis et constans animi occurrere sibi tempus, quod offert sibi causas et occasiones exercitationis virtuose, quas²⁴⁷ martyrii palmam non dubitatur offerre, etsi [eis] vitam non concedatur auferre. Si Achab petit vineam, ut transeat in ortum oletum, tunc demum nega et resiste cum Naboth usque ad lapidationem (Ovidius)²⁴⁸ quia

"Non²⁴⁹ minor est virtus, quam querere, parta tueri:
Causa inest illic; hic²⁵⁰ valet²⁵¹ artis opus."

Esto domus fundata supra firmam petram quam non impingant flantes venti. Nam secure tibi dico id, quod bono viro Iob dictum est:²⁵² "*Si iniquitatem que est in manu tua abstuleris a te, et non manserit in tabernaculo tuo iniusticia, tum levare poteris faciem tuam absque macula; et eris stabilis, et non verebis.*"

Confortare in Domino, et esto robustus, quia milicia est vita hominis super terram. Unde sicut dixit Alexander^{252a} venerande memorie Londoniensi²⁵³ archiepiscopo,

²³⁷ processis.

²³⁸ nam frangii.

²³⁹ laborem.

²⁴⁰ *Ex Ponto*, II, vi, 21-22.

²⁴¹ passa.

²⁴² Thomas Becket to Gilbert Foliot, Bishop of London, in *Rolls Series* 67, Vol. 5, *Epist.* 124, *Mirandum*. This was quoted by Stephen Langton; B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (2nd. ed., Oxford, 1952), 252, n. 2.

²⁴³ molliantur.

²⁴⁴ Sap. 1:5.

²⁴⁵ Prov. 19:24.

²⁴⁶ *Catonis disticha*, II, 14, 18.

²⁴⁷ que.

²⁴⁸ *AA*, II, 13-14.

²⁴⁹ non.

²⁵⁰ hoc, in Ovid.

²⁵¹ erit in Ovid.

²⁵² Iob, 11: 14-15.

^{252a} Alexander III Londoniensi Episcopo, in *Decretales*, 1.9.1.

²⁵³ Lugdunum.

vopo:²⁵⁴ "Indecens omnino probatur prius solvere milicie cingulum,²⁵⁵ quam cedat victoribus adversitas preliorum.²⁵⁶ Insta igitur sicut bonus miles Christi; in tue sollicitudinis officio persevera, ne dum²⁵⁷ tue quietis desideria queris, tu aliquod talenti tibi crediti detrimentum paciaris."

Vide igitur, ne illud Iezechielis tibi improprium a Domino fuerit sic;²⁵⁸ "*Non ascendistis ex adverso, nec opposuistis vos murum pro domo Israel, ut staretis in prelio in die Domini,*" hoc est in die tribulationis.

Porro quando regimen pastorale suscepisti, te ad illud obligasti. Nunc autem non potes venire adversus obligationem tuam. Melius enim fuerat non suscepisse, quam susceptum deserere, nam turpius eicitur, quam non admittitur hospes. Et cuius finis bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est, ait Boecius.²⁵⁹ "Finis, non pugna, coronat."²⁶⁰ Nam "*qui perseveraverit usque in finem, hic s[alvus] erit.*"²⁶¹ Unde Gregorius:²⁶² "Incassum bonum agitur, si ante vite terminum deseratur, quia frustra velociter currit qui, priusquam ad metas veniat, deficit." Vox quippe apostolici preconis est:²⁶³ "*Sic currite²⁶⁴ ut comprehendatis.*" Recordare improprietatis evangelii:²⁶⁵ "*hic homo incipit [fol. 15r] edificare et non potuit consummare.*" Et vide, ne in illud incideris.

Capitulum xxi.

Ad monachum petentem aliam religionem.

Repete de eis, que supradicta sunt in proximo capitulo ab illo versu, "cave, inquam," et cetera, et adde supra:

Amice, iure dictante accepimus quod ea, que sunt voluntaria a principio, ex post facto fiunt necessaria. Licuit tibi stabilitatem promittere, set promissam non licet dissolvere. Licuit tibi non promittere ab inicio stabilitatem in monasterio, set promissam nullo modo licebit tibi inconstancie aut levitatis aut proprii arbitrii irruptione dissolvere. Nam etsi pennas²⁶⁶ habeas quibus avolare satagas, scias tamen eas ligatas esse nexibus preceptorum maioris tui, sine cuius licencia absque perpetue dampnationis periculo volare non vales.

Contra votum ergo venire contendis, dicente Augustino²⁶⁷ quod "tanto magis voti fraudati auges iniquitatem, quanto minus²⁶⁸ vovendi habuisti necessitatem." Forte sub specie boni falleris: (Versus)²⁶⁹ "Fallit enim viciū specie virtutis." Et umbra fingens tibi quod melius alibi poteris proficere, et prefigis causas probabiles tui profectus. Set Aristotelis²⁷⁰ est positum²⁷¹ quod non oportet, accidit quod non oportet. Quippe cum iam alio translatus esses subdola prevaricationis suggestionem instimulatus, iterum suffunderet tibi immissiones per angelos malos, ut versares in animo delictum quo primam vocationem deseruisti, cum dicat Apostolus:²⁷² "*unusquisque in ea vocatione qua vocatus est, permaneat.*"

²⁵⁴ archiepiscopus.

²⁵⁵ singulum.

²⁵⁶ prelaturum.

²⁵⁷ de.

²⁵⁸ Ez. 13:15.

²⁵⁹ *Consol. Phil.*, III, *Pros.*, xi, 120-123.

²⁶⁰ *Carmina Burana*, LXXVI, 4.

²⁶¹ Matt. 10:22.

²⁶² Gratian, *De pen.*, Dist. 3 c. 17.

²⁶³ 1 Cor. 9:24.

²⁶⁴ currere.

²⁶⁵ Lc. 14:30.

²⁶⁶ *Decretales*, 1.9.1.

²⁶⁷ Gratian, C. 27 q. 1 c. 41.

²⁶⁸ minorem.

²⁶⁹ *Carmina Burana*, LXXI, 42.

²⁷⁰ Aristotile.

²⁷¹ posito.

²⁷² 1 Cor. 7:20.

Et dolens de scandalo, quod generasti per mobilitatis tue discessum inter fratres, vel redire iterum in alterius levitatis impulsu conareris vel dum conatus tuos efficere non valeres, tristis remaneres et paulatim ex tristitia subrepente in accidiam deficeres. Viciū desperationis esset quia tunc error novissimus peior priore. Sicque positum in sua funda non cessaret te hostis rotare usque ad iactum^{272a} in anime tue iacturas eternas, latereturque cum diceretur de te:²⁷³ ecce

“mobilis Esonides vernaque incertiō aura.”

Cave, frater, a laqueo venancium. Scriptum legimus:²⁷⁴ “Habet hostis mille modos nocendi. Conatur namque a principio ruine sue unitatem [ecclesie] rescindere, caritatem vulnerare, sanctorum operum dulcedinem invidie felle²⁷⁵ inficere, et omnibus modis humanum genus pervertere ac turbare. Dolet enim satis et erubescit caritatem, quam in celo voluit habere, homines ex lutea materia constantes tenere [fol. 15v] in terra.” Set audi quod²⁷⁶ dicitur in Iohanne:²⁷⁷ “*ex nobis.*” inquit, “*exierunt quia ex nobis non fuerunt.*” Vere durus est hic sermo et magis conscientie tue relinquendus quam exponendus.

Si vis esse in clauistro, cave, ne levitatis agiteris oestro; anchoram immutabilis et immobilis amoris in fundo fidei et littore spei fige. Si vis, ut navis tua subortas evadat tempestates, forte dicere tibi possum illud Salomonis:²⁷⁸ “*Quare seduceris, fili mi, ab²⁷⁹ aliena, et foveris in sinu alterius?*” Ideo et illud dico tibi:²⁸⁰ “*Oculi tui recta videant, et palpebre tue dirigantur gressus tuos,*” quia “principium finemque simul prudentia spectat” — Cato.²⁸¹ “Illum imitare Deum qui partem spectat utramque” — hoc dicit Claudianus. “Futuris enim casibus prudenter occurrere debemus,” dicit Gregorius.²⁸² “Diu deliberandum est, quod statuendum est semel.”²⁸³ “Diu apparandum est bellum, ut vincas celerius.”²⁸⁴ Et idem:²⁸⁵ “Non convalescit planta, que transfertur.”

Ad hoc: qui scis ut[rum] sustinere possis observanciarum onera et asperitates ad quas tam precipitanter anhelas; unde Oracius:²⁸⁶

“Sumite materia[m] vestris, qui scribitis, equam
viribus et versate diu, quid ferre recusent
quid valeant humei.”

Antequam edifies, sede et computa annon tibi sumptus sufficiant. Porro si locum vis mutare, prius est, ut mutes mentem, nam “celum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt.”²⁸⁷ Ieronimo²⁸⁸ at[t]estante quia “non Ierosolimis fuisse, set Ierosolimis bene vixisse laudabile est.” Et egregio Gregorio²⁸⁹ perhibente quod “non loca²⁹⁰ vel ordines creatori nostro nos proximos faciunt, set nos vel merita bona ei coniungunt vel mala disiungunt.”

272a tactus.

273 Ovid, *Her.*, VI, 109.

274 Pope John, in Gratian, C. 16 q. 2 c. 1.

275 falle.

276 quid.

277 1 Joh. 2:19.

278 Prov. 5:20.

279 ad.

280 Prov. 4:25.

281 *Catonis disticha*, II, 27.

282 Gratian, *Dist.*, 31 c. 1.

283 Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 153. Marginal ascription is to Seneca.

284 Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 148.

285 Seneca, *Epist.*, II, 2.

286 *Ars Poetica*, 39-41.

287 Horace, *Ep.*, I, xi, 27.

288 Gratian, C. 12 q. 2 c. 71.

289 Gratian, *Dist.* 40 c. 4.

290 loco.

"Quelibet occulta loca sine gratia animam salvare non possunt. Nam et Loth electus a Domino in ipsa perversa civitate fuit iustus; in monte peccavit. Set quid paradyso iocundius? quid celo securius? et tamen homo de paradiso, angelus de celo peccando cecidit."²⁹¹

"Omne solum forti patria est, ut piscibus equor,
ut volucris, vacuo quicquid in orbe patet."²⁹²

Mirandum duco quod²⁹³

"nemo, quam sibi sortem
seu ratio dederit seu sors obiecerit, illa²⁹⁴
[contentus vivat.]"²⁹⁵

Heu, heu, quantum homines rerum [in]constancia vertit, nomine, et cetera. Nonne legisti in vitis²⁹⁶ patrum quod non poterat seductor ille antiquus aliter seducere illum fixum in cella heremite²⁹⁷ nisi tandem persuasit²⁹⁸ ei, ut iret ad ecclesiam communionem sanctam semel recepturus, et cum a cella eum eliminasset, obitus sibi posuit laqueos, et demum [fol. 16^r] victus incidit in carnis contagium? Hinc ait Salomon:²⁹⁹ "*Irretivit eum multis sermonibus, et blanditiis labiorum traxit illum. Statim eum sequitur quasi bos ductus ad victimam, et quasi agnus lascivians, et ignorans quod ad vincula [stultus] trahatur: donec sagitta transfigat iecur eius; velud si avis festinet ad laqueum, et nescit quia de anime illius periculo³⁰⁰ agitur.*" Cave ergo, ne tu sis bos ductus, agnus lascivians, et avicula decepta.

Nam ut idem Salomon ait:³⁰¹ "*Sicut avis transvolans de nido suo, sic vir deserens locum suum.*" Si quo paras transire conventus est, homines scias ibi esse sicut hic; si solitudo est, et in solitudine non eris melior vel maior meritis quam hic. Legimus³⁰² quod cum quadam vice solus esset beatus Benedictus, merula contra vultum suum prevolante,³⁰³ gravi impulsu temptationis a spiritu fornicationis est angariatus. Unde Gregorius: In solitudine multa pericula sunt. Cave, tibi, quia, Salomone asserente:³⁰⁴ "*melius est duos esse simul quam unum; habent enim emolumentum societatis sue. Si unus ceciderit, ab altero fulciatur. Ve soli, quia si ceciderit, non habet sublevantem.*" "*Funiculus triplex difficile rumpitur.*"³⁰⁵ Ovidius, de remedio amoris:³⁰⁶

"Semper habe Pylade[n] aliquem, qui curet Horestem."

Ad ultimum tibi proponere volumus magni doctoris Augustini doctrinale preceptum,³⁰⁷ quod suis claustralibus promulgavit in hunc modum: "Vos autem, fratres, exortamur in Domino, ut propositum vestrum custodiatis, et usque ad finem vite perseveretis,³⁰⁸ ac si qua opera vestra mater ecclesia desideravit, nec elatione avida suscipiatis, nec blandiente desidia respuatis, set miti³⁰⁹ corde obtemperetis Domino,

²⁹¹ Gregory, in Gratian, Dist. 40 c. 10.

²⁹² Ovid, *Fasti*, I, 493.

²⁹³ MS adds ea.

²⁹⁴ illi.

²⁹⁵ Horace, *Sat.*, I, i, 1-3.

²⁹⁶ vitas.

²⁹⁷ in cellam heremitam.

²⁹⁸ persuaso ei.

²⁹⁹ Prov. 7:20-23.

³⁰⁰ pericula.

³⁰¹ Prov. 27:8.

³⁰² II *Dialogorum S. Gregorii Magni*, c. ii, PL 66, 132; ed. U. Moricca, *Fonti per la storia d'Italia*, 57 (Rome, 1924), 78.

³⁰³ prevolare.

³⁰⁴ Eccl. 4:9-10.

³⁰⁵ Eccl. 4:12.

³⁰⁶ *Rem. Amor.*, 589.

³⁰⁷ Gratian, C. 16 q. 1 c. 30.

³⁰⁸ perselietis.

³⁰⁹ mitis.

cum mansuetudine portantes eum, qui nos regit, qui dirigit mites in iudicio, qui docet mansuetos vias suas. Ne[c] vestrum otium necessitatibus ecclesie [p]reponatis [cui parturenti si nulli boni ministrare vellent, quomodo nasceremini non inveniretis.]”

Tibi ergo dico illud verbum evangelicum:³¹⁰ “*Vade in domum tuam,*” ne et tu sis unus de quibus dicitur:³¹¹ “*filii quidem intendentes et mit[t]entes ar[cum], conver[s]i sunt in die belli.*”

[Capitulum] xxii.

Si petens cessionem pretextu senectutis, cum tamen adhuc vigeat³¹² in eo [officio] fessus summa cura.

Senectus quam pretendis non te excusat a ministerio tuo, set potius accusat te, ostendens te ideo officio tuo debere esse aptiorem. Unde et non immerito tibi dici potest:³¹³ “*baculus arundineus rex Egypti, super quem si aliquis innisus [fol. 16v] fuerit, confringetur, et perforabit manum innitentis.*” Causa hec, cui credebas te posse inniti, perforat te, dum propter senectutem tuam non debeas dimitti ab officio, set potius ad illud urgeri eo quod dicat “*vir summe virtutis,*” Iob, scilicet “*patientissimus:*”³¹⁴ “*In antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia.*” Salomonis quoque sententia talis est:³¹⁵ “*Exultatio iuvenum fortitudo eorum, et dignitas senum canicies.*” Super quem locum dicit glossa magistralis: tunc civitates bene ordinate, tunc ecclesie res recte aguntur, cum et forciores viribus necessariis rebus necessariis insistent operibus, et seniores maiori prudentia prediti de hiis que agenda sunt salubriter consulunt. Legimus etiam imperatorem dixisse decurioni:³¹⁶ “*Cum decurionatus sponte susceperis honore[m], albo³¹⁷ eximi, licet annosum te esse dicas, non potes.*”

Modice fidei, quare dubitasti? Nonne Helysabeth et ipsa peperit filium in senectute sua? Nonne Sare sterilitas commutata est in fecunditate[m], qua annosa tamquam recurrentibus annis peperit Resum? Unde, frater, tibi dicimus illud Alexandri³¹⁸ ad Londoniensem³¹⁹ archiepiscopum quod “*tucius est hoc tempus, si commissa tibi ecclesia sub umbra tui nominis gubernetur, quam si persone alterius nove et ignote, et in tanto discrimine gubernanda³²⁰ commit[t]eretur, maxime quia³²¹ in te vigor devotionis et fidei etiam corpore senescente non deficit, set urgente deorsum conditione corporea forcior spiritus in sublimiora consecidit.*”

[Capitulum] xxiii.

Si fuerit ita senex quod iam inutilis est ad fungendum officio suo.

Scitis, fratres, quod vir venerabilis qui in presencia est, [canus]³²² N., nostra non indiget commendatione, quia titulum sue commendationis luculenter secum gerit ex continua strenuitate dignarum actionum, tamquam micante nitore³²³ depictum. Nunc autem quia ex humane fragilitatis conditione invalescit [fol. 17r] in eum imbecillitas, et sustentari necesse habet de cetero qui alios laudabiliter solebat sustinere,

³¹⁰ Matt. 9:6.

³¹¹ Ps. 77:9.

³¹² videat.

³¹³ Cf. Gratian, C. 23 q. 3 init.

³¹⁴ Iob 12:12.

³¹⁵ Prov. 20:29.

³¹⁶ Cod. Just., 10.32.3.

³¹⁷ ab illo.

³¹⁸ Decretales, 1.9.1.

³¹⁹ Lugdunum.

³²⁰ gubernandi.

³²¹ quod.

³²² Not clear in MS.

³²³ nimio.

dignissimum censemus, ut de cetero iure immunitatis tamquam bene meritis debeat libere gaudere, in qua vocantem Dominum expectat sub sancte pacis et ocii libertate. Civilia quidem iura³²⁴ post xx^{ti} annorum stipendia cum fame integritate militem absolvunt veteranum, et ad publica privilegia immunitatis veteranis concessa transmutant. Etati³²⁵ quoque lxx annorum iura nichilominus tribuuntur³²⁶ immunitatis. Sic et ei, qui perpetua valitudine detinetur, leges imperatorie largiuntur vacationem.

Hinc est quod cum senuit Ysaac et oculi eius caligaverunt, ut primogenitum substitueret in patriarchatum, cui etatis defectu suadente [eum] renunciari duxit, primogenitum ad patriarchatum vocavit benedictionis sollempnitate, a quo se dixerat eximendum.³²⁷ Idcirco illum patrem, nostrum N. venerandum, absolvimus, ut tamquam alter Berzelay impotens ascendere in Iherusalem eo quod fuerit octogenarius revertatur et moriatur in civitate sua, id est in claustris sue quietis. Et sicut ipse Berzelay prebuit alimenta regi David dum moraretur in castris, ita et iste vobis prebeat alimonias orationum, qui quidem interpretatur "ferrum meum," hoc est duricies virtuosa retundens impulsus viciorum.

Capitulum xxiii.

Si debeat alicui concedi cessio ab officio prelationis sue honeste, tamen ne credatur pro culpa sua.

Importuna³²⁸ Chananea quasi per instantem improbitatem tandem meruit audiri, et licet clauso ostio et pueris cum amicis exeuntibus, clamans tamen tres partes meruit ab amico recipere importunus. Legitur etiam in lege secularium principum imperatorem dixisse: ad nimiam inhiationem querulancium multociens non concedenda concedimus. Porro ecce in medio est, qui dudum non destitit clamare post nos, ut eum dimitteremus, et cum crebris exhortationibus moveri, [fol. 17^v] blandis precibus flecti, et iustus etiam minis ab importunitate sua non valeat revocari, nos quasi tedio victi pocius dissimulamus quod cedat quam libere annuamus, eo quod invitum qui servat, idem facit occidendi.

Veremurque, ne cum illud tangat Salmonis:³²⁹ "*Occasiones querit qui vult recedere ab amico.*" Unde opinamur tucius esse, ut sibi relinquatur quam ulterius contra pertinaciam³³⁰ suam reluctantem compellatur, quia sicut scriptum est:³³¹ "*Coacta servicia Deo non placent,*" propter quod dicit psalmista:³³² "*Voluntarie sacri[ficabo] tibi.*" Scriptum est:³³³ "*enim quod quis non eligit, nec optat, profecto non diligit;* quod autem non diligit facile contempnit. Nullum ergo bonum nisi voluntarium. Idcirco et Dominus non ferendum in via baculum precepit per quod ulli violencia inferatur." Ambrosius:³³⁴ "*Voluntarium sibi militem eligit Christus, voluntarium sibi servum dyabolus auctionatur.*"

Quia si invitus³³⁵ detineretur, posset [ali]quid deterius evenire; quia et "invite nupcie," ut ait Alexander,³³⁶ "infelices solent exitus sortiri;" idcirco te, frater, ad presens quamvis inviti et dolentes, tue super hoc relinquimus voluntati. Ut autem occurramus, prout decet et sicut debemus, dentibus detrahencium quorum os male-

³²⁴ Cod. Just., 5.65.1.

³²⁵ Etas.

³²⁶ tribuit.

³²⁷ eximundum.

³²⁸ Cf. Jerome, in Gratian, De pen., Dist.

1 c. 58.

³²⁹ Prov. 18:1.

³³⁰ pertinenciam.

³³¹ Dict. Grat., C. 23 q. 6 c. 4, sec. 1.

³³² Ps. 53:8.

³³³ Nicholas I, in Gratian, C. 20 q. 3 c. 4.

³³⁴ Gratian, C. 15 q. 1 c. 10.

³³⁵ invictus.

³³⁶ Decretales, 4.1.14.

dictione et dolo plenum est, quia [propter] venenum aspi[dum] sub la[biis] eorum de magnis maiora loquuntur, eo quod

"de veris fama addere falsa

gaudet, et e minimo sua per mendacia crescit,"

(hec Oracius)³³⁷

volumus omnibus inno[te]scere quod nulla causa ignominiosa nobis constat de eo, per confessionem aut probationem, sive per facti evidenciam, propter quam sustinemus, ut cedat. Set quia tantum in hac pertinaci et inadibili voluntate cedendi irrefragabiliter obduratus inexortabilem se prorsus reddens, suam etiam nobis invitis et quantum potuimus renitentibus paravit ultroneam cessionem [fol. 18^r] et ideo ei cedenti cedimus, (Ovidius)³³⁸ quia

"dum furor in cursu est, currenti cede furori;

difficiles aditus impetus omnis habet."

Et nota quod hoc, quod sequitur in proximo [capitulo], notabile est in abbatum depositione vel amotione ab abbaciis suis.

Lex equidem humana³³⁹ triplicem signanter designat missionem: ignominiosam, videlicet quando miles ob aliquam culpam suam ignominiose mittitur ab exercitu et stipendiis militaribus et etiam ab ordine militari. Quo casu miles dismissus exauctoratur, id est insignia militaria ei detrahuntur et inter infames deputatur. Est et alia missio causaria, que scilicet propter valitudinem militem solvit, aut ob aliam causam et manifeste necessariam causam. Est et honesta missio, que videlicet emeritis vel antequam emeriti sint ab imperatore indulgetur. Honesta igitur missione, hoc est dimissione, hunc licet stipendiis nondum emeritum quamvis multum meritum dimit[t]i dissimulamus.

Incipit Distinctio II^a

Capitulum i.

Qualiter monachus concessus in abbatem petere debeat licenciam ab abbate suo.

Hucusque fui³⁴⁰ filius vester, licet tamen prodigus, aliter filius dici possim non immerito extitisse et unus minimus tum fratrum qui nec sum dignus solvere corrigiam calciamenti alicuius vestrum, et potius debeo censi ille frater, qui natus est de ancilla superbiente quam qui de libera, qui et quales estis vos. Unde vereor, ne sub quo aridente temporali blandimento a sanctorum consorcio vestro me divine manus eiecerit ultionis, quia cici precipitur et ancilla et filius eius; non enim erit heres filius ancille cum filio libere.

Forsan enim divina providencia, que omnia disponit suaviter [et] at[t]ingit³⁴¹ a fine usque ad finem fortiter, me tam sancte sortis quam vos eligistis cum Magdalena novit indignum. "Nesciente homines," iuxta Salomonis sententiam,³⁴² "utrum amore vel odio dignus sit." Heu me ! quia ecce cum Saule³⁴³ non frustra dicere potero: [fol. 18^v] "Numquid [non] filius Iemini ego sum de minima tribu Israel [et] Beniamin."

Numquam Saul inter prophetas, numquid ego inter abbates: ego spurius et manzer

³³⁷ Properly, Ovid., *Met.*, IX, 137-139.

³³⁸ *Rem. Amor.*, 119-120.

³³⁹ *Dig.*, 3.2.2; 49.16.13.

³⁴⁰ fuit.

³⁴¹ atinge.

³⁴² *Eccl.* 9:1.

³⁴³ 1 Sam. 9:21.

filius inter patres legitimos; ego servus dignus dampnari in metalla et dignus addi metallis inter dominos reverendos; ego fatuus, imo, ut ita dicam brutus, vel brutum inter sapientes, qui ecce "*a. a. a. Domine nescio loqui.*"³⁴⁴ "*Timor et tremo[r] venerunt super me.*"³⁴⁵

Ne forte ista exaltatio sit mihi in ruine humiliationem et honor iste honeri³⁴⁶ non honori, (Versus)³⁴⁷ quia

"non honor est set honus species lesura ferentem,"³⁴⁸

et scriptum legi quia quantus gradus altior, tanto casu gravior, verumptamen quidquid sum, et quidquid ero, quantum in me est, semper me vestrum filium reputabo et fratrem in Christo Ihesu.

Quia etsi oportuerit me commori vobis, non vos negabo. Neque mors neque vita separabit me a caritate huius sancte universitatis. Set nunc angelorum amplexu spirituali communem universitatis et singulorum me servum tocius devocionis polliceor ob noxietate, et licet me quandoque corpore contingat absentari, toto tamen corde vobis et vobiscum remaneo incorporatus. Affectus cum aspectu numquam recedit; locorum distance aut temporum intervalla animum meum ab unitate mea numquam separare valebunt. Brachiis stringentis discretionis et fovendis sinu caritatis vos mihi intexui, et teneo longoque tenebo in eo, qui facit utraque unum, qui est lapis angularis, per quem et in quo multitudinis credencium est cor unum et anima una. Et quia, ut dicit Salomon:³⁴⁹ "*Exultat gaudio pater iusti; qui sapientem genuit letabitur in eo,*" supplico affectuosius vestre universitati, que tamquam pater me genuit in hac [fol. 19^r] domo matre mea quatinus oretis pro me ad Dominum ut sic me dignetur aptare officio mihi indigno commisso. Verba sunt Salomonis³⁵⁰ quod "*gaudeat pater meus et mater mea, exultet que me genuit.*" Ne vituperetur ministerium vestrum, et morem mihi gerentes tamquam vestrum specialem me semper memoria recenti comprehendatis.

Capitulum secundum.

Qualiter concessus abbas captare debeat benivolenciam conventus.

Audite me, viri Sichem, ita ut audiat vos Deus. Viri inquam laboriosi, nam et Sichem interpretatur "labor" vel "humerus." Audite me et exaudiet³⁵¹ vos in humero vestro me subportantes, quia emulor vos Dei emulatione. Officium cuilibet inter vos invitus³⁵² addictus sum; ad honorem Dei, et sancte ecclesie, et huius monasterii, et singulorum vestrum necnon et utilitatem valeam exercere. Nec enim per me vel ex me sufficio tanto regimini, cum non dubitem plures inter vos meliores et ydoneiores morum venustate, scientie fecunditate, et providencie circumspectione fulgere. Insufficienciam meam plane et plene confiteor, et nisi libenter sufferetis me insipientem, cum sitis ipsi sapientes, nichil restaret³⁵³ mihi nisi prorsus succumbere sub hoc honore tamquam mihi per me importabili.

Set quia, ut ait Salomon,³⁵⁴ "*ferrum ferro exacuitur, et homo [ex]acuit faciem amici sui,*" dum scilicet sese mutua invicem amicorum exercent consilia, rogo vos in Christo

³⁴⁴ Jer. 1:6.

³⁴⁵ Ps. 54:6.

³⁴⁶ honesti.

³⁴⁷ Ovid, *Her.*, IX, 31; *Carmina Burana*, CLVa, 220.

³⁴⁸ ferentis, in Ovid; ferentes, in *Carm. Bur.*

³⁴⁹ Prov. 23:24.

³⁵⁰ Prov. 23:25.

³⁵¹ exaudite.

³⁵² invictus.

³⁵³ restauret.

³⁵⁴ Prov. 27:17.

Ihesu quo in officio meo purgante consiliorum vestrorum abstersione rubiginem quam in me videritis vicior[is] et hebecioris ruditatis.

Vel aliter brevis: Si quid in me reprehensibile videritis, lima debite correctionis vestre amicabile, dico dissuasione et dulci persuasione, auferre studeatis. Ego enim me totum do vobis, ut sicut vestro preficior regimini, ita et me totum regere velitis. Simus igitur in Domino [fol. 19^v] cor unum et anima una in Christo Ihesu. Nam etsi capitellum sum, vel columpna, sine vobis tamen erectus nequeo, quia vos estis mee sustentacionis. Exemplum eius sequem, cuius actio nostra est lectio, quem vocant Magistrum et Dominum qui benedicunt: ecce "*ego in medio vestrum sum, tamquam qui ministrat*,"³⁵⁵ iterea ergo, qui est trinus et unus, alpha et o[mega].

In unitate Sancti Spiritus simus unum inseparabilitate unanimi. Magis enim erimus insuperabiles, si fuerimus inseparabiles. Dictum est ab Innocencio secundo subditis suis:³⁵⁶ "Cui manus porrigo, eas vobiscum porrigo, cui porrigo mecum porrigite."

In hoc igitur, et in aliis iuste audite me, viri Sichem, ut Deus audiat vos et exaudiat in die tribulationis. Amen.

Capitulum idem.

Rediens abbas ad domum aliquando in qua sumptus est, sic poterit ordinare.

Eo iocunditate mens exilaratur [et] serenitate videntis amicum quo estuantis desiderii effectum. Magis invidia procrastinaverit impedimenta negotiorum, et dum mora visionem moraretur optatam, angustior turbabatur spiritus rumpere repagula more satagens set irruptione frustrata, presertim cum animo desideranti nichil satis acceleretur, quia longa mora est nobis omnis, que gaudia differt. Nempe teste Salomone:³⁵⁷ "*Spes que differtur affligit animam; et lignum vite desiderium veniens.*" Ecce cum Apostolo³⁵⁸ dico: "*nolo vos ignorare, fratres: quia sepe proposui venire ad vos (et prohibitus sum usque adhuc) ut aliquem fructum habeam in vobis,*" fructum inquam dulcis collacionis et visitationis ut spirituali delecter et recreer refectione.

Quantumcumque me temporum aut locorum disiungunt intervalla, semper tamen animo quasi vobiscum remanens huc mea vota reflectit, et ad locum istum meos, quocumque loco fuerim, retorquet aspectus secum ingemens, quia "*hec requies mea in se[culum] seculi; hic habi[tabo], qu[oniam] e[ligi] eam.*"³⁵⁹ Nempe locus mee nature est natale solum [fol. 20^r] aut nempe locus iste locus nativitatis mee est, cuius memoria mihi in benedictione est, et eius qui me genuit genetricis nullatenus possum oblivisci. Et hoc est quia nescio qua natale solum dulcedine cunctos ducit et immemores non sinit esse sui, quomodo autem immemor essem matris mee, istius inquam domus que me peperit patri meo, Domino Ihesu Christo?

Absit ut ita homine exuto³⁶⁰ brutum induam quod nature [mee] me declinem [a] recordatione³⁶¹ quia "*naturam expellas furca, tamen inde recurret.*"^{361a} Videamus quia lepus, aut canis, aut avicula, si solvi eam contingat, regressu celeriori consueta educationis sue loca qualibet postposita repetunt interruptione. Licet autem cuiusdam dignitatis pretextus, qua nomen abbatis mihi indigno positum est, videatur mihi recompensare [cum] magni nominis et honoris instauratione³⁶² dis-

³⁵⁵ Lc. 22:27.

³⁵⁶ Gratian, C. 35 q. 9 c. 5.

³⁵⁷ Prov. 13: 12.

³⁵⁸ Rom. 1: 13.

³⁵⁹ Ps. 131: 14.

³⁶⁰ hominem exutus.

³⁶¹ recordationis.

^{361a} Horace, *Ep.*, I, x, 24.

³⁶² instaurationem.

pendium separationis, qua meo numine sum avulsus, arctum semper videtur mihi me parte mea carere potiori, dum vos abesse non sine cordis contueor contristatione. At³⁶³ in hoc me spes blande leniens quandoque demulcet, que polliceri mihi videtur se temporis offerre oportunitatem qua totus vobis³⁶⁴ incorporabor, et radicibus ulterius inconvulsis inherebo adeo, ut sola mors corporalis commutationis divorcium valeat celebrare.

Venerande igitur universitatis et singulorum applaudo reverencie in Christo Ihesu exorans, ut me recipiatis in sinum dilectionis vestre omnium et singulorum expositum profectui et honori tota devocione gratulantis spiritus in eo, qui fecit utraque unum, qui vi[vit] et reg[nat], pater et filius in uni[tate] Spiritus Sancti, Deus per infin[itatem] s[eculi] seculorum.

Amen.

Capitulum iii.

Qualiter recedens a domo in qua ipse est abbas pro aliquo negotio magno licenciam debeat accipere.

Instantia mea cotidiana sollicitudo huius domus est specialis, que dum cotidie in diversa me [fol. 20^v] distra[h]it noctes affert insomnes, et dies reddit laboriosos. Dumque labore meo consummato quantulumcumque pausula spero respirare, ecce repente me rapit a preconcepta requie negotii novi occupatio novo comitata labore. Sicque "dumque sitim³⁶⁵ sedere cupit, sitis altera crevit,"³⁶⁶ quia vere homo natus [est] ad laborem.

Insufficientem enim et cura et circumspectione circa etiam minima expedienda me reputo, quia cum omnia fecerim, servus inutilis sum, set spero in retributore omnium bonorum quia "placent munera ab offerente," ut ait Gregorius,³⁶⁷ "non offerens a muneribus, qui cor respicit." Non manum, id est exteriorem operationem, ut ait Augustinus quod licet effectus meus modicus sit, non contempnet tamen affectum, quia "ut desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluntas," dicit Ovidius.³⁶⁸

Ecce itaque, karissimi mei, tali urgente negotio, cogor accingi ad iter; arduum negotium tale et longum restat iter.

Capitulum quartum.

Et si fuerit pro domo propria specialiter addatur hoc capitulum quod sequitur.

Non solum modo ex officio meo teneor prevenire dampnum vestrum, set etiam commodum vestrum augere iuste et honeste. Humane enim ratio legis³⁶⁹ habet, ut si promiserim me nichil facturum quo minus facere possim,^{369a} teneor nichilominus curare, ut facere possim^{369b} quod tibi expedit, et qui non facit quod debet, videtur facere adversus ea, que facere debet. Unde de licencia vestra et favore commendo vos in manus divine gubernationis, et ut verbis utar Apostoli:³⁷⁰ "*Testis est mihi Deus, cui servo in spiritu [meo] in [Evangelio]³⁷¹ Filii eius*], quod sine intermissione memoriam vestri facio et faciam in orationibus meis," rogans vos humiliter in Christo Ihesu, ut mutua vice et vos memoriam mei faciatis.

Scio enim et confido in eo, quod scriptum est:³⁷² "*Longe est Dominus ab impiis, et*

³⁶³ Aut.

³⁶⁴ ovis.

³⁶⁵ situm.

³⁶⁶ Ovid, *Mét.*, III, 415.

³⁶⁷ Gratian, C. 3 q. 7 c. 5.

³⁶⁸ *Ex Ponto*, III, iv, 79.

³⁶⁹ Dig., 50.17.121.

^{369a} possis.

^{369b} possis.

³⁷⁰ Rom. 1: 9.

³⁷¹ in eo quod.

³⁷² Prov. 15: 29.

orationes iustorum exaudiet." Et ego dico [fol. 21^r] vobis cum Samuele:³⁷³ "*Absit a me hoc peccatum, ut cessem orare pro vobis.*" Et ut verbis utamur Apostoli vobis:³⁷⁴ "*Pax fratribus, et caritas cum fide a Deo Patre, et Domino Ihesu Christi.*" Amen.

Nemini quidquam debeatis, nisi ut invicem diligatis. Qui enim diligit proximum, legem implevit.

Capitulum v.

Et si negocium fuerit grande, ut de pace regni, vel magnatorum et potencium, vel aliquid quod non pertineat ad domum propriam, tunc sic inserat hoc, quod sequitur.

Quia nos sumus, qui comedimus peccata populi, [ut] scriptum est,^{374a} hoc est elemosinas pro peccatis oblatas, ideo oportet nos cum populus indiget, pro populo stare, et quantum in nobis est, eius salut[i] procurare, et maxime eorum in quorum salute et pace pax nostra consistit.

Capitulum vi.

Si ex mandato domini pape, vel regis, oporteat ire, addat hoc capitulum sequens precedentibus.

Si de mandato domini pape, sic proloquatur: Vocavit nos ille vicarius Ihesu Christi, successor Petri, cui subdita est tota mundi huius monarchia, quia ei in persona Petri collate sibi claves regni celorum, potestas ligandi atque solvendi plenissima, cui omnis a minimo ad maximum immediate subduuntur. Et ideo obedire volumus, quia tenemur.

Si de mandato regis, sic prosequatur: A domino rege vocati sumus, cuius vocationi resistere non possumus, cum dicat Apostolus:³⁷⁵ "*Ideo necessarie subditi estote non solum propter iram, set et propter conscientiam. Ideo enim et tributa prestatis: ministri enim Dei sunt, in hoc ipsum servientes. Reddite ergo omnibus debita: cui tributum, tributum: cui vectigal, vectigal: cui timorem, timorem: cui honorem, honorem.*"

Nam et canonica constitutio³⁷⁶ interim defert³⁷⁷ honori regio quod episcopus, vel archiepiscopus, vocatus ad concilium excusatur regia preceptione, presertim si rex vocaverit eum ratione communis negotii ad regimen pertinentis. An nescis longas regibus esse manus?

Capitulum vii.

Qualiter rediens post longum tempus alloqui debeat conventum. [fol. 21^v]

Magnificat anima mea Dominum, et exul[tat] spiritus meus spiritali iocunditate in eo, qui de multitudine miserationum suarum reduxit me ad vos, quorum faciem videre desidero; desideravi et[iam] comedere vobiscum pasqua antequam moriar. O, quociens mecum alta ducens suspiria ingemui: quando videbo? putasne durabo? Et ecce misertus mei Dominus, nam dicente Salomone:³⁷⁸ "*Desiderium si compleatur delectat animam.*" Ecce inveni delicias anime mee, filios sapientes, "*qui sunt gloria patris quia coronam senum filii eorum,*" ait Salomon.³⁷⁹ Vos estis filii, qui custoditis legem patris vestri et ideo, Salomone at[t]estante, beati, qui et ait:³⁸⁰ "*Verbum custodiens filius extra perditionem erit.*"

373 1 Sam. 12: 23.

374 Ephes. 6: 23.

374a Alexander, in Gratian, C. 3 q. 1 c. 5.

375 Rom. 13: 5-7.

376 Gratian, Dist. 18 c. 13 (ex concilio Agatensi).

377 differt.

378 Prov. 13: 19.

379 Prov. 17: 6.

380 Prov. 29: 28.

Nunc autem suscipite me, queso, in amplexus affectuosos cordis vestri, sicut et ego vos, et sim vobis filius unus de patribus, de quibus ait Salomon:³⁸¹ "*Gloria filiorum patres eorum.*" Et simul maneamus in eo, qui est trinus et unus. Amen.

Capitulum viii.

Qualiter consulere debeat conventum super aliquo negotio domus sue et eorum postulare assensum.

Sol hominum, Salomon, qui radiis sapientie sue sapientes illustrat, attestatur³⁸² quia "*cogitationes consilii roborantur et gubernaculis tractanda sunt bella.*" Nam sicut alibi docet:³⁸³ "*Dissipantur cogitationes ubi non est consilium. Ubi vero plures sunt consiliarii confirmantur,*" quia "*salus ubi multa consilia,*" eodem asserente Salomone.³⁸⁴ Et quidem lex asserit:³⁸⁵ "Dubium non est omnia, que consilio reguntur iure meritoque et firmitate potiri." Seneca:³⁸⁶ "Consilio vinces melius quam iracundia."

Ecce, fratres et patres, consilio vestro indigemus super tale negotio, quod tale est, et cetera. Et quia negotium vos tangit sicut et me, idcirco necesse est, ut consilium vestrum et favor vester accedat ad alteram partem agendam, quia legitur in lege humana:³⁸⁷ "Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus comprobari debet." Ponatis igitur in uno penso vestre deliberationis quid fugiendum, in alio quid eligendum, eo quod, teste Gregorio,³⁸⁸ futura caute precavenda sunt. Et Salomon:³⁸⁹ "*Oculi tui precedant gressus tuos.*" [fol. 22^r].

Ut supra³⁹⁰ in capitulo quod incipit: Amice iure dictante, et cetera; imperiali enim lege consulente:³⁹¹ "Melius est in tempore occur[r]ere quam post causam vulneratam querere remedium," quia

"sero respicitur tellus, ubi fune soluto
tendit in immensum panda carina solum"

(verba sunt Ovidii.)³⁹² Sapienter sentit Seneca sic:³⁹³ "Citius venit periculum cum contempnitur."

Vos autem seniores estis sensu sicut et tempore familiariusque novistis ad domum istam pertinencia et, ex certis et notis vobis rerum circumstantiis, certius scitis metiri quid honestum et quid tutum, quid utile et quid licitum. Licet autem ego, ob insufficienciam rationis et prudentie, merito debeam inter insipientes censi, in hoc tamen saltem volo fatuitatem declinare, ut vestra expectavi et expectem consilia, quos novi sapienciores, quia, dicit Salomon:³⁹⁴ "*Via stulti recta est in oculis eius. Qui autem sapiens est audit consilia.*" Et iter idem:³⁹⁵ "*Qui cum sapientibus graditur sapiens erit; Amicus stultorum similis efficietur.*"

Capitulum ix.

Qualiter abbas suos alloquitur, quando necesse habet dirigere discretos nuncios pro negotio domus.

Urgente necessitatis articulo tanto fortius³⁹⁶ amminiculo insistendum, in eo quod occurrit agendum quanto necessitas ipsa desiderat instructiorem prosecutionem.

³⁸¹ Prov. 17: 6.

³⁸² Prov. 20: 18.

³⁸³ Prov. 15: 22.

³⁸⁴ Prov. 24: 6.

³⁸⁵ Cod. Just., 5.17.3.

³⁸⁶ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 110.

³⁸⁷ Cod. Just., 5.59.5.

³⁸⁸ Gratian, Dist. 31 c. 1.

³⁸⁹ Prov. 4: 25.

³⁹⁰ Dist. I, cap. 21, fol. 15^r.

³⁹¹ Cod. Just., 2.40.5.

³⁹² *Amores*, II, xi, 23-24.

³⁹³ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 88.

³⁹⁴ Prov. 12: 15.

³⁹⁵ Prov. 13: 20.

³⁹⁶ forciora.

Sane, fratres dilectissimi, tale ad presens nobis emersit negotium ad quod exequentum tales convenit destinare, qui prudenter et fideliter, quod iniunctum fuerit, exequantur, quia quo periculosius res ista negligitur, eo commodius videtur procuranda. Et idcirco de consilio saniori nobis assistencium, N. et N, quos ad hoc credimus ydoneiores, destinamus recolentes quia Salomon ait:³⁹⁷ "*Legatus fidelis, sanitas,*" et idem:³⁹⁸ "*sicut frigus nivis in die messis,*" id est maximi fervoris, "*ita legatus fidelis ei qui misit illum.*"

Ideo misit Iudas Machabeus Eupolimium Iohannis et Iasonem, filium Eleazari, Romam constituere amicitiam cum Romanis. [fol. 22^v].

Unde speramus quod vos sitis filii Iohannis, id est eius in quo est gratia, et Iason, id est "factus in mandato," vel qui mandatum fecerit vel desiderans, eo quod desideretis commodum et honorem domus vestre secundum Deum, et quod sitis filii Eleazari, quod interpretatur "adiutorium Dei mei," quibus divinum assistit adiutorium, eo quod estis viri iusti, quorum custodit Dominus omnia ossa. Apud Dominum enim gressus hominis diriguntur, et cetera.

Credimus etiam vos viros fortes et strenuos firmitate fidelitatis, non timentes aut fugientes leonem, aut ursum, in via, aut tempestates, sicut piger de quo Salomon:³⁹⁹ "*Egestatem operata est manus remissa; manus autem forcium parat divicias.*" Speramus etiam vos columbas reversuras in hanc archam vestram, et delaturas ramum olive in ore vestro; nec enim estis corvi cadaveribus insistentes.

Sancta quidem habentur legata, id est nuncia, secundum legem humanam⁴⁰⁰ que prohibet legatos etiam hostium contra ius gentium puniri set liberos etiam in dicto bello abire. Satius itaque est in hoc casu nuncios favorabiles, per quos tucius et commodius res agatur, destinare, quia, Gregorius dicit,⁴⁰¹ "cum is, qui displicet, ad intercedendum mittitur, irati animus ad deteriora provocatur."

Ite ergo in pace. Angelus Thobie comitetur vobis,⁴⁰² et perficiat gressus vestros Dominus in semitis suis, a quo diriguntur gressus viri iusti, ut ait Salomon.⁴⁰³

Capitulum x.

Qualiter abbas commendat se orationibus et dilectioni fratrum ibi existencium a quocumque monasterio recedat.

Fratres et patres in Christo dilectissimi, cum exuberanti gratiarum actione huic venerande universitati et singulis de universitate tota me inclino devocione. Vos enim tam benigne me suscepistis, tam copiose exhibuistis, et tam hylari ministerio et sedula officio officiositate circa me sollicitos vos gessistis, ut [videam] discipulos [fol. 23^r] in Emaus euntes, cogentes Dominum cum illis manere, [ut], in vobis reputans presentari Martham iterum, speculer sollicitam [exhibentem] Loth hospitalem liberalitatem.

Scio procul dubio quod pro me non exprobatum vobis in die iudicii a tremendo iudice: "*hospes fui et non suscepistis me,*"⁴⁰⁴ eo quod Apostolo bene obtemperatis precipienti hospitalitatem sectari et necessitatibus sanctorum virorum communicare. Ille, inquam, qui pollicetur ei, qui recipit prophetam in nomine prophete, eum accepturum mercedem,^{404a} vobis retribuat eterne retributionis.

³⁹⁷ Prov. 13: 17.

³⁹⁸ Prov. 25: 13.

³⁹⁹ Prov. 10: 4.

⁴⁰⁰ Dig., 50.7.18.

⁴⁰¹ Gratian, C. 3 q. 7 c. 5.

⁴⁰² vobiscum.

⁴⁰³ Prov. 20: 24.

⁴⁰⁴ Rom. 12: 13.

^{404a} Matt. 10: 41.

Igitur de cetero sciatis me esse vobis gratanti voluntati ad antidota obligatum, id est dona contra dona, id est remuneracionem. Verbum legis est;⁴⁰⁵ et ubi se locus et tempus obtulerint, gratum accepti beneficii et memorem ad honoris et utilitatis vestre incrementum me paratum reperietis et diligentem. At⁴⁰⁶ sicut corporis mei pabula honorifice pavistis, ita refectioni [non] esuriets anime mee per orationum alimonias pie in Christo, ut⁴⁰⁷ pro Christo Ihesu intendatis, qui custodiat corda vestra et intelligencias vestras in omni sanctitate usque in diem vocationis vestre. Amen.

Capitulum xi.

Qualiter commendet abbas personam benefactoris et iniungat orationes pro eo.

Si iuxta Veritatis doctrinam orandum vobis est pro persequentibus et calumpniantibus vos, et etiam eis benefaciendum, dicente Domino, vel eiusdem Veritatis tuba clangente:⁴⁰⁸ "*Diligite⁴⁰⁹ inimicos vestros; benefacite eis qui oderunt vos,*" quanto magis hii, qui vos diligunt et benefaciunt vobis verbo et opere, suorum beneficiorum nexibus [vos] ad orandum pro eis astruxerunt et [vos] debitores in hoc et ad hoc procul dubio constituerunt. Immo verius et nos debitores suos per beneficiorum constituimus susceptionem. Ad horum quidem solutionem tanto enixius laborare debemus, quanto conferentis devocio fervencio[r] id persuadere videtur, et beneficia opulenciae se obduci nebula non permittunt oblivionis [fol. 23v].

Ecce inquam, fratres, talis dominus enim et tantus beneficiator noster, qui ariditatem paupertatis nostre humore munificencie sue fecunde rigavit, qui non tantum sua set se totum nobis exposuit et exponit, rogat nos, ut oremus pro eo. Et certe, eo licet tacente, id ipsum clamitant in aures nostras sue munificencie. Rogemus ergo Ihesum Christum, Dominum enim nostrum, retributorem omnium bonorum, ut respiciat eum oculis sue immense pietatis. Det sibi de rore celi et de pinguedine terre habundanciam. Sit uxor eius sicut vitis habundans in lateribus domus sue; filii sui sicut novella olivarum in circuitu mense sue. Longitudinem dierum felicium vitam et misericordiam tribuat ei et concedat omnipotens et misericors Dominus. Amen.

Vel aliter sic: Ecce fratres beatissimi, talis N, qui ordinem nostram sincere diligit, qui se et sua non solum nobis, set etiam toti ordini exposuit et exponit, rogat nos, ut oremus pro eo. Et certe, eo tacente, ipsa eius devocio et liberalitas hoc perorat. Unde commendamus eum orationibus vestris, ut Deus, qui omnia potest, det ei gratiam in presenti et gloriam in futuro. Amen.

Capitulum xii.

Quo plangat abbas abbatem, vel aliquem specialissimum amicum comus sue.

Si David planxit Saulem persecutorem suum, quanto magis lacrimosis planctibus lugubrare debemus et singultibus rumpi suspiriosis, qui tantum, heu, perdidimus amicum. Perdidit David Ionathan amicissimum; Horestes negatur suo carens Pilade; et nos Atropos, invida mors, truculentissima mors, feris omnibus ferior mors, omni virulento bestia venenosior mors, nunc mors mortua nequiter orbavit patre, viduavit amico, consolatore destituit, lumen nostrum eclipticavit, et numerum nostrum [fol. 24r] naturabiliorum infausta sui specie diminuit algorismi.

⁴⁰⁵ Prov. 13: 13.

⁴⁰⁶ Aut.

⁴⁰⁷ et.

⁴⁰⁸ Matt. 5: 44.

⁴⁰⁹ Dilige.

Quis ergo dabit⁴¹⁰ aquam capiti meo? Quis mihi propinabit⁴¹¹ rivum lacrimarum?

“Quis matrem, nisi mentis inops, in funere nati

Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est.

Cum dederit lacrimas animumque repleverit aegrum,⁴¹²

Ille dolor verbis emoderandus erit.” (hec Ovidius)⁴¹³

Sinite ergo sine te ut plangam paululum dolorem meum. Set plangat tota domus ista; plangant singuli. Clamet hec universitas. Clamet et clamitet calamitate repleta, quia, cum Ieremia⁴¹⁴ dico: “*Occidit ei⁴¹⁵ sol cum adhuc esset dies.*” Lamentetur cum eodem Ieremia, et eiulatu Roboam dicat:⁴¹⁶ “*Abstulit magnificum meum Dominus de medio mei: vocavit adversum me tempus ut contereret electum suum.*” Plangat cum Noemi orbata marito et filiis et clamet. Ne vocetis me Noemi, id est pulcrum, set vocate me Mariam, id est am[a]ram, quia amaritudine replevit me omnipotens. Meus Cato consilio, meus Achatas fide, meus Ulixes prudentia, sublati sunt. Set sicut Domino placuit, ita factum est.

Sit nomen eius benedictum, licet autem in Rama, id est in excelso, audiri debeat. Ploratus ex nobis et ululatus multus et fontes lacrimarum a cordis venis erumpentes cathartas operire debeant oculorum, ut fletus affluentia genarum generet sq[ua]lorem.

Non tamen contristemur de nostro dormiente sicut et ceteri, qui spem non habent. Legitur enim in canone⁴¹⁷ quod non flevit Dominus Lazarum mortuum, set ad erumpnas huius vite [ploravit] resuscitandum. Ceterum eo gaudio humanum compensemus dol[or]em de tanti viri absentia, quod de nostro cuneo tantus et tam fortis migravit ad gaudia paradisi. Er argumentemur in hoc pro nobis spem concipientes forciozem, quod si exemplo huius hic militemus, ad celestia stipendia eterni regis transferemur, et oremus pro eo, quamvis pie [fol. 24v] presumamus quod oblationes et orationes pro eo facte sint gratiarum actiones, ut, cum venerit in regnum suum, concedat Dominus eum apud ipsum nostrum esse intercessorem. In oppressione nobis fuit alleviator, in desolatione consolator, in indigentis munificus amministrator, et in omnibus defectibus officiosum presto prebere supplementum.

Capitulum xiii.

Qualiter exordiat, cum necesse habet aliquam constitutionem immutari.

Luculenter lippis patere potest quia expedit hanc constitutionem immutari, eo quod observata multum afferat oneris et nichil honoris aut utilitatis temporalis aut⁴¹⁸ spiritualis. [Si] quis enim ab inicio sui rationem habuerit qua introduci meruit, cessante tamen causa cessare debet quod urgebat. Sic enim cum prohibitum fuisset quia neophiti fierent prelati, ne superbia extollerentur, tamen teste Ambrosio:⁴¹⁹ “Si non deest humilitas competens sacerdocio, ubi causa non adheret, viciu[m] non imputatur.” Sic et propter abusionem potestatis testantur iura canonica⁴²⁰ constitutionem immutatam fuisse, qua constitutum fuit quod principibus catholicis represen-

⁴¹⁰ det.

⁴¹¹ propinet.

⁴¹² harum.

⁴¹³ Rem. Amor., 126-130.

⁴¹⁴ Jer. 15: 9.

⁴¹⁵ enim.

⁴¹⁶ Lam. 1: 15.

⁴¹⁷ Gratian, C. 13 q. 2 .c 28 (ex concilio Tolletano).

⁴¹⁸ autem.

⁴¹⁹ Gratian, Dist. 61 c. 9.

⁴²⁰ Gratian, Dictum post Dist. 63 c. 27.

tabantur electiones episcoporum, ut eorum auctoritas accederet ad maiorem tuicionem contra hereticos ecclesie Dei, in [contrariam] constitutionem. Sic et propter exempli perniciem constitutio bene debet immutari, ut factum est de eneo serpente quem Deus iusserat fieri per Moysem, ne populus repentina morte interiret, quem, cum populus colere cepisset et venerari, Ezechias successor Moysi confregit, excelsa dissipavit, statuas contrivit, et luctos succidit. Et nunc multa hodie que humilitatis et devocionis causa instituta fuerunt in ordine Cisterciensis, quia vertuntur in perniciem exempli, et generative sunt curiositatum et dissolutionis, mutarentur per contrarias constitutiones quorum exempla subprimo relinquens ea indagini presidencium et custodum vinee Domini Sabaoth. Ratione et causa maioris [fol. 25^r] utilitatis bene debet immutari constitutio, et ideo si de assensu nostro communiter procedat, ut potius sit immutatio tocius universitatis quam mea, hanc constitutionem immutemus. Sic enim ait a[u]ctoritas:⁴²¹ "Incommutabilis idemque semper existens Deus atque summa natura sepe sua in sacris litteris legitur mutasse promissa, et pro misericordia temperasse penitenciam. Un[de] licet sit incommutabilis et impassibilis, crebro tamen eius et iuramenta et penitencia mutantur."

Capitulum xiiij.

Qualiter abbas recipit et commendat aliquem magnum prelatum coram conventu suo.

Fratres karissimi, congratulamini hodie mihi, quia ecce venit David in Nobe ad Achimelech sacerdotem, et obstupuit Achimelech. Iste noster David, noster vultu desiderabilis, quem videre desideravimus, quia est noster David, noster manu[s] fortis, eo quod in forti manu opponit clipeum defensionis pro nobis verbo et opere, et in manu munifica nobis porrigit frequenter solacia sue largitatis. Venit, inquam, in nostram Nobe, id est in hunc nostrum latratum vel inter nos latrantes, qui tamquam canes vigiles latrare tenemur orando pro amicis et corripiendo et corrigendo fratres ad invicem. Set venit ad Achimelech, scilicet fratrem suum, regem regentem qualitercumque utpote indignum regimine istum exercitum Domini Sabaoth: vos, fratres, dico.

Igitur, plena devocione agimus tanto Helye gratias, qui dignatus est declinare in iugurium huius pauperis vidue in Sarephta Sidoniarum,⁴²² in hanc scilicet tribulationem nostram; panis Sidoniarum⁴²³ inquam, quia in hac venatione⁴²⁴ meroris et tristicie, ve, penitencias et compunctiones venamur, et venari debemus in hac valle lacrimarum.

Offerimus ergo tibi, venerande pater, mente iocunda et vultu hylari, panes nostre propositionis cum Ach[i]melech et cum vidua hospita Helye quidquid farine continet ydria nostra et quidquid olei in nostro exuberat lechito. Tu, autem, pater, de sancta benignitate tua exemplo [fol. 25^v] eius, qui cor respicit, non manum, qui duo minuta pauperis vidue missa in corbonam omnibus pretulit, quia peribente Ieronimo:⁴²⁵ "Dominus non ea, que offeruntur, set voluntatem respicit offerencium." Et alibi dicitur: exiguum munus, et cetera. Et alibi: Jupiter ut centum taurorum sanguine fuso, sic capitur minimi census amore Deus.

Omnes ergo dicimus: benedictus qui venit in nomine Domini.

⁴²¹ Gratian, C. 22 q. 4 c. 9 (ex concilio Tolletano VIII, c.2).

⁴²² Sidomorum.

⁴²³ Sidomorum.

⁴²⁴ hanc venationem.

⁴²⁵ Gratian, C. 24 q. 1 c. 28.

*Capitulum xv.*⁴²⁶*Iterum, in recessu eiusdem cum licenciat.*

Graciarum quas valemus, non quas volumus, tibi, domine, referimus actiones eo quod tu Ionathas, qui dicitur columbe donum nobis carum super aurum et topaziam, dignatus es venire ad nos morantes Ziph in hac silva propter metum salutis^{426a} et confortare manus nostras in Domino. Hic enim latemus in solitudine germinis, seu floris, vestre conversationis nunc odoriferi in conspectu veri Nazarei, id est veri floridi. Ziph enim germen, vel flos, interpretatur.

Set quanto exilarati sumus ex te columba veniente, nam et sic interpretatur Ionathas, tanto dolemus ea recedente. Verum ut gratia vestra per memorie liberalis affectionem affectuosam recordationem vestre benevolencie nobis reddat presenciam corpore licet absente, suppliciter exoramus. Et sicut scriptum est quod inhiabant Ionathas et David fedus; diligebat Ionathas eum quasi animam suam. Diligas nos in Christo Ihesu te totis visceribus diligentes. Et in signum dilectionis pro vobis oramus, et orabimus, quia apud nos non est nisi pugilus farine et lechitus olei.

*Capitulum xvi.**Qualiter commendat abbas Cystercii in generali capitulo episcopos aliosque magnates, qui venerant ad capitulum generale.*

Ecce, fratres dilectissimi et patres venerandi, facta sunt encennia vestra hic in nostra Iherusalem, innovationes scilicet quas singulis annis convocatis patribus iuxta sanctam patrum nostrorum sanctionem prosequitur ordinis Cistercii observancia, que gratia altissimi cum Salomone templo Domini edificato [et] cum gratiarum actione spirituali exultans iocunditate dicat ad Dominum:⁴²⁷ "*Edificans edificavi domum in habitaculum* [fol. 26^r] *firmissimum solum tuum in sempiternum.*"

Videtis autem quante humilitatis et devocionis gratia ducti ad hec encennia vestra convenerunt viri nobiles, N. et N., et cetera, ut merito dicere valeamus hoc, quod scriptum legitur in libro Regum:⁴²⁸ "*Regina Saba audita fama Salomonis ingressa est Iherusalem cum multo comitatu et diviciis camelis portantibus aromata et aurum infinitum et gemmas preciosas.*" Et nunc dicere possint isti viri virtutum diviciis vernantes cum eadem regina id, quod sequitur in eodem libro Regum sub hac serie verborum: "*Et videns regina Saba omnem sapientiam Salomonis et domum quam edificaverat et cibos mense eius et habitacula servorum et ordinem ministrancium vestesque eorum et pincernas et holocausti que offerebant in domo Domini, dixit ad Salomonem: 'verus est sermo quem audiavi in terra mea super sermonibus tuis et super sapientia tua et non credebam narrantibus mihi donec ipsa veni et vidi oculis meis et probavi quod media pars non fuit mihi nunciata. Maior est sapientia tua et opera tua quam rumor quem audiavi. Beati viri tui et beati sermones tui,'*" et cetera.

Gloriamur igitur Deum, venerabiles, super presenciam vestra qua tam nos dignati estis honorare. Licet autem omnes unum simus in Christo, habundancioris tamen fervor nostre devotio[n]is [et] specialiter firmitatis nostre, secundum ritum nostrum unitati confederari appetit et spirituali uniri unione, ut quos distinctio conversionis videtur separare, idemptitas spiritus in unanimatatem conformet caritatis. Idcirco spirituali incorporatione vos nobis incorporamus suscipientes vos in gremium nostre

⁴²⁶ In MS this is cap. xvi; there is no cap. xv in the text. I have corrected the enumeration to the end of the Distinction.

^{426a} salus.

⁴²⁷ 3 Reg. 8: 13.

⁴²⁸ Regnorum; cf. 3 Reg. 10.

unanimitatis omnium beneficiorum, que in ordine fiunt ab universitate et a singulis, concedentes vobis pro indiviso plenam communionem, exorantes, ut vos ita de nobis faciatis, sperantes exaudiri ab eo, qui Salomonem exaudivit post templum edificatum eum sic deprecantem:⁴²⁹ "*Cum venerit alienigena et oraverit in loco ho[c] tu exaudies in celo [fol. 26^v] in firmamento habitaculi tui et facies omnia pro quibus invocaverit⁴³⁰ te alienigena (id est secularis vel alterius conversationis) ut discant universi populi nomen tuum timere, sicut populus tuus Israel, et probent quia nomen tuum invocatum est super domum hanc quam edificavi.*" Ipse autem, qui est verus Salomon, rex pacificus, dirigat pedes vestras in viam pacis. Amen.

Capitulum xvii.

Qualiter abbas Cystercii capiet benivolenciam abbatum ad generale capitulum, et loquitur hic de iiij^{or} primis abbatibus.

Edificato templo a Salomone venerunt cuncti senes⁴³¹ ex Israel ad Salomonem in die sollempni, et portaverunt archam Domini sacerdotes. Vos itaque, patres reverendi, senes morum maturitate et scientie amplitudine, qui estis ex Israel, id est "Deum videntibus," venistis, inquam, ad hanc diem sollempnem, quam sollempnizavit nobis sanctorum predecessorum nostrorum auctoritas hic, ubi pascha nostrum debemus simul immolare per mactacionem viciorum cultro correctionis, hic in medio exerto et per virtutum refectionem masticacione et decoctione correctionum, hic in medio ebullencium. Nempe dictum est Petro:⁴³² "*Macta et manduca,*" macta scilicet vicia, et manduca virtutes. Scriptum est in veteri⁴³³ lege sic:⁴³⁴ "*Non poteris immolare Phase in qualibet urbium tuarum, quas Dominus Deus tuus daturus est tibi: set in loco quem elegerit Dominus Deus tuus, ut inhabitet nomen eius ibi.*"

Instructi procul dubio [a] Spiritu Sancto⁴³⁵ statuerunt patres nostri, ut singulis annis celebraretur ista synaxis pro correctione viciorum et virtutum ampliacione, hic Cystercii scilicet; hic enim habitat nomen eius dum cultus religionis nostre, quo colimus eum, [et] celebre epulatur ubicumque diffusus [est] ordo Cysterciensis.

Verum venistis ad Salomonem; verum inquam Dominum Ihesum dico Salomonem, non me. Ego enim potius opprobrium hominum et abiectio minima⁴³⁶ abbatum, qui non sum dignus vocari abbas, novissime tamquam abortivus erectus [fol. 27^r] in eminenciam Cystercii candelabri, qui potius abscondi deberem sub modio, utpote totus tenebrosus, quia oculi mei languerunt pre inopia: oculus videt vite quem prorsus viciorum labes eluscavit, et alter oculus scientie quem ignorancie nubes excecavit. Sicque cecum ducere constituerunt isti viri Israel, isti viri videntes et fateor me producere in foveam ubique casurum, nisi qui a me duci deberent, ducatum mihi preberent ordine ductionis preposterato. Nec enim scire valeo alios regere, qui regimen mei ipsius confundo. Ideoque necesse est, ut compaciimini mihi et supportare me.

Set et o, vos seniores, portate archam Domini, ecclesiam dico universi Cystercii ordinis, ut per vos idem ordo regatur et salvetur. Immittite vectes scilicet fortitudinem iusticie virtuosam, quia fortes habemus iiij^{or} anulos in hac archa nostra firmatos, per quos debet portari, quat[t]uor loquor principales abbates. Elegantes gratia Dei sunt anuli; videatis, ut vectes sint solidi et robusti vectores. Isti, inquam

⁴²⁹ 3 Reg. 8: 41-43.

⁴³⁰ invocaverint.

⁴³¹ senex.

⁴³² Act. 10: 13, 11: 7

⁴³³ nova.

⁴³⁴ Deut. 16: 5.

⁴³⁵ Spiritus Sancti.

⁴³⁶ minimus.

quat[t]uor abbates, sunt iiij^{or} boves, quos dedit Moyses filiis Gerson demum execto tabernaculo cum duobus plaustis, sicut legitur in libro Numeri.⁴³⁷ Quat[t]uor isti boves labore operis et verbi, exempli decore et sollicitudine virgulis circumspectionis trahunt duo plaustra: iusticiam videlicet et misericordiam, in quibus totus vehitur ordo, vel humilitatem et caritatem, in quibus medullitus necesse est ordinem versari, vel sine quibus penitus perverti.

Nos autem omnes filii sumus Gerson, quod interpretatur "advena ibi," vel "advena pupille," filii inquam advene Ihesu Christi, qui pro nobis in hunc mundum peregrinavit, quia regnum eius non erat de hoc mundo. Semetipsum⁴³⁸ exinanivit forma servi accipiens. Hic, hic fuit advena pupille, scilicet sanctissime virginis Marie, advocate nostre, que pauper et [fol. 27^v] pupilla humilis et pusilla autentice scilicet ait: Ecce ancilla peperit nobis hunc advenam nostram redemptorem.

Porro isti quat[t]uor abbates merito possunt dici rationale quadrangulum, quod Dominus precepit Moysi induere inter alias vestes sacerdotales, confectum ex auro hyacinthino, sapientie scilicet elucentis, et purpura humilitatis, et coco bis tincto castitatis, que, quasi bis tingitur, dum in Deum et proximum dilatatur, ha[betur]. O, utinam ego vice sacerdotis merear uti isto rationali ! in quo etiam scripta fuerunt hec duo nomina, manifestatio et veritas: manifestatio per misericordiam, veritas per iusticiam. Et hec sunt duo plaustra de quibus dictum est supra.

Nunc autem, vos, filii Israel, qui huc convenistis, rogo suppliciter, ut me qualem-qualem sustineatis, dirigatis, et regatis.⁴³⁹ In omnibus enim, que secundum Deum fuerint, invenietis me paratum iuxta consilium et auxilium vestrum ordinem fovere Cysteriensem ad honorem Dei et ecclesie sue sancte, et ad animarum salutem necnon et personas singulorum secundum Deum extentis amplexari caritatis lacertis.

Capitulum xviii.

Item in fine. idem ad eosdem.

Cum appropriassent dies dormitionis Moysi, dedit benedictiones filiis Israel. Ecce, fratres et filii Israel, solvi debet et hec nostra synaxis et reversuri sumus unusquisque in domum suam. Iam ego, licet homo et peccator miserrimus, unam benedictionem, quam dedit Moyses filiis Ioseph, precor descendere in vos omnes et singulos, que talis est:⁴⁴⁰ "*Benedictio illius qui apparuit in rubo, veniat super caput Ioseph, et super verticem Nazarei inter fratres suos.*" Ioseph interpretatur "augmentum," vel "filius auctus," et vos merito estis Ioseph, quia adaucti filii de ecclesia Dei vos etiam est[is], qui cum Ioseph fugistis manus Egyptie meretricis. Dimisso pall[i]o temporalia scilicet mundo blandienti et allicienti reliquistis, ut sitis mundi. Ideoque estis Nazarei, id est separati, quia a seculo et a secularibus divisi, de quibus non ab[i]re dici potest illud Mosaycum:⁴⁴¹ "*Hii custodierunt eloquium tuum, et pactum tuum* [fol. 28^r] *servaverunt. Iudicia, Iacob, et legem tuam, o Israel.*" Utinam ita hodie recedatis mundi et mundificati in hac piscina probatica ! in hoc natatorio Syloe, ubi singulis annis convenitis propter ablucionem et mundificationem.

Ite ergo, et custodiat unusquisque vineam suam quam verus sponsus tradidit vobis custodibus. Ipse inquam qui est vitis vera vineam suam vobis tradidit, sicut concinit sponsa in Cantico amoris, in quo est sponsus; custodibus pollicetur mercedem dicens:⁴⁴² "*Vinea mea coram me est. Mille tui pacifici, et ducenti hiis qui custodiunt fructum*

⁴³⁷ Num. 7: 7.

⁴³⁸ semet spiritum.

⁴³⁹ rogatis.

⁴⁴⁰ Deut. 33: 16.

⁴⁴¹ Deut. 33: 9-10.

⁴⁴² Cant. 8: 12.

eius," significans per *mille* perfectionem, quasi diceret pacifici tui sunt perfecti, qui in te morantur et laborant. Habebunt enim perfectam remunerationem eternitatis, in qua nullus erit defectus. Eadem autem perfectio [est], que per *mille* figuratur, et per 'centum' designatur. Unde dicit quod custodibus earum premia duplicabuntur. Ad quam remunerationem perducat vos ille verus paterfamilias, qui non cessat conducere operarios suos in vineam suam, et cetera.

Distinctio III^a continens capitula vnginti

Capitulum primum.

Qualiter abbas exortatur conventum suum imminente visitatione super domum suam.

Ephesis Paulus scribit:⁴⁴³ "*Munde sunt manus mee a sanguine omnium vestrum. Non enim subterfugi quominus annuntiarem omne consilium Dei vobis.*" Ecce, fratres, volo quod sciatis me [paratum esse] sicut hucusque ita et nunc ad plantandum, evellendum, dissipandum, et destruendum, iuxta debitum modum correptionis, increpationis, et augmentationis. Si quid scitis huius indigere, omnem rubiginem presto sum, quantum in me est lima correctionis, auferre. Sequarque Augustinum⁴⁴⁴ dicentem sic: "Quantum ad nos attinet conscientie nostre, semper convenit dare opera, ne quid vel quis de ecclesia nostra culpa pereat. Si autem quis ultro et crimine suo perierit, nos in die iudicii inculpatos futuros credimus, qui eorum consulimus⁴⁴⁵ sanitati."

Ecce diffinivit concilium Triburiense:⁴⁴⁶ "Si duo fratres in silva arborem succiderint, [fol. 28^v] et appropinquante casura arboris frater fratri dixerit, 'Cave', et ille fugiens in pressuram arboris ceciderit, et mortuus fuerit, vivens frater illius innocens a sanguine germani diiudicetur." Ego singulis fratrum dico: "Cave, ne imminente visitationis casura quis inciderit in mortem condemnationis."

Lex quidem humana censet putatorem arboris non teneri Aquilia lege, si tempestive proclamaverit.⁴⁴⁷ Ego autem proclamo: "Vos videtis; paratus sum operas meas dare, iuxta debitum officii mei, ad omnia, que suggesseritis, secundum Deum corrigenda." Et quidem sanctio legis est humane⁴⁴⁸ quod qui operas suas locavit tocius temporis mercedem accipere debebit, si per eum non steterit quo minus [operas] prestat. Scit Deus quod locavi operas meas pro eterna mercede, non pro terrena. Per me non stat, neque stabit.

Ammonete ergo quid faciendum et denunciate, et faciam. Dominus papa Alexander⁴⁴⁹ statuit quod "si quis erga episcopum vel actores ecclesie quamlibet querelam iustam se habere crediderit, non prius superiores adeat iudices, quam eos, a quibus se lesum existimat, familiariter conveniat, non semel set sepiissime, ut ab eis aut suam iusticiam accipiat aut excusationem." Et in alio canone scriptum est:⁴⁵⁰ "Si quis adversus eos vel ecclesias eorum causam habuerit, prius recurat ad eos caritatis studio, ut familiari colloquio ea sanent commoti, que sananda sunt, et caritative emendanda." Aliter excommunicabuntur tamquam apostolorum et aliorum patrum contemptores.

Patres nempe nostri hanc formam nobis prefixerunt, ut legistis in usibus, ut consimilis ante visitationem fieret ammonitio.

⁴⁴³ Act. 20: 26.

⁴⁴⁴ Properly, Pope Cornelius, in Gratian, Dist. 47 c. 10.

⁴⁴⁵ quis eorum cum sublimis.

⁴⁴⁶ Gratian, Dist. 50 c. 51.

⁴⁴⁷ Dig., 9.2.31.

⁴⁴⁸ Dig., 19.2.38.

⁴⁴⁹ Gratian, C. 2 q. 7 c. 16.

⁴⁵⁰ Anacletus, in Gratian, C. 2 q. 7 c. 15.

Capitulum secundum.

Qualiter abbas visitans hortatur fratres ad vigilandum circa virtutes et ordinis disciplinas.

Scripta legimus quod iudicante[m] cuncta oportet rimari, et ordinem rerum plena inquisitione discutere.⁴⁵¹ Lex quidem humana [fol. 29^r] eleganter loquitur:⁴⁵² "Congruit bono et gravi presidi curare, ut pacata atque quieta sit provincia quam regit, quod non difficile optinebit, si sollicite agat, ut malis hominibus provincia careat eosque conquirat: nam et sacrilegos, et latrones, et fures, et plagiarios, conquerere debet, et prout quisque deliquerit in eum animadvertere." Plagiarii dicuntur qui furantur liberos homines et vendunt eos. Igitur si tanta et talis incumbit cura secularibus in subditos, multo vigilancior cura exigitur in spiritualibus, pro quam procurari debet salus animarum, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, dampno unius anime mors naturabilium⁴⁵³ corporum non potest comparari.

Ideo statuerunt sancti patres, successores beati Petri, ut fierent visitationes a prelati in subditos ad correctionem morum et eorum incrementum et observationem discipline moderatam ab eisdem patribus sanctis. Hinc etiam et nostri spirituales patres ordinaverunt visitationes, quas celebriter approbavit ultimum Lateranum concilium.⁴⁵⁴

Hinc primo vidit Ieremias virgam vigilantem, virgam scilicet discipline corripientem et castigantem, et postea ollam succensam. Quasillos, qui corrigi nolunt, succendia pati oporteat Gehenne et bene quidem [virgam] vigilantem eo quod ut scriptum est:⁴⁵⁵ "proclivius est cursus ad voluptatem et imitatrix natura viciorum, omnisque etas etiam ab adolescentia prona est in malum." Ideoque virga necesse est; et ut sit vigilans. Idcirco opus est virga vigilanti qua tutum est venienti occurrere morbo. Versus:

Opprima dum nova sunt subiti,
mala scientia morbi.

Nempe parva solent magnis rebus insistere ruinam cum neglecta foret modice scintilla lucerne. Sit ergo vigilans, quia

"neglectis urenda⁴⁵⁶ Philix innascitur agris."⁴⁵⁷

Vigilet ergo virga, quia ut ait Salomon:⁴⁵⁸ "*Virga atque correctio tribuet sapientiam; puer autem qui dimittitur voluntati sue confundet matrem.*" Sic itaque in eis, qui perseverandi sunt et qui corrigendi sunt, vigilans debet virga vibrari, quia "grex totus [fol. 29^v] in arvis unius scabie cadit et prurigne porci."⁴⁵⁹ Et ideo,

"principiis o[b]sta; sero medicina paratur,
cum mala per longas convaluerit moras."⁴⁶⁰

Arbor, que latas prebet paciantibus umbras, quo primum posita est tempore, virga fuit; sic quidem a levibus quo negligantur fit lapsus in gravia.

Et idcirco venimus huc cum virga vigilanti, set speramus in Domino quod hucus-

451 Eleutherius, in Gratian, C. 30 q. 1 c. 11.

452 Dig., 1.18.13.

453 innaturabilium.

454 Cf. Fourth Lateran Council, canon 12.

455 Gratian, C. 20 q. 3 c. 2 (ex concilio Tolletano VII); Gen. 8: 21.

456 horrenda.

457 Horace, *Sat.*, I, iii, 37.

458 Prov. 29: 15.

459 Juvenal, *Sat.*, II, 79.

460 Ovid, *Rem. Amor.*, 91-92.

que omni cura custodieritis cor vestrum, quod in [act]ibus vestris nil inveniet virga nostra quod vapulet. Tamen ad habundantem cautelam et propter ordinis observanciam utimur, Deo disponente, forma nostri ordinis. Respiciat ergo Dominus de celo, et videat, et visitet vineam istam, et nos et vos visitet, oriens ex alto. Amen.

Capitulum iii.

Qualiter abbas visitans corripit fratres visitandos diffamatos.

Licet ex institutione sanctorum patrum nostro[rum] nostro incumbat officio visitationem exercere in subiectis nostris, nichilominus ad visitandum vos sinistra, que audivimus, compellunt. Unde exemplo eius qui dixit:⁴⁶¹ "*clamor Sodomorum venit ad aures meas, descendam et videbo utrum clamorem opere compleverint,*" ad vos descendimus visuri utrum clamorem opere compleveritis. Eum enim sequi vos oportet, qui ait per prophetam:⁴⁶² "*si dereliquerint filii mei le[gem] meam,*" et cetera, usque "*visitabo in virga iniqui[tates] e[orum]; et in ver[beribus] pec[cata] e[orum],*" ut sic procedat visitatio correctionis et punicionis per increpationis verba et verbera debite anima[d]versionis. Nam est alia visitatio consolationis, que fit per piorum operum exhibitionem ex compassione:⁴⁶³ "*Sic visitavit Dominus Deus et fe[cit] redemtionem] p[ro]lebis] sue.*"

Itaque talia et talia de N. flante fumo fame, immo infamie, fetorem auribus et naribus nostris insufflarunt, et quamvis possemus forte quid severius exercuisse, tamen inquisitionem censuimus pref[e]minere sequentes Gregorium, qui ait ad quemdam prelatum:⁴⁶⁴ "*Si quid de quocumque clerico ad aures tuas pervenerit, quod te possit iuste offendere, facile ne credas neque ad vindictam te res accendat incognita, set presentibus ecclesie tue senioribus [fol. 30^r] veritas est diligenter perscrutanda, et tunc, si qualitas rei poposcerit, canonica districtio culpam feriat delinquentis.*" Suggeste sunt autem nobis tales culpe, que non sine gravi dolore cordis dicimus, quas dissimulare non possumus, "quia," sicut dicit Gregorius,⁴⁶⁵ "sunt culpe, in quibus culpa est relaxare vindictam;" et ideo tacere non possumus.

Capitulum quartum.

Qualiter [loqui debeat] quando abbas visitandus diffamatur, et agitur hic de bona fame, que est valde necessaria prelati.

Quid est quod audio de te? Redde rationem villicationis tue. Dicitur enim quod dissipaveris totam substantiam patrisfamilias, que sunt mores et virtutes, et lapsus sis in viciorum voraginem. Scire debueras quod prelati, et maxime omnes et singuli Cisterciensis ordinis, sunt signum positum ad sagittam.^{465a} Et quia albus est ordo, minimusne [defectus] lane, vel macula quantulacumque, notabilius manifestatur in candido quam in altero colore? Unde potissimum fame, non tantum tue, set etiam tocius ordinis, consulere debueras. Humani enim generis inimico suggerente in consuetudinem deduxerunt hii, qui nigrum incandicaverunt, et e contrario qui dicunt malum bonum et bonum malum, ut culpam unius refundant in omnes et singulos tocius ordinis, licet ethnicum habeant reclamatorem, qui dicit ita:⁴⁶⁶

"Parcite paucarum diffundere⁴⁶⁷ crimen in omnes."

⁴⁶¹ Gen. 18: 20.

⁴⁶² Ps. 88: 31-35.

⁴⁶³ Luc. 1: 68.

⁴⁶⁴ Gratian, C. 15 q. 7 c. 2.

⁴⁶⁵ Gratian, Dist. 28 c. 10.

^{465a} Innocent III, Decretales, 5.1.17.

⁴⁶⁶ Ovid, AA, III, 9.

⁴⁶⁷ parcorum refundere.

Si consuluisses Augustinum utique didicisses ab eo quod docuit in sermone, *De Vita Communi Clericorum*, sic:⁴⁶⁸ “*Providemus bona,*” ut ait Apostolus,⁴⁶⁹ “*non tantum coram Deo, set etiam coram hominibus,*” et propter nos conscientia nostra nobis necessaria est, propter vos fama nostra non pollui, set pollere debet in vobis. Due sunt re[s]: conscientia et fama. Conscientia necessaria est tibi; fama proximo tuo. Qui confidens conscientie sue famam neglexerit, crudelis est.”

Quia sic luceant opera vestra coram hominibus, et gl[oria] pa[tri] n[ostro], qui in ce[lo] est, “nec sunt audiendi, ut ait Augustinus,^{469a} “qui reprehenduntur in aliqua negligencia, per quam fit, ut in malam veniant suspicionem. Dicunt coram Deo sibi sufficere conscientiam, existimationem hominum non solum impudenter, verum etiam crudeliter, contemptentes, cum occidant animas aliorum, sive bla[s]phemancium viam Dei.” Nam scriptum est:⁴⁷⁰ “Scire debent prelati [fol. 30v] quia, si perversa unquam perpetrant, tot mortibus digni sunt, quot ad subditos suos perditionis exempla transmittunt. Unde necesse est, ut tanto [se] cautius a culpa custodiant, quanto per prava, que faciunt, non soli moriuntur.” Seneca dogmatizat sic:⁴⁷¹ “Frons nostra populo conveniat.” “Honestus rumor alterum est patrimonium.”⁴⁷² Et Salomon:⁴⁷³ “*Lux oculorum* (scilicet iustorum) *letificat animam; et fama bona impinguat ossa.*” Impinguantur enim virtutes, que per ossa designantur; oleo bone fame et spiritualium vigore medullarum corroborantur. Sperabam quod oleum effusum [erat] nomen tuum, [s]et ecce [non] fumus set fuligo fetens et⁴⁷⁴ fex, non oleum set amurca diffusa.

Capitulum v.

Qualiter abbas neget parcere, seu differre, seu supersedere, seu misereri, cum deponit abbatem, vel pro gravi culpa gravem penitentiam infligit.

Ecce fratres, non sine doloris angustia oportet nos movere candelabrum, et emovere te funditus, quia tepidus es et na[u]seam in nobis male provocasti. Dolemus siquidem quod saltem dissimulare non possumus ad tempus anima[d]versionem tibi infligendam, set tam grave est delictum quod in perniciem redundat exempli et in scandalum multorum, si tibi parceremus, ut ait Ambrosius:⁴⁷⁵ “Est iniusta misericordia. Nam et in lege Moysi scriptum est: ‘*Non misereberis illius.*’ Saul autem contraxit offensam, quia misertus est Achab, regis hostium, ut docetur iij Regum.”

Quia sunt culpe in quibus culpa est relaxare vindictam, contristamur; tempus est ordini Cisterciensi, ut iudicium incipiat a domo Domini. Tibi ergo dicimus, quod dictum est Sennacherib a Domino per Ysaïam, filium Amos, ut scriptum est in libro Regum:⁴⁷⁶ “*Insanisti in me, et superbia tua ascendit ad aures meas. Ponam itaque circulum in naribus tuis, et camum in labiis tuis, et reducam te in viam, per quam venisti.*”

Vade igitur et constringe maxillas tuas in camo et freno obedientie et silentii, et prelationi non te audeas immiscere, et cito redde sigillum.

⁴⁶⁸ Gratian, C. 12 q. 1 c. 10.

⁴⁶⁹ 2 Cor. 8: 21.

^{469a} Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 56.

⁴⁷⁰ Gregory I, quoted by Nicholas in Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 3.

⁴⁷¹ Epist., V, 2.

⁴⁷² Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 254.

⁴⁷³ Prov. 15: 30.

⁴⁷⁴ set.

⁴⁷⁵ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 33.

⁴⁷⁶ 4 Reg. 19: 28.

Capitulum vi.

Pro rigore observanda, et de iniusta misericordia, et qualiter se habeat prelatus cum in iudicio presidet. [fol. 31^r].

Ambrosianum est:⁴⁷⁷ "Facilitas venie incentivum tribuit delinquenti." Ideo imperator punit incestas nupcias,⁴⁷⁸ ne scilicet iniusta dissimulatione audacia delinquendi assumatur. Et Ambrosius:⁴⁷⁹ "Innocentes tradit exicio, qui liberat multorum exicia cogitantem," et "cum indulget indigno ad prolapsionis contagium provocat universos." Ideoque statuit noster legislator, sanctus Benedictus,⁴⁸⁰ quod unus puniatur, ut ceteri metum habeant. Leges non videntur humanas ignorasse, que dicunt, ut pena unius pena sit multorum. Nam "*flagellato pestilente stultus sapiens erit,*" ut dicit Salomon.⁴⁸¹ Unde custos leonis solet verberare catulum coram leone, et leo timet.

Fabulosum est, et tamen non est inutile, quod lupus, cum bovem ex precepto leonis divideret, primo dedit sibi ipsi quandam partem bovis suaviorem ad vescendum, et lupe uxori sue postea aliam partem, leoni minus bonam. Et leo percussit ipsum super caput ita, ut excoriatum sanguine totum aspergeret, et precepit vulpi, ut divideret, qui primo precipuam partem dedit leoni, postea pulcrum leone, et ita pociores partes pocioribus distribuit convivis. Placuit leoni, et dixit vulpi: "Quis te docuit tam bene dividere?" Respondit: "Domine, ille qui habet rubeum capucium." Et ita felix, quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum.

Augustinus:⁴⁸² "Duo ista nomina, homo et peccator, non frustra dicuntur. Quia peccator est, corripere; quia homo, miserere. Nec omnino liberabis hominem, nisi persecutus fueris peccatorem." Viciū est enim omni misereri, et semper fallit enim viciū specie virtutis et umbra.⁴⁸³ Unde dicit Gregorius:⁴⁸⁴ "Sepe vicia se esse virtutes menciuntur, ut tenacitas parsimonia, [effusio] largitas, crudelitas zelus iusticie, remis[sio] pietas volens videri." Audi legis secularis disciplinam iudices sic informantem; id enim non est constantis et recti iudicis cuius animi motum vultus detegit, et summam ita ius reddi debet ut auctoritatem [fol. 31^v] dignitatis ingenio suo augeat.

Immo dolum lex⁴⁸⁵ reputat hominem depositum apud me in vinculis ad eius lacrimas et preces solvere, quod Ambrosius videtur dogmatizare dicens:⁴⁸⁶ "Si quis solverit latronem filiis deprecantibus et motus lacrimis coniugis exicium parat multorum," quia ut ait Iohannes Chrysostomus, semper scelera nisi resecentur, excrescunt, et in augmentum facinorum prosilitur quociens secunda impunitate peccatur.

In archam tabernaculi reposita fuerunt tabule, virga, et manna: tabule inquam scripture sancte scientie;⁴⁸⁷ virga districtiois; et manna dulcedinis et pietatis. Non sufficit prelato virga, nisi et baculum habuerit: virga percuciens, baculus sustentans. Omnis enim actus prelati debet versari circa subditorum correctionem sic, ut subditi possint dicere cum propheta:⁴⁸⁸ "*Virga tua, et ba[culus] tuus, ipsa me conso[lata] sunt*" Non dicit, "confuderunt," set, "conso[lata] sunt." Audi Gregorium organizantem:⁴⁸⁹ "Sit amor, set non emolliens; sit vigor, set non exasperans; sit zelus, set non immoderate seviens; sit pietas, set non plus quam expediat parcens. Vide Moysem pie

⁴⁷⁷ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 33.

⁴⁷⁸ Cod. Just., 5.5.9.

⁴⁷⁹ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 33.

⁴⁸⁰ *Regula*, c. 70, CSEL 75, 160.

⁴⁸¹ Prov. 19: 25.

⁴⁸² Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 35.

⁴⁸³ Cf. supra, fol. 15^r, n. 269.

⁴⁸⁴ Gratian, Dist. 41 c. 6.

⁴⁸⁵ Dig., 16.3.7.

⁴⁸⁶ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 33.

⁴⁸⁷ scientia.

⁴⁸⁸ Ps. 22: 4.

⁴⁸⁹ Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 9.

amanem et districte sevientem cum enim semel et iterum obiceret se ad impetum Dei irascentis dixit: *'Aut dimitte eis hanc noxam, aut dele me de libro in quo me scripsisti.'*⁴⁹⁰ Et tamen iste, qui tanto amore populi constringitur, zelo rectitudinis succensus, venia iam obtenta, inquit: *'Ponat vir gladium super femur suum; cecideruntque illo die quasi xxxiiij milia.'*⁴⁹¹ Audi elogiacum nostrum, Iob dico, *"Cum sederem,"* inquit,⁴⁹² *"quasi rex circumstante exercitu, eram tamen merencium consolator."* Ubi dicit Gregorius:⁴⁹³ *"sedere quippe circumstante exercitu vigor est discipline regiminis; merencium verbo corda consolari ministerium est pietatis."*

Ba[culo] pastor ille evangelicus lapsam ovem revisisse, non abiecisse, legitur. Ideo Salomon:⁴⁹⁴ *"Noli esse nimis iustus."* Nam ut ait Ambrosius⁴⁹⁵ super illum locum: *"non veni vocare iustos, set peccatores ad penitentiam; "In lege sacrificium, in evangelio misericordia; "lex per Moysem data est, misericordia per me, et gratia,"*⁴⁹⁶ dicit Dominus Christus."

Igitur cum iudex [iudicas] aliquem preoccupatum in aliquo delicto, considera [fol. 32^r] teipsum, ne et tu tempeteris. "Petrus factus fuit fidelior post lapsum," ut ait Ambrosius.⁴⁹⁷ Quem Dominus permisit cadere, ut dicit Gregorius,⁴⁹⁸ "ut qui futurus erat pastor ecclesie sua culpa disceret, qualiter aliis misereri debuisset," quia iudicium sine misericordia fiet ei, qui non fecerit misericordiam. Quia misericordia semper exaltat iudicium et dicit Ieronimus:⁴⁹⁹ "Tucius est reddere rationem pro misericordia quam propter crudelitatem." Eleganter ait Seneca:⁵⁰⁰ "Homo qui in homine calamitoso misericors est memoris sui."

Capitulum vij.

Qualiter misericordiam et dispensationem in rigorem temperare debeat abbas.

Gregorianum est:⁵⁰¹ "Vera iusticia compassionem habet, falsa indignationem, quamvis et iusti soleant recte peccatoribus indignari. Set aliud est quod agitur typo superbie, aliud, quod zelo discipline. Indignantur enim, set non dedignantur. At contra, qui [de] falsa iusticia solent superbire, ceterosque despiciunt, nulla infirmantibus misericordia condescendunt."

Ieronimus⁵⁰² ait super illud Ieremie — *"recedite polluti, recedite, abite, nolite nos tangere, nolite nobis communicare"* — "Talis loquela non illuminat [cecum], non sanat egrotum, non curat infirmum, set magis occidit atque in desperationem mittit periclitantem. Boni etenim rectores ex sua infirmitate aliorum infirmitatem pensantes magis per humilitatis et mansuetudinis levamentum student peccantes ab erroris laqueo eruere, quam per austeritatem in foveam perditionis nutantes propellere. Unde gencium doctor: *'Factus sum,'* inquit⁵⁰³ *infirmus.'*"

Isti sunt qui alligant onera gravia et importabilia, digito autem suo nequeunt ea movere. Nam aspere quam existimo, non duriter, non imperiose, ita tolluntur magis docendo quam iubendo; magis monendo quam minando. Et si quid minamur dolendo, fiat de scripturis comminando vindictam futuram, ne nos ipsi in nostra potestate, set Deus in nostro sermon timeatur.

⁴⁹⁰ Exod. 32: 7.

⁴⁹¹ Exod. 32: 7.

⁴⁹² Iob. 29: 25.

⁴⁹³ Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 9.

⁴⁹⁴ Eccl. 7: 17.

⁴⁹⁵ Gratian, *De pen.*, Dist. 1 c. 48.

⁴⁹⁶ Io. 1: 17.

⁴⁹⁷ Gratian, Dist. 50 c. 54.

⁴⁹⁸ Gratian, Dist. 50 c. 53.

⁴⁹⁹ Properly, John Chrysostom, in Gratian, C. 26 q. 7 c. 12.

⁵⁰⁰ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 242.

⁵⁰¹ Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 15.

⁵⁰² Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 16.

⁵⁰³ 1 Cor. 9: 22.

Capitulum viij.

Contra prelatos, qui magis volunt timeri in suis iudiciis, predicationibus, et proclamationibus, quam zelo rectitudinis et pie correctionis regere subditos suos.

Apostolica voce audivimus: "argue, increpa, obsecra, in omni paciencia et doctrina."⁵⁰⁴ Et alibi scriptum est:⁵⁰⁵ "Plus erga corrigendos agat benivolencia quam severitas, [fol. 32v] plus correctio quam comminatio, plus caritas quam potestas." Set ab hiis, qui, que sua sunt, querunt, non que Ihesu Christi, facile ab hac lege disceditur, et dum dominari magis quam consulere subditis placet, honor inflat in superbiam, et quod provisum est ad concordiam tendit ad noxam. Et Petrus:⁵⁰⁶ "Non dominantes in clero." Audi melos Gregorianum:⁵⁰⁷ "Habet hoc proprium doctrina arrogancium, ut humiliter nesciant inferre que docent, et recta, que sapiunt, etiam recte ministrare non possunt. In verbis enim eorum perpenditur quod, cum docent, quasi in quoddam videntur sibi summitatis culmen presidere, eosque, quos docent, ut longe infra se positos velud in quodam imo conspiciunt, quibus non consulendo loqui set vix dominando dignantur. Recte hiis per prophetam dicit Dominus:⁵⁰⁸ 'Vos autem cum austeritate imperabitis eis, et cum potencia.' At contra, doctrina vera tanto vehementius hoc elationis vicium fugit [per cogitationem], quanto ardentius suorum verborum iaculis ipsum magistrum elationis, id est dyabolum, insequitur."

Ecce si documentum Gregorianum attendant prelati, non debent caput ferocitatis motibus movere nec oculorum totis⁵⁰⁹ aspectibus leonizare nec truculentis rictibus pretendere tortoris, qui se scire debent in humilitate⁵¹⁰ fore correctores.

Capitulum ix.

Quod prelatus in pena infligenda debet habere considerationem ad dignitatem et a[u]ctoritatem meritorum eius, qui puniendus est.

In canone⁵¹¹ docetur quod "non est dignum, ut passim unusquisque honorabilia membra sua prout quisque voluerit et ei placuerit verberibus subiciat [et] dolori, ne dum incaute subdita⁵¹² membra percutit, ipse quoque [debitam] subditorum suorum reverenciam subtrahat, iuxta illud sapientis: 'leviter castigatus⁵¹³ reverenciam exhibet castiganti, asperitatis autem nimie⁵¹⁴ increpatio nec increpationem recipit, nec salutem.'"

Audi et Iheronimum, qui ait:⁵¹⁵ "Episcopi sacerdotes se sciant esse, non dominos; honorent clericos quasi clericos, ut ipsis episcopis a clericis honor referatur." Sic et quilibet prelatus non dominum set prelatum se cognoscat, et non confundat et conterat sibi subditum, set sicut vult a subdito debitum honorem sibi impendi, ita et ipse suo subdito debitum exhibeat honorem.

⁵⁰⁴ 2 Tim. 4: 2.

⁵⁰⁵ Gregory I, in Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 4.

⁵⁰⁶ 1 Pet. 5: 3.

⁵⁰⁷ Gratian, Dist. 46 c. 1.

⁵⁰⁸ Ez. 34: 4.

⁵⁰⁹ totus.

⁵¹⁰ humilitatis.

⁵¹¹ Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 8 (ex concilio Bracarenensi III).

⁵¹² subditi.

⁵¹³ castigatur.

⁵¹⁴ nimia.

⁵¹⁵ Gratian, Dist. 96 c. 7.

Capitulum x.

Quod prelatus non debet nimiam humilitatem, et maxime in publico, circa subditum [fol. 33^r] suum exercere, qua[m]vis iniuste eum offenderit, nec familiaritatem.

Abbas, vel quilibet prelatus, si attendat sui nomen officii, ut patrem se sciat dum filium pia consolatione demulcet, et prelatum dum collatum suo inferiori se per caritatis reddit officiositatem. Unde Augustinus dicit in *Vita Clericorum*:⁵¹⁶ "Quando necessitas discipline [moribus] coercendis dicere vos dira aut dura compellit, si et ipsi modum vos excessisse sentitis, non a vobis exigitur, ut ab subditis vestris veniam postuletis, ne apud eos, quos oportet esse subiectos, dum nimium servatur humilitas, regendi frangatur auctoritas." Unde oportune docet Innocencius quod "si forte iudex ordinare processerit caute, et prudenter invenire debet occasionem supersedendi negotio vel revocandi quod factum est, ita ne vilescat a[u]ctoritas iudicialis."⁵¹⁷

Capitulum xi.

Contra prelatos, qui deferunt quibusdam subditorum suorum in correptionum asperitatem, cum eos castigare debeant virtute veritatis, eo quod timent ne male loquantur de eis.

Attestante Ieronimo,⁵¹⁸ evenit quod "uno peccante ira Dei super omnem populum venit, puta quando sacerdotes, qui populo Dei presunt, erga delinquentes,⁵¹⁹ benivoli volunt videri, et verentes peccantium linguas, ne forte de eis male loquantur sacerdotalis severitatis⁵²⁰ immemores nolunt complere quod scriptum est:⁵²¹ '*Peccantem coram omnibus argue: ut ceteri metum habeant,*'" et item:⁵²² '*Auferte malum a vobis.*'

Audiamus et Gregorium sic pangentem:⁵²³ "Sunt nonnulli, qui, dum malefacta hominum [laudibus] efferunt, augent que increpare debuerant. De quibus per prophetam dicitur:⁵²⁴ '*Ve illis, qui consuunt pulvillos sub omni cubito manus, et faciunt cervicalia sub capite universe carnis.*' Quisquis ergo male agentibus adulatur, et pulvillum sub cubito et cervicas sub capite iacentis ponit, ut qui corripi ex culpa debuerat, in ea fultus laudibus molliter quiescat. Hinc per Iezchielem dictum est:⁵²⁵ '*Ipse edificabat parietem, ipsi autem lineabant eum.*' Parietis quidem nomine peccati duricia signatur, quam peccator significat, set adulatores parietem liniunt, qui peccata perpetrantibus adulantur, ut quod illi perverse agentes edificant, ipsi adulatores quasi nitidum reddunt."

Legitur etiam in Ecclesiastico⁵²⁶ tam contra prelatos, qui maioribus subditis suis sub quadam adulationis ymagine deferunt, minoribus autem parcere dedignantur, quam contra adulatores alios in his verbis:⁵²⁷ "*Diviti suspecto multi sunt recuperatores, locutus est superba et iustificaverunt eum. Humilis deceptus est insuper arguitur; locutus est sensate [fol. 33^v] et non est ei datus locus. Dives locutus est, et omnes tacuerunt, et verbum eius usque ad nubes perducunt. Pauper locutus est, et dicunt: Quis est hic? Et si offenderit, subvertent eum.*" Signancius sonat simphonia Gregoriana: mortuus mortuum sepelit quem aggere adulationis premit. Et augusta Augustini sententia est:⁵²⁸ "In exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverencia ordinis peccator honoratur."

⁵¹⁶ Gratian, Dist. 86 c. 4.

⁵¹⁷ Innocent III, in Decretales, 5.1.17.

⁵¹⁸ Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 17.

⁵¹⁹ delinquent.

⁵²⁰ severitas.

⁵²¹ 1 Tim. 5: 20.

⁵²² 1 Cor. 5: 13.

⁵²³ Gratian, Dist. 46 c. 2.

⁵²⁴ Ez. 13: 18.

⁵²⁵ Ez. 13: 10.

⁵²⁶ Eccli. 13: 26-29.

⁵²⁷ hec verba.

⁵²⁸ Gratian, Dist. 83 c. 2.

Memorandum est, quod dicit Seneca:⁵²⁹ "Bonus animus nunquam erranti obsequium accomodat." Ideoque dicit propheta:⁵³⁰ "*Corripiet me iustus in mi[sericordia], et incre[pabit] me: ol[eum] autem peccatoris non impin[guet] ca[put] meum,*" id est adulatio.

Capitulum xii.

*Contra prelatos negligentes in correctione*⁵³¹ *subditorum suorum, et agitur hic qualiter debeat corrigere subditos suos.*

Ecce frater, incidisti in illud Gregorianum:⁵³² "Consentire videtur erranti, qui ad resecanda, que corrigi debent, non occurrit." Itaque vigilandum tibi fuerat super gregem tuum. Unde dicit Ieremias delinquenti populo sic:⁵³³ "*Prophete tui viderunt tibi falsa et stulta; nec aperiebant tibi iniquitatem tuam.*" "Prophetas," teste Gregorio,⁵³⁴ "vocat prelatos qui futura supremi iudicii manifestant." Monet Paulus⁵³⁵ Thymoteum⁵³⁶ "*ut potens sit ad exortandum in doctrina sana.*"⁵³⁷ et eos qui contradicunt, redarguere." Ammonet Dominus Ysaïam sic:⁵³⁸ "*Clama, ne cesses,*" et cetera. Super quem locum dicit Gregorius:⁵³⁹ "Preconis quippe officium suscipit, quisquis ad sacerdotium accedit⁵⁴⁰ ut ante adventum iudicis, qui terribiliter sequitur, ipse scilicet clamando gradiatur. Sacerdos igitur, si predicationis est in[s]cius, quam clamoris vocem daturus, est preco mutus. Nota etiam quod in linguarum specie super primos pastores Spiritus Sanctus insedit, quia nimirum, quos repleverit, de se loquentes protinus facit."

Capitulum xiii.

Contra prelatos, qui volunt videri nimis pii, et benigni, et ideo semper volunt parcere et numquam punire.

Frater, numquam tu sanctior aut iustior tibi videris Apostolo, qui tibi et omnibus dicit quod "*scrire debes quoniam qui corripit fratrem suum et revocaverit ab errore vie sue lucratus est, animam eius et operit multitudinem peccatorum.*"⁵⁴¹ Caritatem nimirum non attigisti, qui tertium genus elemosyne facere noluisti; asserente sacra a[u]ctoritate beati Albini:⁵⁴² "Tria sunt genera elemosinarum: una corporalis, scilicet egenti dare quidquid poteris; [fol. 34^r] altera spiritualis, dimittere scilicet a quo lesus fueris; tertia, corrigere delinquentem, et reducere in viam veritatis errantes."

Doleo quod diceris abbas, et non es; mallet te esse et non dici. Abba enim pater interpretatur. Quippe dicit Salomon:⁵⁴³ "*Percute filium tuum virga, et liberabis animam eius a morte.*" Egregius Gregorius noster scribit in *Dialogo* suo beatum Benedictum quemdam monachum virga percutiendo sanasse, quem crebra ammonitione sanare non poterat. Nonne Dominus piissimus Ihesus, qui tamquam ovis ad occisionem ductus coram tundente obmutescens, flagello de resticulis facto eiecit male conversantes de domo orationis?⁵⁴⁴ Opere precium est audire Ambrosium sic loquentem:⁵⁴⁵ "Non osculatur semper pater filium, aliquando castigat. Quando castigatur qui

⁵²⁹ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 70.

⁵³⁰ Ps. 140: 5.

⁵³¹ correctionem.

⁵³² Gratian, Dist. 83 c. 5.

⁵³³ Lam. 2: 14.

⁵³⁴ Gratian, Dist. 43 c. 1.

⁵³⁵ Tit. 1: 9.

⁵³⁶ Read Titum.

⁵³⁷ sua.

⁵³⁸ Isai. 58: 1.

⁵³⁹ Gratian, Dist. 43 c. 1.

⁵⁴⁰ accedit.

⁵⁴¹ Jac. 5: 20.

⁵⁴² Gratian, Dist. 45 c. 12.

⁵⁴³ Prov. 23: 14.

⁵⁴⁴ Dict. Grat., Dist. 45 c. 8 pars ii.

⁵⁴⁵ Gratian, C. 5 q. 5 c. 3.

diligitur, tunc erga eum pietas exercetur. Habet enim et amor plagas suas, que dulciores sunt, cum amarius ingerunt se. Dulcior enim est religiosa castigatio quam blanda remissio. Unde illud prophete:⁵⁴⁶ *'Dulciora sunt amici verbera quam voluntaria oscula inimici.'* Unde:⁵⁴⁷ "Non omnis, qui parcit, est amicus; nec omnis, qui verberat, inimicus. Melius est cum servitate diligere quam cum lenitate decipere. Et qui freneticum ligat et qui lethargicum⁵⁴⁸ excitat, ambobus molestus est; ambos tamen amat. Quis nos potest amplius amare quam Deus? Et tamen nos [non solum] docere suaviter, verum etiam terrere salubriter non cessat. Fomentis lenibus, quibus consolatur, sepe etiam mordacissimum medicamentum tribulationis adiungit; exercet fame patriarchas, et pios [et] religiosos; populum contumacem penis graviorebus agitat; non aufert ab apostolo stimulum carnis tercio rogatus, ut virtutem in infirmitate perficiat." Audi iterum elegantissimum Augustini methaphoram, que talis est:⁵⁴⁹ "Noveris aliquando furem avertendis pecoribus pabulum spargere, et pastorem aliquando flagello ad gregem pecora errancia revocare."

Iterum hortor, ut consulas Augustinum, et docebit te quando et qualiter debeas delinquentem corripere. Ait enim:⁵⁵⁰ "A malis semper [corde] disiungimini; ad tempus caute copulamini corpore. Duobus modis te non maculabit malus, scilicet si non consentias, et si eum redarguas, hoc est non consentire, non communicare. Communicatur quippe quando facto eius consorcium voluntatis vel approbationis adiungitur. Neque ergo consentientes sitis malis, ut approbetis, neque negligentes, ut non arguatis."

Si vis esse bonus aries [fol. 34^v] in grege oportet te non esse mutilum, hoc est cornibus correctionis et correptionis carentem, quamvis habeas vellus lenitatis et consolationis, set et cornibus contra delinquentes armari et vellere confovere penitentes. Increpat Gregorius Januarium episcopum, qui presimplicitate noluit corripere elaios, qui clericos contempserunt, dicens:⁵⁵¹ "Dum simplicitate studetur a vobis, quantum videmus disciplina negligitur."

Capitulum xiiij.

Contra prelatos, qui facile credunt sinistra.

Impudenter transgredieris doctrinam Gregorii, que sic docuit episcopum Corinthiorum:⁵⁵² "Si quid de quocumque clerico ad aures tuas pervenerit, quod te iuste possit offendere, facile ne creadas neque ad vindictam te accendat res incognita, set presentibus ecclesie tue senioribus est veritas diligenter perscrutanda, et tunc, si qualitas rei poposcerit, canonica⁵⁵³ districtio culpam feriat delinquentis." Idem ipse ait:⁵⁵⁴ "Grave satis est et indecens, ut in re dubia certa detur sententia." Audi et Augustinum in *Libro de Penitentia*:⁵⁵⁵ "Quamvis vera sint quedam, tamen iudici non sunt credenda, nisi certis indiciis demonstrentur." Et Salomon:⁵⁵⁶ "*Antequam scruteris ne reprehendas.*" Et Seneca:⁵⁵⁷ "Difficilem oportet habere aurem ad crimina." Dicit Ieronimus:⁵⁵⁸ "Ante probationem accusationis illate neminem a tua communionem suspendas, quia non statim qui accusatur reus est, set qui convincitur crimi-

⁵⁴⁶ Prov. 27: 6.

⁵⁴⁷ Augustine, in Gratian, C. 5 q. 5 c. 2.

⁵⁴⁸ lethargicum.

⁵⁴⁹ Gratian, C. 5 q. 5 c. 2.

⁵⁵⁰ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 8.

⁵⁵¹ Gratian, C. 11 q. 1 c. 40.

⁵⁵² Gratian, C. 15 q. 7 c. 2.

⁵⁵³ canonicam.

⁵⁵⁴ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 74.

⁵⁵⁵ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 75.

⁵⁵⁶ Eccli. 11: 7.

⁵⁵⁷ Pub. Syrus. *Sententiae*, 156.

⁵⁵⁸ Properly, Nicholas, in Gratian, C. 15 q. 8 c. 5.

nosus." Ideo statuit canon⁵⁵⁹ ut "nullus ante veram iustamque probationem iudicetur, aut dampnetur, teste Apostolo,⁵⁶⁰ qui ait: "*Tu, quis es, qui alienum servum iudicas? suo domino stat aut cadit:*"⁵⁶¹ domino suo, scilicet Deo, qui novit occulta cordium, stat ab eo remunerandus, cadit condemnandus.

Capitulum xv.

Contra prelatos, qui ex ira, vel mala voluntate aut odio, vel amore, vel timore, pervertunt ordinem iudiciorum, et sic sunt acceptores personarum.

Organizat Gregorius sic:⁵⁶¹ "Illa prepositorum sollicitudo utilis, illa est cautela laudabilis, in qua totum ratio agit,⁵⁶² et furor sibi nil vendicat. Restrīgenda sub ratione potestas⁵⁶³ est, nec quidquam agendum est priusquam concitata ad tranquillitatem mens redeat. Nam commotionis tempore iustum putat omne, quod fecerit." Omne putat licitum, quod furor esse facit. Impedit ira animum, ne possit cernere verum. Unde Seneca:⁵⁶⁴ "Iram qui vincit, maximum hostem superat." Esto secundum Apostolum,⁵⁶⁵ "*tardus ad iram.*" Et dicit Salomon:⁵⁶⁶ "*Totum spiritum suum profert stultus, [fol. 35r] sapiens differt, et reservat in posterum.*" Unde et Gregorius:⁵⁶⁷ "Summopere cavendum est, ut rectores ecclesie et qui publica iudicia exercent in dictandis sententiis nullatenus levitate an furore ducti precipites sint, set causis prius diligenter ventilatis, cum res, que ignorabatur, pleniter ad noticiam venerit, tunc divina et humana lex resolvatur, et tunc secundum quod ibi statutum est, remota personarum acceptione, diffinitiva proferatur sententia. Hinc est quod Moyses querelas populi semper ad Domini tabernaculum ingressus referebat, et iuxta quod Dominus imperabat iudicia proponebat, nos nimirum instruens, ut non ex corde nostro, set ex precepto [divino], condemnationis vel iustificationis, sententiam proferamus."

Urbane siquidem id observare videntur quidam iudices in quibusdam partibus, qui semper in principio sententie sue premittunt illud prophete:⁵⁶⁸ "*De vultu tuo iudicium m[eum] prode[at],*" et cetera. Unde dicit Ambrosius:⁵⁶⁹ "Ira sepe etiam innocentes ad crimen adducit." Et Apostolus:⁵⁷⁰ "*Non vos defendentes, karissimi, set date locum ire.*" Dicit Gregorius:⁵⁷¹ "Quat[t]uor modis genus humanum [iudicium] pervertitur: timore, dum metu potestatis alicuius veritatem loqui pertimescimus; cupiditate, dum premio alicuius animum corrumpimus; odio, dum contra [quemlibet] adversarium molimur; amore, dum amico vel propinquo prestare contendimus." Unde Augustinus:⁵⁷² "Quisquis metu cuiuslibet potestatis veritatem occultat, iram Dei super se provocat, quia magis timet hominem quam Deum."

Caveat ergo sibi, qui iniuste aliquem condemnat, nam ait Augustinus:⁵⁷³ "Si quisquam fidelium fuerit anathematizatus iniuste, potius ei ob[i]erit, qui facit quam ei qui hanc patitur iniuriam." Unde et Salomon ait:⁵⁷⁴ "*Sicut avis in incertum volans et passer quolibet vadens, sic maledictum frustra prolatum,*" id est sine causa iusta super eum,

⁵⁵⁹ Evaristus, in Gratian, C. 2 q. 1 c. 20.

⁵⁶⁰ Rom. 14: 4.

⁵⁶¹ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 67.

⁵⁶² augit.

⁵⁶³ posita.

⁵⁶⁴ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 290.

⁵⁶⁵ Jac. 1: 19.

⁵⁶⁶ Prov. 29: 11.

⁵⁶⁷ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 70.

⁵⁶⁸ Ps. 16: 2.

⁵⁶⁹ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 68.

⁵⁷⁰ Rom. 12: 19.

⁵⁷¹ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 78.

⁵⁷² Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 80.

⁵⁷³ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 87.

⁵⁷⁴ Prov. 26: 12.

qui misit illud, ut enim ait Augustinus:⁵⁷⁵ "Qui iustus est, et iniuste maledicatur premium illi redditur." Item idem:⁵⁷⁶ "Temerarium plerumque nil nocet ei, de quo temere iudicatur. Ei autem, qui temere iudicat, ipsa temeritas necesse est, ut noceat." "*Qui enim nocet,*" ut ait Apostolus,⁵⁷⁷ "*recipit id quod nocuit*" Gregorius:⁵⁷⁸ "Contingit plerumque, ut iudiciis locum teneat, cuius vita minime ad locum concordat, ac sepe agitur, ut vel dampnet immeritos, vel ipse ligatus solvet alios. De talibus recte per Iezechielem dicitur:⁵⁷⁹ '*Mortificabant animas [que non moriuntur, et vivificant animas] que non vivunt.*' Non morientem quippe vivificat [fol. 35^v] qui reum prorsus condemnandum absolvere conatur."

Unde videndum est que culpa precessit, et que penitentia sit secuta post culpam, ut quos omnipotens Deus per compunctionis gratiam vivificavit illos pastores sententia absolvat. "Tunc⁵⁸⁰ vera est absolutio presidentis, cum interni⁵⁸¹ sequitur arbitrium iudicis. Quod bene quadriduani mortui resuscitatio illa signat, que videlicet demonstratur, quia prius Dominus mortuum suscitavit et vivificavit, dicens:⁵⁸² '*Lazare, veni foras,*' et postmodum is, qui vivus fuerat, egressus a discipulis est absolutus, sicut scriptum est:" "*solvite eum et sinite abire;*"⁵⁸³ ex qua consideratione intendum est quod illos debemus per pastorem auctoritatem solvere, quos auctorem nostrum cognoscimus per suscitantem gratiam vivificare. Veniat itaque foras mortuus, id est culpam confiteatur peccator. Venientem vero foras solvunt discipuli, quia pastores ecclesie ei debent amovere penam quam meruit, qui non erubuit confiteri quod fecit.

Illis enim, qui alia via incedunt, dicit Dominus per Ysaïam:⁵⁸⁴ "*Ve, qui dicitis bonum malum, et malum bonum,*" et cetera. Ideo audiri debet Ambrosius dicens:⁵⁸⁵ "Iudicet ille de alterius errore, qui non habet quod in se ipso condemnet. Iudicet ille, qui non agit ea, que in alio putaverit punienda, ne, cum de alio iudicat, in se ferat sententiam. Iudicet ille, qui ad pronunciandum nullo odio, nulla offensione, nulla levitate ducatur. Bonus enim iudex nil ex arbitrio suo facit."

Capitulum xvi.

Contra prelatos, qui credunt quibusdam incusatoribus, et ad vocem quorundam susurronum facile presumunt sinistra de bonis.

Frater, dolendum est quod aures habes⁵⁸⁶ prurientes, quod dicit Ieronimus:⁵⁸⁷ "Caveat unusquisque, ne linguam aut aures habeat prurientes, id est, ne aut ipse aliis detrahat aut alios audiat detrahentes. Nemo invito⁵⁸⁸ auditori libenter refert." Ait Seneca:⁵⁸⁹ "Viciū est et omni[bus] credere et nulli." Notabiliter dixit hec, quia bonis et probatis et maturis credendum est et illis, qui omni carent suspicione.

Item, advertere debet vir discretus quod amor carnalis et timor atque avaricia plerumque sensus [h]ebetant humanos, et pervertunt opiniones, ut questum pietatem putant et pecuniam quasi mercedem prudentie. Ideo statutum est in canon-

⁵⁷⁵ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 90.

⁵⁷⁶ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 49.

⁵⁷⁷ Col. 3: 25.

⁵⁷⁸ Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 88.

⁵⁷⁹ Ez. 13: 19.

⁵⁸⁰ Gregory I, in Gratian, C. 11 q. 3 c. 52.

⁵⁸¹ interim.

⁵⁸² Io. 11: 43.

⁵⁸³ Io. 11: 44.

⁵⁸⁴ Isai. 5: 20.

⁵⁸⁵ Gratian, C. 3 q. 7 c. 4.

⁵⁸⁶ homines.

⁵⁸⁷ Properly, Anterus, in Gratian, C. 6 q. 1 c. 13.

⁵⁸⁸ in vico.

⁵⁸⁹ *Epist.*, III, 4.

bus.⁵⁹⁰ "Ut prelati non habeant seculares pueros [fol. 36^r] aut prave homines in societate et familiaritate sua, qui sciant secreta sua, set boni testimonii habeant dyacones aut presbiteros in ministerio cubiculi sui, qui irreprehensibiles valeant inveniri." Unde Cato:⁵⁹¹ "Cum bonis ambula." Et Seneca:⁵⁹² "Cum hiis conversare qui te meliorem reddere possunt," nam ut idem ait: malorum consortia bono corrumpunt. Et super illum locum Salomonis,⁵⁹³ "*ex studiis cognoscitur puer*," dicit Ieronimus:⁵⁹⁴ "Quicumque virtutibus studet cum modestia continencie, auditioni sapientum, observationi mandatorum Dei, et maxime simplicitati et humilitati videns huius munda et recta opera intelligit. Si autem hiis contrarium videris, corrige. Si non potes, devita, ne ab eo corrumparis."

Verum, quid dicam cum videam quosdam prelatos frequenter patulas aures inclinantibus quibusdam suspiciosis, garrulis, levibus, et immature conversationis susurronibus, secreto cum eis confabulantes, et tractatum cum eis tamquam cum maturis et sapientibus habentes, et quodcumque deterius est, eis super quibuscumque dictis fratribus et personis fidem adibentes? Procul dubio existimandum est [illos] a talibus corrumpi.

Nam et videmus quosdam semper o[p]portune et importune ingerentes se⁵⁹⁵ suis superioribus et irruentes consiliis eorum tamquam sine eis non posset cena duci. Et semper volunt, ut prelati sui applaudant eis et demulceant eos factis et verbis. Naturam redolent canum et simiarum: si enim fricuere aures canis, alludet tibi cauda, et numquam simia iocularioris movebit risus, nisi dominus ei alludat. Semper domino adulatur, et quociens sibi dominus congratulatur, servientes quantumcumque beneficos tumentibus buccis subsannant. Isti sunt, qui rimantur secreta superiorum ut per hoc ab eis timeri possint, [s]cientes, quia carus erit verri, qui verrem tempore quo vult accusare potest. Isti enim sunt, qui cum vident abbatem, vel priorem aut subpriorem, cum alio secreto colloquio frui, statim reputant se despectos et abiectos. Talibus innitens prelatus non studet simplicitati,^{596a} quia, dicit auctoritas:⁵⁹⁶ "Habeant omnes simplicitatem columbe, ne cuiquam machinantur dolos, et serpentis⁵⁹⁷ astuciam, ne aliorum supplantentur insidiis." Unde dicitur:⁵⁹⁸ "*Estote prudentes sicut serpentes, et simpli[ces] st[cut] co[lumbe]*."

Vis scire, prelate, quomodo inter subditos [fol. 36^v] te debeas habere? Si aures tuas non claudis Claudiano,⁵⁹⁹ poteris ab eo sic docente doceri:

"Hoc⁶⁰⁰ te preterea crebro sermone docebo,
ut te tocius medio telluris in ore⁶⁰¹
vivere cognoscas, cunctis tua gentibus esse
facta palam nec posse dari regalibus umquam
secretum viciis; nam lux altissima fati⁶⁰²
occultum nil esse sinit, latebrasque per omnes
intrat et abstrusos⁶⁰³ explorat fama recessus.

⁵⁹⁰ Gregory I and Paschal, in Gratian, C. 2
q. 7 cc. 58-60.

⁵¹⁹ *Collectio distichorum vulgaris*, 6.

⁵⁹² *Epist.*, VII, 8.

⁵⁹³ Prov. 20: 11.

⁵⁹⁴ *Decretales*, 2.23.3.

⁵⁹⁵ set.

^{596a} simplicitate.

⁵⁹⁶ Jerome, in Gratian, C. 16 q. 1 c. 5.

⁵⁹⁷ serpentes.

⁵⁹⁸ Matt. 10: 16.

⁵⁹⁹ *Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, 269-279.

⁶⁰⁰ hec.

⁶⁰¹ orbe.

⁶⁰² facti.

⁶⁰³ obstrusos.

[Sis pius in primis; nam cum vincamur in omni
munere, sola deos aequat clementia nobis.]
Neu dubie suspectus agas neu falsus amicis
rumorumve avidus.”

Ex predictis igitur liquide patet quos debeat a secretariis suis repellere prelatus et eis nullo modo fidem contra bonos adhibere. Ethnicus⁶⁰⁴ etiam unum docet familiare signum quo vitari cautiore tales possint, dicens:

“absentem qui rodit amicum,
qui non defendit alio culpante, [solutos]
qui captat risu hominum [famamque dicacis]
fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere
qui nequit: hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.”

Iterum idem:⁶⁰⁵ “Archanum neque tu scrutaberis ullius unquam.”

Quid de quoque viro et cui dicas sepe, videte; percunctatorem fugito, quia garrulus idem est. Nec retinent patule commissa fideliter aures. Igitur, prelate mi, ad vocem eius qui omni suspitione caret, presume sinistra de aliquo. Nam et testes, secundum iura, producti contra aliquem debet esse [sine] omni exceptione maiores, et cum in dubiis in meliorem partem sit interpretandum; tucius est declinare in dexteram quam in sinistram. Cum dicat Innocentius⁶⁰⁶ quod “quilibet debet presumi ydoneus, donec contrarium ostendatur,” non statim debet prelatus obliquare oculos in eum de quo sinistra audivit, presertim si fuerit vite emendacioris et si talis non extiterit ante[a] eius vita vel opinio qualis nunc suggeritur esse prelato, ut dicit Gregorius. Considera considerationem Innocentii⁶⁰⁷ circumspectissimam in qua dicit quod “at[t]endendum est an is qui accusatur sit regularis, qui mundo renunciavit, annon; an excellencioris sit dignitatis; an antefuisset clare opinionis et bone fame, et graviter infamatus et valde suspectus, et utrum de facili possit puniri; an sine scandalo nequeat condemnari. [fol. 37r] Preterea utrum accusatores et testes sint honesti.”

Item videat prelatus si de facili velit et possit emendari accusatus, ne, si condemnatur et eiciatur, deterius inde contingat, sicut fit cum multis, qui, si in abbaciis suis debite punirentur, inter flagella converterentur, at eiecti et se et alios corrumpunt, et ordinem totum multipliciter scandalizant; et fiet error novissimus peior priore; et hoc introducit indiscreto prelatorum. Nam ait Augustinus:⁶⁰⁸ “Tu bonus tolera malum. Nam et Christus Iudam, cum sciret furem esse, toleravit et ad predicandum misit, eique cum aliis eucharistiam dedit. Ecce inter sanctos est Iudas, ecce fur est Iudas, et, ne contendas, fur et sacrilegus, et non qualiscumque fur, set dominicorum loculorum, set etiam sacrorum. Si[c] crimina discernuntur in fure, non qualiscumque furti set peculatus: peculatus enim furtum dicitur de re publica.” Adhuc audi Augustinum dicentem:⁶⁰⁹ “Si iudex es, si potestatem iudicandi accepisti, si apud te ecclesiastica regula accusatur, si veris documentis testibusque convincitur, coherce, corripe, excommunica, degrada,” hoc est, quod dicitur alibi, ut crescente contumacia crescat et pena.

Attende, quia scriptum est quod “de nemine desperandum est, dum in hac vita

⁶⁰⁴ Horace, *Sat.*, I, iv. 81-85.

⁶⁰⁵ Horace, *Epist.*, I, xviii, 37.

⁶⁰⁶ Innocent III, in *Decretales*, 2.23.16.

⁶⁰⁷ Innocent III, in *Decretales*, 5.3.32.

⁶⁰⁸ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 cc. 2-3.

⁶⁰⁹ Gratian, C. 23 q. 4 c. 11.

constituitur, quia nonnumquam quod diffidencia etatis differtur consilio maturiore perficitur.⁶¹⁰

Inspice modum penitendi ipsius penitentis, ut secundum hoc parcas vel aggraves. Nam dicit Augustinus in *Libro de Penitencia*:⁶¹¹ "Multum satisfactionis obtulit qui erubescencie dominans nil eorum, que commisit, nuncio Dei, id est sacerdoti, denegavit. Deus enim qui misericors et iustus est sicut conservat⁶¹² misericordiam in iusticia, ita [et] iusticiam in misericordia. Opus enim misericordie est peccanti peccata dimittere: set oportet, ut [iustus] iuste misereatur. Unde sciendum est quod dignus est misericordia, qui spirituali labore petit gratiam. Laborat enim mens paciendо erubescenciam, et quoniam erubescencia magna est pena, qui erubescit pro Christo dignus fit misericordie." Hinc est etiam quod dicit auctoritas de eo qui penitet, quod si illius conversationem et lacrimarum fontem in omnibus [fol. 37v] videritis floridis actionibus et optimis operibus pululare humanius, circa eum sollicitudo pervigil appareat. Item quamvis acutius, benignius tamen intueatur et spontaneam confessionem peccatorem prosilientem, id enim optimum pronosticum est contricionis. Nam dicit Augustinus sic:⁶¹³ "Si ultro confitetur parcatur ei, et oretur pro eo. Si autem deprehendatur aut vincatur, secundum arbitrium presbiteri vel prepositi gravius emendetur." At "nos in vicium credula turba sumus,"⁶¹⁴ et nostri moderni prelati eciam semel delinquentem semper repudiant, nauseant, et repellunt, nec ulla delinquentis penitentia quantumcumque diuturna poterit apud eos eum reparare, qui semper malum etiam modicum pensant in trutina sue severitatis, et nullum bonum in lance iusticie volunt recompensare. Contra quos dicit Ethnicus:⁶¹⁵

"Exitus acta probat. Careat successibus, opto,
quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat!"

Non enim in eo, qui vite emendacioris est per penitentiae digne fructum, notari debet presens factum secundum id quod aliquando male fecit. Unde dicit Gregorius⁶¹⁶ super illum locum Iob,⁶¹⁷ "*Ferrum de terra tollitur, et lapis solutus in eis convertitur*:" "Ter[rum] de ter[ra] tollitur, cum fortis propugnator ecclesie a terrena, quam prius tenuit, actione separatur. Non ergo in eo debet despici quod fuit, quia incipit esse quod non fuit." Attendant prelati quod David post adulterium et homicidium spiritum prophetie recepit et in proprio gradu permansit; Achab, post mortem Naboth per penitentiam humiliatus, in regia sede permansit; Petrus Christum negavit, et tamen postea factus est princeps apostolorum; et sic de multis. Audi et Dominum dicentem:⁶¹⁸ "*In qualibet die peccator conversus fuerit et ingemuerit omnium iniquitatum eius non recordabor amplius*." [S]et tu recordaris. Tibi certe dicit Iohannes Chrisostomus:⁶¹⁹ "Ubi paterfamilias largus est, dispensator non debet esse tenax. Si⁶²⁰ Deus benignus, ut quid sacerdos eius austerus vult apparere?"

Disce, disce, prelate, parcere iuveni, parcere seni. Disce quia quandoque haustu aque curatur aliquis a gravi morbo, quo alius non curatur [fol. 38r] etiam pocionibus scam[m]oneatis aut efficacibus farmaciis. Disce presumere pro emendatis et pro sese

⁶¹⁰ Leo I, in Gratian, C. 32 q. 2 c. 11;
De pen., Dist. 7 c. 1.

⁶¹¹ Gratian, *De pen.*, Dist. 1 c. 88.

⁶¹² conservant.

⁶¹³ Gratian, C. 12 q. 1 c. 11.

⁶¹⁴ Ovid, *Fasti*, IV, 312.

⁶¹⁵ Ovid, *Heroides*, II, 85-86.

⁶¹⁶ Gratian, Dist. 50 c. 18.

⁶¹⁷ Iob 28: 2.

⁶¹⁸ Ez. 18: 21-22.

⁶¹⁹ Gratian, C. 26 q. 7 c. 12.

⁶²⁰ set.

corrigentibus, quia contra incorrigibiles semper presumendum est et sentenciendum. Unde pater noster, beatus Benedictus,⁶²¹ determinat dicens: "Si fomenta apposuit et unguenta adortacionum, si medicamenta divinarum scripturarum ad unctionem excommunicationis, si demum verberum tormenta, et abbas viderit quod nil proficiat sua industria, faciat orationes fieri pro eo a fratribus. Quod si⁶²² nec profecerit, utatur abbas ferro abscisionis." Unde sic in epygramate, id est superscriptione illius capituli, dicitur: "De hiis qui sepius correcti non emendaverunt." De talibus dicitur:⁶²³

"Rumor de veteri faciet ventura timeri,
cras poterunt fieri turpia facta⁶²⁴ heri.
Passa modo Paridem pateris iam Thesea pridem,
es fractura fidem, ne redeas in idem."⁶²⁵

Attendat ergo prelatus quantum,⁶²⁶ et quem, et qua de causa puniat. Videat an, de quo agitur, ignorans fecerit: veniam enim se dicit Apostolus meruisse, quia ignorans fecit.⁶²⁷ Videat an pio zelo fecerit, ut si forte puerum iuvenem sereno vultu allocutus fuerit vir integre fame et locutionis caste a multis retro temporibus, et cum pie zelans amplexus fuerit, aut coronam eius aut faciem osculatus fuerit, non statim ideo prelatus suus iudicet eum esse sodomitam. Si elemosinam dederit coram hominibus, vel quid huiusmodi boni operis palam fecerit, non dicat eum laudes humanas sicientem. Et sic de similibus. Hoc enim modo, ut ait Porpheta,⁶²⁸ "*porunt amarum [in] dulce, et dulce [in] amarum.*"

At sunt quidam prelati, qui volunt videri ita ferventes, ita rubiginem omnem eliminantes, ut videantur occurrere omni contagio et [esse] observatores totius puritatis. Forte zelum habent, set nunc habeant zelum Phinees, zelum dico quem rogat discretio. Dum enim intemperate rubiginem eliminare contendunt, purum ferrum conterunt, et quandoque scoriam non purgant.

Oppinio quod si tria regna desinerent^{628a} in prelati, totius religionis cultus purior appareret: quorum unum [fol. 38v] est temeraria suspicio, secundum zelus sine discrimine, tercium autem ad presens duxi silendum. Qui enim sine discretione zelo utitur, calcaribus acutis urget equum sine freno effrenem. Unde dicit Gregorius: zelum tuum informat scientia, inflammet caritas, alioquin zelus tuus erit furor nimius.

Adhuc advertant prelati quod triplex est presumptio, vel suspicio. Est enim temeraria, de qua dicit auctoritas:⁶²⁹ "Nullum iudicetis suspicionis arbitrio; set primum probate, et postea caritativam proferte sententiam." Ergo omnis suspicio potius repellenda quam approbanda. Est et probabilis suspicio, que oritur contra aliquem ex credulitate bonorum virorum et ex modo vivendi eius contra quem oritur in quo multi scandalizantur, propter quod inducunt canones purgacionem alicui, vel ex alia probabili causa, ut publica et celebri laborat infamia, ita quod crimen

⁶²¹ *Regula*, c. 28; CSEL 75, 84-85.

⁶²² sic.

⁶²³ *Carmina Burana*, CLII, 17-18; in MS the order is reversed, so that the last two lines precede the first two.

⁶²⁴ sicut.

⁶²⁵ In MS the last two lines read:

*Per ossa modo, per idem per idem modo Thesea pridem,
Factura fidem, ne redeas in idem.*

⁶²⁶ quantus.

⁶²⁷ 1 Tim. 1: 13.

⁶²⁸ Isai. 5: 20.

^{628a} tria regnare signarent.

⁶²⁹ Melchisedech, in Gratian, C. 2 q. 1 c. 13.

manifestum est; non tamen confessus est aut convictus certis et legitimis probationibus, contra istam admittitur probatio in contrarium. Est et violenta suspicio, sive presumptio, ob quam statim potest dampnari is, contra quem hec⁶³⁰ stat presumptio. De hac dicit Ieronimus:⁶³¹ "*Qui tenet adulteram*⁶³² *stultus est,*" ubicumque igitur est fornicatio, vel fornicationis suspicio, libere dimittitur uxor ob talem suspicionem." Impune interficit maritus illum, cui denunciavit, ne de cetero cum uxore sua colloqueretur, quem postea invenit cum eadem.

Hec igitur sufficiant quoad hoc, ut videat⁶³³ prelati qui, qualiter, et in qua suspensione sint dampnati, et quibus fides debeat adhiberi, et quibus non.

Capitulum xvii.

Contra prelatos, qui laute vivunt, et epulantur cotidie splendide, et ornatis et curiosis vasis hauriunt pocula, et subditi eorum claustrales aridis cibis et pa[u]cis vescuntur.

Ve, qui predicas non furandum, furans; predicas ieiunandum, commensationibus tamen immergeris. Ecce quid de te et de talibus dicit Ieronimus:⁶³⁴ "Ecclesie principes, qui deliciis affluunt, et inter epulas atque delicias pudiciciam servare se credunt, eiciendi sunt, [fol. 39^r] cum eo, qui cotidie epulabatur splendide in tenebras exteriores. An non confusio et ignominia [est] Ihesum Christum crucifixum, pauperum, et esurientem, falsis corporibus predicare? et in ieiuniorum doctrinam tumentes buc[c]as tumenciæque ora proferre?" An nescis quia ministri templi prohibentur in Veteri Testamento vinum et siceram⁶³⁵ bibere, ne ebrietate graventur corda eorum, ut sensus eorum semper vigeat et tenuis sit? Nam venter pinguis crassum generat sensum, ait quidam sapiens. Dicunt seculares, cum vident prelatum turgiventris, "Ecce, ventripotens genitor."

Hii quale sepulcrum anguillarum, qualis lupo in lupos aquaticos ha[bentur]? Cur non audis Apostolum clamentem:⁶³⁶ "*Non in commensationibus, et ebrietatibus.*" Audi Ieronimum:⁶³⁷ "Venter et genitalia sibimetipsis⁶³⁸ vicina sunt, ut ex vicinitate membrorum confederatio intelligatur viciorum. Nabuzardan princeps cocorum muros Iherusalem legitur destruxisse, quia venter, cui multitudo cocorum deservit, edificia virtutum ad solum redigit."

Set dicis, cui honorem, honorem. Pessime intelligis hoc, quia non est honor honorare ventrem, quia "*qui nutriebantur croceis, amplexati sunt stercora.*"⁶³⁹ Beatus Benedictus coquinam suam [su]per se permittit abbati propter hospites reficiendos non ingurgitandos, neque se ingurgitandum.⁶⁴⁰

Antequam fuisses abbas contentus eras refectioe arida et communi conventu quem pascit porrus aridus et faba cogata. Quomodo tam delicatum nunc reddidit stomachum tuum dignitas abbacialis? Magni et delicatissimi viri seculares mundanos luxus et delicias fugiunt, ut sub te in claustro tuo sumant a vidua in Sarepta panem subcinericium et modicum oleum⁶⁴¹ de lechito, confectiones salsarum, nidores carniū, et omnes alias ventris delicias nauseantes, et tu, qui factus est magister claustrī,

⁶³⁰ hoc.

⁶³¹ Gratian, C. 32 q. 1 c. 2.

⁶³² adulterum; Prov. 18: 22.

⁶³³ videatur.

⁶³⁴ Gratian, Dist. 35 c. 4.

⁶³⁵ sinceram; throughout I have printed siceram for sinceram.

⁶³⁶ Rom. 13: 3.

⁶³⁷ Dict. Grat., Dist. 44 pars i.

⁶³⁸ semetipsis.

⁶³⁹ Lam. 4: 5.

⁶⁴⁰ *Regula*, c. 1; CSEL 75, 125.

⁶⁴¹ elei.

in confusione eorum nauseas ea, quae ipsi cum maximo sapore spirituali sumere sibi letantur ad qualemcumque suae naturae sustentationem.

Audi Ieronimum,⁶⁴² qui ait: "Ignominia sacerdotis est propriis [fol. 39v] studere divitiis. Natus in paupere domo et tugurio rusticano, quod vix milii cibario pane rugientem ventrem saturare poteram, nunc similam et mella fastidio." Dicit Seneca:⁶⁴³ "Fortuna quem nimium fovet, stultum facit."

De te fabula narratur, quia forte stultus factus es. Non potes comedere nisi amygdalam⁶⁴⁴ conditam cum variis speciebus sive in tam commixtionem habentem quot aliquis Macer aut Ypocras consultus studiose eligeret. Frixia farsita non intrabunt guttur tuum aureum, nisi habeant conductum salse aromatice; nec placet tibi coccus, nisi sciat cruciare murenulas aut anguillos pipere et aliis tormentis, quibus addantur supplicia pile pestilentis. Rusticus et agrestis fuit ille Baptista, ille plus quam Propheta, qui noluit bibere vinum et siceram; tu autem smaragdinum habens ventrem non potes ei infundere nisi nectareos haustus, vina gariofilata ruspata.

Ve, et iterum ve, et ve, quia, Veritas asserit:⁶⁴⁵ "*Ve vobis qui saturati estis quia esurietis.*" Dixit David siciens:⁶⁴⁶ "*O si quis daret mihi de aqua quae est in Bethel iuxta portam ubi habitant Philistei.*" Et viri fortes irruentes in cuneos Philistinorum attulerunt eam. At ille noluit eam bibere set libavit eam Domino, dicens:⁶⁴⁷ "*Propicius sit mihi peccatori Dominus ne faciam hoc: num sanguinem illorum, qui profecti sunt, et⁶⁴⁸ animarum periculum bibam?*" Et tu patrimonium crucifixi, quod sudoribus multis claustralium, vel conversorum, vel aliorum forsitan pauperum elaboratum est, in barat[h]rum ventris immittere non vereris.

Vide, ne et de te dicat Ethnicus:⁶⁴⁹ "Quidquid quesierat, ventri donavit avaro." Non dignaris ori tuo apponere vas ligneum a[u]t fictile, set mazelina, limpida, pollita, et levigata, aut vitrea perlucida, ydolum tuum tamquam in speculo representans.⁶⁵⁰ O, vermis! O, fex! O, qui es vas stercorum, qui vile sperma fuisti! O, qui eris esca vermium, de quo vermes et bufones venenosissimi [fol. 40r] orientur, valde irreverenti animo et infrunito effrons et impudens paras tibi artocopos et artocreas, tuis claustralibus sica faba gloriantibus. Disce dietam Ieronimi⁶⁵¹ dicentis: "Non accipiamus tales cibos, quos aut diff[ic]iles digerere aut digestos magno partos et perditos labore [doleamus]. Constat [h]olerum [et] pomorum aut leguminum [et facili]or apparatus est, et arte impendiisque cocorum non indiget, et sine cura sustentat humanum genus; moderate sumptus (quia nec avide devoratur quod irritamenta gule non habet) et leviori digestionem dequoquitur." Seneca:⁶⁵² "Parvo fames constat, magno fastidium." Ideo Lucanus:⁶⁵³ "Discite quam parvo liceat traducere vitam et quantum natura petat." Item Seneca:⁶⁵⁴ "Parabile est, quod natura desiderat." Idem:⁶⁵⁵ "Ad manum est, quod satis est." Idem:⁶⁵⁶ "Desideria naturalia finita sunt." "Facile est pascere paucos ventres et nil aliud desiderantes quam impleri."⁶⁵⁷ Dicit etiam Boecius in *Libro Consolationum*.⁶⁵⁸ "Paucis minimisque natura contenta est quam si

⁶⁴² Gratian, C. 12 q. 2 c. 71.

⁶⁴³ Pub. Syrus, *Sententiae*, 204.

⁶⁴⁴ amygdalatam.

⁶⁴⁵ Lc. 6: 25.

⁶⁴⁶ 2 Sam. 23: 15-17.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ ad.

⁶⁴⁹ Horace, *Epist.*, I, xv, 32.

⁶⁵⁰ representancia.

⁶⁵¹ Gratian, *De consecr.*, Dist. 5 c. 26.

⁶⁵² *Epist.*, XVII, 4.

⁶⁵³ *Pharsalia*, IV, 377-378.

⁶⁵⁴ *Epist.*, IV, 10.

⁶⁵⁵ Seneca, *Epist.*, IV, 11.

⁶⁵⁶ Seneca, *Epist.*, XVI, 9.

⁶⁵⁷ Seneca, *Epist.*, XVII, 4.

⁶⁵⁸ *Consolat. Philos.*, II, *Pros.* V, 44-46.

superfluis urgere velis aut iniucundum fiet quod infuderis aut noxium." Et Ieronimus dicit:⁶⁵⁹ "Animas ita nimio sanguine et adipibus quasi luto involutas, nil tenue, id est subtile, nil celeste cogitare." Ideo signanter precepit Dominus:⁶⁶⁰ "*Videte ne graventur corda vestra in crapula, et ebrietate.*" Docet te Horacius⁶⁶¹ quam proficius est mediocris cibus, dicens:

"Accipe nunc victus tenuis que quantaque secum
adferat.⁶⁶² in primis valeas bene nam varie res
ut noceant homini credas, memor illius esce,
que simplex olim⁶⁶³ tibi sederit: at simul⁶⁶⁴ assis
miscueris elixa,⁶⁶⁵ simul conchilia turdis,⁶⁶⁶
dulcia se in bilem vertunt stomachoque tumultum
lenta feret pituita.⁶⁶⁷ vides ut pallidus omnis
cena desurgat dubia? quin corpus honestum
hesternis vitiis⁶⁶⁸ animum quoque pregravat⁶⁶⁹ una,
atque affigit humo divine particulam aure,"

id est animam. Unde Ieronimus:⁶⁷⁰ "Irridet Oracius appetitum ciborum, qui consumpti relinquunt penitenciam." [fol. 40v].

De aliis duobus generibus luxus, scilicet habitu curioso et carnali incontinenia prelatorum, item de eorum cupiditate et ambitione et avaricia et proprietate, item de eorum arrogancia et superbia et elatione, hic supersedeo non tracturus de eis quoad istos articulos nisi de speciali voluntate vestra et mandato. De hiis enim et quinque modis gule, et de generibus abstinenciarum et de gastrimargia⁶⁷¹ et suis circumstantiis diffusum et amplum tractatum scripsi ad rogatum quorundam scolarium, dum adhuc in Egypto Lombardie sederem in cathedra pestilencie contempnens Hebraos.

Capitulum xviij.

Contra prelatos, qui de proprio ingenio confisi consilium a suis subditis querere contempnunt, et si forte aliquem de senioribus consulunt, iuniores et minores consulere dedignantur.

Si verum est, immo quia verum est, quod dicit Salomon:⁶⁷² "*Salus est ubi multa consilia,*" ergo quasi a destructione consequentis, ubi nulla consilia, non est salus. Quoniam ergo ausus es inniti prudencie tue contra Salomonis doctrinam, ideo penitebis. Audi Salomonem:⁶⁷³ "*Vidisti hominem sapientem sibi videri? Magis illo spem habebit stultus.*" Ait Gregorius:⁶⁷⁴ "[t]ultus est, qui in eo estimat se primum, ut bona, que viderit, discere contempnat." Nam ut ait quidam philosophus: optima ratio vivendi, discendi cupiditas; et ideo si unum pedem haberem in sepulcro, adhuc discere vellem.

Senes consulendi⁶⁷⁵ sunt, quos quia Roboam filius Salomonis spernit adherens

⁶⁵⁹ Gratian, *De consecr.*, Dist. 5 c. 29.

⁶⁶⁰ Lc. 21: 34.

⁶⁶¹ *Sat.*, II, ii, 70-79.

⁶⁶² afferet.

⁶⁶³ olei.

⁶⁶⁴ ac semel.

⁶⁶⁵ clymque.

⁶⁶⁶ tardis.

⁶⁶⁷ propinata.

⁶⁶⁸ epulis.

⁶⁶⁹ pergravat.

⁶⁷⁰ Gratian, *De consecr.*, Dist. 5 c. 30.

⁶⁷¹ castrimargia.

⁶⁷² Prov. 11: 14; 24: 6.

⁶⁷³ Prov. 26: 12.

⁶⁷⁴ Gratian, Dist. 22 c. 4.

⁶⁷⁵ consulendum.

iunioribus, recesserunt ab eo decem tribus, et translatum est regnum in Ieroboam. Consulendi etiam sunt iuvenes ingenio perspicaciores et vite modestioris. Si enim aliquid revelatum fuerit sedenti, hoc est inferiori, superior^{675a} tacet. Unde ait Ieronimus:⁶⁷⁶ "Pessima consuetudo est in quibusdam ecclesiis tacere presbiteros, et presentibus episcopis [non] loqui." Audi, audi et Augustinum:⁶⁷⁷ [fol. 41 r] "Si tibi," inquit, "quod iuste fiat Dominus revelaverit, nequaquam iuvenile[m] etatem tuam et honoris ecclesiastici rudimenta contempno. Senex enim a iuvene, et episcopus tot annorum a collegio meo necdum anniculo paratus sum doceri, quomodo possum [vel Deo] vel hominibus iustam reddere rationem." Unde dixit lex secularis:⁶⁷⁸ "Ubi tractatur publica utilitas, nulla maiori irrogatur iniuria, si a minori veritas investigatur." A[u]ctoritas beati Clementi dicit: reperitur auri vena quandoque preter spem in valde horrenti et deserto loco.

Ideo tam a minimis quam a maximis consilium est expetendum; nec etiam res amissa sepius reperitur, ubi esse nullo modo putabatur? At tu sapiens vis videri, et vis tue prudencie, immo verius impudencie, omnia adscribi.⁶⁷⁹ Aut es homo invidentis arrogancie aut magne insipientie.

Capitulum xix.

Contra prelatum, qui modicam, vel nullam, curam habet de infirmis fratribus.

Doleo quia non doles, eo quod nescis dolere cum dolentibus, flere cum flentibus, nescis et cum Paulo infirmantibus compati, nec es factus infirmis infirmus. Doleo te esse maledictum, eo quod Benedictum, patrem nostrum, non attendis, qui quanta sollicitudine compassionis curandi sint infirmi ostendit, dicens:⁶⁸⁰ "Ante omnia et super omnia infirmorum" instandum est curationi: "ante omnia," ut omnibus aliis postpositis hec cura precedat; "super omnia," ut sedulius et diligentius hec cura agatur. Unde dicit Ieronimus:⁶⁸¹ "Qui clemenciam non habet, neque indutus⁶⁸² est viscera misericordie et lacrimarum, quamvis spiritualis sit, non adimplet legem Christi." Nisi opus esset caritatis curare infirmos, Veritas tibi non esset dictura:⁶⁸³ "*Infirmitas fui et non visitasti me, vel curasti. Esurivi,*" et cetera. Nam et "*Benefacite*⁶⁸⁴ *hiis qui oderunt vos,*" precepit Dominus; quanto magis domesticis et bonis! Dicit enim Ambrosius:⁶⁸⁵ "Omnibus detur misericordia, iusto amplius." Ut quid, ut qui[d] pavisset quinque milia hominum pastor bonus, si dimittere eos fame mori bonum fuisset? Ut quid languidos curasset, si⁶⁸⁶ bonum esset eis in morbi sui causa relinquere [fol. 41 v] eos morti? Salomon:⁶⁸⁷ "*Panis egencium vita pauperum es. Qui defraudat illum homo sanguinis est*" ut ait Augustinus.⁶⁸⁸ Et etiam Ambrosius:⁶⁸⁹ "Pasce fame morientem. Si non pavisti, occidisti." Similiter alio periculo morientem subleva quo potes auxilio; si non feceris, occidisti, Seneca dicente: qui succurrere potest periculo, nec succurrit, occidit. Nam generale est:⁶⁹⁰ "Qui occasionem dampni dat, dampnum dedisse videtur." Quare consuleret Apostolus Thymoteum sic:⁶⁹¹ "*Noli adhuc bibere*

675a prior.

676 Gratian, Dist. 95 c. 7.

677 Gratian, C. 24 q. 3 c. 1.

678 Cod. Just., 1.40.5.

679 abscribi.

680 *Regula*, c. 36; CSEL 75, 95.

681 Gratian, Dist. 86 c. 22.

682 inductus.

683 Matt. 25: 42.

684 Benefacere; Matt. 5: 44; Luc. 6: 27.

685 Gratian, Dist. 86 c. 14.

686 scilicet.

687 Eccli. 34: 25.

688 Gratian, C. 14 q. 5 c. 2.

689 amborum; Gratian, Dist. 86 c. 21.

690 Gregory IX, in Decretales, 5.36.9.

691 1 Tim. 5: 23.

aquam, set modico vino utere propter stomachum," si bonum non esset physice consulere membri et corporis infirmitati?

Nequaquam ipsa Veritas attestaretur quia male habenti[bus] opus est medicus.^{691a} Quomodo ergo audes negare proximo et fratri tuo opem medicine, qua opus habet? Si enim negas id, quo opus habet, negas opem, et si negas opem, quid aliud facis quam interficis? Fatuum ore censeo, cum possit brevi censu mederi morbo et morbidus restitui sanitati, quo commodior possit esse quibus negociis, eo negato morbosum non sine dispendio et onere domus diuturna in valetudine detinere. Set fatuum esse puto eum cum difficultate et magna sollempnitate recepissee in suum monachum, et tam facili delinquere periclitantem.

At secundum leges humanas, pater non potest filium, nec dominus servum, nec patronus liberum repetere, quem expositum quodammodo ad mortem alterius voluntas misericordie amica collegerit. Et sunt verba legis hec:⁶⁹² "Nec enim suum dicere poterit, quem pereuntem fame contempsit." Quomodo ergo monachus, si convaluerit, cuius curam dereliquisti, poterit dicere te esse suum patrem aut prelatum nisi propter humilitatem obediencie? Tu tamen qua fronte dices illum tuum esse monachum?

Set super omnia miranda mirum est quod, si vilis ovicula scabie infecta sit, curritur ad forum venale, emitur sulphur, emuntur alia, que ad curam scabiei et pruriginis ovis moribunde sunt necessaria; at de morbo hominis dicunt: "hec est in nostro pectore cura minor." Si claudicat equus, si quo morbo infectus fuerit, consuluntur ypomedici, id est marescalli, [fol. 42^r] et pro cura equi unius multa effunditur in multis et variis medicamentis pecunia. Quid tibi videtur proximus: pecus, an equus, an homo?

Non iudicaverunt Iudei, apud Dominum, sacerdotem et levitam transeuntes proximos, set Samaritanum, qui infudit in vulneribus afflicti vinum et oleum. At sunt quidam prelati, qui arridentes suis subditis blandissimo verbo et gemituoso dicunt: "Amantissime, quomodo tibi est? Vere multum condoleo tibi. Ihesus Christus, per preces beatissime matris sue, advocate nostre, det tibi sanitatem." Quibus dicit, qui de pectore Domini virtutem hausit:⁶⁹³ "*Filioli mei, non diligamus verbo neque lingua.*" Obloquitur etiam Iacobus⁶⁹⁴ hiis falsis et aridis blandimentis sic: "*Si frater aut soror nudi sint,⁶⁹⁵ et indigeant⁶⁹⁶ victu cotidiano, dicat autem aliquis de vobis illis: Ite in pace; caleficimini et saturamini; non dederitis [eis] autem que necessaria sunt corpori, quid proderit?*" Iohannes Evangelista⁶⁹⁷ quemdam excommunicavit, in tertia epistola sua, Diotrep[h]em nomine, quia pauperes non respiciebat, quia dicit Apostolus ad Tymoteum:⁶⁹⁸ "*Exerce te ad pietatem. Nam corporalis exercitatio, ad modicum utilis est: pietas autem ad omnia utilis est, habens promissionem vite, que nunc est, et future.*"

Ad quid resuscitasset pius Ihesus amicum suum Lazarum, qui ad lacrimas sororum eius motus est et flevit cum flentibus, nisi hoc esset opus pietatis? Auctor nature humane conditioni compassus est, et tu compati negligis. Hospitalitatem teneris exercere apud peregrinos, quia caritatem teneris habere, et piam exhibitionem subtrahis tuis, immo, eis quibus a Deo commune est quidquid abbacia habet sicut et tibi. Si infirmaris, de bonis ecclesie queris pocionis olearia et unguenta, et pauperi

^{691a} medico; Matt. 9: 12.

⁶⁹² Cod. Just., 8.51.2.

⁶⁹³ 1 Io. 3: 18.

⁶⁹⁴ Iac. 2: 15.

⁶⁹⁵ sunt.

⁶⁹⁶ indigent.

⁶⁹⁷ 3 Io. 9.

⁶⁹⁸ 1 Tim. 4: 7.

claustrali claudis ea et denegas. Set qua conscientia, quod tibi vis fieri, alii[s] non facis, dic. Cur domus infirmorum, que dicitur nosocomium,⁶⁹⁹ et orphanorum, que dicitur orphanotrophium ubi orphani et pupilli aluntur, constitute sunt, nisi ut ibi curarentur et alerentur? Nec sufficit dicere ut [fol. 42v] utaris⁷⁰⁰ herbis, que in [h]ortis abbacie crescunt. Nam debes prius vasa ecclesie vendere quam ob defectum tuum moriatur infirmus, vel non es in caritate neque caritatis minister cum ea, que in presenti habes, non prosunt ad curam infirmi.

Audi Ieronimum:⁷⁰¹ "An ignoramus, quantum auri, quantum argenti de templo Domini Assirii sustulerunt? Nonne melius conflatur sacerdos propter alimoniam pauperum, si aliqua⁷⁰² subsidia desunt? Nonne dicturus est Dominus: 'Cur passus es inopes fame mori?' Et certe habebas aurum unde ministrasses alimoniam. Melius fuerat ut vasa vivencium servares quam metallorum. Ornatus sacrorum redemptio est captivorum. Ille verus⁷⁰³ thesaurus est Domini, qui operatur quod sanguis eius operatus est." Et tu, domine prelate, parcis pecunie languente monacho vel converso tuo: prefers ergo pecuniam homini. Cum omnes res temporales sint pro homine et sub homine, cum possis habere medicos et medicinas ad opus infirmorum, non excusaris, immo accusaris, si non habes. Vide quia dicit Ieronimus:⁷⁰⁴ "Certe habebas aurum per quod ministrasses⁷⁰⁵ alimoniam;" "per quod" intellige quidquid expedit et necessarium est sue infirmitati, non panem tantum et communem victum sanorum intellige, quia nil infirmo prosunt quandoque. Si tantum panem dare vulnerato sufficeret, Samaritanus vinum et oleum non infudisset.

Super illum locum, "*Ecce quam bonum et quam iocundum habi[tare] fratres in unum.*"⁷⁰⁶ dicit auctoritas:⁷⁰⁷ "Illi vero [non] habitant in unum, qui a fratrum solacio se subtrahunt." Item dicit lex:⁷⁰⁸ "Dolo facit, qui cum pro[h]ibere potest, non prohibet." Et item:⁷⁰⁹ "Qui non facit quod debet, videtur facere adversus ea⁷¹⁰ que debet." Itaque an freneticum an hereticum nescio, humanum tamen non sapit verbum prelati dicentis de infirmo monacho: "Dimit[t]amus eum mori, quia citius veniet ad gloriam. Plus diligo unum mortuum quam duos vivos, quia ad Deum vadunt." Set certe, licet ad Deum vadat, tu qui teneris super afflictum pia gestare viscera et succurrere, si potes, tu non vadis ad Deum, qui sic [fol. 43r] loqueris, set magis recedis a Deo, quia Deum in membro suo non visitas, nec debitam prestas alimoniam. Perversa consolatio est, que desolationem inducit.

Si lex evangelica, vel canonica, vel lex nature qua aliis debes facere quod tibi vis fieri, et aliis non facere quod tibi non vis fieri,⁷¹¹ non monet te, audi saltem legem Moysi, ut adaperiat Dominus cor tuum in lege sua et in preceptis suis. Scriptum est in Deuteronomio sic:⁷¹² "*Circumcidite⁷¹³ prepucium cordis vestri, et cervicem vestram, ne induretis amplius, quia Dominus Deus vester ipse est Deus deorum, Dominus dominancium, Deus magnus et potens et terribilis, qui personam non accipit nec munera. Facit iudicium pupillo et vidue, amat peregrinum et dat ei victum ac vestitum. Et vos ergo amate peregrinos, quia ipsi advene fuisti in*

⁶⁹⁹ nosotochium.

⁷⁰⁰ utatur.

⁷⁰¹ Properly, Ambrose, in Gratian, C. 12 q. 2 c. 7.

⁷⁰² set aliquando.

⁷⁰³ vere.

⁷⁰⁴ Properly, Ambrose, in Gratian, C. 12 q. 2 c. 7.

⁷⁰⁵ ministrasset.

⁷⁰⁶ Ps. 132: 1.

⁷⁰⁷ Pope Alexander, in Gratian, C. 3 q. 1 c. 5.

⁷⁰⁸ Dig., 15.1.36; 50.17.109.

⁷⁰⁹ Dig., 50.17.121.

⁷¹⁰ eam.

⁷¹¹ Dict. Grat., Dist. 1 init.

⁷¹² Deut. 10: 16.

⁷¹³ circumcudit.

terra Egypti.” Ergo monacho, alienigene, et converso humili et pauperi faciendum est solacium et cura impendenda, sicut generoso, indigene, nobili et potenti. Eque enim sapientibus et insipientibus debitorem se factum esse Paulus profitetur.⁷¹⁴

Sequere et audi Moysem dicentem:⁷¹⁵ “*Si unus de fratribus tuis, qui morantur infra portas civitatis tue, in terra quam Dominus Deus tuus daturus est tibi, ad paupertatem venerit: non obdurabis cor tuum, set aperies manum tuam pauperi, et dabis ei mutuum, quo eum indigere perspexeris. Nec ages quippiam callide*⁷¹⁶ *in eius necessitatibus sublevandis, ut benedicat tibi Dominus Deus tuus in omni tempore, et in cunctis ad que manum miseris. Idcirco ego precipio tibi, ut aperias manum tuam fratri tuo, egeno et pauperi, qui tecum versatur in terra.*” Ecce generaliter dicit, “in necessitatibus,” et “precipio” dicit, ut intelligas te de precepto non in una necessitate, puta famis a[u]t sitis, set in omni alia teneri subvenire necessitatem patienti.

Imprecatur sibi Iob dicens:⁷¹⁷ “*Si negavi quod volebant pauperibus,*” et iterum ait:⁷¹⁸ “*Flebam quondam super eo qui afflictus erat, et compaciebatur anima mea pauperi.*” At nostri prelati ita frugi volunt esse domui sue, ut boni et fideles patresfamilias videantur, ut nec etiam infirmis subveniant. [fol. 43v].

Capitulum xx.

De novicio primo recipiendo in capitulo, bono clerico et maxime a[u]ctoritatis viro.

Congratulamini mihi, quia ecce reperimus dragmam perditam; filius prodigus ad patrem penitens revertitur, qui substantiam paternam, bona scilicet naturalia, cum meretricibus, id est secularibus scienciis (que sunt silique porcorum, quibus ventrem, hoc est mentem suam, saturabat) consumpsit; ecce reportat bonus pastor ovem perditam in humero; ecce de spoliis Egipciorum ditantur hodie Hebrei. Set ecce venit mulier ad puteum haurire aquas. Mollicierum secularium penus mulier est, set venit ad profundum religionis haurire aquas sapientie salutatis. Quia “*beatus homo quem tu erudieris, Do[m]ine, et de le[ge] tua docu[eris] eum,*”⁷¹⁹ non lege Iustiniana, set illa, que est “*lex Domini im[maculata], conver[tens] animas,*”⁷²⁰ felix transitus a decretis Gratiani ad decreta benedicta Benedicti. Ergo, fratres mei, mactemus ei vitulum saginatum, tympanum pulsemus, et chorum [agamus] foris stantibus invidentibus, qui volunt intrare ad nupcias sponsi et sponse.

Amice, si cum David facis et dicis, “*Introibo in domum t[ua]m in ho[locaustis],*”⁷²¹ ut tu te facias totum incensum, tunc veni, et introduceris in hanc cellam vivariam. Si mundo renuncias, et⁷²² si tibi ipsi renuncias, ut iuxta quod ait Augustinus⁷²³ — “Non solum facultatibus set et voluntatibus propriis” — et vice Dei hominem statuas supra caput tuum; si potes contempnere mundum et neminem contempnere, tunc veni, et ingredere in hanc sanctam civitatem. Si potes exinanire te ipsum prorsus constitutis ieiuniis, ordinariis vigiliis et officiis, laboribus indictis secundum precepta et nutus tui presidentis, et omni [e]mancipati servitutis officio pro eo, qui⁷²⁴ exinavit semetipsum formam servi accipiens, cui servire regnare est, tunc venias in domum Domini tui⁷²⁵ in omni humilitate et patientia [ita] paratus obedire imperiis maioris

⁷¹⁴ Rom. 1: 14.

⁷¹⁵ Deut. 15: 7-11.

⁷¹⁶ callidum.

⁷¹⁷ Iob 31: 16.

⁷¹⁸ Iob 30: 25.

⁷¹⁹ Ps. 93: 12.

⁷²⁰ Ps. 18: 8.

⁷²¹ Ps. 65: 13.

⁷²² set.

⁷²³ Gratian, C. 12 q. 1 c. 11.

⁷²⁴ quod.

⁷²⁵ sui.

tui, quisquis et qualis ipse sit, ut in uno oculorum tuorum et in uno crine colli tui, hoc est caritate et humilitate, vulneres [te] cum sponsa eius,^{725a} qui pro te lancea vulneratus est, in eo et pro eo, qui factus est patri obediens usque ad mortem, [fol. 44^v] mortem autem crucis, tunc veni in ortum sponsi cum sponsa. Si vis esse pusillus ut⁷²⁶ Zacheus, tunc ascende arborem sichomorum, ut subtus te videas mundi sterilitatem et despicias. Alioquin, si hoc nolueris, non eris dignus eo, qui dixit:⁷²⁷ "*Qui non renunciat patri et matri et omnibus que possidet,*" et cetera.

Affige te cruci veri crucifixi; cumcrucifigaris ei, ut conresurgas et cumregnes. Si vis et potes mortificare membra tua, ortante Apostolo,⁷²⁸ pro eo cuius omnia ossa dinumeraverunt, et cuius membra extenderunt in crucis patibulo, tunc intra et hanc archam Noe, quia, ut ait Ieronimus:⁷²⁹ "Omnis, qui inventus fuerit extra archam, peribit regnante diluvio," et [vere extra eam sunt]⁷³⁰ qui adhuc in diluvio carnis et fluxus secularis natant. Quidam egregius versificator egregie te ortatur sic:

In cruce sudavit Dominus, servus ne quiescat.

Tolle tuam, tulit ipse suam; gustavit acetum, fac et idem; non maior erit reverencia servi quam domini. Si vis suus esse secutor, oportet tormentis tormenta sequi: non itur ad astra deliciis. Ideo mortem quam solvere debes nature, persolve Deo; moriaris in illo. Quandoquidem mortem non est vitare, vere transeat in formam virtutis.

Memento quod accedis huc, ubi vere philosophie viget studium. Tu ergo, cum tuo Socrate pergente Athenas ad philosophandum et abiciente immensum pondus auri, totum aurum tuum abicias, [id est] totam scientie secularis pre[e]minenciam, excellenciam, [et] fulgiditatem. Si vis in nostris Athenis vere studere, ubi immortalibus studetur vite perhempnis doctrinis, Athene enim immortales interpretantur, et si vis studere in immortalitate, abicienda sunt mortalia et caduca, referente Ieronimo:⁷³¹ "Non putavit Socrates se posse et simul [virtutes] et divitias possidere." Lex etiam humana,⁷³² tu forte melius nosti, dicit quod "vere philosophantes pecuniam contempnunt." Totum igitur, quod habes, abicias, quia quidquid homo possidet aut habet, nomine pecunie censetur, ut in utroque [fol. 44^v] iure didicisti. Set et te totum abicias, si eligis "*abiectus esse in domo D[ei] m[ei] magis quam h[ab]itare in ta[bernaculis] peccatorum.*"⁷³³ Agnosce illud satirici:⁷³⁴ "Cum tamen a figulis munitam intra-veris urbem sarcofaco contentus eris. Mors sola fatetur quantula sunt hominum corpuscula." Igitur, "si potes Archiacis conviva recombere lectis" et "vile olus" cum Diogene "modica cenare patella,"^{734a} ut penitus Aristippum exuas, et sub tugurio paupercule videue acceptes panem subcinericium, et hec alia prius dicta volueris, protestare palam et ad honorem Dei vivi et veri.⁷³⁵

^{725a} eum.

⁷²⁶ et.

⁷²⁷ Lc. 14: 33.

⁷²⁸ Col. 3: 5.

⁷²⁹ Gratian, C. 24 q. 1 c. 25.

⁷³⁰ The reading of these four words, difficult because of a wrinkle in the MS, has been supplied by R. Hunt, Keeper of Western MSS, Bodleian Library.

⁷³¹ Gratian, C. 12 q. 2 c. 7. For Socrates, read Crates; cf. Jerome, Epistola LVIII (Ad Paulinum), PL 22, 319.

⁷³² Dig., 50.5.8.

⁷³³ Ps. 83: 11.

⁷³⁴ Juvenal, *Sat.*, X, 171-172.

^{734a} Horace, *Ep.*, I, v, 1-2.

⁷³⁵ Deo vivo et vero.

*Domine*⁷³⁶ *labia mea aperies et os meum annuntiabit laudem tuam.*

*Deus in [adiutorium] meum intende, Domine ad adiuvandam me festina.*⁷³⁷

Anno domini millesimo quadringentesimo secundo.

Anno domini millesimo quadringente.⁷³⁸

Kent State University.

⁷³⁶ The following four lines are written in
a hand later than that of the text foregoing.

⁷³⁷ Ps. 50: 17, 69: 2.

⁷³⁸ This line is written in a hand different
from that of the four lines preceding.

Current Trends in Mediaeval Bibliography: A Progress Report

DONALD FINLAY

BEFORE the annual meeting of the Mediaeval Academy of America in Toronto, there was held on April 6-7, 1967, at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, a conference on mediaeval bibliography. This conference grew out of one held at Brown University in 1965 [MedSt. 27 (1965)] and another held in November 1966 at the University of California, Davis, and continued the discussions of the possibility of more adequate control of the bibliography of Mediaeval Studies. Progress reports into bibliographical projects begun since 1965 were also received.

This third conference was made possible by grants from UNESCO, the Canada Council and the American Council of Learned Societies. Among those attending the Toronto meeting were: Mlle. M. T. d'Alverny (Paris), Aldo S. Bernardo (Binghamton), Loy Bilderback (Fresno State College), Thomas J. Condon (American Council of Learned Societies), Peter Dronke (Cambridge), Donald F. Finlay (Toronto), Robert S. Hoyt (Minnesota), John Leyerle (Toronto), Harrison T. Meserole (Modern Language Association), James J. Murphy (Univ. Cal., Davis), Richard H. Rouse (Univ. Cal., L. A.), Peter H. Sawyer (Minnesota), Richard J. Schoeck (Toronto), Lawrence K. Shook (Toronto), and Lynn R. White (Univ. Cal., L. A.). Richard J. Schoeck and James J. Murphy acted as co-chairmen for the three sessions that were held.

The first of the progress reports was made by Mlle. d'Alverny who outlined in great detail the work of the Centre d'Études Supérieures de Civilisation Médiévale at Poitiers and its publication *Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale*. The annual bibliography of this journal, arranged by subject with numerous cross references, gives excellent coverage for the period from the tenth to the twelfth century. Mlle. d'Alverny pointed out that two steps were contemplated to render this bibliography more useful to its readers. The number of cross references was to be reduced and a list of the periodicals from which the bibliographical items were extracted was to be included. While remarking on the international coverage of this bibliography (over 250 periodicals in all languages), Mlle. d'Alverny indicated that the directors of this project hope to extract from periodicals in eastern languages especially Arabic. Another bibliographical centre

with which Mlle. d'Alverny is connected is the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes. One project the Institut has undertaken besides the continuing compilation of its *Bulletin* describing new manuscript sources is the publication of an onomasticon Arabicum. This onomasticon will be based on the Arabic sources and will cover the period from the beginning of Islam to the sixteenth century.

The Centre for Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies at the University of California has also continued its efforts in bibliographical research. Dr. Richard Rouse reported that his *Annotated Guide to Serial Bibliography*, which surveys current bibliographies in mediaeval studies, would go to press in the summer of 1967. A further project of Dr. Rouse's will be a critical bibliography of review articles on various fields of study, e.g.: Patristic Studies in the last ten years. Such a bibliography would be useful either for young teachers preparing a course of lectures or students engaged in a new area of study. Finally, the Centre plans, at least tentatively, a bibliography of bibliographies that have appeared since World War II.

The History Department of the University of Minnesota has also undertaken a bibliographical project under the direction of Robert S. Hoyt and Peter H. Sawyer. Professor Sawyer reported on this work. Called an International Mediaeval Bibliography, it will provide on three by five inch cards a complete listing of all the articles, notes, books and reviews published in a selected list of one hundred and fifty periodicals in each quarter of a year. Such an arrangement will provide promptness of publication and ease of assemblage and should be, therefore, both current and cumulative. The periodicals will be international in coverage and it is hoped that once the project is under way the number of periodicals listed will be greatly increased. The bibliography covers the period from the accession of Diocletian to the end of the fifteenth century and its scope will include works on theology, philosophy, history, liturgy, art, architecture, literature, numismatics and archaeology. The geographical area covered will extend from Spain to Scandinavia and Russia and include the Byzantine Empire.

A pilot project to study the methods of electronical data analysis and their application to the bibliographical problems of mediaeval studies was one of the results of the Davis conference. Using the first three volumes of *Speculum* a group of mediaeval scholars and computer technicians at Fresno State College prepared a computer program that would provide a bibliography of all this journal's articles, notes and reviews. Reporting to the delegates on the success of this first effort, Professor Loy Bilderback assured them of the economic feasibility as well as the real value for scholarly work of such computer systems. One would seek information from a co-ordinating bibliographical centre where the request would be

processed individually and promptly and a specific bibliography would then be sent to the interested scholar.

The conference was assured of the support of the Modern Language Association in any attempts to achieve a comprehensive mediaeval bibliography. This aid would be by way of reasonable co-operation between MLA and any group drawing up a complete bibliography of mediaeval studies. The material gathered by MLA bibliographers would be turned over to mediaeval bibliographers in return for any help and expert knowledge such bibliographers could give to aid the MLA in preparing its bibliography. Professor Harrison Messerole, MLA's representative at the conference, gave many practical guidelines to be observed in any attempts to compile a bibliography. He also underlined the necessity of considering computer system as the only really adequate method of compiling bibliographies in the future and described MLA's venture into automated bibliography preparation.

However, computerized bibliographical control must be viewed with certain caution as Thomas Condon of ACLS pointed out. The expert knowledge available within a certain discipline is not sufficient to solve the problems that computers present. Contact with the experts in the field of computer science is absolutely necessary for a successful bibliographical project. Those in the humanistic sciences can insure a successful encounter with computer scientists if they will decide what they actually want or need and then present these needs to the automation experts. The ACLS hopes to assemble a technical group to analyze the problems of co-ordination and centralization of bibliographical information. This group would then advise scholarly organizations in the latter's efforts to computerize bibliographical control of their literature.

The future of the efforts at continuing the work of the conference was insured by an important invitation. Professor Messerole asked members of the conference to attend a meeting at Penn State of its biennial bibliography conference. This conference will be held in November of 1968 and will provide an opportunity to discuss the possibilities of co-operation among the isolated efforts at producing bibliographies in the social and humanistic sciences. The members of the conference accepted with gratitude this invitation.

Two other recommendations were made to further this work:

1. Resolved to urge that all possible efforts be made to speed up the progress towards uniformed and synthesized citation in bibliographies published in North America.
2. Resolved to urge that a bibliography committee in mediaeval studies be constituted.

REPORT OF A THESIS DEFENDED AT
THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

Robert of Flamborough, Liber Poenitentialis

J. J. FRANCIS FIRTH

Robert of Flamborough held the office of penitentiary among the canons at the Abbey of Saint-Victor in Paris near the beginning of the thirteenth century. It was his duty to hear confessions, especially those of the students at the University of Paris, who were all, or nearly all, clerics. At the request of his friend, Richard Poore, Dean of Salisbury, he composed a small book of instructions for confessors regarding the proper way to hear confessions and impose penance.

This treatise is in the form of a dialogue between a penitent confessing his sins and a confessor. The confessor questions the penitent at great length and the latter replies, sometimes asking for explanations and guidance. Through the words of the priest the author indicates how he thinks a confessor should deal with a penitent. Sometimes, but not always, the confessor gives reasons which are intended to instruct the reader in the theory and practice of hearing confessions. At the end of the treatise the author has copied from some old collections of canon law a list of texts indicating penances for different kinds of sins. He considers that these penitential canons, which in his time were already quite obsolete, should be the norm by which the confessor is to estimate the proper penance for each sin.

By a study of the manuscript tradition this editor has found that Flamborough most probably composed his treatise in the form of a continuous dialogue. Even in this primitive form of the work he made considerable use of canonical sources, sometimes explicitly citing them. This earliest redaction of the Penitential, which the editor has called Form W, cannot have been composed earlier than 1198 A.D. and was probably completed before 1208.

Later our author became more thoroughly acquainted with his sources and found new ones. Noteworthy among these sources are the commentary on the *Decretum* of Gratian by a great canonist, Huguccio of Pisa, the moral teaching of Robert Courson, and many decretal letters of Popes including several quite close to his own time. Using this increased fund of information, Robert revised his work, enlarging it and dividing it into five books with chapters and subdivisions. The fruit of this first revision is called Form O; it must have been completed not earlier than 1208, nor yet very long afterwards. A second revision, still within the period 1208-1213, resulted in Form A, the final complete form published in the present edition. Actually both revisions seem to have been accomplished in stages, resulting in a confusion of texts in many manuscripts which represent several phases of the development.

The revisions mentioned thus far were the work of the original author; other changes, such as the division into ten books in manuscripts KP and the references in manuscript X to legislation passed at the Fourth Lateran Council, cannot have been the work of Flamborough. In addition, four of the manuscripts contain an appendix to the Penitential which contests the author's stand on two points of canon law. This

appendix of two or three paragraphs was written by a contemporary anonymous author.

The primary purpose of this edition is to present the text of Form A, which is the author's final complete redaction of his work, in idiom as close as possible to the wording employed by Robert himself. This task has been made more difficult by a lack of literary skill on the part of the author; here and there he allowed a text to be included which was grammatically incorrect or which did not make good sense. This difficulty has been compounded by contamination of the manuscript tradition at the hands of scribes. Sometimes they would correct the text from the current wording of church law or by their own conjecture; or again they would correct manuscripts of one tradition from those of another.

A treatise such as this can be properly understood only if it is compared with its sources. For this reason a search has been made for the immediate sources which Robert used. When more remote sources happen to have been found, these too are usually indicated, as well as parallel passages from contemporary literature.

It is also necessary to know something about the history of penance in the Church and especially about the thought and teaching on this subject current in the author's own day. By Flamborough's time the solemn, public penance which had been normal in the early Church had fallen into disuse except for a few especially odious crimes; instead private administration of penance was the general rule. Most theologians at this time taught that the guilt of sin was remitted, not by any action of the priest, but rather by God himself acting through the grace of contrition granted directly to the penitent. The power of the priest was considered to be effective rather in his imposition of penance.

Robert in his Penitential expresses a personal conviction regarding this exercise of authority by the confessor. The priest, he maintains, must impose the penance prescribed by the canons handed down "from the holy fathers," with due regard however for the circumstances and strength of the penitent. If the confessor fails to do this, he will be responsible before God for his neglect of duty; but the penitent, if he performs this penance with generous good faith, will be released from temporal punishment for those sins. On the other hand, if the penitent, although sincerely contrite, is unwilling to undergo the full rigours of the traditional penance, the confessor may consent to mitigate this requirement to practically any degree, but he must warn the repentant sinner that his remaining debt will have to be made up under the avenging hand of God either in this world or in purgatory.

It is the editor's contention that the most important feature of this Penitential is its application of law to the individual in confession. In the century preceding its publication, canon law had evolved from a conglomeration of haphazardly arranged and sometimes contradictory texts into a thoroughly organized, consistent system. This renewal of ecclesiastical law had been begun under the influence of the Gregorian Reform; it had been directed by the study of the old Roman civil law in the schools, and had been further made effective by the legislative activity of Popes issuing decretals and of ecclesiastical courts enforcing them. The new "scientific" canon law had not affected the practice of confession to any great extent until Robert of Flamborough composed his short treatise. In his Penitential this law was put within reach of the ordinary priest who heard confessions, becoming a norm for his and the penitent's activity.

Thus the influence of the Gregorian Reform and of the canon law which it had engendered entered into a new and effective field of action, namely the direction given to the penitent by the confessor. This, no doubt, brought about a more uni-

versal observance of reform measures. The effectiveness of reforming synods, now becoming more common, was supported by an appeal to men's consciences and an insistence that the law be observed if one were to attain salvation.

At the same time Flamborough's Penitential inculcates a conception of law and morality somewhat different from that which had prevailed formerly in the Christian world. In this work there is much more emphasis on conformity with the letter of the law in daily living, and juridical norms intended primarily for the direction of the judge in ecclesiastical court are applied inflexibly and without discrimination to the penitent. Our author considers the power of authority so binding that it can impose disabilities and special restraints on individuals without their consent. So, for instance, he thinks that young men and women are obliged to obey the will of their parents who have promised them in marriage or dedicated them to a monastery in childhood.

Actually Robert's treatise is one extreme example of a kind of zeal for reform which was very common in his day. More and more reformers in positions of authority at this time had been subjecting members of the Church to the judgment of its courts. This spirit is reflected throughout the Penitential in the author's high esteem for canonical precision. He is unwilling to let the penitent determine his own course of action when it is possible to give him precise directives on the basis of church law. A somewhat similar zeal is expressed in some of the enactments of the Fourth Lateran Council which met soon after the completion of his treatise. Several canons of this council are intended to reform Christian living through obedience to its own new, precise laws.

Thus Flamborough's treatise represents an important step in the development of the "moral theology" found in practical manuals of later centuries which, like Robert's work, were intended for the direction of confessors. In regard to this evolution, the present editor has given his attention solely to the continuity and contrast of this work with what preceded it, leaving others to investigate its effect on the development which followed.

Mediaevalia

METHODS IN THE STUDY OF OLD ENGLISH IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

MICHAEL MURPHY

The study of Old English began in the sixteenth century. This well known fact gives rise to the question as to how the earliest scholars of that period attained their knowledge of this "dead" language without the aid of grammars, dictionaries or readers. Laurence Nowell (c. 1514-76) who seems to have been the earliest pioneer in the study of OE, has left no account of his method of learning the language, or of the reasons that prompted him to take it up; but his assiduity in the study is attested by the fact that at one time or another he had in his hands a sizeable number of OE prose manuscripts and about half the total extant corpus of OE poetry.¹ Moreover he made his own glossary in the course of his studies, and a small part of it was published by his friend William Lambarde as a glossary to the latter's book *Archaionomia* (1568), a collection of Anglo-Saxon laws, which Nowell had also given him. The words in the *Archaionomia* were largely confined to terms of legal interest, and the rest of Nowell's glossary remained in manuscript.²

Contemporary with Lambarde and Nowell were two other prominent students of OE: Matthew Parker, Archbishop of Canterbury, and his secretary John Joscelyn. Together these two men edited a number of books in OE, or with sizeable OE extracts. One of these was *A Testimonie of Antiquitie* (1566), the first book ever printed in OE; it contained a homily and pastoral letters by Aelfric, for which the editors provided a translation. Another of their books was *The Gospels of the fower Evangelistes* (1571) in OE, accompanied by a translation from the recent Bishops' Bible. It had a preface by John Foxe the martyrologist, and was generally referred to as his edition, though Foxe acknowledges in the preface that it came from Parker. But much of the work for the antiquarian books published under Parker's aegis was done

¹ For details of his biography see Robin Flower, "Laurence Nowell and the Discovery of England in Tudor Times," *Proc. of Brit. Acad.* 21 (1935), 47-73, and the introduction to A. H. Marckwardt's edition of *Laurence Nowell's Vocabularium Saxonum* (Ann Arbor, 1952).

² R. J. Schoeck points out that more than two thirds of the Elizabethan Society of Antiquaries were lawyers; that a good deal of interest in OE (especially OE law) was generated in the Inns of Court by the *Archaionomia*, and that Lambarde was made an honorary benchler of Lincoln's Inn (1579) for his work. That the Inns were probably instrumental in interesting some members in the study of OE is suggested by the presence there in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of such men as Sir Henry and Sir John Spelman, Camden, Twysden, D'Ewes, all of whom developed a keen interest in OE. See R. J. Schoeck, "Early Anglo-Saxon Studies and Legal Scholarship in the Renaissance," *Studies in the Renaissance*, V (1958), 102-110; and "The Elizabethan Society of Antiquaries and Men of Law," *N&Q*, n.s. I (1954), 417-421, and 544.

by his secretary, who also compiled his own dictionary, and on a much larger scale than Nowell's.

The study of OE was continued into the seventeenth century by Richard Verstegan and William L'Isle. Verstegan's book, *A Restitution of Decayed Intelligence* (1605) pleaded for a return to the use of a "pure" English, and offered lists of "Saxon" words with etymologies which showed a considerable if imperfect knowledge of OE. More important for the present discussion is L'Isle who published an edition of two Aelfrician prefaces together with his own translation: *A Saxon Treatise Concerning the Old and New Testament* (1623). It is in the preface to this book that we come for the first time upon an extensive piece of evidence which sheds direct light on the question at issue. L'Isle gives an account of the way in which he became interested in OE, and of the remarkable method he followed in order to learn it. He became aware, he says, of the great monastic learning in the time of Bede and Alcuin:

The due consideration hereof first stirred up in me an earnest desire to know what learning lay hid in this old English tongue: for which I found out this uneasie way, first to acquaint my selfe a litle with the Dutch both high and low; the one by originale, the other by commerce allied: then to read a while for recreation all the old English I could finde, poetry or prose, of what matter soever. And divers good bookes of this kinde I got, that were never yet published in print; which ever the more ancient they were, I perceived they came neerer the Saxon: But the Saxon (as a bird, flying in the aire farther and farther, seems lesse and lesse;) the older it was, became harder to bee understood. At length I lighted on Virgil Scotished by the Reverend Gawin Dowglas Bishop of Dunkell, and uncle to the Earle of Angus; the best translation of that poet that I ever read: And though I found that dialect more hard than any of the former (as neerer the Saxon, because farther from the Norman) yet with help of the Latin I made shift to understand it, and read the booke more than once from the beginning to the end. Whereby I must confesse I got more knowledge of that I sought than by any of the other. For as at the Saxon Invasion many of the Britans, so at the Norman many of the Saxons fled into Scotland, preserving in that Realme unconquered, as the line Royale, so also the language, better than the Inhabitants here, under conqueror's law and custome, were able. Next then I read the decalogue &c. set out by Fraerus in common character, and so prepared came to the proper Saxon; which differeth but in seven or eight letters from the Pica Roman: and therein reading certaine sermons, and the foure Evangelists set out and Englished by Mr. Fox, so increased my skill, that at length (I thanke God) I found my selfe able (as it were to swimme without bladders) to understand the untranslated fragments of the tongue scattered in Master Cambden and others, by him some, and some by Sir Henry Savill set forth: as also those in Tho: of Walsingham, Caius and Lambard; with certaine old charters that I met with among the Kings Records, and in the Coucher-bookes of Monasteries; Yet still ventring not far from the shore. At last waxing more able through use, I tooke heart to put forth and dive into the deep among the meere Saxon monuments of my worthily respected kinsman Sir. H. Spelman, my honourable friend Sir. Rob. Cotton & of our Libraries in Cambridge. So far about went I for want of a guide, who now (Thanks be to God) am able to lead others a neerer way (Sign. c4^v-d1^r).³

³ Fraerus or Marquard Freher published *Decalogi, Orationes, Symboli* (1610); William Camden, *Remaines Concerning Britain* (1605); Henry Savile, *Rerum Anglicarum Scriptores* (1596); Thomas of Walsingham author of a number of medieval histories; John Caius, *De Antiquitate Cantabrigiensis* (1568 and 1574).

A little later in the preface L'Isle understandably complains that "We lacke but a Grammar which our Saxon ancestors neglected not, as appeares by that of this Aelfricus yet extant in many faire-written copies. The like if we had for the language of our time, it would give us occasion either in wording or in sentensing, the principale parts thereof, to looke backe a little into this outworne dialect of our forebers; which England hath kept best in writing, Scotland in speech" (Sign. e4v).

Allowing for quirks peculiar to L'Isle's own experience, this account should allow us to infer how earlier students acquired their knowledge of the language. It is certainly true that L'Isle is standing on the shoulders of his predecessors, but it seems fair to deduce that they pursued a method very similar to his, though they worked with MSS, while he had the benefit of some of their printed books; and they probably did not take such a remarkably circuitous route to their goal.

The investigations of Marckwardt and Rosier have unearthed the sources of the Nowell and Joscelyn dictionaries, and shown that these sources were very much the same: biblical translations and glosses, homilies, the Chronicle, Aelfric's grammar, Alfredian translations, the laws, and some separate Latin-Old English glosses.⁴ What should be noticed here is that, leaving out of consideration even the special cases of Aelfric's grammar and the glosses, almost all of these texts had versions available in the sixteenth century, either in Latin or in English, in manuscript or in print. The homilies constitute the most notable exception; the Latin originals of the Aelfrician homilies had perished — had indeed been destroyed, the editors of *A Testimonie* claimed, by post-Conquest Roman Catholics who "coult not well broke" some of the doctrine contained in them.⁵

Such very paraphrastic OE translations as the Alfredian versions of Bede and Orosius, or Aelfric's version of the Old Testament could, of course, be extremely treacherous for a beginner. But a glossed Psalter or Gospel was somewhat safer, as the glossing form gives less scope for paraphrase, although these also would have to be used with care as they were not always literally word for word either.⁶ Certainly some application with these biblical texts would have yielded enough knowledge of grammar and vocabulary to make an observant sixteenth century student aware of gaps and paraphrases.⁷ He would note, without needing King Alfred's specific warning, that Anglo-Saxon translators sometimes rendered their originals literally, sometimes according to the general sense. Relieved of such uncertainties and the awkwardness of working with manuscripts, the method still holds good. Any modern

⁴ A. H. Marckwardt, "The Sources of Laurence Nowell's *Vocabularium Saxonium*," *SP*, 45 (1948), 36; and J. L. Rosier, "The Sources of John Joscelyn's *Old English-Latin Dictionary*," *Anglia*, 78 (1960), 39. See also Rosier's "Lexicographical Genealogy in Old English," *JEGP*, 65, (1966), 295-302.

⁵ *A Testimonie*, fol. 5 (Huntington Library copy); for differences in the various "issues" of this book, and for some reference to its polemical motivation, see J. Bromwich, "The First Book Printed in Anglo-Saxon Types," *Trans. of Cambridge Biblio. Soc.*, Vol. 3, Pt. iv (1962), 265-291.

⁶ For a convenient account of the varying degrees of care taken, and the amount of liberty allowed themselves, by the different Anglo-Saxon glossators of biblical books see M. K. Morrell, *A Manual of Old English Biblical Materials* (Knoxville, 1965) and the important bibliographies in this invaluable work.

⁷ It is interesting to note the suggestion of Kenneth Sisam that the OE biblical glosses were originally intended as "one practical way of helping the clergy to understand the [Latin] psalms that were so constantly on their lips," *RES*, 7 (1956), 128 — the precise reverse of the process which I try to outline in this paper.

student who has begun with the most frequently used reader-grammars has also probably started his reading of genuine OE with Bible texts.

Although by the early seventeenth century there was a certain amount of printed material which could be used by students to learn OE, the process was still an "uneasy" one, for neither of the dictionaries compiled by Nowell and Joscelyn had been printed and, as L'Isle had complained, there was still no grammar. In spite of these difficulties some determined scholars persisted with such success that several other books in or about OE were published before the mid-century. Besides the books by Lambarde, Parker and Joscelyn, and L'Isle there were now Sir Henry Spelman's *Archaeologus* (1626), a glossary of OE law terms; an OE Psalter by Spelman's son John (1640); another and better edition of the Gospels by Junius and Marshall (1665); and Abraham Wheloc's edition of the OE version of Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* with the Latin in parallel columns (1643). In a second edition of the *Ecclesiastical History* (1644) Wheloc incorporated a second issue of *Archaionomia*, as well as an edition of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle with a Latin translation. Finally William Somner's *Dictionarium Saxonico-Latino-Anglicum* (1659) provided the first major help in reducing the labor of learning OE by the old method.

That these and later scholars used the texts of their predecessors to learn OE, as L'Isle had done with both manuscripts and books, is put beyond conjecture by an interesting study plan suggested by George Hickes, the greatest OE scholar of his day. In the preface to his *Institutiones Grammaticae Anglo-Saxonicae* (1689), the first OE grammar, he outlined a course of study for beginners (sign. C2^v) which he updated in his *Thesaurus* (1705). One should first read the grammar, and then:

As soon as possible take up the reading of the Saxon Gospels which Thomas Marshall published at Dordrecht and which are more correct than those of Foxe, as well as being much more appropriate for students. When these have been easily mastered you may proceed to the Saxon Psalms published by John Spelman. When you have construed a considerable part of this you can go on with hope and courage to the Saxon Heptateuch which my friend Edward Thwaites published in a faultless edition at Oxford. After that you may proceed in due order to reading the short dissertation by Aelfric on the Old and New Testaments, and the same author's Paschal Homily. Then you can set out to read King Alfred's paraphrase version of Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* than which neither Caesar nor Cicero, in their more muted manner, ever wrote anything more perfect. From this you may go on without fear to that other paraphrastic translation done by the same king or by bishop Werferth of Worcester: I refer to the books on the Consolation of Philosophy by An. Man. Sev. Boethius, which Christopher Rawlinson, a scion of the Plantagenets, published most accurately at Oxford. When you have read this you can easily run through the Canons and Laws which Henry Spelman published in the first volume of Councils. From there you can proceed with the highest expectations to the *Archaionomia* which Lambarde published or preferably to the edition of it which Wheloc republished (Pref. Sign. p2^v. My translation).

All of the works mentioned here were in print, not in some crabbed MS hand, and all had translations available. The most noticeable omission is any reference to Somner's *Dictionarium*, though Hickes must have been assuming its use. Even with Somner's dictionary a beginner without the prodigious energy and enthusiasm of Hickes might well have found his program less than seductive;⁸ but it must represent

⁸ See W. B. Gardner, "George Hickes" (unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1946), 155-156 and 407 for references to the remarkable speed with which Hickes mastered OE.

fairly well the kind of system that Hickes himself followed, though he, of course, had no grammar provided for him.

Further corroborative evidence of this method of learning OE is provided in a short autobiographical statement by Elizabeth Elstob, a friend and protégée of Hickes, who herself published work in OE, including a shorter version of Hickes's *Institutiones*, translated into English, and adapted, rather optimistically, for the use of young ladies.⁹ Having shown an interest, she says, in the Alfredian *Orosius* which her brother William intended to publish, she learned the alphabet, and noticed similarities between OE and modern English, particularly the resemblance of some OE forms to terms still in use when she was a child in Northumberland. "With this the kind encourager of my studies being very well pleased, recommended to me the Saxon Heptateuch, most accurately published by Mr. Thwaites [1698]. The matter of that book being very well known and familiar to me, made the reading of it very easy and agreeable: and led me on to the reading of several other treatises..."¹⁰

Elizabeth had in addition the two invaluable learning tools of grammar and dictionary which had not been available to her predecessors of the period before Hickes and Somner; these students had had to labor along with the old method if they had the tenacity. Sir Roger Twysden, for example, writing to Sir William Dugdale in 1658, confesses that he is no hand at OE, but indicates that he might learn some from missals and prayer books in OE and Latin; if not, "I will be content to stay till Mr. Somner's Dictionary come out." About ten years before this Dugdale had made much the same confession and resolution, though he was at that time in vain hopes that Sir Symonds D'Ewes would produce a dictionary he had promised.¹¹

Somner's dictionary had been long in coming, but a satisfactory work was probably not possible sooner, though the publication of Joscelyn's dictionary would certainly have eased somewhat the labors of earlier scholars. Many of them had had to make their own glossaries, or to copy those of their predecessors. Somner was an able scholar, and had had experience helping D'Ewes with the latter's proposed dictionary; and he had the foundations of others on which to build. He frankly acknowledges his debt to the collections of earlier scholars which his contemporaries handed over to him.

If Hickes's grammar was even later in coming, a more adequate scholar could hardly have been found for the task in the seventeenth century. His work was much more a pioneering effort than Somner's, but he too had a debt to his predecessors in the study of Old English.

In addition to these self-teaching aids some instruction in OE was available at the universities from time to time. Wheloc was the first holder of an Anglo-Saxon lectureship established at Cambridge by Sir Henry Spelman about 1639. Wheloc is best known for the work published while he held this post, but he appears to have had some students too.¹² Somner succeeded him in the stipend from the lectureship, but did not teach at the university, and after the publication of his dictionary at Oxford, the centre of OE studies shifted there. The great philologist Francis Junius settled

⁹ *The Rudiments of Grammar for the English-Saxon Tongue* (London, 1715).

¹⁰ *An English-Saxon Homily on the Birth-Day of St. Gregory* (London, 1709), Pref. pp. vi-vii.

¹¹ *Life, Diary and Correspondence of Sir William Dugdale*, ed. W. Hamper (London, 1827), 336-7, 195, 197.

¹² See F. L. Utley, "Two Anglo-Saxon Poems," *MLQ*, 3 (1942), 243-261.

at Oxford a couple of years before his death, and his friend and collaborator on the OE edition of the Gospels, Thomas Marshall, had become Rector of Lincoln College where George Hickes was also a fellow. The Provost of Queen's College, Gerard Langbaine (d. 1659), and his successor, Thomas Barlow, were also interested in OE studies. It seems highly likely, therefore, that there was some unofficial teaching of OE at the university even before the establishment of a lectureship at Queen's in 1679. The founder of this lectureship, Sir Joseph Williamson, had been a student and fellow of Queen's in Langbaine's time, and had himself studied OE sufficiently to attempt writing OE verse.¹³ The first holder of the lectureship, William Nicolson, taught OE every Wednesday in term time for about three years. Even after his departure Queen's College continued to produce OE scholars, notably Edmund Gibson and Edward Thwaites. Indeed when Thwaites entered in 1689 the college was reputed to be a "nest of Saxonists."¹⁴ As well as publishing work in OE himself, and helping Hickes with his *Thesaurus*, Thwaites taught the language, and by 1698-99 was complaining about the shortage of copies of Somner's dictionary: he had only one to go around among fifteen students, so he helped publish smaller and cheaper editions of Somner's dictionary and Hickes's grammar.¹⁵ It was also one of his students, Christopher Rawlinson, who published the OE edition of Boethius to which Hickes refers in his study plan.

Thus, in the latter half of the seventeenth century learning OE may still have been "uneasy," but with a dictionary and a grammar, with a sizeable number of printed editions of OE works and some personal instruction, the path was not now "so far about for want of a guide."

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¹³ See A. Turner, "Another Anglo-Saxon Poem," *MLQ*, 9 (1948), 389-393.

¹⁴ John Nichols, *Literary Anecdotes of the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1812-16), 4, 141.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 141, 146.

LANGUAGE AND THEME IN THE TOWNELEY MAGNUS HERODES

CHARLES ELLIOTT

In the Introduction to his edition of *The Wakefield Pageants in the Towneley Cycle*, A. C. Cawley interestingly discusses the use of language made by the apparent author of these plays.¹ His summarizing comment indicates the main reference of the discussion, namely to the device of juxtaposition, whereby comic and serious elements are so brought into relationship as to express the playwright's "Christian interpretation of life."² But the dramatist's linguistic resource seems to be not merely of this kind; it manifests as well a verbal profundity which is characteristic of the only "personality" among the English medieval playwrights. The following note attempts briefly to indicate this faculty with reference to one of the relevant plays, the *Magnus Herodes*, in which the Herod theme is given perhaps its most subtle and individual treatment.

The text provides illustrations of verbal anachronism which functions thematically. Herod swears "by Gottys dere nals" (1.116) that he will no longer hold his peace, so vexed is he with the news of a lad who will "sesse his stall" (1.111). The invoking of God, whose Son is to die by nails, ironically articulates the values rejected by Herod's attitude and actions. In this particular context, the pre-figuring type of Antichrist expletively relies on Christ's sacrifice yet to come. Later, enraged by the prophecy told him by his counsellors, Herod promises "mede... by Cokys dere bonys!" (1.228). Here again is oblique inter-penetration of opposed scales of values. The agitation in him has been produced precisely by the imminence of "Cokys dere bonys", the saving Son of the Father; and His "mede", which will both preserve and punish, is to be "dere" to the crucified giver of it, to those who will achieve bliss from it, and to those who will come by bale by it.

As well, the play on occasion demonstrates an allusiveness and ambiguity of diction serving, like the anachronisms, to juxtapose clashing "metaphysics". Early in the pageant *Nuncius* commands:

Carpys of no kyng
Bot Herode, that lordyng. (II.33-34)

The "kingship" of the imminent Christ is not defined, and the allusion remains sufficiently vague to be interpreted as a "political threat" to Herod, thus providing a simple, direct motivation for his fears. Yet almost immediately the ambiguity is startlingly exploited by the playwright in order to provide a daring point of irony. *Nuncius*, in stating Herod's titles, is made to utter a burlesque of the attributes of the Deity:

He is kyng of kyngys, kyndly I knowe,
Chefe lord of lordynges, chefe leder of law. (II.37-38)

¹ Old and Middle English Texts (Manchester, 1958), pp. xxvii-xxx. Quotations from *Magnus Herodes* are taken from this edition.

² *Ibid.*, xxx.

The lines go beyond the conventional indication of Herod as a ranting, claiming character. They make up marked irony because, already in the play, the Magi (figures of earthly potency) have yielded homage to the child-king. The verses also boldly magnify the opposition of Herod to the New Dispensation, for traditionally Satan is regarded as *simia Dei*,³ while central in the theme of Antichrist is a blasphemous imitation of Christ.⁴ This allusive, oblique technique is used again in another remark by *Nuncius*:

He is the worthiest of all barnes that ar borne;
Fre men ar his thrall, ful teynfully torne. (II.55-56)

Here the first line is decidedly ambiguous. Directly taken, it refers to Herod, but the conditioning function of "worthiest", "barnes" and "borne" allows it meaning also as an allusion to Christ. The second verse is, at one level, secularly ironic; "fre" contradicts "thrall," and he who en-thralls the free has just been termed "worthiest". At another level, it is a parodying of Christ's attributes, which free His believers yet en-servant them. Thus the statement is ignominiously true of Herod but gloriously so of Christ, of whom he is a counterfeit. Similar is the comment by *I Consultus* immediately before the slaughter is planned:

... if ye do as I meyn
He shall dy on a spere. (II.251-252)

Death by the spear signifies not merely the brute putting-down of the "lad", but as well prefigures the dying by the spear of Longinus of the "knafe" who lives on as Christ.

Further, the pageant provides instances of excessive, intensifying pejoration. In the encounter between slaughtering soldiers and the mothers, 2 *Miles* addresses the second woman as "thou old stry" (1.348) and then "bawd" (1.354). And 3 *Miles* uses "stry" of the third (1.380). Such are conventional terms of abuse used by the "dogmatic" opposers of the innocent. Yet they are coloured and warped by an earlier utterance, namely the first of these railing ejaculations. "What, hoore, are thou woode?" asks *Miles of I Mulier* (1.340). Here is applied, by the doer of a brute action, the criterion of sanity to the attitude of a mother resisting the slaying of her child. Thus the soldiers are shown to be not merely "dogmatic", but committed by vitiated reason to their desperate tasks.

Of such verbal profundity the other versions of the Herod play show little. In the eighth Chester play, Herod makes claim to cosmic potency.⁵ Yet while he declares himself "king of kinges" (1.161), his following reference ("I Tyrant," 1.163) robs his whole utterance of irony. In the Coventry *Pageant of the Shearmen and Taylors* similar limitless claims are made by Herod; but the allusions to "Magog and Madroke" (1.490), "Mahownd" (1.516) and "Jubytor" (1.517) give the entire speech an *outré* quality.⁶ The various treatments of the massacre-episode would seem, at first sight,

³ See M. Rudwin, *The Devil in Legend and Literature* (Chicago, 1931), 40, for a reference to iconographical representation of a three-headed Satan — the Trinity inverted.

⁴ See, e.g., Br. L. Lucken, *Antichrist and the Prophets of Antichrist in the Chester Cycle* (Washington, 1940), 76.

⁵ *The Chester Plays*, ed. H. Deimling (Vol. I: E.E.T.S., E.S., 62, reprint 1959).

⁶ *Two Coventry Corpus Christi Plays*, ed. H. Craig (E.E.T.S., E.S., 87, 2nd ed., 1957).

to yield more fruitful comparison, for the incident is delimited by tradition and must find room for a confrontation, of one kind or another, between slayers and mothers of the slaughtered. The York play includes the rhetorical address by *I Miles* to the lamenting women: "False wicchis, are ye woode?" (l.221).⁷ But their comparative passivity, which finds outlet in grief rather than in action, deprives the question of the subtlety it achieves when delivered to the different mothers in Towneley. In the Chester version a degree of thematic confusion is present which harasses the final impression. On the one hand is the darkening stress coming from the slaying of Herod's own son among all the others; on the other, the interchanges of soldiers and women descend to near-farce, and the reactions of the latter lack the "realism" found in the corresponding area of the Digby massacre-play.⁸ There the mothers pray that Herod shall be eternally damned. Yet here again is thematic disjunction, for the characterization of Watkyn disturbs, over-rides and jostles with the "sentence" potentially present in Herod's death on-stage. The Hegge play takes the massacre-incident in quite a straight fashion, and the supreme and lasting impression comes from the dramatic entry of Mors and the despatching of Herod.¹⁰ In the relevant episode of the Coventry play there is no subtlety arising from variation on the stock attitude of soldiers towards mothers, at least not in their actual encounter.¹¹ However, immediately after the killings, *I* and *II Miles* disrupt the "dogmatism" of Herod and his aiders, the first declaring:

For thys grett wreyche that here ys done
I feyre moche wengance ther-off woll cum. (ll.875-876)

And the second:

Wherefore to the kyng lett vs goo,
For he ys lyke to beyre the perell,
Wyche wasse the cawser that we did soo. (ll.878-880)

This particular issue of potential comparison results, then, in manifest contrast, by which is emphasized the individuality of the "Wakefield Master", who uses his language subtly and daringly while preserving consistency in the articulation of his theme.

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⁷ See Play XIX in *York Plays*, ed. L. T. Smith (1885).

⁸ Play X.

⁹ *Candlemas Day. Herod's Killing of the Children*. See *Digby Plays*, ed. F. J. Furnivall (E.E.T.S., E.S., 70, 1896).

¹⁰ *The Massacre of the Innocents: the Death of Herod*. See *Ludus Coventriae or the Plaie called Corpus Christi*, ed. K. S. Block (E.E.T.S., E.S., 120, 1922). The cycle is now generally called "Hegge."

¹¹ See Note 6 above.

WOLFRAM'S *LAPSIT EXILLIS* (PARZIVAL IX, 469)

CHARLES R. DAHLBERG AND PETER SALUS

A further contribution to the recent spate of comment on Wolfram's *lapsit exillis* (Parzival IX, 469, 7) may be justified if it rests upon accepted manuscript readings, if it accords with the development of Wolfram's poem, and if it relates to traditions of thought basic to Wolfram's subject.¹ In fact, we suggest that the reading *lapsit exillis* of MS D (St. Gall) be accepted;² that the phrase be interpreted as "It fell among conditions of exile"; that this interpretation accords with the roles of Anfortas and Parzival and with the situation of Munsalvaesche; and that these elements of Wolfram's poem are best seen in the light of traditional attitudes on the subject of the Fall and Christian redemption.

If we assume *exillis* in MS D to be an ablative plural of *exilium*, we may read *lapsit exillis* as "It fell among conditions of exile."³ This reading may be supported on the assumption of an *i-l* confusion or a variant spelling (*-lli-* for *-lii-*), either being an easy assumption on paleographical grounds, particularly in manuscripts of this period.⁴

Lapsit as a Late Latin perfect causes no difficulty,⁵ and the meaning "conditions of exile" is a clear enough reading for *exilliis*; "among exiles" as an alternative, complementary reading is supported by Tacitus's use of the plural *exilliis* as a figure for *exulis*.⁶ Medieval Christian developments of the idea of exile support this meaning.

¹ A survey of the proposed readings and explanations of *lapsit exillis* is that of Joachim Bumke, *Wolfram von Eschenbach*, Sammlung Metzler, No. 36 (Stuttgart, 1964), 65-67. Items not included by Bumke are P. W. Tax, "*Felix culpa* und *lapsit exillis*: Wolframs *Parzival* und die Liturgie," *MLN*, 80 (1965), 454-469; Henry and Renée Kahane in collaboration with Angeline Pietrangeli, *The Krater and the Grail: Hermetic Sources of the Parzival*, Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, No. 56 (Urbana, Illinois, 1965), 109f., 170, 172; H. Kolb, *Munsalvaesche: Studien zum Kyotproblem* (Munich, 1963), 125, 176f. For this last reference we are indebted to Professor Tax.

² The variant readings are listed in *Wolfram von Eschenbach* I, ed. Karl Lachmann, 7th ed. rev. E. Hartl (Berlin, 1952), 226.

³ The ablative in *-lis* is noted in *Thesaurus linguae latinae* (*ThLL*), V, 2 (Leipzig, 1931-1953), 1484, 35.

⁴ For the paleography of the various *Parzival* MSS, see Francis J. Nock, *The Parzival Manuscript Gk*, Ottendorfer Memorial Series of Germanic Monographs, No. 22 (New York, 1935), 4-12; Nock specifically mentions misspellings and scribal misunderstandings involving *l* on pp. 11f.

⁵ On the Latin perfect in *-it*, see Manu Leumann, *Lateinische Laut- und Formenlehre*, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, II.2.1 (Munich, 1963), 337f.; for the shortening of the vowel to *-i* (especially after Plautus), *ibid.*, 103.

⁶ See Lewis-Short, *Latin Dictionary*, p. 702b, s.v. *exsiliū*, *exiliū*, where they cite Tacitus's "plenum exsiliis mare" (*Hist.* I, 2). For medieval usage of the ablative singular to indicate place or condition, see *ThLL*, 5, 1489, 81-83. For the ablative in the locative sense, see Leumann, p. 280, and J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinische Syntax und Stylistik*, rev. Anton Szantyr, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, II.2.2 (Munich, 1965), 145-148. The stylistic use of *exilium* "place of exile" is discussed on p. 750.

Exilium was used of the expulsion from Paradise after the Fall; in certain contexts, it became almost a synonym for *lapsus*.⁷ The word was also used to mean the punishment of expulsion, and thus it came to mean "earthly life" or "this present life."⁸ In this sense it accords with the familiar Augustinian-Boethian figure of life as an exile from or a pilgrimage toward one's true home or native country.

This group of meanings relates to Wolfram's poem principally through the idea of a fall and of Munsalvaesche as an appropriate place of exile. In Book V, Parzival finds the wounded Anfortas at the Grail Castle on Munsalvaesche, in the Terre de Salvaesche. After he fails to ask the right question, Parzival awakens to find the castle deserted. As he rides forth, he meets Sigune (V, 250), who identifies the country as a wild region where "inner dr̄zec m̄len wart nie versniten / ze keinem b̄we holz noch stein: / wan ein burc diu st̄t al ein."⁹ This description places the Grail Castle in a wilderness, readily identifiable in Christian tradition with this earth or this life. Sigune's point that the castle is "erden wunsches r̄che" (V, 250, 25) further strengthens this identification. The names Munsalvaesche and Terre de Salvaesche also establish the wilderness motif. Thus Munsalvaesche, with its conditions of exile, is appropriate as the place where the Grail stone fell: *lapsit exillis*.¹⁰

Trevrizent tells Parzival of this inscription in Book IX, 469, in a passage rich in associations with the idea of a fall. The passage constitutes an important stage in Parzival's spiritual instruction, and it serves to link Anfortas and Parzival by means of Trevrizent's teaching; further, it gives significance to the major themes of Parzival's development: love, sorrow and joy, and the "brave man slowly wise." (I, 4, 18).

The most important connection with the theme of a fall lies in the time and place, on Good Friday at the Fontane de Salvatsche, the Fountain of Salvation which complements Munsalvaesche, the savage mountain, for it is here that Parzival receives the instruction that provides the remedy for the shame that he incurred at the Grail Castle when he failed to ask Anfortas "herre, wie st̄t iuwer n̄t?" (IX, 484, 27).

Trevrizent's Good Friday instruction refers explicitly to the first fall of mankind and is based upon the traditional background of the fall of the angels, led by Lucifer (IX, 463). After the fall of Adam and Eve comes that of Cain (IX, 464). But God, like Cain, "selbe antlitze h̄t genomen / n̄ch der ̄rsten megede vruht." (IX, 464, 28f.). Thus, says Trevrizent,

von Ad̄mes k̄nne
huop sich r̄uwe und w̄nne
s̄t er uns sippe lougent niht,

⁷ *ThLL*, 5, 1486, 44-52.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 52-57.

⁹ We quote throughout from the edition of Albert Leitzmann, *Altdeutsche Textbibliothek*, Nos. 12-14 (Tubingen, 1955-1961).

¹⁰ Recently, Kolb, 176f., has suggested that the stone is really *lapis exilii* "stone of exile," where the exile is that of the Schekinah after the destruction of the Temple, and interprets Munsalvaesche and Terre de Salvaesche in this light (133-135): they are the places of exile of the guardians of the Schekinah who are awaiting the rebuilding of the Temple and the reunification of the Jews. Kolb derives *salvaesche* from Latin *salvagiū* and *salvatsche* from Latin **salva(t)ge*, an adjectival form from *silvaticus*. As French invariably lost post-tonic, intervocalic *-t-*, these derivations would seem to violate certain precepts of historical linguistics. We cannot concur with Professor Kolb's view, preferring here a more traditional approach.

den ieslich engel ob im siht,
 und daz diu sippe ist sünde wagen,
 sô daz wir sünde müezen tragen.
 dar über erbarme sich das kraft,
 dem erbarme gît geselleschaft,
 sit sîn getriuwiu mennischeit
 mit triuwen gein untriuwe streit,
 in sult ûf in verkiesen.
 welt ir saelde niht verliesen,
 lât wandel iu vür sünde bi. (IX, 465, 1-13)

This passage identifies Parzival's atonement as the task of redemption that must follow his earlier fall and as a task patterned after that of Christ's atonement on the Cross.

The Crucifixion was traditionally understood as the complement of the fall of Adam; in fact, this understanding is basic to the medieval practice of seeing the Old Testament as a prefiguration of the New, a practice encouraged by St. Paul, who called Adam "a figure of him who was to come" (Rom. v. 14) and who refers to the Passover in saying (I Cor. v. 7) that "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." Thus Adam's degradation contrasts with Christ's glory and parallels Christ's humiliation. As Erich Auerbach points out, the Fall "is the starting point of the Christian drama of redemption," and the combination of the humble and the sublime "is a very old Christian motif" which "comes to life again in the theological and particularly the mystic literature of the twelfth century. In Bernard of Clairvaux and the Victorines it occurs frequently."¹¹ Wolfram, writing only a short time later, quite clearly reflects the *humilitas-sublimitas* theme in the development of his major character, Parzival, and in Trevrizent's observation that "von Adâmes künne / huop sich riuwe und wünne."

Anfortas's story constitutes a further reflection of Adam's fall and the theme of humility, for in his pride he served Orgeluse (IX, 478; XII, 616), and *Amor* — "swelh grâles herre ab minne gert / anders dan diu schrift in wert" — was his battle cry.

"Eins tages," says Trevrizent,
 ...der künec al eine reit
 daz was gar den sînen leit
 ûz durch âventiure
 durch vreude an minnen stiure: ...
 mit einem gelüpeten sper
 wart er ze tjosieren wunt,
 sô daz er nimmer mêr gesunt
 wart, der süeze oheim dîn,
 durch die heidruose sîn. (IX, 479, 3-6; 8-12)

This wound can be healed through Parzival's atonement, for just as Christ, in descending ("falling") to assume human form, redeemed the fall of Adam, so Par-

¹¹ Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis* (Bern, 1946), 148f.; trans. Willard Trask (New York, 1957), pp. 131f. Both Bernard and his close friend and contemporary Guillaume de Saint-Thierry associated the image of exile with that of the land of unlikeness, the human condition after the Fall. See Saint Bernard, *Sermo XXVII in Cantica canticorum*, PL, 183, 916A; Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, *Meditativae orationes*, IV, PL, 180, 216 B-D.

zival, in asking the question, heals Anfortas's wound, the result of a fall, and at the same time redeems his own previous failure. The Good Friday scene with Trevrizent conveys this instruction, and the account of the Grail reinforces this interpretation.¹²

There can be no doubt of the stone's heavenly origin, and in any but a textual sense the idea of a stone from heaven (*lapis ex caelis*) is relevant.¹³ The inscription *lapsit exillis*, referring to the stone's fall (*it fell among conditions of exile*) reflects the divine origin of Christ, Who descended to earth in human form, and the falls as well of Adam, Anfortas, and Parzival. The stone reflects both the Fall and the Redemption, for, says Trevrizent, "von des steines kraft der fênis / verbrinnet, daz er zaschen wirt: / diu asche im aber leben birt." (IX, 469, 8-10). The phoenix had long been associated with Christ as Redeemer, particularly in the parallels with the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. But the stone's closest connection with the Redemption lies, of course, in the fact that on each Good Friday "ein tûbe von himele swinget, / ûf den stein diu bringet / ein kleine wize oblât." (IX, 470, 3-5). This use of the symbol of the descent of the Holy Spirit upon Christ conveys beyond any doubt Wolfram's intent to link Christ's redemption with Parzival's task.

The phrase *lapsit exillis*, then, with the significance "It fell into conditions of exile," offers several advantages over the various alternative suggestions. Without rejecting the semantic validity of many of the *lapis* readings, it gives them a firmer textual and intellectual basis. The *lapsit* reading embraces the motifs of heavenly origin, the *felix culpa*, and the idea of the stone of humility; the word *exillis* suggests both the humility of the post-lapsarian condition (the land of unlikeness) and the sublimity of the paradise lost through the Fall. This humility-sublimity confrontation is central to the idea of *felix culpa* and therefore to fallen man. The phrase thus suggests the stone's origin and purpose, that of redemption through love. In reflecting these themes, the inscription becomes clearly germane to the development of Parzival as a character, "a brave man, slowly wise," and to the theme of redemption as a whole.

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¹² Cf. Tax, 456-462.

¹³ Cf. *ibid.*, 462-464.

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